

THE OUTLINE OF KNOWLEDGE

EDITED BY
JAMES A. RICHARDS

THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

BY ARTHUR DONALD INNES



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THE EARLY CIVILIZATIONS AND EMPIRES

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

I.—Prolegomena

UNTIL the last fifty years, the great majority of people, and indeed of all professedly Christian populations, were brought up in the belief that the career of mankind upon our planet began in the year 4004 B.C. Fifty years ago men had by no means recovered from the shock of the promulgation of the Darwinian theory, which, as far as our present purposes are concerned, meant that Man had been evolved out of a lower animal form in the slow course of many thousands of years. It was still the general belief that the entire race of mankind was descended from the patriarch Noah, who with his family alone survived a universal deluge which submerged the world not much more than four thousand years ago, a belief crystallized in such terms as "antediluvian." We have since learned to readjust our ideas and to recognize that Christianity does not require us to accept unquestioned, the chronology of the Old Testament; that spiritual truths are not inextricably bound up with any particular theory of the material cosmogony, the process by which the material universe came into being; and the most orthodox can accept the doctrine of evolution not as contradictory of the statement that the Almighty created Man in His own image, but as a new and intelligible interpretation of it.

Having once recognized that the value of the Hebrew Scriptures

is not vitiated by the acknowledgment that human errors have found their way into the text, we no longer have qualms about accepting historical evidence of facts which are not to be reconciled with the details of the Hebrew tradition. Our grandfathers accepted the Hebrew records as axiomatic, verbally inspired, not open to criticism. We have learned to regard them as valuable evidence in matters of history, but still as evidence which must be tested by the same criteria as any other records.

As history, distinguishable from legend, the Hebrew record begins in the nineteenth century B.C. with the grandfather of Jacob (or Israel the eponymous hero of the Israelites), Abraham, the contemporary of that great Mesopotamian monarch, Khammurabi, who appears in the Hebrew Scriptures as Amraphel, King of Shinar, the first indubitably historical character of the Bible. But the researches of the last seventy years have proved beyond all possibility of doubt that at least fifteen hundred years—a millennium and a half—before Abraham and Khammurabi, there was an advanced and highly-organized civilization both in the Nile valley and in the Euphrates valley, and that the inhabitants of those regions, who have left actual contemporary records of their doings not reconcilable with the Hebrew legend of the Flood, must have passed out of the stage of pure barbarism many hundreds and perhaps some thousands of years earlier.

It is the object of the present work to set forth in brief the story of the development of civilization in organized communities from the earliest times in which we have positive records for such a reconstruction, and to carry it down to the present day—a period which, roughly speaking, covers something over six thousand years. Before entering upon our main task, however, it will be useful to devote a few pages to prehistoric Man—to questions concerning him the answers to which are not derivable from conscious records. For before he could construct records he had already attained to something which must definitely be called civilization—the assertion of the mastery of the human race over nature, its self-subjection to law, and the development of law as the means to obtaining the highest welfare of the community at large.

II.—*Primitive Man*

That Man, endowed with speech, handling tools, aiming missiles, and using fire, originally improved himself out of an animal akin to the great apes is certain. That he existed tens of thousands of years ago with a brain capacity which distinguished him as Man from any ape is also certain; his bones are found preserved from an age which unquestionably preceded the last Glacial period when Europe was

an Arctic region. He achieved his mastery over nature and over the rest of the animal creation, in spite of inferior physical strength and endurance, by discovering that he could use tools and could use fire, which no other animal ever did. The rest of the animals, it may be said, have never made anything except shelters for themselves and for their winter provisions. But discovered that he could make fire his servant, and that he could do things with a stone or a stick in his hand which otherwise were much more difficult to accomplish.

The first differentiating step had been made when he grasped that fact, and the next came when he found that he could improve upon the stone or stick which he picked up and increase its utility. The weaving and plastering which other animals as well as himself had used for housebuilding provided him with a basis for the development of other arts, especially when he found that clay could be baked hard. Man became a potter. His sticks and stones became hatchets and javelins, and he became a hunter. He found that he could plant things and make them grow where he wanted them instead of having to seek for them, and became an agriculturist. He found that there were animals which he could tame and keep within reach to provide him with food and clothing, and he became a herdsman. Whether he was still in the animal stage when he discovered the advantage of co-operation and became a dweller in communities we do not know—that was a discovery made by many other animals. But when men had reached the stage of dwelling together in communities, fighting their enemies and capturing prey with weapons, adapting nature to their own use by means of tools, keeping herds and growing cereals, they were well on the way to acquiring civilization.

When and how Man acquired the most distinctive of all human attributes—articulate speech, as opposed to mere variety of intonation which accompanied that power, and the vast increase of experience which he gained by it all the members of the community could throw their own experiences into the common stock by narrating them, must have given him an enormous immediate advantage over his competitors in the struggle for livelihood while he was still only a jungle-dweller.

When desiring to break things, Man used the stone as a hammer, a thing *with* which he struck instead of only a thing *on* which he struck, he had perhaps become definite by Man; certainly he had done so when he first began to use fire and when he first began to use edged stones for cutting and shaping things as well as for breaking them. Fire, the flint chisel or axe, and the flint weapon, made him an embryo manufacturer, able also to fight at an advantage against beasts stronger and swifter than himself. He had started on his

career as conqueror; he had crossed the line which distinguishes him from the beasts; he was indubitably primitive Man. In whatever stratum of the earth's surface we can find indubitably human bones, or shaped flints, or things made by shaped flints, or things made with fire, we know that in that place primitive Man existed at a time when that particular stratum was the top stratum; though geologists may differ on the question of how many tens of thousands of years have elapsed since that time. But what we do know in consequence is that primitive Man was in existence in different parts of Europe and in the Indian Archipelago tens of thousand of years ago; and there are portions of the earth's surface where primitive Man—Man who has no tools except such as are made of stone and bone and wood—still exists, regions where he has not discovered the use of metal. In the first stone-tool stage he was "palæolithic," in the second improved stage he was "neolithic."

Man when he has discovered the use of metal is primitive Man no longer; till then his progress has been limited by the inefficiency of his tools. The metal-using race is infinitely better armed for the conflict both with human competitors and with nature, and the conquering races are those which can turn metal to the best account. Man, in short, progresses not only by adapting himself to his environment, but by adapting his environment to himself; and metal provides him with a means to that end infinitely superior to any which he possessed before he learnt to use it. The use of metal carries him out of the really primitive stage; his communities become permanent settlements with a continuous development. We are well within what may be properly called the historic period before another discovery gives immediate superiority to the peoples who have improved upon the use of the earlier known softer metals, copper and bronze, and have learnt to use weapons and tools of iron.

Primitive Man has no history, because he leaves no conscious record of his doings. History begins only when Man has progressed sufficiently to erect permanent buildings and to decorate them with pictorial representations of his doings; more definitely when he has begun to use the pictorial art not only to represent events or portraits but to symbolize sounds, when figures stand for words—that is to say, when writing has been invented. Mural pictures or inscriptions are the earliest historical documents. With the movable records engraved on tablet cylinder the era of Books has begun. But it is not till a later stage that the inquirer sits down to compile from oral tradition and the dubious interpretation of ancient records a story of the past.

We may confidently anticipate that the still very youthful science of anthropology will presently enable us to arrive at very much more certain conclusions than has been possible as yet as to the nature of

primitive societies. But it may be taken as proved, or at least as a probable working hypothesis, that every community regarded its members as of one kin having a common ancestor, and counted certain other communities as being also akin, the common rule being that husband and wife must not be born members of the same community, but that mating was confined to the single group of communities. Their does not appear to be anywhere a trace of sexual community, though plenty of polygamy, which allowed one man many wives, and some of polyandry, which allowed one woman many husbands.

In the community acting for most purposes as a unit, the appropriation to each other of the particular male and the particular female, and consequently of offspring to parents, would tend to generate the two ideas of the family as a unit and of individual ownership, blending in the ideas of family ownership in the household. When two clans or communities fought with each other, and it occurred to the victors to substitute enslavement for the wholesale massacre of the vanquished, a slave population would grow up in the community. By the appropriation of slaves the household would be expanded; the pastoral and nomadic clan would tend to become an aggregate of allied families, each having its own flocks and herds and its own slaves of both sexes; while the agricultural clan would tend rather to the development of the village community, with settled habitations close to each other in the center of a cultivated area worked by common labor and with its produce shared in common. In some such manner would seem to have come into being, the communal agricultural system and the patriarchal pastoral system, modifying the tribal systems, which displayed themselves in the early civilizations.

The city would appear to be the development of the agricultural community produced by the advance of manufacture and the consequent division of labor. The advance of manufacture would obviously emphasize the idea of individual ownership and of exchange; "what I have made is mine, and I can exchange it for what you have made, which is yours." Within the community, the area of dwelling-houses extends because every one is not engaged primarily in agriculture and only secondarily in making the goods which he needs; there are many who are engaged only secondarily upon agriculture and primarily upon making the goods which other people want but lack the skill to make for themselves satisfactorily. The city would not develop till the advance of manufacture was made possible by the introduction of metal; and the same development brings about the beginnings of commerce, the exchange of goods between communities. These cities, these larger aggregates, grow and expand necessarily where communication is comparatively easy, and also where the fertility of the soil makes the bare obtaining of a livelihood a less

strenuous business; and at the same time the enlargement of the community necessitates a higher organization, a more elaborate control of the relations between its members. It follows that city life and political organization developed first in fertile river basins; and therefore Mesopotamia and the Nile are the two earliest centers of culture.

III—Race Distribution

If all the races of mankind have descended from a common stock originating at a single center, their differentiation and dispersion over the entire globe must have occupied an enormous period, as to which speculation is vain. It would indeed be easier to believe that Man was actually evolved in more than one region but for the fact that the races cannot be distinguished as species since the human cross-breed is not, as are hybrids, sterile. Man, from the time at least when he became a hunter using weapons to kill—since without them he must have been a very inefficient slayer—was migratory, living in communities, groups of associates, which moved perpetually in search of fresh hunting-grounds, only occasionally localizing themselves where the conditions were peculiarly favorable and no stronger community was moving upon their track. When Man became a herdsman as well as a hunter, a tamer as well as a slayer of animals, he continued migratory, seeking fresh pastures. When he began to be a cultivator his nomadic instincts were checked; when a little labor in cultivation was richly repaid, a community capable of holding its own against attack was inclined to remain permanently settled.

By these ceaseless migrations, extending over many thousands of years, the whole globe was gradually peopled. When the dispersion began or whence it started can only be guessed with more or less plausibility. Hereditary characteristics began to develop, which grew into distinctive racial attributes; and long before history began the populations of the world might probably have been distinguished into four main divisions, each having certain persistent characteristics sufficient to justify us in referring to them as races: the American; the Mongolian, whose main habitat is Eastern and Central Asia; the Negro, mainly in Africa; and the fourth, most conveniently labelled Caucasian, occupying Western Asia, Europe, North-East Africa, including Abyssinia and Egypt, and the Mediterranean littoral of Africa. Not improbably the American is an offshoot of the Mongolian. Negro and Caucasian strains are to be detected in parts of the Mongolian area, Mongolians (Hottentots) in South Africa, Mongolians (Finns and Lapps) in Europe, apart from Mongolian immigrants within the historic period. As to India,

the proportion of Negro, Mongolian, and Caucasian is matter of apparently hopeless controversy, of theories diametrically contradictory, save that the pure Negro is certainly not to be found there.

Of the four groups, the Caucasian is the subject of most controversy, owing to the marked differences of the types which it includes. We are on tolerably safe ground in distinguishing a Hamitic or African section, and a Semitic or Asiatic section. But Europe gives a complex which has by no means been disentangled, for it embraces not less than three distinct physical types. One is, roughly speaking, prevalent in the north of Europe, fair "dolichocephalic"—that is, long-headed, long from back to front of the cranium in proportion to its width; another, dark and dolichocephalic, prevalent among all the peoples about the Mediterranean; the third, mainly (but by no means exclusively) in South-Central and Eastern Europe, "brachycephalic"—that is, short or round-headed, short from back to front of the cranium in proportion to its breadth. These, since the Mongolian is brachycephalic, are sometimes classed as Mongolian.

There is at least a strong presumption that the dark long-heads were closely akin to the Hamites of the Caucasian branch. Possibly the northern fair long-heads were of the same original stock. The short-heads, unless they were immigrants, must have been differentiated from them at a very remote period indeed. But, in any case, the greater part of Europe was occupied by the tribes of one or other of the three divisions, or by composite tribes, before Europe began to have a history, before the "Aryan" made his appearance.

Who were the Aryans? Whence came they? Volumes, libraries have been written on the subject. Here we can only summarize some tentative conclusions. Probably they were originally a section of the Caucasian group who, in at least comparative isolation, developed a language which not much less than three thousand years ago had in one form or another dominated every European language, and some others as well. Peoples speaking an Aryan tongue—languages, that is, which all beyond doubt had a common origin and differed essentially from the tongues of Hamitic, Semitic, or South European Caucasians, as well as from all non-Caucasian tongues—did between 2000 and 1000 B.C. (approximately) penetrate practically the whole of Europe, and also into Persia and over the mountains of the Hindu Kush into India.

The Aryan tongue then was spread abroad by successive migration of Aryan-speaking groups, each migration carrying with it some variant of the Proto-Aryan language—Indo-Aryan, Iranian (Persian), Hellenic, Italian, Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic—and in a less degree common institutions presumably derived from a common source. Hellenic-speaking groups overran what we now call Greece:

speakers of Latin and the kindred Oscan overran Italy; tribes of Celtic speech overran Western Europe, including the British Isles; Teutonic speech was carried over Scandinavia. But racially, for the most part, populations were not displaced; they absorbed more than they were absorbed by the new-comers, who only leavened the mass; they remained substantially what they had been before. Hence both Teutons and Celts included both round-headed and long-headed groups, racially distinct. Homer's "fair-haired Achæans" were absorbed into the dark-haired Greeks. The Caucasian race-element in India was unquestionably small, though the Indo-Aryan language and tradition predominated; and if the western Slav is predominantly Caucasian, the eastern is predominantly Mongolian. Thus the generic name Aryan and the specific names Teutonic, Celtic, and the rest, became all in effect linguistic appellations significant only in a very slight degree of common racial origin, though the first appearance everywhere of the Aryan—that is, of organized communities speaking an Aryan tongue—is of the highest importance.

But the Aryan does not come on the stage at all in the earliest scenes of history. With the single exception of the Mongolian Akkadians, the first actors are all Hamitic or Semitic Caucasians.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLIEST CIVILIZATIONS

I.—Egypt to the Eighteenth Century B.C.

THE earliest communities of which we have anything like a continuous record were in existence in the Nile valley and in Mesopotamia some six thousand years ago. Even at that date the most advanced of the human race would seem to have been still in the Neolithic stage—the stage, that is, when flint tools had attained the highest perfection of which they were capable, but metal was not yet in use. Probably it was somewhere about 4000 B.C. that copper began to be employed in the making of tools. Our attention will be given first to the development in Egypt.

Our account of this early dawn of history must at present be regarded as merely provisional, liable to be disturbed or overthrown by fresh discoveries and by less doubtful interpretations of the data at our disposal. We can only say that the evidence at present points to the conclusions which we shall express as if they were ascertained facts.

At this early stage, then, we must regard Egypt as falling into two divisions—Northern or Lower Egypt, comprising the Nile Delta; and Southern or Upper Egypt, extending from the delta more or less to the Cataracts. Upper Egypt was the home of the Egyptians proper—a Hamitic people with no negro element, though they had found their way into the Nile valley from the south. A somewhat different African race—the Libyan—occupied the Delta, but seems already to have been modified by a Semitic admixture from Syria. Two thousand years later we shall see that there was a great Semitic incursion and temporary domination; but there was clearly a Semitic element in early Egypt; and it seems on the whole more likely that this was derived from the partly Semitic Delta than from an earlier Semitic invasion from the south, though there is evidence which points rather to the latter view. Tradition brought the Egyptians into the Nile valley under the leadership of the sky god Horus, whose followers had spears with metal points; but this is probably a confusion between the original occupation of the Upper Nile and the wars in which the Upper Egyptians subdued the people of the Delta, the wars which may

be called the beginning of Egyptian history, the wars of the First Egyptian Dynasty. The sacred Hawk, the symbol of Horus, became the symbol also of all the pharaohs.

Until recent years our knowledge of ancient Egyptian history was derived from the works of the Greek historian, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who wrote in the fifth century B.C., and of the learned Egyptian Manetho, of whose records, compiled some two centuries after Herodotus, only an epitome survives. Both derived their information from the priests, who were the depositories of Egyptian learning in their day. Apart from misinterpretations of the ancient monuments of which modern study has given more accurate renderings, the story told by Herodotus, and still more by Manetho, corresponds with no wider diversity than might have been expected to the really contemporary records of the ancient monuments. To their story have to be added the fragments of Hebrew tradition.

The story begins with the first dynasty of kings who brought Upper and Lower Egypt under a single scepter, who were also the first kings to leave monumental records of their doings. The first of them, according to the later traditions, was Menes. But Menes would seem to be a sort of amalgam of two or three of the kings who really carried out the conquest of Lower Egypt. The first king of both regions known by the monuments was Narmer ("the Scorpion"), and the second Aha ("the Fighter"). At Hierakonpolis ("Hawktown"), the center of the religious cult of Horus, there have been found reliefs recognized as contemporary representing the victory of Narmer over the peoples of the north. In the same region is the tomb of Aha, and these two are perhaps the original of the composite figure of Menes. But Narmer is undoubtedly entitled to our respect as a quite real person, the actual first king of the first recognizable dynasty. His successor, Aha, was evidently another famous warrior who, already reigning over both Upper and Lower Egypt, carried his arms southward against the Nubians beyond the First Cataract. All the kings thenceforth are described as kings of Upper and Lower Egypt, for Upper Egypt was never completely amalgamated with the Delta, and the gods of the two regions were only partly identified with each other. It is to be noted the Merpeba, the sixth king of the dynasty, appears to have founded Memphis, just above the apex of the Delta, as his royal city. The conquered north was recovering an equality with the south, and the accession of the shadowy Second Dynasty may have meant that it actually achieved a temporary domination with Memphis as its capital.

The Third Dynasty was inaugurated by the marriage of the southern chief, who took the name of Kha-Sekhem, to the heiress of the Second Dynasty. Kha-Sekhem probably won his bride by force of arms, for he restored Upper Egypt as the home of the central author-

ity and smote Lower Egypt with a heavy hand. His son Tjeser, or Khetneter, built the earliest of the Pyramids as a tomb at Memphis. The last of the dynasty was Senefru. With Senefru begins the period of the great Pyramid building, dating probably from somewhere about the year 3200 B.C. Senefru's two Pyramids are much larger than those of his predecessor Tjeser.

The Fourth Dynasty began with the apparently brief and unimportant reign of Sharu, who was followed by Khufu, a monarch who probably wedded Senefru's widow. Khufu and his son Khafra are more familiarly known to posterity through Herodotus as Cheops and Chephren—father and son; though Herodotus says they were brothers, which scarcely fits with his other statement that they reigned for 106 years between them, a period extended by Manetho to 123 years. Khufu was the builder of the biggest of all the Pyramids, Khafra of the next biggest, which, like that of his son Menkaura, the Mykerinus of Herodotus, is in other respects an improvement upon the Great Pyramid. The Pyramids would, by themselves, be an absolutely conclusive proof that the Egyptians 5,000 years ago had attained a mathematical accuracy of design and precision of workmanship implying a very high intellectual development. But the tradition is also indubitably true which declares that they were constructed by means of what was practically an unlimited amount of slave labor mercilessly exacted. The carriage of the huge blocks of stone from which they were built was effected by human haulage.

It was also in the time of the Pyramid builders that the Egyptian artists attained their highest mastery of portrait sculpture, before it had been conventionalized in the later statuary. The art of the carver had received its first great impulse in the early days of the First Dynasty, presumably as a result of the adoption of metal tools; and before that dynasty had passed, the use of hewn stone in building had begun. Under the Second Dynasty there was no great progress, although it was a period apparently distinguished by prolonged peace: the kings recorded many acts of piety, but no victories. In the energetic life under the Third Dynasty the creative impulse was again active, culminating under the Third and Fourth Dynasties at the close of the fourth and beginning of the third millennium.

The Pyramids were the most remarkable development of the practice of tomb-building. The pyramid itself was a tomb, and close to it was the temple dedicated to the deified spirit of the departed monarch, a pillared structure of hewn stone from which modern excavation has extracted remarkable artistic treasures. The nobles of the court had their own humbler tombs, now called *mastabas*, humbler indeed, but still very solid structures, built around the royal mausoleum.

The pyramids of the kings of the Fifth Dynasty did not maintain

the standard of their predecessors; but on the other hand the temples show an advance, and the practice of decorating them as well as the tombs with pictorial representations of the monarch's distinguished deeds was initiated.

Although the Third Dynasty had recovered political supremacy for the Upper Egyptians, it had not succeeded in restoring the center of gravity to the south. Senefru himself is closely associated with Memphis, and the Fourth Dynasty was in effect Memphite.

With the Fifth Dynasty the recovery of the south became complete and permanent, at least in certain aspects. Its founder, Userkaf, would appear to have been a priest of the northern sun-god Ra at On or Heliopolis (the city of the Sun), at the apex of the Nile Delta. The southern Horus and the northern Ra had been more or less identified; but, in the composite god, Horus had predominated. From this time Ra distinctly predominates, and the attributes of Horus are accessory and subordinate. The gods of the south had been "theriomorphic," beast-shaped, humanized animals, at best represented as human figures with animals' heads, such as the Horus hawk and the jackal-headed Anubis. The gods of the north were "anthromorphic;" the Semite had created his gods after his own image. The northern conception of deity was a shade less barbaric than the southern.

According to tradition, Userkaf seized the throne by a violent usurpation; there is no traditional record of the circumstances under which it passed to the Sixth Dynasty, which, like the Fourth, was Memphite. Two of its pharaohs bore the name of Pepi. The first was a vigorous monarch in whose reign expeditions were dispatched into the interior beyond the Cataracts. The natives were not brought under the direct sway of the Egyptian power, though the Nubian barbarians perhaps in some sort acknowledged the paramount authority of the civilized Empire, an acknowledgment complimentary rather than practical. The first Pepi, who is reputed to have reigned for fifty years, was followed in succession by two boys born to him in the very last years of his life. The mummy of the elder proves that he was not more than fourteen when he died, and the younger, Pepi II., is said to have been only six when he was raised to the throne. The two provided the first instances of recognition of the title of a minor to the succession. Pepi II. was reputed to have been one hundred years old when he died, a tradition the truth of which is generally accepted.

This preternaturally long reign of ninety-four years, which establishes a quite unparalleled record, was presumably responsible for the development of disintegration in the governmental system of ancient Egypt. Hitherto the government had been that of unqualified despots, claiming to be incarnations of Horus, or Ra. There is no sign of an aristocracy of hereditary chiefs who could combine to resist the mon-

arch who was himself sacrosanct. There were no satraps of great provinces who could rebel. Upper Egypt always was divided into districts which, in accordance with the later Greek nomenclature, are generally called nomes, and their governors nomarchs. But they were administered, not by the territorial magnates who were themselves retained at the court, but by king's officers whom, for the sake of illustration, we may liken to the sheriffs of our Norman and Plantagenet kings. Now the long minority which succeeded the death of Pepi I. would involve a weakening of the central government and a tendency on the part of the nomarchs each of them to reside upon, and to enlarge his own authority in, his own district. Pepi II. was apparently not sufficiently vigorous at any time to interfere with this development; at the end as at the beginning of his enormous reign he must have been personally entirely inefficient; and consequently, by the end of it, every nomarch had practically become a petty prince, and the royal authority had fallen very low. If this account is correct, there had hitherto been an actual aristocracy which had been kept in personal attendance upon the court while its governmental functions had been discharged by royal deputies; whereas in Pepi II.'s reign the nobles deserted the court and began to dwell upon and personally to rule over their own estates. Whatever the actual process may have been, the practical result was that at the end of the Sixth Dynasty there was no longer any strong central government, and an aristocracy of territorial magnates had developed itself with the same kind of disintegrating effect as that of mediæval European feudalism or of the Celtic clan system in Scotland and Ireland.

So for some two hundred years, while two shadowy and powerless dynasties of pharaohs, the Seventh and Eighth, reigned at Memphis, the land of Egypt was distraught by warring nobles and knew no progress of any kind.

At length a Ninth Dynasty, wholly unconnected with that of Memphis, was established at Herakleopolis (to adopt again the Greek nomenclature), some sixty miles south of Memphis, presumably by a vigorous noble, who succeeded in imposing his own authority upon his neighbors. In this new dynasty is distinguishable the person of one Khati, or Ekhtai, whom Manetho calls Akthoes, and describes as the most cruel oppressor in the history of the country. He was, at any rate, vigorous enough to establish his dominion farther southward. This Herakleopolitan dynasty and its successor held their scepters in a very precarious fashion; the nobles of the south refused to recognize their supremacy, and the Memphites looked upon them as usurpers. In the end it was the southerners who won, the lords of the Thebaid—the region just below Herakleopolis, the old home of the conquering pharaohs. Thebes definitely threw off the Herakleopolitan yoke under a prince named Antef. Not long afterwards the Herakleo-

politans were overthrown altogether, and the first of the Eleventh (Theban) Dynasty established himself on the throne of the pharaohs. With the triumph of Thebes begins the period of what is called the Middle Kingdom, in contradistinction to the old kingdom of the first dynasties and to the later Empire.

Most of the kings of this Eleventh Dynasty bore the name either of Antef or of Mentuhetep besides a throne-name with the divine or royal termination Ra. The earlier of them had probably established their supremacy only in Upper Egypt; the first pharaoh "of the two lands" of this line was perhaps Neb-hapet-Ra Mentuhetep, whose supremacy is marked by a renaissance of art in the temple sculptures. Hitherto the artists have been anonymous. Now we get what may be called the autobiographical epitaph of the artist Mertisen, who claims to have been the only man living—with the exception of the son to whom he imparted his knowledge—who really understood the business of depicting the human figure in action. If his boast was true, he must have been the regenerator of the art of his time. Neb-hapet-Ra left records of numerous wars; but they are too much damaged to enable us to derive much historical information from them. It is, however, fairly evident that he conducted campaigns southward into Nubia, westward into Libya, and possibly north-eastward into Syria, though this is by no means certain. Perhaps we may credit him with having effectively ended the long anarchy. His successor, Sankha Ra Mentuhetep, had no similar inducement to military demonstrations; the event of his reign was the dispatch, not overland but by the Red Sea, of an expedition to Punt, the southern land from which the Upper Egyptians claimed to have made their way to the Nile valley, the land in which some authorities also find the original home of the people known to us as Phoenicians.

The Twelfth Dynasty, also Theban in origin, succeeded the Eleventh without disturbance. All its kings bear the name either of Senusert or Amenemhat, the latter pointing definitely to Theban origin, since Amen was the name of the Theban sun god, who was, of course duly identified with Ra. Its founder, however, Amenemhat I., had enemies who tried to assassinate him, whether from jealousy of the new dynasty or because he was an inconveniently vigorous reformer. The power of the monarchy was thoroughly re-established, not impossibly to the displeasure of the nobles. Under these powerful rulers great works were undertaken: the control of the water of the Nile, the reclaiming of great areas, the organization of the government, the systematizing of the relations between the nobles and the Crown and of their legal powers. They raised splendid temples, colossal statues, and huge obelisks.

The Amenemhats and Senuserts were not only political organizers and creators of great public works; they were also warriors who ex-

panded the borders of Egypt and curbed the Nubians on the south. To one of the Senuserts Manetho gives the name of Sesostris, which is explained as a very easy Greek corruption of the probable pronunciation of the Egyptian name. Herodotus places a distinctly mythical Sesostris, a tremendous conqueror, somewhere before Cheops; but he would seem, in fact, to have been a heroic figure to whom the traditions of foreign conquest in general were appropriated, but who was actually in the first instance a blend of the Senuserts. Senusert III., who planted fortresses halfway between the Second and Third Cataracts to overawe the Nubians, left also a grandiloquent inscription which accords particularly well with the idea of Sesostris conveyed by the narrative of Herodotus. Still Senusert did not march through Western Asia to the Black Sea as Sesostris was fabled to have done. The wars of the dynasty outside of Africa appear to have been confined to one expedition into Southern Syria, a region where the Semites were strongly established. There are, however, signs of commercial intercourse with the Bedawin tribes of those regions, whose caravans are recorded as visiting Egypt with merchandise desired of the Egyptians: a precedent suggestive of the sojourn of Abraham in the land of the pharaohs. It is evident also that there was intercourse by sea with the ports where the Phoenicians were probably already planted, and with the islands of the Ægean Sea.

If Senusert III. was the greatest of warriors, his successor, Amenemhat III., was the mightiest monarch, or, at any rate, the most splendid in his public works. He was especially responsible for the engineering works of the district now called the Fayûm. Those works led Herodotus to believe erroneously that the great lake called Moeris was entirely artificial, constructed for the purpose of controlling irrigation. In fact, however, it was a natural lake which Amenemhat's dikes and embankments converted into a vast controllable reservoir. Here also he set up two gigantic statues of himself which Herodotus saw and admired from afar, under the impression that they towered actually out of the lake itself. Still more marvellous in the eyes of the Greek historian was the great temple which he called a labyrinth, after the analogy of the Labyrinth of Crete. It has been suggested, however, that this name was applied to it by a misapprehension of its title as the temple of "Lamaris," representing the king's throne-name Ne-mait-Ra. It is probable also that the first Sphinx was a monumental portrait of this same pharaoh.

After the great Amenemhat there was a failing of power. His second successor, the last of the dynasty, was a queen with the throne-name Sebekne-feru-Ra, a name taken from the crocodile god Sebek, which reappears repeatedly in that of Sebek Hetep, commonly borne by the pharaohs of the Thirteenth Dynasty. During the Thirteenth Dynasty, probably about the beginning of the eighteenth century B.C.,

came the great Semitic invasion of the Hyksos, the "shepherd kings," who were the dominant power in Egypt for the next three hundred years. That invasion broke down the barrier which had hitherto subsisted between Egypt and Asia; so we turn here to examine the Asiatic development during the preceding centuries.

II.—Mesopotamia to the Eighteenth Century, B.C.

Towards the close of the fourth millennium, about the time when we judge that Senefru was building his pyramids in Egypt, there was a king of Kish, in the valley of the Euphrates not far from the later Babylon, named Utug, an indubitably real person who dedicated a vase in a temple at the city of Nippur. A little later there reigned at Legash—then on the extremity of the Persian Gulf, which in the course of the centuries has receded a couple of hundred miles—a king named Urnina of whom there remain contemporary representations in relief. His grandson Eannatum was a mighty warrior, whose war with the neighboring city of Umma is recorded in the reliefs and inscriptions of which is called the "Stele of the Vultures," discovered at Telloh, now in the Louvre. Also he made war upon Elam, the land among the mountains immediately eastward of the Tigris valley. The date can be fixed with some certainty in the first century of the third millennium—that is, a few years after 3000 B.C. Thus in the year 3000 we are in a definitely historical period, a period which left conscious records of its doing not only in the form of pictorial representations, but in writing which represents language, the cuneiform script which was employed through out the whole Babylonian or Mesopotamian area. Bronze was already in use; the use of bronze and the established practice of writing, to say nothing of carved reliefs, prove that the people of Lower Mesopotamia had already long passed out of the primitive and barbaric stage.

This early seat of Asiatic civilization, lying in an area of about one hundred and fifty by two hundred miles, fell into the upper and lower regions of Akkad and Sumer. Its civilization and its language, generally Sumerian, were Mongolian—that is, neither Hamitic, Semitic, nor Aryan. Whether the Sumerians were the original indigenous inhabitants is a matter of some doubt: they were of a type clearly akin to the Dravidian races of India, but the theory which brings them to Mesopotamia as emigrants from India is certainly questionable. On the other hand, certain other affinities with the Chinese point to a prehistoric connection with that race, suggesting the view that in spite of the immense divergence of the Davidians from the Chinese they had a common origin, and that the Sumerian was a special development of the same original stock.

Here, however, we are in the realms of conjecture, with evidence

totally inadequate to the forming of any definite conclusions. We must for the present take the Sumerians as we find them, only wondering at the curious fact that they depicted their gods not as Sumerians but as Semites, from the earliest times. They must, therefore, in the earliest times have already been in collision with Semites; but whether they conquered or expelled Semites who were there before them, or were attacked by Semitic invaders who failed to conquer them, is as yet an unsolved problem. It is to be remembered that while Sumer itself is always strictly Sumerian, there were always Semites in Akkad. The farther we move north-westward and westward from the head of the Persian Gulf the more exclusively Semitic the population becomes, throughout the whole region bounded to the westward by the Taurus Mountains, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea.

At our earliest period the Sumerians and Akkadians were dwellers in cities, and the Semites were already on the verge of becoming the dominant race; though in spite of all vicissitudes the language and the learning of the Sumerians showed an unfailing power of recuperation, forced themselves upon the Semite conquerors, and even ultimately triumphed in the last great Babylonian Empire, which was finally overthrown not by Semites but by the Persians.

We know, then, that an advanced civilization, city-dwelling, metal-using, and writing, was flourishing before the end of the fourth millennium. We infer that it had been already in existence for centuries, but of that earlier period we have no record except legends which tell of kings who reigned for several hundreds or even thousands of years; in whose time was the great deluge in which the part of Noah was played by Sit-napishtim. Most mythologies introduce some hero of supernatural prowess and vigor, who smites giants and monsters and performs other like marvellous works; and such a Sumerian hero duly appears in the person of Gilgamesh. As with other mythologies, it is possible to suspect that some genuine historical personality was the prototype of the hero; but it is only when we have some actual contemporary record that we can feel ourselves really in the presence of history.

Lagash was the dominant city for some generations after Eannatum. Its supremacy ended in the reign of a usurping monarch, Urukagina, who allowed his zeal for social reform and the abolition of aristocratic privileges to rend the state in factions; of which advantage was taken by Lugalzaggisi of Umma to overthrow Lagash. This energetic conqueror not only made himself lord of Sumer but marched through Syria, the land of the Amorites, or Westerners, as far as the Mediterranean. A hundred years or so after the fall of Lagash, Kish in Akkad had again waxed powerful under Semitic rulers and challenged the supremacy of Umma. There is a sculptured monument of one Sharrukin, in the days of whose successor Manishtusu it is re-

corded upon an obelisk that Lagash and Umma were subject to him. The portraits of the kings of these monuments show that they were bearded Semites, not clean-shaven Sumerians. Soon after him came Urumush, who conquered Elam and was succeeded by Shargani Sharri, Sargon of Agade, the traditional founder of the imperial Semitic power to whom legends were attached probably appropriated from some of his predecessors. He seems at least to have been mixed up with Sharrukin, unless indeed the authorities are in error in distinguishing at all between Sharrukin and Shargani. "Sargon," in fact, stands to the Semites a good deal as Menes stands to the Egyptians.

We can affirm with some confidence that Shargani arose in Agade, which was presumably subordinate to Kish, about the latter half of the twenty-eighth century. He extended his dominions over Sumer and Akkad, and a good deal farther to the east and north. His successor, Naram-sin, was also a great conqueror who was more or less warranted in assuming the grandiloquent title of "King of the Four Quarters of the World." There is a fine stele now in the Louvre which commemorates one of his conquests. Records many centuries later affirm that Sargon carried his arms to the Mediterranean, into Arabia, and into Elam, statements which are likely enough to be true.

After Naram-sin (*circa* 2700 B.C.), there is a blank extending over some two hundred years. In the interval it would seem that the Sumerians had recovered their ascendancy. Lagash was again the dominant city with a ruler bearing the old Sumerian title of Patesi. Gudea of Lagash was evidently a powerful prince; but in the next generation the scepter passed to the city of Ur. Dungi, the second of the kings of Ur, made himself master of the whole of Akkad as well as Sumer, and possibly of Elam as well. But the power of his dynasty was broken early in the twenty-third century by an Elamite king. A hundred years later it disappeared altogether.

In the twentieth century Elamite kings were reigning at Ur and the neighboring Larsam, and Semites from Syria had established themselves in Akkad with the hitherto comparatively unimportant Babylon as the seat of their power. In the year 1944 B.C. the great King Khammurabi, or Hammurabi, ascended the throne of Babylon.

The Semite Dynasty had now been reigning at Babylon for about a hundred years. Akkad is a buffer shielding Sumer from invasion either from Upper Mesopotamia or from Syria. Presumably there was some migratory or expansive movement of the Semites which brought the westerns, the Amorites, in force upon Mesopotamia in the twenty-first century. Akkad was easily torn from the weakened kings of the south; and during the time of Khammurabi's five predecessors of the First Babylonian Dynasty, Babylon acquired the supremacy over the whole of the upper region. In the reign of the fifth Babylonian, Sin-muballit, it would seem that an Elamite conqueror estab-

lished himself at Larsam, expelling the representative of the Sumerian line, the Sin-iddinan, who presently reappeared as the vassal of Khammurabi, who again was periodically at war with Rim-Sin, the Elamite prince of Larsam.

During his first thirty years Khammurabi obtained some successes against Rim-Sin, extended his dominion northward, and compelled to submission the King of Ashur on the Tigris, or Assyria, an old Semite power which had resisted the new Semite incursion. The Assyrian Shamshi-Adad became a stout supporter of the victorious Khammurabi, who apparently adopted the principle of transforming defeated kings into trusted lieutenants. During this period, however, it would seem that he found the Elamite power too strong for him; entered into temporary alliance with Chedorlaomer (Chudur Lagumur), King of Elam itself, Arioch of Ellasar, who is probably to be identified as Rim-Sin of Larsam, and Tidal "King of the Gentiles"—that is, of the Hittites (Khatti) beyond the Taurus; and took part in the campaign against the cities of Palestine recorded in Genesis xiv. It is probable enough that Abraham had emigrated from "Ur of the Chaldees" when the Elamites ejected its Sumerian rulers. The Hebrew account would seem to imply at least that Chedorlaomer was the head of the northern confederacy. It is perhaps noteworthy that the biblical chronology dates this campaign precisely at the time when Khammurabi was on the point of renewing his wars with Rim-Sin, wars in which he won the overlordship over Larsam and Ur. Perhaps he attempted an attack upon Elam itself, as he seems to have met with some severe reverses, which he attributed to the anger of Elamite goddesses whose images had been carried off from their shrines to Babylon.

Khammurabi, a great political organizer who codified the laws of Babylonia, died in the last year of the century. His successor finally overthrew Rim-Sin. But the dynasty did not long retain its power. A new Sumerian king established his throne on the coast of the Persian Gulf, calling himself King of the Sea Land. But this was not the power which was destined to displace the Babylonians. Beyond the Taurus Mountains on the north-west lay the hordes of the Khatti. Beyond the mountains of Elam on the east an Aryan migration was in progress. In the middle of the eighteenth century the Khatti overflowed the mountain barrier and swept through Mesopotamia in a devastating raid which shattered the power of Babylon. Like Zenghis Khan or Nadir Shah in India many centuries later, the Khatti came and departed for the time being; but an Aryan wave burst through Elam and rolled into Mesopotamia, which was too much shattered to resist. The newcomers did not sweep away or even enslave the natives, whether Sumerian or Semite; but they set up a ruling dynasty and aristocracy, something after the fashion

of the Normans in England, which reigned for more than five hundred years, bearing the name Kassite. In like manner what would seem to be a second branch of these precursors of the Medes and Persians pushed their way north-west, and set up in Northern Mesopotamia, beyond Ashur, the kingdom of Mitanni—an Aryan lordship over a mixed population mainly Semite. The names of the Kassite and Mitannian rulers are almost conclusive proof that they were of the same Aryan stock as the later Persians. But Khammurabi had in fact completed the work of Semitizing the whole great region over which his sway extended, though the Sumerian element was indeed never obliterated. The old Sumerian and Semite civilization triumphed over its barbarian conquerors as, in much less degree, the Latin civilization conquered the Goths and Franks and Lombards who overran Western Europe and overthrew the Roman Empire in the West.

There is little room to doubt that Khammurabi's is the first name definitely entitled to a place among those of the world's great rulers who have been organizers and administrators, though usually also of necessity conquerors: men who, if they were destroyers in some degree yet destroyed only to build. He was a sort of Babylonian Alfred the Great, whose title to fame rests above all else upon the legal code which he caused to be engraved upon a stone stele now at the Louvre. He is not indeed to be regarded as a great promulgator of new laws; but the ruler who put into permanent shape the law of the land evolved out of diverse custom during many centuries cannot be denied the title of a legislator.

Legal deeds, Khammurabi's governmental letters and dispatches, and his code of laws, supply us with positive information as to the condition of Babylonia in the nineteenth century B.C.

We find three great classes of the community not without a resemblance to the thegnhood, the free ceorls, and the serfs of the early English—the first comprising the government officials and great landholders, the second small freeholders and free laborers, and the third, slaves whose persons were the actual property of their owners. The Babylonian had a high conception of the majesty of the law and of its functions in protecting the liberties, lives, and property of the people; the Babylonian law protected the slave even against his own master. The slave could acquire property and might obtain freedom by purchase. A free woman who married a slave remained free, and the children of the marriage were free. Women enjoyed much independence; they could be owners of property; married women were very far indeed from being the chattels of their husbands; if a woman were divorced, except for unchastity, she could claim the custody of her children and maintenance. There were even religious sisterhoods

vowed to chastity, and the vow was compatible with formal marriage and life in the world.

There were elaborate laws controlling the relations between debtors and creditors, principals and agents, for the regulation and security of an extensive foreign commerce; regulations also dealing with the respective liabilities of employers and employed. Strict legal forms were necessary to give validity to wills and to the transfer of land; the witnesses set their seals to the clay tablets upon which the deeds were drawn out—the use of clay had probably been responsible for the comparatively rapid development of a script or writing. The Babylonian law was particularly careful in its insistence upon the maintenance of canals and the regulation of the water supply upon which the enormous fertility of the whole area was dependent; the matter was one which demanded the attention of a paternal government, just as the regulation of the Nile demanded the care of the Senuserts and Amenemhats in Egypt. Shrewd kings in both countries realized that a prosperous country could be taxed for the benefit of the royal treasury without feeling the strain; as we should express it nowadays, the Crown saw its own advantage in fostering the wealth of its subjects.

It is interesting to observe that there was a silver standard of price by which land and goods were valued, but no general employment of currency—that is, the purchaser of land or goods and the payer of taxes made his payment in goods equivalent to the purchase price, the goods being regularly valued before the exchange was completed.

Finally, it is to be noted that portions of the Babylonian mythology correspond respectively to the Hellenic legends on the one hand and to the Hebrew cosmogony on the other—so closely that we must regard each of those extremely diverse systems as having been at an early stage infected by Babylonian influences. But the Hebrew and the Hellene each assimilated only what was sympathetic to his own religious outlook; the Babylonian influence brought them no closer to each other.

CHAPTER III

THE NEAR EAST: FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO THE TWELFTH CENTURY B.C.

I.—The Hyksos and the Egyptian First Empire

THE Shepherd kings, Hyksos, "princes of the shepherds"—that is, the Bedawin masters of flocks and herds who fell upon Lower Egypt in the early years of the eighteenth century as nearly as we can judge—were outer barbarians in the eyes of the Egyptians. We have no certain means of accounting for the incursion. The Semitic expansion which first covered Syria and Palestine with Semites, even the expansion which established the first dynasty of Babylon, were already ancient history. Doubtless there were Semitic kingdoms and cities in these regions, already too strongly established to have offered a tempting prey even to Sesostris, though according to the biblical narrative the King of Elam had thought it worth his while to assert a supremacy over them. But evidently there was no organized Semitic Empire in the south which annexed the land of the pharaohs. To all appearance there was simply an irruption of Bedawin tribes who burst into the Delta, overran it, and then gradually surged over Upper Egypt, the whole of which was probably never brought into complete subjection.

The Bedawins may have come out of either Arabia or Syria, or both. The Syrian Semites were still undoubtedly to a great degree nomadic, at any rate to the east of the Jordan and the Orontes. The Elamite incursions upon Sumer in the nineteenth century, and the raiding of the Khatti or Hittites from beyond the Taurus of which the incursion into Babylonia in the middle of the eighteenth century was only a crowning example, may well have induced a southern migratory movement on the part of the northern Semitic nomads; and thus we may very reasonably account for an irruption of the nomad hordes into Egypt, when the line of vigorous twelfth-dynasty rulers had passed away.

As compared with the Egyptians themselves the Hyksos would have been barbarians. Like the Kassites in the north they did not represent a superior conquering civilization which imposed itself upon the conquered; when they were driven out again, they left behind an evil memory of their rule, but no permanent impress of their own character. Apparently no organized resistance was offered to the in-

vaders. Their victory was an easy one; all the more easy probably because they came armed with a new instrument of war—the chariot and horses—hitherto practically unknown to the Egyptians.

Manetho names six Hyksos kings whose reigns extended over two hundred and forty years. The fifth, Iaias, can be pretty definitely identified with the powerful monarch Khian, who had the throne-name of Seuseren-Ra. Relics of his reign have been found at Bagdad and in Crete; but it is unnecessary to infer that they reached those remote regions in his day: they do not imply that he conquered Crete and Mesopotamia. In the name of another Hyksos king scholars are disposed to discover that of the Semitic Yakub, which was borne by the Hebrew patriarch Jacob, though it is not suggested that the king and the patriarch were the same person.

The Hyksos kings would seem to have become Egyptianized except for their retention of the worship of the Semitic desert god Set. The whole period of the Hyksos conquest is one of confusion. They came in the days of the Thirteenth Egyptian Dynasty, and the pharaohs of the Fourteenth Dynasty were probably merely titular lords in the Delta, reigning by grace of the conquerors. The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Dynasties are those of the Hyksos themselves, with some of whom the Fourteenth Dynasty was contemporary. The Seventeenth, on the other hand, would seem to be that of native Egyptian rulers in the Thebaid, who defied the foreign rulers with more or less success until their successor, the first king of the Eighteenth Dynasty, triumphantly ejected the Hyksos altogether.

The Hyksos conquest is not to be regarded as merely another version of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt, but we are fully warranted in recognizing an intimate connection. The Semitic conquest would have made easy the settlement in the Delta, in the land of Goshen, of the Semitic Israelite clan. The story of Joseph fits into it easily, though some of the names, such as that of Potiphar, show that the version of the story which we possess was, at any rate, edited certainly as late as the tenth and probably as early as the seventh century. The exodus would not necessarily be identified with the expulsion of the Hyksos; rather it would seem that when the Semite masters were driven out, the Israelite clan was retained in a state of subjection under the "kings who knew not Joseph," and broke away subsequently; but this is a question to which we shall revert later.

The feeble rule of the Thirteenth Dynasty and the Hyksos invasion probably had the immediate effect of causing the Theban nobles to set up the standard of independence under a prince of their own. The most distinguished of these rulers, many of whom bore the old Theban name of Antef, was Nub-kheper-Ra, who evidently succeeded in holding back the invaders. At a later stage, however, in the time of Khian, the Hyksos had succeeded in making good a somewhat precarious

supremacy, which, towards the end of the seventeenth century, was again challenged by the Seventeenth Dynasty proper, the Sekenen-Ras. It may, at least, be plausibly supposed that about 1620 Sekenen-Ra I. set up the standard of revolt, as a patriot leader descended from a native royal line, against the foreign tyrants. Between 1620 and 1590 three Sekenen-Ras in succession were gradually driving the Hyksos back, until Sekenen-Ra III. was killed in battle and was nominally succeeded by a young son, Kames. Then the Hyksos advanced again; but when Kames reached man's estate he took the offensive, and before his short life was ended captured Memphis. The young warrior was succeeded on his death by his brother Senekhten-Ra, who only survived for a few months, and was followed by the third brother, Aahmes the Liberator, in 1580. Seven years later the Hyksos had been driven out of their last entrenchment, and Aahmes had won "Egypt for the Egyptians." As the founder of the new Egyptian Empire his name is reckoned as the first in the list of the Eighteenth Dynasty.

Aahmes and his son Amenhetep annihilated the Semites as a political force in Egypt, and revived the old Theban supremacy over the Nubians of the south. There is no record of campaigns into Asia, whether their own or of either of the two generals who bore the same name as Aahmes. Thothmes I., however, the third pharaoh of the line, took advantage of the disintegrated condition of the Semites to invade Syria and carry his arms as far as the Euphrates, on the banks of which he set up a monument to commemorate his conquest—which, indeed, would really seem to have been nothing more than a raid. A second Thothmes, whose reign ended with the sixteenth century, was followed by a queen, Hatshepsut.

Hatshepsut refrained from war; but her successor, Thothmes III., who had been nominally associated with her on the throne, without exercising any real power, found the way open before him as a creator of empire. The relationship of this whole group of monarchs is particularly obscure; it seems, however, certain that Hatshepsut was the daughter of Thothmes I. Thothmes II. was probably her husband, and Thothmes III. was the son of Thothmes II., but not of Hatshepsut. Hence, while Hatshepsut lived, Thothmes II. and Thothmes III., though bearing the royal title, were both subordinate to her. Perhaps Thothmes III. was rendered all the more efficient by the years during which his military ambitions had been held in check by his autocratic stepmother. She was a magnificent ruler, of a masculine character; but she would not risk the loss of her ascendancy by allowing the young Thothmes to control armies of which she was not Amazon enough to take command herself. Though she could boast comfortably that Syria was subject to her, the composite peoples of that region probably paid very little attention to her sovereignty, and were

perhaps preparing to resist in arms if any inconvenient attempt should be made to emphasize it.

We have laid stress on the fact that the whole Egyptian and Semitic area with which we have had to deal hitherto was cut off from the rest of the world by the great mountain chain which starts with the Taurus on the west, runs up to Armenia, and then sweeps down to the south-east on the other side of the Mesopotamian plain: a barrier only occasionally broken through by Elamites at one end, by Hittites at the other, and by the Aryans, who made themselves for the time being the ruling caste of Kassites in Babylonia and in the kingdom of Mitanni in Northwestern Mesopotamia. Outside Egypt itself the bulk of the population was Semitic. Phœnicians and Canaanites were in possession of the more or less coastal districts of the west; but in Northern Syria, called by the Egyptians Naharin, between the Euphrates and the Orontes, there was probably by this time a considerable Hittite admixture. Between the two great dominions of Babylonia and Mitanni lay the not as yet very powerful kingdom of Assyria, which had been Semitized by an earlier stock than the Amorite Semites who now peopled Syria. Presently we shall find all these different elements coming into play in relation to the expanding Egyptian Empire.

Before Hatshepsut had been dead a year, Thothmes III. was on the march for Syria, determined to reassert his sovereignty.

The story of the campaigns of Thothmes is recorded in detail in a great temple inscription, the earliest war narrative, from which much information can be gathered. Evidently a general confederacy had been formed in Western Syria, having as its moving spirit the Prince of Kadesh, on the Orontes, beyond Phœnicia. Thothmes struck north from the later Philistia; the confederates intended to block his passage of the hills below Mount Carmel between the plains of Jezreel and Sharon, with their force resting on Megiddo, which enabled them to cover both the main passes to the north and to the south. They took for granted that he would not use the difficult center pass, a dangerous and unsuitable route for an army with many chariots. Thothmes took the risk of a disaster, ignored the unanimous advice of his generals, marched up the central pass at the head of his troops, carried his army through the ravine, which was unguarded, and on the next day inflicted an overwhelming rout upon the confederates. The Egyptian historian suggests that Megiddo itself might easily have been rushed if the Egyptian troops had not thought more about plunder than about forcing the victory home. Consequently, when they came before the walls they found the city in a condition to defend itself, and Megiddo was only compelled to surrender after a prolonged siege. Thothmes was well repaid by the richness of the spoils and the quality of the captives that fell into his hands. In successive campaigns, year

after year, Thothmes subdued the whole of Palestine and Phœnicia. In the fifth campaign came a startling strategical development, for Thothmes conveyed his army by sea to Northern Phœnicia and then struck straight upon Kadesh. Another year was needed to complete the subjection of the region and to make it a secure base for further operations. In a new series of campaigns Thothmes conquered the Naharian district, though year after year there were renewed revolts. So impressed were the northerners with the might of the Egyptian king that both Mitanni and Assyria sent tribute, and even Hittite rulers from beyond the mountains sent him complimentary presents. Even more remarkable is the record of tribute received from the island of Cyprus; doubtless the islanders were alarmed by the fact that his subjugation of the Phœnician cities had given him the command of the sea.

Thothmes the Great did not sigh for fresh worlds to conquer. His armies did not cross the Euphrates. He was statesman no less than soldier, and the closing years of his life were spent in organizing the empire which he had won. His treatment of conquered subjects was always lenient. From the beginning it had been his habit to carry back to Egypt as hostages the children and brothers of princes and chiefs; but his object was to impress them with Egyptian wisdom and power, so that they might ultimately return to their own land with a conscious desire to Egyptianize their own people. Egyptian garrisons were planted, and Egyptian officials were always present to foster and encourage the Egyptianizing tendencies of the new rulers; while the garrisons themselves gave the conquered people security against attacks from beyond the border, besides establishing the Egyptian dominion.

Thothmes not only created an Egyptian Empire in Western Asia, he also re-established, in a more effective form than before, the ancient ascendancy of the Theban princes in Nubia or Ethiopia, where the once unqualified negroes of Kush had, during the last centuries, been largely displaced by immigrants from Punt, Abyssinia, and Somali-land. Under Thothmes an organized government was established as far up the Nile as Napata, in the neighborhood of the Fourth Cataract.

No great amount of Egyptian poetry is known to us, but it is not surprising that one of the best pieces we have is an ode or hymn celebrating the exploits of Thothmes the Great.

The conqueror died in 1447. The succession of his son Amenhetep II. was rashly seized as an opportunity for revolt in the far north. Amenhetep marched to suppress it in person, distinguishing himself both as a general and as a mighty man of valor. By way of a demonstration he crossed the Euphrates and entered the kingdom of Mitanni which promptly offered submission. Possibly the new Mitannian dynasty, which began about this time, was inaugurated in consequenc

of the pharaoh's activity; the Mitannian rulers henceforth are the very good friends of the southern emperor. Amenhetep appears to have given the northerners a lesson which did not need to be repeated; there were no more revolts in the twenty-six years of his reign. His successor, Thothmes IV., in the course of a brief reign, marched armies through Northern Syria; more, apparently, to overawe the natives than because of anything in the nature of an actual revolt. It is notable, however, that he took for a wife a Mitannian princess—the first foreign spouse of an Egyptian pharaoh—who was the mother of his son and successor, Amenhetep III. the Magnificent, who ruled over Egypt for thirty-six years. Amenhetep was thus the cousin of the Mitannian king Dushratta, whose sister he also took as one of his wives, though not his principal consort.

Amenhetep III. did not seek to emulate the war-like prowess of his predecessors. In fact, there was nothing to urge him to such a course. The empire which he inherited extended from Nubia on the south to the mountains of Asia Minor on the north. With so vast a dominion nothing but a mere lust of conquest could have led him to attack the civilized northern Powers, which, for their part, were by no means desirous of challenging him; while further conquests in Africa over rude barbarians from whom no danger was to be anticipated, would have brought with them no advantages whatever. Amenhetep stands to Thothmes much as Shah Jehan stood to Akbar some three thousand years later in India—he was the most splendid monarch of a mighty line, but not the greatest. The Egypt of his day was in the zenith of its culture and at the height of its prosperity; the temples and monuments of his reign perhaps exceed those of any other period in their magnificence. But prosperity and luxury were sapping the virile energy of Egypt, and in the next reign, under the gorgeously impracticable dreamer Akhenaten, the might and majesty of the First Empire fell into decay.

The creation of the Egyptian Empire established the beginning of an international system in which may be called the known world—a fact illustrated by the prominence which till lately attached to royal marriages and dynastic matrimonial alliances. Much light has been thrown upon international relations—especially in the first half of the fourteenth century—by the discovery in 1887 of the Tell el-Amarna letters, and more recently of tablets at Boghaz Kyoi, the site of the Hittite capital in Asia Minor. These are actual letters and dispatches, in the cuneiform or Babylonian script, which passed between the monarchs of that time. Several of these are addressed by the Mitannian Dushratta to his Egyptian cousins Amenhetep III. and Amenhetep IV., better known perhaps by the name of Akhenaten. Amenhetep III. had for his principal wife an Egyptian named Tii; but he took as another wife Dushratta's sister, before that king's accession, and still

later Dushratta's daughter, who, after the pharaoh's death, became the wife of Akhenaten. The implication that the Mitannian king was a smaller person than the Egyptian emperor is obvious. On the other hand the Kassite King of Babylonia was distinctly annoyed by Amenhetep's refusal to send him an Egyptian princess for a wife; evidently he accounts himself the Egyptian's equal. Dushratta we find fighting and routing the Hittites, and we learn also that he exercised some sort of supremacy over Assyria.

In the reign of Akhenaten, however, the Assyrian Ashur-uballit evidently considered himself on an equality with Dushratta, and was trying to obtain recognition from Egypt as an independent monarch. On the other hand, the Kassite Burraburiash was annoyed at the presumption of Assyria, which, as he tells Akhenaten, was the vassal not of Mitanni but of Babylonia. The Egyptian, however, disregarded his protests, and recognized Ashur-uballit's independence. A falling-off of the Egyptian power is, however, manifest; for Ashur-uballit grumbled because he did not receive such handsome presents of courtesy as his former suzerain of Mitanni, and Burraburiash could politely point out to his brother of Egypt that liberality in the matter of presents was an excellent way of securing friends. In fact, the northern kings were evidently beginning to look upon the treasury of Egypt as a source from which a handsome income might be derived; Burraburiash incidentally emphasizes his own stern refusal to countenance and support a Canaanite revolt, in order to impress upon Akhenaten the advisability of a material recognition of his services.

While Amenhetep III. was reigning, the Hittite dominion was still outside the recognized circle of the Powers; Dushratta soon after his accession in Mitanni had inflicted on the Hittites a defeat which checked their aggressiveness. But the king Shubbiluliuma was breaking into Northern Syria even before Akhenaten's accession, and during that monarch's reign the correspondence includes letters from the Shubbiluliuma. The time was at hand when the Hittites were to make themselves felt among the great Powers, and were to play their part in shaking the foundations of the Egyptian Empire.

For more than a century past there had been intercourse between the islands of the Ægean Sea and Egypt. The temple decorations of Thothmes III. record the visits of Cretans, and there is ample evidence of the interaction of Egyptian and Minoan influences. But the islanders were still a world apart even more than England was a world apart from Europe in the days of the Heptarchy; there are no letters from Knossos in the Tell el-Amarna correspondence.

Amenhetep IV., or Akhenaten, the son and successor of Amenhetep III., was a genius, an irresponsible devotee of Ideas, who reigned for seventeen years and died probably before he was thirty. Under wise influences, such a youth might have been trained into a very great

monarch. But a boy enthusiast wielding unlimited power, devoid of experience, which appears to him superfluous, and very much aware that he is a great deal cleverer than any of his safe, sober, and conventional entourage, can work a surprising amount of havoc—with the best intentions.

Egypt was an exceedingly priest-ridden country; the most exaggerated language of Protestant reformers concerning the Church of Rome in the sixteenth century might have been applied to the orthodox religious system of the Egyptians—the extravagant influence of its priests, the degrading character of its superstitions, the vast wealth which it absorbed. Akhenaten was a wholly unpractical person with an entirely abnormal intellect, who rose from his anthropomorphic, theriomorphic, material surroundings to an amazingly spiritual conception of a supreme Godhead of whom the sun itself was but a symbol. As the symbol of the Godhead, the glorious disk of the sun, *Aten*, was to be worshipped, though only as a symbol, or at most as his visible embodiment. There were no other gods, and only to the honor of Aten were temples to be raised. The Theban Amen was rudely deposed from his throne, the throne he had so long occupied as the supreme deity, to make way for this new and to the Egyptians incomprehensible divinity. The very names of Amen and of all the other deities in the Egyptian pantheon were ordered to be erased from every monument in the land by the decree of a boy who was probably not more than fifteen; though that age implied in Egypt a degree of development equivalent to at least twenty years for the sons of a northern race. The decree was emphasized by the change of the king's own name from Amenhetep to Akhen-aten, "pleasing to Aten," whereby he abrogated his own title to the divinity claimed by all his predecessors; though less assertively since the development of international politics had made it impossible to pretend that the king of Egypt was divine while the kings of the north were merely human.

Thebes was the center of the Amen worship, and was also the capital of the Eighteenth Dynasty of pharaohs. Akhenaten removed himself from Thebes and built a new royal city at the modern Tell el-Amarna. There he remained surrounded by the nobles and courtiers who thought fit, honestly or otherwise, to adopt the new worship. There he developed his progressive theories of art and religion, leaving his Empire to take care of itself. The new art, too, was a departure from the Egyptian convention, influenced perhaps by Cretan ideas; but instead of actually inaugurating a progressive movement, it only brought about a reaction which made all subsequent Egyptian art wholly conventional and lifeless; and while the pharaoh thus cut himself off and dwelt apart, the provincial governors were left to preserve the Empire as best they could, unsupported by the central government.

Akhenaten died while still a young man, as we have noted, and before a dozen years had passed all his attempted reforms had been obliterated. But no vigorous personality appeared to remedy the collapse for which Akhenaten had been responsible. This was to be the work of the new Nineteenth Dynasty, which began in 1321 with the brief reign of Rameses I. The task was no small one, for during the long absence of any strong central government in Egypt the Hittite power had established its supremacy in Northern Syria, while Phœnicia and Palestine had practically recovered their ancient independence.

II.—The Era of the Hittite Struggle

Hitherto we have met with the Hittites only as raiders into Mesopotamia or Northern Syria, Naharin, sweeping down from the mountain regions of Eastern Asia Minor. All that we know of them, their language, their deities, their names, their typical types, their culture, differentiates them completely from Aryans and Semites, from Egyptians, from pre-Hellenic islanders in the Ægean or dwellers on the western coast of Asia Minor. They were Mongolians, but only in the vague sense in which that name is commonly applied to races which cannot be otherwise classified. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the Hittite face as represented in sculpture is still characteristic of Armenia. Behind their mountain barriers they had proved themselves quite unassailable by Semites or Sumerian Babylonians even under the leadership of Kassites or Mitanni, who indeed never seem to have betrayed the superior military capacity which we are disposed to associate with the Aryan peoples.

Of the Hittites as an organized power we know nothing before the fourteenth century, though their first actual appearance was in the great raid which was shortly followed by the Kassite conquest of Babylonia. The first king who comes definitely before us (unless we except the Biblical "Tidal King of Nations") is Khattush, whose son Shubbiluliuma attacked Mitanni, corresponded with Akhenaten, and before he died made himself master at least of Naharin. He is credited with being the founder of the Hittite capital, which bore what may be called the national name of Khatti, the modern Boghaz Kyoi in the uplands to the east of the river Halys, which at a later stage was the eastern boundary of the western dominion of Lydia. It is however, tolerably certain that Hittite chiefs had at a much earlier date established dynasties in sundry cities of Northern Syria, notably at Carchemish.

The reign of Shubbiluliuma marks the rise of the Hittite power, its definite entry into the group of great Powers. Even in the reign of Amenhetep III. Shubbiluliuma was feeling his way; for the Mag-

nificent pharaoh was too much occupied with building temples and rearing monuments to give to his Empire the attention which it demanded. Dushratta of Mitanni had very promptly on his accession taught the Hittite that he was not to be attacked with impunity; Shubbiluliuma judged that the annexation of Naharin would be a more feasible scheme. There the inland chiefs had not been completely reconciled to the Egyptian overlordship like the commercial cities of Phœnicia; which profited by the general enforcement of law and order, very much as mediæval cities were the allies of a monarchical central government to which a feudal baronage was apt to be antagonistic. There were Hittite princes who would be his natural allies, Semitic Amorites ready to revolt against any superior authority, and exiled princes of Mitanni eager to overthrow Dushratta. With all these Shubbiluliuma intrigued successfully, while Ribadda, the loyal ruler of Phœnician Byblos, who understood the danger, vainly endeavored to inspire Amenhetep with his own alarm. When at last the Egyptian was persuaded to send a force to the north, the Hittite was ready with more or less plausible explanations, and the Egyptian army retired again. The crafty king then contented himself with fostering a fresh Amorite revolt, and explained his own continued attacks upon Naharin as being directed against the aggressions of Dushratta, who was certainly innocent of any desire to quarrel with Egypt.

The accession of Akhenaten and the influence during his first years of the queen-mother Tii, who was probably jealous of his Mitannian kindred, put an end to any prospect of intervention from Egypt; the loyalist towns of Phœnicia found that they got no credit for their loyalty and began to fall away. Ribadda's indignant protests passed unheeded. Canaan followed the example of Naharin, and its loyalist princes were treated with the same indifference as those of the north. The country was being overrun by the wandering tribes of the Khabiri, very probably the Hebrews; it looks as if the Israelites were now entering the promised land after their wanderings in the desert, whatever the date of their actual departure from Egypt may have been. Canaan got no help from the suzerain. Then the Amorites succeeded in capturing Byblos and expelling the loyal Ribadda, who was killed soon afterwards; whereupon the triumphal Amorite prince Arizu succeeded in making his peace with Akhenaten by representing himself as having really been the loyal defender of the Empire against disloyalists and foreign invaders.

But now Shubbiluliuma's hour had come. Arizu the catspaw had done precisely what was wanted of him; he had completely wrecked the Egyptian domination of the north, while Akhenaten himself had allowed the whole imperial organization to go to wrack. The Hittite denounced Arizu as a recalcitrant vassal of his own. Arizu was not strong enough to defy him, and submitted. Dushratta of Mitanni was

assassinated; his exiled kinsfolk returned from Naharin and seized the throne. Assyria, on the south-east of Mitanni, snatched its opportunity to annex a portion of the kingdom. The son of Dushratta took refuge with Shubbiluliuma, who had long since quarreled with the Mitannian exiles. Shubbiluliuma gave the refugee Mattiuaza his own daughter in marriage, and restored him to his father's throne, of course as a vassal. Ashur-uballit of Assyria, a prince as shrewd as he was energetic, promptly came to terms, having no mind for a conflict with the Hittite monarch, who was now emphatically lord of all Northern Syria and Phœnicia. His position was finally established by a treaty with Egypt, probably when Horemheb, who had been Akhenaten's viceroy in the Delta, was raised to the throne of the pharaohs some years after Akhenaten's death.

Horemheb was a statesman and administrator of experience, who had probably preserved Lower Egypt from anarchy in the latter years of Akhenaten. But he had as much as he could do in the re-establishment of order in Egypt itself after the chaos produced by Akhenaten, whose immediate successors had done little enough to straighten out the tangle. Imperial projects were outside Horemheb's range. But he got the machinery of government gradually into working order upon conservative lines. By so doing he made a political and military revival possible, for a reconstruction starting from Akhenaten's wholly idealist revolution was out of the question. He had ascended the throne probably because there was no one with an obvious title, and because he was the only man whose influence and services to the state marked him out as the best available ruler, and also as acceptable to the priests of Amen. He did not found a dynasty—that was left to his successor Rameses I., whom he may himself have designated to carry on his work as a trusted colleague, and as being secure of a capable successor in his son Seti. For practical purposes the Nineteenth Dynasty and the Second Empire began with the accession of Seti.

The supremacy of the north which had been won by Shubbiluliuma was now wielded by his son Mursil; but he ruled over a large and heterogeneous dominion which could not be called an organized empire. The new pharaoh meant to give his reign the character of a revival of the glories of the First Empire; and he took as his model, though one which he could emulate only at a distance, the great Thothmes III. Seti had hardly ascended the throne when he conducted a campaign to re-establish control over Canaan, and to recover from the Hittite power the dominion over the Phœnicians. The Hittites had never attempted to rule over Palestine; and Mursil was apparently unconscious of the strategic value of Phœnicia. The Phœnicians themselves, unlike the Amorites of Naharin, had held by Egypt to the last, and had thrown off their allegiance only when they

found themselves hopelessly deserted; probably they were now willing enough to exchange a Hittite for an Egyptian sovereign from whose vigor something was to be hoped. Mursil threw down no challenge to Seti, to whom the Phœnician towns submitted themselves. Palestine had ignored Egypt when Egypt had no armies at its command, but offered no serious resistance in the changed circumstances. The recovery of Phœnicia gave Egypt the command of the sea, and after a short interval Seti again took example by Thothmes, carried his army to the northern ports, crossed Lebanon, and attacked the Hittites in the Orontes valley, where they were put to rout in their first actual encounter with Egyptian armies. As a result, a treaty was concluded which would seem definitely to have recognized the Egyptian sovereignty over Phœnicia.

With this eminently practical achievement Seti was satisfied. But his son Rameses II., who succeeded him about the year 1300, had larger ambitions. He resolved to recover the whole Empire of Thothmes. But Mursil had given up in effect only the southern cities of Phœnicia, on which he set no great value. When the young pharaoh prepared a great expedition for conquest, the old Hittite gathered forces from all his dominions to meet him and give battle in the Orontes valley. He drew Rameses and his advance guard into a trap, and almost overwhelmed them; but Rameses succeeded in cutting his way through, joining his main force, and very thoroughly turning the tables on the Hittites, who were completely routed—Rameses, according to his own account, performing unheard-of prodigies of valor.

The victory was no doubt magnificent; it served at once to re-establish the reputation of the Egyptian soldiery and to convince Rameses that he was at least the equal of Senusert and Thothmes. His triumph was celebrated upon temple walls and in heroic poems which did not fail to give due prominence to his own superhuman prowess. Nevertheless, though the Hittites had been smitten hip and thigh, the victors were in no condition to pursue their success. Rameses returned to Egypt with his army and his laurels; but the work of conquest had not been achieved, and Mursil's successor Mutallu by no means intended that it should be achieved. While Rameses rested on his laurels, Mutallu prepared for war; and some two or three years after the great rout a Hittite army burst into Palestine, which promptly revolted against Egypt. The whole work of conquest in Asia had to be done over again. When Rameses took the field, he overran Palestine and Phœnicia and forced the chiefs of Naharin to acknowledge his supremacy; but he was either driven out again or Naharin revolted as soon as his back was turned, for the whole region was again acknowledging the Hittite authority when

Mutallu was succeeded by his younger brother Khattusil about the twentieth year of the reign of Rameses.

In effect the whole outcome of the war so far seems to have been that the Egyptians, in the first instance taking the aggressive, retired after being victorious in a pitched battle; that the Hittites surged into Palestine and were driven out again; and that the Egyptians surged into Naharin and were driven out again. Khattusil had no desire to prolong hostilities from which no one derived any advantage, and which must in fact have been ruinously exhausting to both Empires; and he celebrated his accession by proposing a treaty of peace with his rival, emphasizing his amicable intentions by restoring the Amorite prince who had acknowledged the sovereignty of Egypt and had consequently been dethroned and carried off a prisoner to Khatti.

Rameses accepted his proffered amity, and a treaty of alliance was concluded of which the text is preserved on the monuments of Rameses and in part at least in the tablets at Boghaz Kyoï. The "Great Chief of Kheta" and the "Great Prince of Egypt" vowed eternal amity between themselves and their children for ever. It was declared that the old treaties between Shubbiluliuma and Horemheb and between Mursil and Seti were confirmed. The two kings were to make common cause if either should be attacked by an external Power or by rebellious tributaries. Each promised not to harbor rebellious refugees from the territory of the other. Each promised to return under an amnesty such refugees as he had hitherto harbored. The treaty having been duly ratified, the consorts of the two kings sent each other polite letters of congratulation. Rameses, who had gained nothing whatever either by the war or by the treaty, which left him in precisely the same position as before his first aggressive movement, salved his pride with monumental records of his glorious victories, while Khattusil took the more practical course of impressing his own authority upon the restored prince of the Amorites. But the wars of the Hittites and the Egyptians were over.

Since the accession of Shubbiluliuma, the Hittite power had absorbed Mitanni and spread its dominion over all Northern Syria, till it had come into fierce collision with the revived power of Egypt and entered upon a conflict from which it emerged with unimpaired territories but without any further expansion. During the same period the old Egyptian Empire had gone to pieces, but had been partly restored, though with very much diminished boundaries. The impression conveyed to posterity that Rameses II. was the mightiest of Egyptian rulers is due mainly to the effrontery of that monarch, who not only magnified his own actual deeds, but appropriated to himself the monuments of his predecessors and the glories which they recorded. The glory of the mis-called Rameses the Great was mainly fictitious, though, braggart as he was, he may probably be credited with reckless daring

and personal skill in the use of weapons. In that really remarkable battle, the first fight in which the Hittites were routed, it is tolerably evident that the victory was won by the better discipline and organization of the Egyptian troops and by personal valor, in spite of the superior numbers and more skillful disposition of the Hittites. The presumption, however, is that the military reorganization was the work not of Rameses but of his father Seti.

The great struggle had exhausted both the Powers. Rameses reigned for more than forty years after it was all over. Had he been anything of a statesman, that long reign and long period of peace should have given ample opportunity for recuperation and consolidation. But Rameses had begun his rule by what might almost be called a parody of the rule of Thothmes III., and he continued it as a parodist of Amenhetep III. He began by seeking glory, and went on by aiming at splendor; his glory was chiefly tinsel and his splendor was unintelligent. Through all time, empires of the Oriental type have usually fallen into degeneracy as soon as they ceased to be essentially military, except under abnormal rulers such as the Great Mogul Akbar. The standard of political vitality is low, and martial ardor is the main incentive to corporate vigor and intellectual energy. After the great war, Egypt, while it maintained its appearance of magnificence, was in fact decaying; more and more it was passing under the dominion of the priesthood; while more and more its armies were ceasing to be national and instead were formed of mercenary regiments hired from Libya, and presently from rovers of the Ægean.

Before the death of Rameses himself the western barbarians of Libya were becoming aggressive, and an attack upon the Delta had to be beaten off. The accession of his son Menepthah, who is still perhaps most generally regarded as the pharaoh of the Exodus, was taken as a signal for revolt by the Canaanites, though the power of Egypt still proved itself capable of dealing with them drastically. In the enumeration of the tribes and cities smitten by Menepthah is to be noted the name of Israel, which certainly strengthens the conviction that the Hebrews were already settled in Palestine, and are to be identified with the Khabiri. Shortly afterwards a great rout was inflicted upon a confederate force of Libyans and sea-rovers, among whom are to be noted the Akaiwasha, who were probably the Hellenic Achæans making their first actual appearance in history, as well as the Tursha and Shardina, names which are at least strongly suggestive of the Italian Tyrsenians and of Sardinia, though possibly they should rather be connected with Sardis in Asia Minor. Though the Egyptian arms were triumphant against both insurgents and invaders, the insurrection and the invasion were significant of Egypt's decaying power. The very long reign of Rameses, with the nine years of Menepthah, cover the first seventy-five years of the thirteenth century.

After the great treaty of 1279 there were no more hostile relations between Egypt and Khatti. King Khattusil was evidently resolutely peaceful; the alliance was ratified a dozen years later by the marriage of the Hittite's daughter to his brother of Egypt, for the celebration of which the northern monarch took the unprecedented step of visiting Egypt in person. But the loose Hittite Empire was already tottering. It had indeed resisted the shock of the Egyptian attack; but its lack of coherence and the strain of the struggle left the Hittite kings too weak to assert themselves effectively. Already in the reign of Khattusil the growing power of Assyria was beginning to assert itself as the equal of Khatti; and in the reign of his son Dudhalia was ravaging Hittite dependencies unmolested. The Hittites were not overthrown in any great war; it would seem that their evanescent power broke up piecemeal, succumbing to internal decay rather than to external shocks.

Only that portion of Mesopotamia which had once formed the kingdom of Mitanni, and had then been absorbed by Shubbiluliuma, was affected by the struggle between Egypt and Khatti. We have seen that in Shubbiluliuma's time Assyria's strength was increasing under the shrewd king Ashur-uballit, who carefully avoided any collision with the Hittite conqueror. We have seen also how Burraburiash, the Kassite king of Babylonia, corresponded as an equal with Amenhetep IV., Akhenaten, as his predecessor had corresponded with Amenhetep III. Burraburiash had given up the attempt to claim any sovereignty over Assyria.

The marriage of Ashur-uballit's daughter to either Burraburiash or his son and successor suggests that the astute Assyrian was beginning to exercise an ascendancy at the Babylonian court. It is possible to see in the assassination of the son of this princess a revolt against the Assyrian influence; at any rate, it was Ashur-uballit who smote the rebels and set on the throne the legitimate king Kurigalzu III.

But Kardunayash—the Kassite name of Babylonia—recovered strength under this ruler, who waged successful war against Elam, and at the end of his reign inflicted a severe defeat on the Assyrian Adad-nirari, who presumed to attack him. When Khattusil was reigning at Khatti, Shalmaneser I. was king of Assyria. While the Egypto-Hittite war was still in progress Shalmaneser invaded what had once been Mitannian territory. Khattusil, who preferred diplomacy to war, retaliated by an alliance with Babylon. The result was renewed war between Assyria and Babylon, which would seem to have been to some extent rent between a Kassite party, who looked for Hittite support, and a Semitizing party which favored Assyria. At any rate, about the year 1250, when the Hittite power was becoming palpably

ineffective, Shalmaneser's son, Tukulti-Ninib I., ejected the Kassite king and assumed the crown of both Babylonia and Assyria.

Seven years later both Assyrians and Babylonians revolted against the energetic and tyrannical Tukulti-Ninib, headed by the king's own son, who slew his father, took the throne of Assyria for himself, and restored the legitimate Kassite in Babylonia. Assyria was overtaken by the dynastic chaos which is apt to follow such violent proceedings. The history of the ensuing years is obscure; but it would seem that towards the close of the century there was a renewed conflict between Babylonia and Assyria, in which the Kassite Melishipak made himself master of Assyria. In the next generation the Assyrian Ashur-dan ejected the Kassite king or viceroy; and within a few years Babylonia had got rid of its last Kassite king and established on its own account the new native Babylonian dynasty of Pashe about the year 1180, when a third Rameses was reigning in Egypt who seemed for a moment to have revived the waning glories of that Empire. But before we continue our record of the peoples with whom we have been hitherto concerned, we must turn aside to other races and regions with which they were now to be brought in contact.

III.—The Ægean Isles and Coasts

It will prevent confusion to explain at the outset that we shall here apply the terms Greece and Greek to a geographical area and its inhabitants of whatever race, reserving the terms Hellene and Hellenic specifically for those Aryan peoples who occupied it only a short time before the full light of history breaks upon it. The area covered is the modern Balkan Peninsula, together with the islands of the Ægean Sea and the coast regions of Asia Minor, the mountainous interior of Asia Minor being both geographically and ethnically distinct from it.

In this Greek or Ægean region there had grown up during many centuries an advanced cultivation entirely apart from, and independent of, the civilizations of Western Asia and Egypt; and the peoples among whom it arose were ethnically distinct from Egyptians, Sumarians, Semites, Aryans, and probably Hittites also. There are indications of an African origin, neither Hamite nor negro; but if they were African emigrants they came into Greece before Egypt had achieved a distinctive culture, in the neolithic times before the use of metal had been discovered.

To the early Greek culture the name Minoan has been given from the mainly, though not perhaps wholly, legendary Cretan king, Minos, who figures in the hero-tales of the Hellenes. "Minoan" is, in effect, equivalent to Cretan, and the name has been adopted because Knossos in Crete is the remarkable burial-place of pre-Hellenic remains, from

the excavation of which most of our still somewhat hypothetical knowledge is derived, tempered by inferences from Hellenic legends.

From these excavations, from the varying characteristics of the artistic and architectural relics unearthed by the archæologists, we can draw sundry chronological inferences. Fragments of Egyptian bowls point to some communication with the Nile Delta in the time of the Third Egyptian Dynasty, which we have placed at the end of the fourth millennium. When the dynasty of Rameses was ruling in Egypt, the Cretan Knossos had given place to Mycenæ in the Peloponnesus as the headquarters of the most advanced culture, but Knossos had not yet lost its supremacy when the artists of Thothmes the Great were depicting the visitors from Keftiu or Crete. An intermediate Minoan period shows correspondence with the period of the Twelfth Egyptian Dynasty, approximately the twentieth century. Consequently it is clear that a definite educated Minoan culture existed from a time contemporary with or prior to the building of the first pyramid by Tjeser, and lasted through progressive stages until it was displaced by the Hellenic expansion of the thirteenth century. It is of interest also to note that the hardening of copper tools by the admixture of tin was understood by the Cretans long before it was adopted by the Egyptians.

It is difficult to ascertain the precise relation between the culture of Crete, and ultimately of Mycenæ, and that of another center of Greek culture on the north-east corner of the Ægean, the city of Troy. The Troy which actually perished at the time when the Mycenæan culture was at its height was Mycenæan; but it was built upon the ruins of an older Troy, itself reared upon the ruins of another. The excavators tell us that there were six successive towns of Troy on the same spot, and that the first Troy was mainly, if not wholly, neolithic. There is evidence that the later pre-Hellenic population of Asiatic Greece was of Aryan origin, though in part at least it took on the non-Aryan Minoan culture, very much as the originally barbarian Hellenes themselves appropriated the Mycenæan culture and transformed it into an entirely characteristic culture of their own.

We incline then to the view that the Mycenæan culture came in contact with the Trojan after Troy had become Aryanized, and not before five successive Troys had been buried. Even then the stubborn Aryan refused to be absorbed by the more sophisticated southern race, and only took on its culture with a difference.

Now, it would seem that in the whole region of Greece in its pre-historic state we have to deal with at least two strongly opposed racial elements gradually occupying the territory: an African element pushing up from the south and developing an advanced civilization emanating mainly from Crete; on the north, Aryan peoples occupying Thrace and Illyria, and pushing down into Macedonia and Thessaly.

while another branch pushes over the Hellespont into the coast lands of Western Asia Minor. Of these Aryan peoples the eastern branch is the more advanced; the western or Hellenic is still in the neolithic stage, perhaps as late as the fifteenth century. The eastern or Phrygian branch should probably not be called Hellenic at all.

Manifestly the Africans, the Minoans, were a seafaring folk who spread over the Archipelago and developed their culture in the Archipelago. Whether the first occupants of the mainland east and west of the Ægean were precursors of the Minoans of the same original stock, who remained neolithic and unprogressive, or were precursors of the Aryans, or were of a race distinct from both, remains uncertain; the presumption at least is that they were not Aryan. But by the time when the Minoan culture, architecture, pottery, and manners and customs thereby portrayed, achieved a sudden predominance in the south of European Greece, apparently about the end of the fourteenth century and during the thirteenth century, it would seem that that region was mainly inhabited by a population of mixed descent, partly, though not perhaps predominantly, Hellenic, over whom Minoan invaders established a supremacy.

The Minoan culture on the mainland belongs entirely to the "late Minoan" period, which lasted approximately from 1500 to 1200. But the early and middle bronze-using Minoan culture had dominated the Ægean islands for something like fifteen hundred years before. The "middle Minoan" period corresponds approximately to what we have called the Middle Kingdom of Egypt, and the Hyksos period, covering the centuries from the twentieth to the sixteenth. It was a little before this time, at the end of the "early Minoan" period, that Troy passed out of the neolithic stage, influenced though not dominated by the Minoan culture; from which we may infer that, whether neolithic Troy was already Phrygian or not, it was, at any rate, not African. As in European Greece, so also in Western Asia Minor, we incline to the hypothesis that during the next few centuries the population became one of mixed descent combining Phrygians and pre-Phrygians, but with the Phrygian element predominating in the north, and the pre-Phrygian or Carian in the south.

At a very early stage, Knossos must have been a center of political power wielded by an imperial dynasty. Spacious architectural conceptions are evident in the earliest designs, which must have been earlier than the twentieth century. The Cretan monarchs preferred palace building to temple building, and in that field they left the Egyptians far behind. From one point of view the most surprising characteristic is the presence of great drainage works on a scale unknown in the ancient world except to the Romans; and, from another, the representations of ladies of the Minoan court clad in raiment

highly suggestive of the court of Charles II. or, at an earlier stage, of the Tudor period.

Hellenic tradition made Minos a great Cretan king who, before he sank or rose to the dignity of a judge in the under world, ruled mightily over the islands of the Ægean, and claimed a yearly tribute of youths and maidens from Athens, until Theseus, the Athenian hero, slew his monster son the Minotaur. Whether Minos actually reigned or not, all the evidence points to an effective Minoan supremacy over sea and islands and coast. The Minos tradition, with others attributing an eastern origin to heroic families among the Hellenes and to their earliest instructors in civilized arts, suggests that Hellenes were already settled in Bœotia, in Attica, and in the Peloponnese, and then became subjected about the fifteenth century to Minoan dynasties: a view much more probable than the other, that the mainland natives imported and adopted Minoan ideas of their own account. It is noticeable that the Minoan development, which has given us the great remains at Mycenæ and Tiryns, was apparently accompanied by the decadence of Knossos and the transfer of the center of Minoan splendor to the southern European mainland of Greece.

Now if our inferences have been correct, about the beginning of the fourteenth century Minoan princes were reigning in Bœotia and the Eastern Peloponnese over a mixed population who may be called Ionian or Pelasgian, according as the Hellenic element predominated or was subordinate. Farther north, in Thessaly, was a definitely Hellenic population, the Achæns, practically untouched by the Minoan civilization. Beyond these again were the Aryan tribes of Macedonia, with Illyria on the west and Thrace on the east, those to the westward being of the Hellenic stock, while those to the east may have been Slavonic. In the islands, the power of the once mighty state centered at Knossos had vanished, overthrown perhaps by the recently developed Minoan state on the mainland.

At this stage, then, a new migratory impulse was stirring among the Northern Hellenes. This people had been behind their neighbors, and remained in the neolithic stage long after copper and bronze had been brought into full use by Minoans, Semites, and Egyptians; but in remote Danubian regions they made for themselves a still more valuable discovery, the use of iron, which rendered them infinitely more formidable. The southward movement from Illyria and Macedonia brought them into collision with their kinsmen, Achæans and Danaans, who had only recently learned the use of bronze weapons from the Minoans. Much as, two thousand years later, Angles and Saxons poured into Britain, when they felt the pressure of other Teutonic tribes at their backs, so Achæans and Danaans, under pressure from the north, pushed southward upon Ionians and Pelasgians, or took to their ships and pressed eastwards into the islands or on to the

Asiatic coast. Under pressure from them again, their southern Ionian and Pelasgian kinsfolk pushed across to the southern coast of Asia Minor, through the Cyclades. Their impetus set in motion the Phrygian or partly Carian peoples, who had already, perhaps, been profiting by the fall of the Minoan state to obtain a footing in the southern islands, in Crete and in Cyprus, from which the Ionian newcomers now again ejected them. And so it befell that in the days of Menephtah, about 1230 B.C., mixed hordes of sea-rovers, some of whom were certainly Hellenes, joined with the Libyans in that attack whose repulse has been recorded. So, to use the familiar parallel, Saxons united with Picts and Scots in attacks upon the Britons after the Roman evacuation, before British princes wrought their own ruin by calling them in to their own aid. And so, also, it befell that nearly half a century later mixed hordes, of whom only a very few were Hellenes, were flinging themselves upon the coasts of Phœnicia and Palestine till their conquering career was checked by Rameses III.

As we have reconstructed this period of history, the iron-using Hellenes from the north have no part in the actual southward and westward movement of Achæans and Ionians and the corresponding movement of Minoans and Phrygians, although they provided the original impulse. The facts and the hypotheses, of which the whole hypothesis is a composite, tally also remarkably well with those invaluable Hellenic documents, the Homeric poems. Troy was a real town, a town which had been wealthy and important for many centuries, until it was absolutely wiped out and levelled with the ground by a great force of Achæans, Danaans, and Argives, at a date which tradition fixed in 1184 B.C.—precisely at the time when indubitable history relates that the islanders and the peoples of southern Asia Minor were seeking new territory and were checked by the skill and valor of Rameses III.; the time when, according to our hypothesis, they had been set in motion by the advance from the west of Achæans and Ionians.

In the Homeric poems, which probably only attained their consummate form in the hands of an Ionian poet or poets in the ninth century, the Greeks bear the names we have used; they are not known to themselves as Hellenes. They are users of bronze, but of iron only to a very slight extent; their great hero is the Thes-salian Achilles; the "Argives." *Argeioi*, manifestly take their name not from Argos in the Peloponnese but from Argos in Thessaly. The record is the traditional record of the Achæan and Ionian advance upon Northern Asia Minor, mingled with the traditions of Minoan kings of Peloponnesian Mycenæ, although these are crossed by the appropriation of the Mycenæan glories to the later Hellenic conquerors of the Dorian branch, the iron-users from the north.

It must be remembered that, however firmly convinced we may

be that a single poet wrote the "Iliad," and a single poet wrote the "Odyssey," or even that a single poet wrote both, still he was not describing contemporary events or conditions, but was working upon traditions of past history passed from lip to lip, generation after generation, over a period as long as that which separates us from the Great Rebellion. That tradition was embodied in old lays, re-fashioned and welded together in one magnificent whole by the master hand; but the master did not choose to obliterate the original marks of diversity, nor was he at any pains to harmonize discordant traditions for the sake of historic truth. So far as he sought to harmonize them it was only for the sake of artistic truth. He was an Achæan Ionian of the ninth century, portraying Achæans of the twelfth century, inevitably importing into his portrayal some coloring derived from later ideas. But the result shows that the Achæan tradition did not depart further than oral tradition must be expected to do from a history reconcilable with the other data which have been brought to our knowledge.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEMITIC AREA: FROM 1200 TO 538 B.C.

I.—The Twelfth and Eleventh Centuries

IN the closing years of Rameses II. and the weak reign of his son Menepthah, Egypt was still enjoying the semblance of her former glories, though her real vigor had been sapped. Enough of the glitter remained to confirm later generations in the belief that Rameses had been the greatest of kings. After the death of Menepthah the illusion of Egyptian greatness vanished in the confusion of the three following reigns, at the end of which a Syrian adventurer managed for a few months to usurp the royal title.

The Syrian was ejected by Setnekht, an Egyptian noble probably of the blood royal, whose son, Rameses III., was a not unworthy successor of the great pharaohs. His thirty years' reign at least re-established order, restored the material prosperity of the country, and saved her from humiliation at the hands of foreign foes. Egypt grew rich, and the "treasures of Rhampsinitos"—a combination of the name of Rameses with one of his titles—became proverbial. He was a sort of King Canute, an able and wise ruler whose traditional fame was not diminished by his propitiatory treatment of the priesthood. But the power of Egypt under Rameses, like the power of England under Canute, depended upon the personality of the monarch; the virility of Egypt had departed for ever.

The outstanding event of his reign was the first great sea-fight on record, the fight in which Rameses shattered the great invasion of the "Islanders" (the Northerners). The eastward movement of the Phrygians was probably responsible for shattering what was left of the Hittite power in the north. When the migrating host of Carians and Islanders flung themselves upon Northern Syria and Phoenicia, they carried all before them; their fleets and armies, acting in co-operation, swept victoriously southward. But the vigorous Egyptian gathered his forces by sea and land and struck before any attack from him was expected. His ships annihilated the Islanders' fleet as they lay at anchor—probably off the Nile mouth—out of touch with the shore force, from which they were cut off by the simultaneous appear-

ance of his army, which then overwhelmed their hosts upon land. As far as Egypt was concerned, the single campaign was absolutely decisive; the migratory confederacy was completely broken up.

Rameses returned in triumph to Egypt, and the remaining four-and-twenty years of his reign were devoted to the development of her material prosperity. Only once more did Rameses himself have to draw the sword, to inflict upon the Libyans an equally decisive defeat upon their last attempt to invade the Delta. Menephtah had defeated them when they came with islanders and allies; they were not likely to stand against Rameses when they came alone.

But Rameses had no idea of recovering the Egyptian Empire. There were no foreign foes to be feared, and he had no desire to extend his dominion; nor did Egypt provide him with the materials for doing so. The very armies with which he won his victories were largely made up of foreign mercenaries, many of them akin to the enemy he had destroyed. Not with such troops are empires won.

For the rest of the century the history of Egypt is the story of the increasing subjection of the series of eight kings, all of whom bore the name of Rameses, to the domination of the priests of Amen. When the last Rameses died, Herihor, the High Priest of Amen at Thebes, was also to assume the title of pharaoh unopposed; while he recognized as independent king of Lower Egypt the viceroy of the north, whose wife was of the royal line, and who had for many years been a satrap exercising authority with little or no reference to Rameses. Practically it would appear that these two dynasties entered into a compact by which they were to rule Upper and Lower Egypt respectively, while one or the other was to enjoy in alternation a nominal supremacy over the whole. The Ramessides count as the Twentieth Dynasty, and these alternating rulers, whose ascendancy lasted into the tenth century, as the Twenty-first.

We have seen how, while Rameses III. was reigning in Egypt, the anarchy which had fallen upon Assyria after the murder of Tukulti-Ninib was brought to an end by the accession of Ashur Dan, and how the Kassites vanished from history with the establishment of the Pashe Dynasty in Babylonia at about the same time. Neither Babylonia nor Assyria awoke to immediate activity. Ashur Dan did not attempt to recover the northwestern districts, which in the last days of the anarchy were apparently overrun by Hittites retreating before the pressure from the Phrygians on the west.

Towards the end of the twelfth century Nebuchadrezzar I., challenged by the Assyrian Ashur-rish-ishi, defeated the latter and apparently extended his dominion over Naharin. Then actually, at the close of the century, Ashur-rish-ishi was succeeded by Tiglath-pileser, who may be called the first of the great Assyrian conquerors. He humbled Babylon, annexing all her possessions in Upper Mesopotamia,

recovered the lands appropriated by the Hittites at the beginning of the century, subjugated the whole of the ancient Mitanni, overran Naharin, and finally thrust his way over the mountains into the ancient kingdom of Khatti, though he did not penetrate so far as that town itself. Then he struck down at North Phoenicia, where he claimed a sovereignty which was readily conceded. Though he only reigned for seven years, dying in 1100, he dealt one more blow to Babylon, which had made a last vain attempt to challenge his power.

With his death both Babylonia and Assyria sank into the same inert condition as Egypt under the Twenty-first Dynasty. Throughout the eleventh century no activities are to be recorded either in the Egyptian or in the Mesopotamia area. There was a long era of peace in both regions, though it was the peace not of progress but of apathy. Even in the twelfth century the only great sons to whom the ancient lands had given birth were Rameses III., Nebuchadrezzar I., and Tiglath-pileser I.; in the eleventh they produced none at all. Through those two centuries the stage for the most remarkable movements is to be found partly in Greece, of which we shall not speak here, and mainly in the great region bounded on the northeast by the Euphrates, and on the west by the Mediterranean and the desert of Sinai—Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine.

We have reason to suppose that the Hebrews entered Palestine and there established themselves in the time of Akhenaten—that is, in the first half of the fourteenth century—and that Israel was one of the peoples of Canaan whose defiance was punished by Menephtah about 1230 B.C. After the long wanderings in the desert, a return to the nomadic life of their forefathers, the twelve tribes had crossed Jordan, spreading themselves northward to the confines of Phoenicia and southward into the hill country of Judah. Politically they did not form a united nation, but submitted themselves locally to the judges, who in general were military leaders.

The Hebrew were distinguished from all their neighbors, Semitic or other, by the unique religion which taught them to worship a God unrepresented by images of any kind; whereas all their neighbors worshipped many gods, all represented by images made with hands. The worship of Yahweh was preserved by the priesthood, especially in association with the tribe most isolated in its mountain fastnesses from external attacks.

The connection with the outlying tribes on the Phoenician marches, beyond Jordan, and in the far south beyond Judah, was not closely maintained; they were all in perpetual contact with other kindred Semitic tribes. Some of them soon fade out of the Hebrew chronicle; the tribes which remained prominent throughout the history of Judah and of Israel were those which dwelt west of Jordan and south of the Sea of Galilee, the tribes which descended, according to the Hebrew

tradition, from the sons of the two full wives of the patriarch Jacob.

In the early days, however, the outlying tribes had not been seduced from their allegiance, and we find them taking prominent part in the struggle with the Canaanites proper, with Amorites and Hittites in the northeast, and with Bedawin Moabites, Ammonites, Amalekites, and Midianites, especially under the leadership of Barak and Gideon. The great victory celebrated in Deborah's Song of Triumph, a victory over the northern enemies, was probably not long after the time of Meneptah. But even at this time, immediately preceding the struggle in which Gideon overthrew the Midianites, the narrative tells how the two tribes of the extreme north, Dan and Ashur, took no part in the contest, but "remained in ships and on the sea-shore!" Evidently they were assimilating themselves to their Phœnician neighbors. Very shortly afterwards we find the first unsuccessful attempt to impose a monarchy upon the loosely associated Israelite confederacy made by Gideon's son Abimelech.

The trans-Jordan tribe of Gad took no part in the conflict with the northern Canaanites, or in that with the Midianites who were west of the Jordan when Gideon smote them; but they contributed the hero of the next war, which was again fought against a Bedawin group, the Ammonites. And then we find Israel plunged into its long struggle with the Philistines, who were neither Bedawins nor Canaanites proper, but the lords of the western plain between the mountains and the sea stretching from the south half-way up the coast of Palestine.

The Philistines are to be definitely identified with a portion of that horde which met with its tremendous defeat at the hands of Rameses III. The horde had included Hellenic Danai, who do not reappear in the south; but the greater portion of it consisted of Pulesti (Philistines) and their kindred tribes from Crete and Caria: not Hellenes, probably not Aryans, but a population possibly in some degree Aryanized by the Phrygians in their home on the west coast of Asia Minor. Whether the defeat was less tremendous than the records of Rameses would have us to believe, or was inflicted before the arrival of reinforcements which did not venture again to challenge Egypt, it is evident that a Philistine horde soon afterwards poured into the plains of Philistia and made themselves masters of it. If Judah and Benjamin had made their way into the plains at all, they were swept back to the hills by the Philistine conquerors, who established a confederacy of five great cities dominating the whole district from Ekron in the north to Gaza in the south, with Ashdod and Askelon on the coast, and Gath as the advanced fortress inland to hold back the hillmen. They brought with them something of the Minoan culture which they had learned in a probably brief habitation in Crete; more characteristically, they brought the superior bronze weapons which they had long used in Caria and Lycia; but they were conquerors after the

manner of the Danes and Northmen, and probably remained in their conquered territory as an aristocracy which adapted itself to and absorbed the characteristics of its Canaanite subjects, though they remained to the Hebrews aliens in a much more emphatic sense than the Bedawin or Canaanite tribes.

In the course of the eleventh century the hillmen of Judah and Benjamin had learned to look upon the Philistines very much as the twelfth-century Welshmen looked upon the Norman barons of the marches; though with additional loathing, as worshippers of false gods who had even robbed Israel of the shrine of Yahweh, and carried the Ark into captivity. Philistine garrisons were planted in the heart of the territory of Israel far up to the north, and the oppressive conquerors almost succeeded in disarming the Israelite population. The spirit of defiance was not killed, but the unhappy people would not move until some war lord should arise to lead them; and it was under these conditions that the prophet Samuel, the incarnate spirit of religious and national revolt, reluctantly consented to break with tradition and to give Israel a king, towards the closing years of the eleventh century.

The period of the depression of the great empires was also the period marked by the development of the Aramaic power in Syria, following on the Aramaic expansion of the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries. The Aramæans were the Syrians of the Hebrews Scriptures, where we find their power focused at the city of Damascus. They are distinct from the original Semites of Mesopotamia; from the early Semitic wave which established the first kingdom of Babylon; and from the Amorites, the Semitic people with whom we have associated Northern Syria in the past; as well as from the Canaanites and Phœnicians. The relation between Aramæans, Hebrews, and all those trans-Jordan tribes with whom the children of Israel fought—Moab and Ammon, Midian and Amalek and Edom—is obscure. The Aramæans were of nomadic origin, pretty certainly akin to these southern tribes; but when they made themselves masters of Syria their movement appears to have been southward from the Euphrates valley. How, when, and whence they came to the Euphrates valley is an unexplained question. But it seems at any rate reasonable to suppose that they came of a stock akin to Israel, Moab, and Edom, rather than to any other of the Semites with whom we have been concerned.

The Aramæans proper hardly came into conflict with the Hebrews until the tenth century, unless it was at the time when Israel was making good its position in the north of Canaan, definitely secured by the victory celebrated in the Song of Deborah. By that time they were already established at Damascus, which they had taken from the Amorites. Probably they never pushed west of the Lebanon

and anti-Lebanon Mountains, or south of Bashan which lies to the east of the Sea of Galilee, their southward movement being checked by their Bedawin kinsfolk, Ammonites and Midianites; though there is some reason to suppose that they gave chiefs to the Edomites still farther to the south.

Meanwhile, the Phœnicians abode in their cities by the sea, comparatively immune from disturbance, protected on the land side by the mountain barrier, and rendered impregnable from the sea by their own navies. Phœnicia had only been really subjugated when the power of Egypt was able to strike from the south through Palestine; neither Canaanites nor Isralites ever attacked them, and they successfully survived the onslaught of the islanders. The Phœnicians never combined to form an aggressive state; they were content to enjoy the wealth which commerce brought them, a business in which they had no competitors. Among seafaring folk they monopolized the knowledge that organized commerce is more lucrative than piratical raiding.

II.—The Rise and Disruption of the Hebrew Kingdom

The history of Assyria and Babylonia is practically without records until early in the ninth century. Egypt was still under her Twenty-first Dynasty until more than half the tenth century was over, and under her next dynasty she became only intermittently active. The interest of the next hundred years of our story centers in the rise, the brief power, and the disruption of the Hebrew kingdom and the gradual consolidation of a Syrian power.

The eleventh century was not yet over, according to our chronology, when the Hebrews, inspired by the Ephramite Samuel and captained by the Benjamite Saul, revolted against the Philistine oppression. Saul's first appearance as a leader was, however, on the east of Jordan outside the Philistine sphere, in a raid upon the Ammonites, the Bedawin foe on the east. The disarmament of Israel by the Philistines was not carried beyond Jordan, and thither it may be that many bolder spirits had retreated rather than submit to the Philistine sway. There, at any rate, it was possible to gather an armed force. This initial display of prowess confirmed Samuel's selection of Saul as leader or king, and silenced the rivals who were jealous of the chosen monarch and against whom he refused to take any action.

Immediately Saul turned his arms against the Philistines. His son Jonathan was dispatched to drive out one of their northern garrisons at Geba. The news of this open revolt caused the Philistines to gather in force and advance to Michmash to crush the rebels. But they were a mixed multitude. According to the Bible narrative, a daring exploit on the part of Jonathan started a panic in the

Philistine host; the local or tribal contingents fell upon each other, believing that treachery was at work; and Saul seized his opportunity to turn their confusion into a complete rout and a great slaughter.

Having cleared the Philistines out of the hill country, the king soon made his power felt by the old enemies of Israel beyond Jordan and by the Amalekites on the south; but he followed the dictates of ordinary political prudence in seeking to save the spoils and to preserve his prisoners, regardless of his mentor Samuel, who had demanded a war of extermination in the name of Yahweh. The divergence of policy produced a split between what may be called the Puritan faction on the one hand, to whom Saul had originally owed his crown—a faction which found its strongest supporters among the hillmen of the south, the tribe of Judah, always in some degree isolated from their northern kinsmen—and the faction of Saul's adherents on the other. The Puritans fixed their hopes upon one of their tribesmen, David, a young captain who rapidly achieved distinction. There is no reason to doubt that David was personally loyal to the king; but Saul distrusted his faith, and David had to retire to the mountain fastnesses of his own land to escape the king's wrath. The Philistines had returned to the attack soon after the smiting of the Amalekites. David, who had taken a prominent share in the successful resistance offered, now waged war against them on his own account; but, since he could no longer act in coöperation with Saul, he apparently gave up the contest and made terms satisfactory to himself with the Philistines, who recognized him as a semi-independent viceroy of their own in the south. Soon afterwards Saul met with his great defeat at Mount Gilboa, where he and his son Jonathan were slain.

Israel, with the exception of David and his countrymen, who were now feudatories of the Philistines, recognized Ishbosheth, another son of Saul, as king. The position was not to David's liking. His old devotion to Jonathan no longer stood in the way of his personal ambitions, and on their fulfilment now depended the liberation of Israel and the triumph of Yahweh over the gods of the Gentiles. Only under his own leadership could Israel be inspired with that fervor of Puritan enthusiasm which should urge it on to victory.

David then asserted his claim to the succession as having been undoubtedly the nominee of Samuel. He did not, however, succeed in deposing Ishbosheth till the royalist captain, Abner, as a result of a personal quarrel with the king, went over to David's side. The assassination of both Abner and Ishbosheth, though not contrived by David, removed the only possible rivals in the leadership, since David's own chief captain, Joab, was no less loyal than he was able, fierce, and turbulent. All Israel recognized David as

king, and he signalized the fact by surprising and capturing the almost impregnable city of Jerusalem, which the Hebrews had never hitherto succeeded in wresting from its Canaanite possessors.

The Philistines had never attempted to restore their garrisons either in the north or in David's territory of Hebron; they had been contented with the overlordship which must have been established after the battle of Mount Gilboa. Apparently they had been undisturbed by what seemed to be mere faction fights among their feudatories. But the capture of Jerusalem woke their alarm. They gathered to attack David, who now at last openly set them at defiance, and inflicted upon them two defeats so overwhelming that he no longer needed to stand on the defensive, but struck straight and hard at the two most important Philistine cities—the strategic advanced post at Gath, and Ashdod, which was recognized as the premier city in the confederacy. The capture of both destroyed the Philistine state. For the remainder of the reign, Philistines appear as forming the royal bodyguard, and one of them became a trusted captain of King David; they were no longer enemies, though they do not seem to have become his subjects.

David's treatment of the Philistines, once his companions-in-arms, was lenient enough. Samuel himself would have been satisfied with the mercileless policy adopted by the great soldier when he turned his arms upon the old enemies beyond Jordan. Half Moab was put to the sword, and when Ammon called in the northern Aramæans to its aid and flung defiance at him, the Ammonites were practically annihilated. The Aramæans took alarm, but their gathered forces were completely routed, and Damascus itself was annexed to the Hebrew kingdom. David rounded off his dominions by the annexation of Edom on the south, which gave him a port on the Red Sea. He was a man of war, but he may be credited with the statesmanlike conception that the wealth of the kingdom which he had organized might be greatly increased by a sea-borne commerce with the south.

As soldier and patriot he had realized such ambitions as no Hebrew before him could have dreamed of; how thoroughly also in him were realized the ideals of Hebrew Puritanism in his own and in later ages, needs no emphasizing. His son and successor, Solomon, was a man of altogether different type, a man of peace as his father had been a man of war; one whose relations with foreign Powers were managed wholly by methods of diplomacy; an astute politician who made his succession secure by the magnificence with which he endowed the worship of Yahweh at the beginning of his reign, whereas in later years he virtually discarded his alliance with the priesthood.

Solomon turned his Red Sea port of Ezion-geber to such account that he became fabulously wealthy, though whither his ships went it is impossible to say—probably the historians themselves only had

a vague impression that Ophir was somewhere in the south. It is not impossible that they brought gold even from Africa beyond the equator; it is more than probable that they traded with the western coast of India. David's annexation of Damascus had brought with it the control of the trade route between the western sea and Mesopotamia, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsacus, the biblical Iphsah. He cultivated relations with the wealthy Hiram of Tyre, which had now become pre-eminent among the Phœnician cities. In Philistia he held the port of Gaza, though it has been argued that the Philistines in general escaped from the Hebrew dominion by submitting themselves to Egypt, since, in the reign of Solomon's successor, the pharaoh Shishak, or Sheshenk, claimed a sovereignty there without opposition. Solomon himself, in accordance with his policy, opened diplomatic relations with Egypt, and received an Egyptian princess as one of his wives. The familiar story of the visit of the Queen of Sheba further illustrates the range of Solomon's diplomatic and commercial connections.

David's Puritanism had been of the Cromwellian or Independent type—that is, he had been the champion of religion without being subservient to the "churchmen." The ideal of a Puritan monarchy faded away in the reign of his successor. Before it was ended, the Israelites were enjoying at least a large latitude in the worship of false gods. The policy which established friendly commercial relations in all directions also gave free play to foreign influences, and the vital unifying energy of the nation, was dissipated. Before Solomon's death, the outlying non-Hebrew provinces which David had annexed had already shaken off their allegiance to a prince who cared more for wealth and culture than for military prestige; both Damascus and Edom recovered their independence.

Solomon was succeeded by his son Rehoboam, a prince of the worst Oriental type, brought up in the harem, arrogant, self-willed, and utterly incompetent. There had always been a certain artificiality in that union between Northern and Southern Israel which had been accomplished by the energy of David. The disintegrating factors which had been repressed under the great king had again been coming into full play under Solomon, unchecked by the necessity for solidarity which had been involved by the struggle, first for independence, and then for dominion. The ambitious soldier Jeroboam, whom Solomon had driven forth to exile in Egypt, his mother's land, saw his opportunity, returned to Palestine, and headed a revolt against Rehoboam. Judah, and rather curiously Benjamin, proved loyal even to so degenerate a grandson of the tribal and national hero; the center of the Yahweh worship and the strength of Puritanism lay within their territory; they held together and preserved the line

of David on the throne of the south. But Jeroboam carried with him the whole of the north, which was richer, more populous, and more open to Gentile influences. The adventurer saw that he could not conquer the south; and in order to counteract the risks of the Yahweh worship again asserting a unifying influence, he deliberately fostered the secondary calf-worship, brought originally from Egypt, which had never been eradicated. Therefore his name has been handed down to posterity by the Judaic chroniclers as for ever accursed—he is “Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, which made Israel to sin.”

Of the two kingdoms into which the united kingdom of David and Solomon was broken up about the year 930, the northern was much the stronger and wealthier, standing in a relation to the Southern which has some similarity to the mediæval relations of England to Scotland. While the foreign relations of Judah were for a long time to come controlled by her relations with the northern kingdom, Israel itself continued to play an active part in the international politics of the East till it was overwhelmed by Assyria; and played it as a typically Oriental monarchy, founded by a military adventurer, and ruled over by successive dynasties each of them founded by a military adventurer—the houses of Jeroboam, of Baasha, of Omri, of Jehu, Menahem, Pekah, and Hoshea. Judah, on the other hand, held fast by the legitimate line of David, which for the most part held loyally to the worship of Yahweh, and was consistently supported by all the forces of the Yahwist priesthood and of Puritanism. But the kingdom was never able to do more than preserve its own integrity; it could never adopt an independent rôle in international politics. When we find it taking part in foreign wars, it is usually in the position of a somewhat reluctant ally, almost a dependency, of its more powerful Northern neighbor.

At the time of the disruption, the Twenty-first Dynasty in Egypt had, for only a few years, been displaced by the Twenty-second or Bubastite Dynasty, half of whose monarchs bore the name of Sheshenk. The first Sheshenk was probably a Libyan—captain of the Libyan mercenaries who had become the mainstay of the Egyptian standing armies—who obtained for himself a sort of legitimate title by marrying the daughter of the last king of the preceding dynasty. He made Bubastis in the Delta his capital, and successfully established his authority over Upper as well as Lower Egypt. It was at his court that the exiled Jeroboam had found refuge; and perhaps it was in the interests of his *protégé* that Shishak made his expedition against Rehoboam and carried off to Egypt as spoils the greater part of the treasure of Solomon's temple. Sheshenk I., however, was the only king of his dynasty who made any mark.

Nothing further of importance is to be recorded until the ninth century, when Assyria suddenly rose into tremendous importance after her prolonged era of decadence or, at least, of apathy.

III.—The Second Assyrian Empire, 893-745.

Almost at the middle of the ninth century the conquering power of Assyria came into collision with the southern Syrian states—Damascus, where Benhadad II. or Hadadezer was reigning; the more northerly Hamath; and Israel, then under the rule of Ahab, son of Omri.

In the earlier part of the century there had been frequent wars between Israel and Judah and between Israel and Damascus. The son of Jeroboam was overthrown by a vigorous captain, Baasha, who seized the throne and attacked Judah, which retaliated by an alliance with Damascus, whose intervention saved Asa, King of Judah, from subjugation by Israel. A few years later Baasha's son was assassinated by another captain, Zimri, who was immediately crushed by the general, Omri, who established a comparatively stable dynasty and achieved a reputation which permanently associated his name with the annals of Israel wherever they enter the Assyrian records, for Israel is referred to in them as "Bit-Omri," the house of Omri. He annexed Moab and probably established an ascendancy over Judah, which is clearly suggested, at least, in the history of his son Ahab and the King of Judah, Jehoshaphat.

The Judaic chroniclers tell us little concerning Omri, though they are singularly full in their history of Ahab, chiefly, no doubt, because of the long struggle between the king and the Yahwist prophet Elijah. Evidently at the accession of Ahab the ascendancy of Damascus was recognized; nevertheless, when Benhadad attempted to exercise his overlordship tyrannically, Ahab was able to offer a resistance so successful that the Syrian conceded to him a highly favorable treaty. Perhaps Benhadad had already realized that the united strength of the South would be needed to hold back the tide of the Assyrian advance. When, in 854, the northern power advanced against the southern Syrians, Benhadad was supported by the kings of Hamath and Israel in the great battle of Karkar, as recorded by the Assyrians. Though their historians claim it as a victory, the significant fact remains that after it the king, Shalmanezzer, retired, and some years elapsed before he renewed the attack. The biblical narrative describes Benhadad as a drunkard in telling the story of his earlier conflict with Ahab; it contains no record of the battle of Karkar; but he must have been at least a capable soldier and organizer to cope so successfully as he did with the now mighty northern power.

was equally willing to give the protection they desired—the greater the wealth of Babylon, the bigger would be the tribute which he would be able to exact.

A disputed succession between two of his sons produced some years of chaos at the end of his long reign, a chaos which induced the Babylonian king to throw off his allegiance, though his revolt was finally crushed by an overwhelming rout of the Babylonians.

Shalmaneser died in 825; his successor, Shamashi-adad IV., spent the first half of his thirteen years' reign in fighting for the crown, and the second half in suppressing the Babylonian revolt. After him came Adad-nirari III., who resumed the attack upon Syria, compelled the submission of Hamath, and of Phœnicia, which had not revolted though it had ceased to pay tribute, and at last imposed tribute upon Damascus itself.

When Damascus failed to fulfil its old function as the barrier of the south, the southern states, even as far as Edom, made prompt submission in the form which principally interested Assyrian monarchs—the payment of tribute. Damascus could not venture upon hostile action against the other obedient tributaries, and Joash of Israel, grandson of Jehu, was able to throw off the submission to Syria which Hazael had imposed upon his predecessor. While there was a strong presumption that Assyria would intervene to prevent any increase of the power of Damascus, she would have no objection to Israel increasing its power at the expense of that troublesome state. Joash and his son, Jeroboam II., recovered all the territories of which Damascus had robbed their predecessors, and even annexed Syrian territory which had never belonged to them since the time of Solomon. Jehu and his line in Israel evidently were tolerationists in religion. The Judaic chronicler reproaches them for "continuing in the sins of Jeroboam." Still, Jehu's revolution had itself been fostered by the Yahwist prophet Elisha, who remained always in friendly relations with the dynasty till his own death in the reign of Joash. Joash and Jeroboam II. were both vigorous kings who advanced the power of Israel.

Their joint reigns covered rather more than the first half of the eighth century. Adad-Nirari of Assyria, the last strong king of his line, died about the time of Jeroboam II.'s accession; his successors took no active part in Syrian affairs, while Jeroboam would seem to have been acquiring a general hegemony of the south. Since the battle of Karkar, Israel had never shown any inclination to follow the example of Damascus in its persistent attitude of resistance to Assyria, and the Assyrian kings now saw no reason to object to the extension of the Israelite power at the expense of the always turbulent Syrians.

Indeed it must have been altogether convenient to them that

Damascus should have an active enemy instead of an ally in the south, for they themselves were seriously troubled in the north by the growth of a hostile power in Armenia, where the hillmen had been combining to form the state of Urartu, or Van, ever since the evil days of Ashur-nasir-pal. Both Shalmaneser and Adad-Nirari III. had found it necessary to conduct or send what we should call punitive expeditions against Urartu, without achieving any very decisive results. After the death of Adad-Nirari practically the whole of the northeastern hill country conquered by Ashur-nasir-pal was annexed by Urartu, and the Assyrian expeditions met with unvarying disaster, though the hillmen abstained from attacking Assyria in the plains.

The military failures, coupled with a superstitious panic induced by an eclipse of the sun in 763, brought about an insurrection and civil war, which in its turn gave the long subject Babylonia renewed opportunity for revolt, and once more an independent Babylonian dynasty was established. Thus by the year 750 the total break up of the Assyrian Empire seemed imminent. It was averted by the revolt of the professional soldiers against the reigning dynasty, which was deposed to make room for the great soldier, Pul or Pulu, who adopted the significant name of Tiglath-pileser III. 745. For the first Tiglath-pileser was the traditional creator of the first Assyrian Empire.

IV.—The Last Assyrian Empire, 745-606

The disintegration of the Assyrian government under incompetent kings did not mean that the Assyrians had lost their fighting qualities; they had merely fallen into a brief eclipse, much as it befell in England in the days of Edward II. The army only needed a great captain to make it as efficient as it had ever been; and it had found a great captain in Tiglath-pileser. From Babylon as a military power nothing was to be feared; the new king was content at first to overawe it by a military demonstration which sufficiently served his immediate purposes, and then turned his attention to more serious matters. A campaign against the encroaching hillmen on the north-east taught them the wisdom of keeping within their own borders; then he moved upon Syria. The alarmed King of Urartu, whose power had been extended westwards, made common cause with the Syrians and marched down from the mountains to attack him, only to meet with complete rout.

Naharin submitted to the conqueror. When Tiglath-pileser turned his arms against Urartu itself, Southern Syria prepared to resist the attack which was obviously threatening. But no such strong combination as had been formed in the old days by Benhadad was now possible. Jeroboam of Israel was dead; his line had ended with his son, and Israel was ruled by another military usurper, Menahem,

whose power was exceedingly unstable. In two campaigns Tiglath-pileser broke up the new confederacy; Damascus, Israel, and Tyre were compelled to pay tribute, and the Assyrian again turned to complete the subjugation of Urartu, whose power he shattered, though he did not succeed in bringing it to entire subjection.

Now it would seem that the anarchy which had overtaken the northern kingdom of Israel had given to the old king, Azariah, or Uzziah, of Judah, the opportunity of extending his own ascendancy—northwards to take the place of that of the house of Jehu, and southwards over Edom. Since the disruption, the kingdom of Judah had never before held a dominant position; when Uzziah's son Jotham died a general combination was formed to destroy its new ascendancy. The new king, Ahaz, threatened with destruction, appealed to the great conqueror of the north for protection. The Assyrian came, smote the independent cities of the Philistines which had joined the confederacy, received the submission of the last military usurper in Israel, Hoshea, and carried the Syrians of Damascus into captivity. Here we observe the application of a method characteristic of the Assyrian Empire, the wholesale deportation of populations. In a later reign, Israel was subjected to the same fate as Damascus, and the "lost tribes" vanished into the unknown. All the outlying peoples sent in submission and tribute, and Tiglath-pileser was the acknowledged lord of all the lands from the Euphrates to the peninsula of Sinai.

There remained Babylonia, still in a condition of nominal independence. But there the dynasty had latterly been ousted by a Chaldean from the district of the Lower Euphrates and the Persian Gulf. In answer to an appeal from the Babylonians Tiglath-pileser easily ejected the Chaldean, not to restore the fallen dynasty but to claim for himself the crown of Babylonia, and the ancient title of King of Sumer and Akkad. In the next year, 727, Tiglath-pileser died.

In 720, seven years after the conqueror's death, Egypt and Assyria met for the first time in the shock of battle. For more than four hundred and fifty years the hand of Egypt had scarcely been felt in Asia. Solomon had married an Egyptian princess, and Sheshenk I. had raided Jerusalem in the middle section of the period; Philistia had voluntarily, as it would seem, placed itself under Egyptian protection, for the sake of security against the growing power of the Hebrew kingdom. Practically these are the only events which during those four and a half centuries had brought Egypt and Asia into contact at all. The new conflict was brought about by a general rising of the west, from Hamath on the north to Gaza in the south; against the Assyrian supremacy; a rising fomented by Egypt, which sent forth its armies to support the insurgents. The result was a

crushing defeat for the Egyptian, who made haste to conciliate the victor, Sargon, with gifts which he duly recorded as "tribute." This battle of Raphia was ominous of troubles to come.

The death of Tiglath-pileser and the accession of his son Shalmaneser II. had given the signal for insurrection. Hoshea of Israel stopped his tribute, the payment of which had saved his kingdom from destruction in the last reign. Shalmaneser was murdered, and succeeded by Sargon, before the stubborn Israelite was crushed; but that event, and the deportation of nearly thirty thousand Israelites, very soon followed Sargon's accession. For the time the revolt spread no further, but it had given the Chaldeans another opportunity. Merodach-baladan set himself up as king in Southern Mesopotamia, supported by another Power of which we have heard nothing for several centuries, the kingdom of Elam, which felt itself threatened through the Assyrian conquests in the hill country.

Sargon left the west in order to reassert his sovereignty in the east, but met with so little success that he had to retire, leaving Babylonia to acknowledge Merodach-baladan. Perhaps the report of his failure encouraged the fresh rising which brought about the campaign in which Sargon crushed the northern Syrians at the second battle of Karkar (which lies in the Orontes valley), and then smote the Egyptians and Philistines at Raphia, thereby recovering the whole southern dominion of Tiglath-pileser.

Sargon, however, was not moved by any present desire to conquer Egypt. His ambitions lay rather in the familiar direction of Babylonia; moreover, he was seriously troubled by the old enemies, the mountaineers of the north, who were now finding encouragement from the Phrygian Power which had been gradually consolidating itself in the western part of the old Hittite dominion in Asia Minor, and also perhaps from the Aryan tribes on the east who were soon to become famous as the Medes. No Assyrian, except Tiglath-pileser and Ashur-nasir-pal, had met with anything but disaster in previous wars with the mountaineers, who were now harassing the Assyrian marches and the semi-dependent hill tribes. Sargon was kept perpetually fighting, while he did not venture to risk a great expedition to the heart of the hills. It was not till the tenth year of the war that he was able to deliver a crushing blow against Rusas, King of Urartu.

Even then he would not venture to invade the territories of the Phrygian Midas, who appears in the Assyrian records as "Mita of Mushki"; who in his turn was satisfied with raids on the Cilician march. Revolts, however, in the Syrian territory, which in the north were presumably fostered by Midas, and in the south by Egypt, were easily suppressed. And now Sargon again found his opportunity in Babylonia, which did not like its Chaldean ruler, since

he failed to perform what Babylonians regarded as the principal duty of a responsible government—the protection of trade. When Sargon in 709 moved against Merodach-baladan, the latter, deserted both by Elam and by his Babylonian subjects, was promptly driven into Chaldea. There he was crushed, and Chaldea itself was annexed by Sargon, who had already been welcomed as king in Babylonia, and whose triumph was crowned by the arrival of a gift-bearing embassy from Midas, who saw no prospect of further gains by continued hostilities. Sargon, just as he had removed a crowd of Israelites to new quarters, deported Chaldeans to Samaria and Hittites to Chaldea, the last being the remnant of the once powerful people who still occupied some of the territory on the extreme north-west of the Empire. In 705 the king, who had fully recovered the prestige which seemed to be tottering at one period of his reign, was succeeded by Sennacherib.

Before entering upon the story of the erratic career of Sennacherib we must turn aside to Egypt, which we have so long and deservedly neglected. Her wholly uninteresting Twenty-first Dynasty, with its alternating pharaohs at Tanis in the Delta and at Thebes in Upper Egypt, had given place in the middle of the tenth century to the almost equally uninteresting Bubastic or Libyan Dynasty, which flickered out about the time when Tiglath-pileser was starting upon his career.

The last Sheshenk was succeeded by one Petubaste, who seems to have been for a long time previously associated with him in the government. When the first Sheshenk made himself pharaoh in Lower Egypt, the priesthood of Amen had made Napata, far to the south, the center of their worship, and there established an independent Nubian monarchy. One more Bubastite was acknowledged as pharaoh after Petubaste; but during his reign his daughter's son Piankhi, the Ethiopian king at Napata, claimed not only dominion over all Upper Egypt, but also the actual dignity of the pharaoh. All Upper Egypt was prompt to acknowledge him; Lower Egypt, where the worship of Amen was out of fashion, was less ready to receive its champion. Lower Egypt broke up temporarily into a sort of confederacy of princes, of the Bubastite family for the most part, until one of them, named Tefnakht, successfully asserted his own sovereignty over them and prepared to attack the pharaoh of Upper Egypt. But when Piankhi advanced Tefnakht's followers broke up; one after another the princes came in to the Nubian king, and Tefnakht himself was soon obliged to tender his allegiance.

Having thus won general acknowledgment, Piankhi left the governorship of the north in the charge of his son Shabaka, who as viceroy was probably responsible for the collision with Assyria and the defeat at Raphia in the reign of Sargon. The disaster probably caused

the loss of Lower Egypt for a time; Shabaka had to retire to Upper Egypt, while Tefnakht and his successor reigned for a few years in the Delta. Then Shabaka, who had succeeded Piankhi on the throne, invaded Lower Egypt, slew his rival, and established his own supremacy. He had not forgiven his defeat by the Assyrians, and promptly set to work, upon Sargon's death, to raise revolts in Sennacherib's dominions, where Phœnicia and Judah alone had been allowed to retain a degree of independence under their own dynasties.

Conquests of the Assyrian type are loosely held; the death of the conqueror is apt to be followed by the immediate revolt of all the outlying provinces of an empire which is a mere congeries of subjugated states. When Sennacherib succeeded Sargon, the irrepressible Merodach-baladan reappeared in Babylonia, supported by an Elamite army. He and his Elamites were driven out promptly enough; but meanwhile the Sidonian Luli had acquired a predominant influence in Phœnicia, and seems to have thought of setting up an independent maritime state; while in the south Hezekiah of Judah, no longer hampered like his predecessors by the ascendancy of Israel, was seeking to assert a Judaic supremacy over the cities of Philistia, aided by Judaizing factions, and by the influence of the Egyptian Shabaka. But Bedawin jealousy prevented the formation of a southern confederacy under his leadership. When an Assyrian army appeared in Phœnicia the cities made prompt submission, and Luli had to fly overseas. Sennacherib marched south by the coastland plains, reversing the ancient route of Thothmes and Rameses. His arrival in Philistia alarmed Shabaka, who dispatched to meet him an army, which was routed in the neighborhood of Ekron. The towns of Philistia submitted, though Lachish stood a long siege. Then Sennacherib's army turned upon Hezekiah, and, in the Biblical phrase, "took all the fenced cities of Judah" except Jerusalem itself. Hezekiah, however, on this occasion staved off the imminent danger by paying a very heavy ransom. Sennacherib had not at present made up his mind to an invasion of Egypt, and apparently took his departure.

Meanwhile, Merodach-baladan had once more taken advantage of the Assyrian's absence to reappear in Babylonia, though on Sennacherib's return he was soon in hasty flight in Elam. A Babylonian nominee of Assyria had hitherto nominally occupied the throne, but was now displaced to make way for Sennacherib's son Ashurnadinshun. Then the king found occupation for himself in a hill campaign on the north-east, while his generals were with difficulty suppressing an insurrection in Cilicia, which was apparently supported by some piratical Greek forces from the islands, since there was fighting by sea as well as by land.

Sennacherib's next experiment was an attack upon Elam, whither

he dispatched a fleet built in the Euphrates for that particular purpose. The fleet ravaged the coast of Elam; thereupon the King of Elam raided into Babylonia, and retreated taking with him Ashurnadin-shun as a prisoner, and leaving behind a king of his own making. Sennacherib captured this king, but the Assyrian's pursuit was evaded by the Elamite mountaineers, and he retired foiled, to Nineveh. Thereupon the Babylonians set up another king, who was duly supported by a force from Elam. Sennacherib won what he called a great victory, which was probably a virtual defeat, since he failed to remove the new king of Babylon; but when the King of Elam died he returned to the attack, and this time not only deposed the king but sacked and burnt the city of Babylon itself. The Babylonians were accustomed to having the crown of Babylonia treated as a shuttlecock by Assyria and Elam; that they would doubtless have forgiven, but they did not forgive the desecration of their shrines and the insults offered to their deities.

Sennacherib's chroniclers tell us practically nothing of the years following the sack of Babylon; it was their business to record successes, or what passed for successes, and to ignore manifest failures. Such a failure, according to the Egyptian and Hebrew tradition, did in fact overtake Sennacherib. Egypt under a new pharaoh, Tirhakah, returned to her old device of stirring up the petty kings of the south. Sennacherib marched south, again besieged Lachish and Libnah in Philistia, while his marshal, or *Rabshakeh*, made a demonstration before Jerusalem; and then, finding that Tirhakah was collecting forces, marched to besiege Pelusium, at the head of the isthmus of Suez.

While he was besieging Pelusium there was a terrific outbreak of plague in the camp of the Assyrians, which compelled the break-up of the siege and a hasty retreat. Both the Egyptians and the Hebrews attributed the Assyrian disaster to Divine intervention; though the Egyptians have nothing to say about Jerusalem, and the Hebrews do not mention that the Assyrian camp was before Pelusium: the most natural inference from the Scripture text would be that it was still at Libnah.

Sennacherib was assassinated in 682 by two of his sons. The third, Ashur-akh-iddina, or Esarhaddon, who was probably acting as governor of Babylonia, made good his own claim to the throne and expelled the assassins. The new king would seem to have already secured the favor of the Babylonians, and distinguished himself by restoring the ruined city, and replacing its old inhabitants. Chaldean and Elamite invaders found the population hostile, and Esarhaddon chose to treat the Elamites with diplomatic friendliness instead of following the normal custom of repaying the invasion of Babylonia by an invasion of Elam.

In fact, there were dangers threatening from the north which made

the Assyrian monarch anxious to secure the Elamite friendship. One horde of wild tribes from beyond the Black Sea—whom the Greek historian calls Kimmerians—had burst down into Asia Minor through the Caucasus on one side and across the Hellespont on the other. On the east the Aryan group, known as the Medes, associated with Scythians, who may or may not have been Aryans, were pushing forward behind the old enemies of Assyria in the hills. The Kimmerians found enough to occupy them in Asia Minor, after one raid through the mountains into Assyria itself had been severely checked; but for some years fighting and diplomatizing with the Medes and the Scythians kept Esarhaddon thoroughly engaged.

At last, when the barbarian confederation had been more or less dissolved and was no longer likely to prove dangerous, the Assyrian entered upon his great project, the conquest of Egypt. Incidentally, a futile attempt on the part of Syria to shake off the Assyrian yoke had been sharply punished, and Phœnicia and Palestine rendered submissive. Esarhaddon was politic besides being a soldier. His plans were carefully laid, and the useful support of the Bedawins was secured before he flung himself upon his prey. In 670 he burst into Egypt and captured Memphis; after a fierce resistance Tirhakah fled to Upper Egypt. There Esarhaddon left him, established garrisons and a government of his own in the Delta, and then withdrew. His retirement was the signal for Tirhakah to fall upon the Assyrians in the Delta with a Nubian army. Esarhaddon was on his way to take summary vengeance, when he was overtaken by sickness and died, leaving Ashur-bani-pal as his heir.

Ashur-bani-pal, the Sardanapalus of the Greeks, at once took up the task and marched upon Egypt. Tirhakah fled after the first defeat; Memphis was recovered, and a river expedition sailed up the Nile to Thebes, which surrendered without offering any resistance; while Tirhakah retired into Nubia. Lower Egypt, as far as Thebes, was distributed among governors and princes, sometimes Egyptian, sometimes Assyrian. Ashur-bani-pal had no sooner retired than plots were afoot on behalf of Tirhakah. The Egyptian prince of Sais, Niku, was arrested and sent off to Nineveh; but the Assyrian, instead of slaying him, set him back as governor of Lower Egypt, trusting thereby to convert him into a really powerful and loyal supporter. In 662, however, Tirhakah's son, Tanutamun, again invaded Lower Egypt with an Ethiopian army. He was joined by a number of the princes, and Niku, who remained loyal to Assyria, was killed. Again Ashur-bani-pal returned in wrath; the patriot princes took flight; and Thebes itself was this time not only sacked but utterly destroyed as a habitable city, though the temples were left standing. The population was deported, and imported Elamites were planted over

the district in their place. Psamatik, the son of Niku, who had escaped when his father was killed, was made viceroy.

Assyria, now at the height of its prestige, heard for the first time of Gyges, King of Lydia, on the west of Asia Minor. Lydia had been consolidating itself as the center to resistance to the Kimmerian hordes; and though Gyges was making head against them effectively, he wanted the alliance of the great Power on the east, though he never got any practical assistance from Ashur-bani-pal. The Assyrian probably considered that the outlanders of the west might conveniently be left to cut each others' throats, while he treated Elam as Egypt had been treated.

Sardanapalus was to the Assyrian Empire what Aurangzib became to the Mogul Empire in the seventeenth century A. D. Esarhaddon's dominion, even without Egypt, was sufficiently unwieldy from the lack of an adequately organized system of central control. The conquest of Egypt was an error of judgment, because the country was too remote, and its population, not being Semitic, was too antagonistic for it to be retained except at the cost of an immense strain upon Assyria. For Esarhaddon, the miscalculation had been natural; it was only when Egypt was occupied that the inherent difficulty of holding it in the same way as the Semitic southern dominions of Assyria were already held became manifest.

Ashur-bani-pal had failed to realize the position, and imagined that he could undertake new conquests. He made up his mind to destroy Elam, the power which had been responsible for so much trouble in Babylonia in the days of Sennacherib, and which, moreover, deliberately challenged him. But Elam, as Ashur-bani-pal's predecessors had learned to their cost, was an exceedingly difficult country, and its conquest, coupled with the strain from Egypt, exhausted the power of the Empire.

Perhaps the king had not intended to take the aggressive. His first Elamite war was the direct result of an Elamite invasion. The Assyrian armies drove the Elamites back, pursued them into their own mountains, routed them there, killed the king and set up another in his place as a vassal; after which they withdrew from the country.

The next phase was a great revolt, very ill-organized, though very wide-reaching, raised by Shamash-shum-ukin, Ashur-bani-pal's brother, who was reigning at Babylon as a sub-king. The insurgents seized Lower Babylonia as well as Babylon itself. Ashur-bani-pal marched against them, stormed Babylon—where Shamash-shum-ukin made himself a funeral pyre of his own palace—and crushed the rebels. Then he turned again upon Elam, which was offering an asylum to sundry refugees whom its king refused to surrender, captured and destroyed its capital, Susa, and carried off much spoil. The Elamite kingdom perished completely; but the campaigns must have been ex-

ceedingly costly, both in blood and in treasure, in spite of the loot. Incidentally, in destroying the kingdom, Ashur-bani-pal also destroyed the Power which had held in check the Persian mountaineers on the south-east.

Sardanapalus crowned his work as a conqueror by campaigns against the Arabs of Southern Syria, and by routing an incursion of the Kimmerians, who, defeated by Lydia, under Ardys, the successor of Gyges, broke into the Euphrates valley through the mountain gorges. But long before the end of a reign extending over more than forty years he must have realized that his Empire was unmanageably large. Psamatik in Egypt, after some years of apparent loyalty as viceroy, threw off his allegiance, easily mastered the Assyrian garrisons—which must have been weakened by the drain of troops for the Elamite and other campaigns—and was hailed as pharaoh by all Egypt as far south as the Cataracts. The Assyrian made no attempt to re-establish his authority; Psamatik is merely ignored in his records.

Even before the death of Sardanapalus, in 626, the floodgates were opening to the barbarians of the north. A horde of wild Scythians, under a leader whom we know as Madyes, having first dealt a finishing stroke to the Kimmerians, burst into the Euphrates valley and swept through Syria; though they came as mere raiders, not as empire-builders. Ashur-bani-pal's heirs were a feeble folk. When the barbarian tide had ebbed, they were powerless to recover their ascendancy in the south-west. The Babylonians set up a king of their own, Nabopolassar, whom the Assyrians were forced to acknowledge. Assyria was, in fact, reduced to its pre-imperial limits. Across the Tigris the Mede, Kyaxares, had consolidated an Aryan power. In 608, before the last great Assyrian had been dead for twenty years, Necho, the successor of Psamatik, marched armies up to the Euphrates and claimed to have recovered the old Egyptian Empire. Two years later, Kyaxares the Mede, in alliance with Nabopolassar of Babylon, fell upon Nineveh itself, and the last of the Assyrian monarchs, Sinshun-ishkun, fired his own palace and perished in the flame. There was no more Assyria.

V.—The Last Babylonian Empire, 606-538

The Asiatic conquest effected by the pharaoh Necho was very short-lived. Nabopolassar of Babylonia was, in his own eyes, the heir of the Assyrian Empire so far as concerned Mesopotamia and Syria; beyond the plain of the two rivers he would not challenge the now established Median supremacy. Within those plains there was no one to challenge his own; but south and west of the Euphrates he would not permit Egypt to prevent him from reasserting his power.

that he was virtually deposed in favor of the Egyptian general Amasis. When he attempted to recover the dignity of pharaoh, the only troops who would fight for him were the mercenaries. He was defeated and assassinated, and Amasis reigned in his stead; though, according to Herodotus, he proved himself when once on the throne as much a friend of the foreigners as any of his predecessors. Amasis was still reigning when Cyrus captured Babylon.

THE WORLD OF GREECE AND ROME

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF PERSIA AND HELLAS TO 500 B. C.

I.—The Aryan Migration, and the Medes

For a short space in an earlier chapter, we passed out of what we have called the Semitic and Egyptian area to give an account of the peoples in the Greek area down to the expulsion of the Minoans by the Hellenic migration. This was necessary, because from the beginning of the twelfth century the Eastern area was affected by the movement. Otherwise the Aryans, races of Aryan speech, have hitherto appeared only as dynastic aristocracies—in Mitanni, and as the Kassites in Babylonia—save that latterly we have been aware of Aryans pressing upon the Semitic frontier. Now we reach the point where an Aryan dominion was to be established over the whole region with which we have hitherto been concerned.

The Medes and Persians have become the heirs of the ancient empires, and are to clash almost immediately with the Hellenic Aryans on the west. Moreover, during the past seven centuries the Hellenes have been developing their own supreme civilization—colonizing everywhere, building up their own unique organization of city-states, and challenging the maritime supremacy of those commercial cities of Phœnicia which never appeared as taking an active part either in international politics or as influencing intellectual or political progress until their great colony of Carthage made a bid for maritime empire. And while the Hellenes were thus developing, their Aryan kinsfolk in Italy were laying the foundations of the Roman Empire. It is time therefore to give our attention to the Aryan peoples of the outer world.

The peoples whom we call Aryan are primarily connected with each other upon philological grounds—that is to say, the groups of Aryan of Indo-European languages are so closely connected that we are compelled to regard them all as derived from a common parent stock. These languages have been, so far as we know, in almost complete

possession of Europe for some 3,000 years, and for a like period have dominated Persia and India north of the river Nerbudda, possibly very much longer. We are not to infer that the bulk of the populations affected belonged to the Aryan races which introduced the Aryan tongues. We know, in fact, that this was the case only to a limited extent. But we also know that wherever the Aryan tongues have been taken, they, with more or less completeness, superseded the aboriginal languages, and the races which brought them became at least a dominant aristocracy, though ultimately merged in the mass. The Aryan tongues were hardly modified by the other tongues with which they came in contact; whereas, while Aryan religion and Aryan institutions also became dominant, they were also much modified by the persistence of the previously established beliefs and practices.

Hence the Eastern and the Western Aryans became as completely differentiated from each other as from Semites or Mongolians. The Western shape into five great groups. The first which rises to distinction in the course of history is the Hellenic, and the second is the Italic. Then the Celtic group appears, and only very shortly before the inauguration of the Christian era, the Teutonic. Last of all the Slavonic group enters the field. It must be remarked, however, when we speak of them in this order, that the Slavs appear always to be hovering on the outskirts of civilization. It is not improbable that the Phrygians, of whom we have already heard, really belonged to this group; and that the extremely loose term Scythian, commonly employed by the Greeks to cover all sorts of nomadic barbarian hordes from regions east of the Caspian Sea and north of the Danube, includes Slavonic tribes. The Slavs have always been the least progressive of the Aryans, and at all stages it has been difficult to distinguish between them and the non-Aryan Mongolian nomads of Central Asia—to see how far the Slav who speaks an Aryan tongue descends from a Caucasian stock, or is a Tartar essentially in spite of his language. The Eastern Aryans, to whom some authorities entirely restrict that name, fall into two divisions—the Iranian and the Indian.

As to the early migrations of the Aryan peoples our information is of an exceedingly conjectural order, and there are marked differences of opinion. There are some who place the cradle of the race on the shores of the Baltic; others who transfer it to Central Asia; others who would fix it in the south of Russia. On the whole the presumption is rather in favor of the view that their original seat was partly in south-eastern Europe, partly in Asia, north of the Oxus, a river which flows into the Caspian Sea. There would then have been two main directions of movement—one to the west, the other to the south-east; the latter, the movement across the Oxus, being earlier in point of time. As early at least as the third millennium B. C. the Oriental

Aryans were probably occupying the country between the Oxus and the mountain range which forms the north-west frontier of India. Early in the second millennium at least the Occidentals were occupying the regions of the Danube and the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, whence certainly before the middle of the millenium they were overflowing eastward into Asia Minor as the Phrygians, southward as Hellenes, and westward into Italy, while another great stream, the first Celtic tide, was migrating by more northern routes towards the Atlantic.

Now as the western movement split into different streams it became differentiated as Hellenic, Italic, and Celtic, while it may be that yet another, the Teutonic, was taking a northerly direction. So also the eastern migration took a double direction—one to the south and west, the Iranian, working down to the Persian Gulf and up towards Armenia; the other towards the south and east, through the mountain passes, into the great plains of Northern India.

As early as the seventeenth century B. C. the Iranian movement was making itself felt across the western mountains in the Semitic area, within which it established its foreign Kassite Dynasty in Babylon, and its kingdom of Mitanni, of which the Aryan character is proved by the names of the princes. We do not know whether the movement towards India was earlier or later. Probably it was induced by changing climatic conditions, which were drying up the once fertile and cultivable regions already in occupation. The Indo-Aryans made their way through the passes of Afghanistan into the Punjab—the "land of the five rivers" watered by the Indus and its tributaries. There, as the race indications would seem to show, they established themselves, driving before them any previous occupants of the soil and retaining the purity of their own blood. A later wave of immigrants pushed past them into Sirhind (the country between the rivers Sutlej and Jumma) and the "Doab" (the land enclosed between the Jumna and the Ganges, which meet at Allahabad). Here for the present we may leave the Indian movement with the surmise that the second host of immigrants had established itself, though only as an aristocracy, in the region which it occupied not long after the tenth century, and possibly a good deal earlier. India remains external to our historical sphere for a long time to come, although the veil between her and the west will be raised for a moment at the time of Alexander the Great.

Of the Iranians, apart from the Kassites and Mitanni, we hear practically nothing until in the second half of the eighth century Tiglath-pileser IV. recognized on his eastern border an Iranian principality which was meant to serve as a buffer against Urartu. The Iranian group of tribes, who were collectively known as the Medes, must have been in possession of most of the lands on the north

of Elam between the Assyrian border and the Caspian Sea. In the reign of Sargon this Median Power deserted Assyria for alliance with Urartu, for which crime its chief Deiokes suffered a temporary captivity. But by the end of the century—that is before 700 B. C.—he was back among the Medes, and, if we may trust the tradition preserved by Herodotus, occupied himself in giving their loose tribal confederation something in the shape of a monarchy. He and the son, whom Herodotus calls Phraortes, ruled over the Medes for three-quarters of a century; according to the same authority Phraortes made a premature attack upon Nineveh in the reign of Sardanapalus, only to meet with disaster and death.

Deiokes was certainly the Daiakku of the Assyrian record who is mentioned in connection with Sargon's struggle with Urartu. His grandson Uvakhshatra is the Kyaxares of Herodotus, who organized the armies of the Medes, whose southern kinsfolk, the hardy Persians of the hills, were said to have been brought under the Median supremacy by Phraortes. Kyaxares dealt the final blow to Nineveh which blotted the Assyrian monarchy off the face of the earth; also he absorbed under his sway the whole of what had been Urartu and extended the Median Empire as far as the river Halys on the west, whereby he came in conflict with the King of Lydia. It is curious to observe that in the course of the struggle a great battle between the Medes and the Lydians was interrupted by an eclipse of the sun—the first predicted by a western astronomer, Thales—which so disturbed both parties that they agreed to submit their differences to arbitration of Nebuchadrezzar, who was wise enough to abstain from using the opportunity to extend his own dominion. Kyaxares and his son Astyages consolidated what was now the great Iranian kingdom of Media, embracing the whole hill country from the Lydian march on the river Halys to the Persian Gulf.

Still, however, the Median Empire meant not much more than a confederacy of Median and Persian petty princes and chiefs. For some time past, a family founded by a certain Achæmenes (Hakhamanish) had been princes of the Persians in what once had been Elam. The great man whom we know as Cyrus had just succeeded in 550 to this Persian chieftainship. Tradition asserts that his mother was a daughter of Astyages, who had purposely married her to a minor baron instead of a great noble on account of certain portentous dreams which had frightened him. Stories were woven about the wonderful career of the founder of the Persian Empire as freely as many centuries afterwards they were woven about the career of Charlemagne. The House of Achæmenes had probably in fact already achieved considerable distinction. At any rate in 550 Cyrus appears to have had no difficulty in deposing Astyages and commanding the allegiance of the Median as well as of the Persian nobility.

The seizure of the Median crown by Cyrus was the first step towards his creation of an empire greater than any that had preceded it. But before he smote Babylon he had to subjugate another Aryan dominion on the west that brought him in contact with the Hellenes. Now, therefore, we have to trace the development of the Hellenes from the time of the Ionian invasion of the coast lines of Asia Minor, through its later stages; and therewith the rise of the Lydian dominion.

II. The Hellenic Expansion, 1200-800

The Hellenizing of the Isles and of the Asiatic coast was primarily the work of the Achæans and Ionians, who to a considerable extent assimilated the culture of their Minoan predecessors, but transformed it into something new, with a beauty born of their own exquisite sense of proportion. Possibly from the admixture of quasi-Oriental elements the Ionian Greek acquired a perception of beauty more sensitive than that of any other of the Western Aryans, including his own Dorian cousins; but it was grafted upon a vigorous sanity, which prevented him from falling into Oriental extravagances. In the purest Hellenic strain, the Dorian, there is a solid basis for that harmonizing of æsthetic and moral excellence which made the Greek express both as "love of the beautiful"; yet in the Dorian there was something lacking which kept him short of the ethical and artistic achievement of the Ionian. The consummate flower of Hellas was the Ionian Athens, which gave to mankind the masters who have never been surpassed in architecture, in sculpture, in poetry, and philosophy—Athens, the well-spring of political liberty and of intellectual freedom, the immortal mother of immortal sons.

Even in the Achæan age, at least as reproduced from the standpoint of a ninth-century Ionian poet—a conscious reproduction of the past, only tinged with the color of contemporary conditions—the Hellenes had a polity, a social organization, which bore in it the germs of a political development inconceivable among the peoples of the East because it rested upon the twin principles of freedom and law.

The Egyptian system set at the top an incarnate god with ministers who were his slaves, and who lorded it over the population who were their slaves. Broadly speaking, the Eastern conditions might be described as mere gradations of slavery; only those appointed by authority had any voice in the affairs of the State, and there were hardly any limits to their powers of tyranny. The only force which could counter the personal will of the despot was the priesthood; for even kings were afraid of the gods and were anxious to conciliate the people who were, so to speak, in touch with the gods. The gov-

ernment of towns and the control of commerce was indeed organized, but the principal function of the king's officers was to provide the king with revenue, with labor for public works, and with soldiers for his wars. In other respects they might be the king's councilors, but whether he chose to take their advice or not depended entirely on himself.

To all this the strongest contrast is presented by Achæan society as depicted in the Homeric poems; whereas that society bears in many respects a marked resemblance to what we know of later communities of Western Aryans when they first came into contact with civilizations more elaborate than their own. The Homeric Greeks were already dwellers in cities; but, broadly speaking, each city with the adjacent agricultural territory was an autonomous unit which we may call a state. That state was composed of the free holders of the soil, all of whom carried arms and were liable to be called upon to fight in any wars in which the state might be involved. Each state had its prince or king, ruling by hereditary right, and each prince had a council of chiefs or leading men. When any pronouncement of importance affecting the state at large was to be made, the king arrived at his decision in consultation with his council, and a general gathering of the freemen was assembled to hear the decision. Normally the assembly merely expressed its assent; but if popular opinion was violently outraged the fact would be manifested, and if the king proceeded on his course he did so at his peril. In other words, though the community of free men had no political initiative, their acquiescence was in effect necessary to the king's policy: the government had to be in reasonable accord with popular opinion.

The same principle worked when states combined for joint action. Although one prince might exercise an ascendancy over neighboring princes, there was no large inclusive kingdom, no one with an acknowledged right to dictate to others. When the princes combined to go to war, as for instance against Troy, they chose one of their number for a war-lord; but the whole body of the princes formed a council, and to the opinion of the council the war-lord was obliged to show a great deal of deference. Any offended prince might retire altogether, or spoil combined action by sulking in his tent like Achilles; he was under no binding obligation of allegiance. And as the independence of individual princes was an essential part of the structure of Hellenic society, so also was the status of the free man. If any new departure of policy of a momentous character were in contemplation, the intention was submitted to the whole gathering of the armed free men, not for discussion but to ensure an adequate acquiescence. These peculiar characteristics, the autonomy of the individual community, and the freedom of the individual person, did

not tend to facilitate joint action, and prohibited any despotic subjection of large dominions.

With the expansion of the Hellenes the geographical conditions of the Greek peninsula in Europe, of the Islands, and of the coast of Asia Minor, fostered this particularism, which brought about the unparalleled development of city states, but prevented the creation of a Hellenic Empire. When at last the attempt was made by the Macedonians, the empire of empires which resulted were not Hellenic, but were merely Oriental empires tempered with Hellenism, and the political development of Hellas itself went to pieces. The Hellenes were a people apart, vividly alive to their kinship with each other, and exceedingly contemptuous of the non-Hellenic world; but there was never a Hellenic nation.

In the twelfth century, under pressure from the immigration of their more barbaric but iron-using kinsmen from the north-west, the Achæans and Æolians from Thessaly and Bœotia, and the Ionians from Attica and the Peloponnese, occupied the Islands and the coast of Asia Minor. Behind, the cruder and fiercer Dorian tribes thrust southward, but did not succeed in dispossessing them till they reached as far as the Peloponnesus itself. There the Dorians occupied the Isthmus of Corinth and the eastern portion of the peninsula, driving the Achæans back into Arcadia, Elis, and the district which retained the old name of Achaia. Thence the Dorians pushed across the most southerly islands till they reached the south-western corner of Asia Minor, having occupied Crete on the way. Where they entered into possession they usually established themselves as a military aristocracy—a character which they preserved especially in Sparta and in Crete, Sparta being the center of their government in Laconia. Here the pure-blooded "Spartiatæ" retained their complete supremacy as a warrior tribe with a purely military organization—an organization, that is, which made military supremacy its first object. Even their Hellenic predecessors, the Laconians, were only allowed a very small measure of political freedom, while the possibly pre-Hellenic Helots were reduced to a condition of degraded serfdom which had no parallel in other Hellenic communities, though in all there was a substratum of slaves.

The Dorian invasion and expansion was probably completed before the end of the eleventh century. By that date the whole of what we have called Greece was no longer Minoan but had become Hellenic. And the Hellenic world was practically a congeries of city states—communities, that is, independent of each other, and each centering in a flourishing city—flourishing at least if it possessed a port. The Hellenes never endeavored to push inland. Each community was intent upon its own individual interest, and only the recognition of common interests, accompanied by the common action which was

prevented by their particularism, could have enabled them to attack the upland kings of Phrygia and Lydia, though traditionally at least the Dorians gave a dynasty to Lydia.

During the centuries immediately following, the old monarchical system everywhere gave way to an aristocracy which was primarily one of birth. The process is easy enough to follow. The chiefs, who had formed the king's council were, like the king himself, the hereditary heads of family groups. The kings had probably themselves for the most part obtained their position as hereditary war-lords, though tradition assigned to some of them a foreign descent; but they had never exercised despotic power, and the noble families looked upon the royal family as little, if at all, better than themselves. Instead of the king dominating the council, he was by degrees practically reduced to being merely on an equality with them, while they were all on an equality with each other in respect of the functions of government or religion which were allotted to one or the other.

By the end of the eighth century the ancient kingship was a thing of the past, except in Sparta, which had a unique system of its own. She had not a monarchy, but two kings, official heads of the state and leaders in war; but practically the Spartan government was in the hands of a group of officials called *ephors*, who held office for a year only, and were all drawn from the small group of pure Spartan families. In spite of the Spartan kingship, it remains true that in every Greek state in the eighth century the old monarchy had gone and the government was in the hands of a close aristocracy of birth, which was also becoming an aristocracy of wealth—an oligarchy.

Since the aristocracies used their power to forward their own interests arrogantly and often oppressively, there came a time in the seventh century when one after another of them was overthrown by some popular leader, who headed an insurrection, which, when successful, he turned to account by usurping the supremacy for himself, while he maintained it by means of the troops, retained in his pay, who had won him his position. To these usurpers of the old functions of the monarchy the Greeks gave the name *Tyrannos*, which in its turn acquired the odious significance that has ever since attached to the name of "tyrant." In other cases no military usurpation was effected, and popular revolt only expanded the circle of the oligarchy or else gave to the free men at large a share of political power which ultimately made them the predominating force which entitled such states to be called democracies.

With the eastward expansion through the Islands, Achæans and Ionians, and to a less extent Dorians, also became sea rovers—pirates like the Northmen of later years. In that capacity they gave trouble to the Phœnician merchants, but did not, at first, prevent that enterprising people from developing a trade in the Ægean, from which,

perhaps, they had been formerly shut out by the Minoan seamen. But when the Hellenes had finished their migratory movement by occupying all the islands and the available coasts of the Ægean, they turned their maritime energy to account by developing their own seaborne commerce and driving the Phœnicians out altogether. The Phœnicians, thus forced farther afield, started on the African coast in the ninth century the great colony of Carthage, which was destined entirely to eclipse Tyre and Sidon and the other cities of Phœnicia proper.

As the new cities of Ionia waxed in wealth and population—we now use the term Ionia to cover, generally, the coastline of western Asia Minor and the islands thereto adjacent—they sought opportunities for further expansion by sea, since they could not penetrate inland. Thus they colonized the shores of Propontis, the Hellespont, and the Sea of Marmora, and entered the Black Sea—always, however, confined to the shores, for the same reason as in Ionia itself. This colonial expansion began perhaps as early as the ninth century; by the middle of the eighth the colonists were beginning to go farther afield. Before long Ionians and Dorians, chiefly from Ionia, but also notably from Corinth, were planting themselves in Sicily and Southern Italy, where the Greek cities achieved great splendor and wealth. It was not till a hundred years later that they founded Massilia, the modern Marseilles, far to the west on the Gulf of Lions. On the Libyan coast they planted the colony of Cyrene, and in Egypt itself they were permitted to set up on the Delta the great trading port of Naukratis. Every new colony was itself a new city state, associated by ties of religion and sentiment with its own mother city, but absolutely independent, owing no allegiance nor any claims to active alliance. The Delta ports were the most cosmopolitan spots in the world. Naukratis, originally a colony from Miletus, lost its direct connection with the motherstate and became a common Hellenic center; and at Naukratis Hellenes from every part of Hellas learned a sense of their own kinship and of their common superiority to all manner of barbarians.

But the Hellenes, having no consciousness of any common foe against whom combined action was necessary, formed no common political league. The unity was almost confined to their common worship of the Olympian gods and their common reverence for sundry shrines, especially the shrine of Apollo at Delphi. The indubitable Hellenes—Dorians, Ionians, Æolians, Achæans—recognized each other as all being on the same plane. They extended a certain toleration to peoples with whom they admitted a possible relationship. The rest of the world consisted of barbarians whom in the sixth century they had not yet learned to look upon as utterly inferior, but who were still to all Hellenes, aliens, as no Hellene was to another. Beyond that their consciousness of unity did not extend. The one

common council in which all Hellenes were entitled to representation—the Amphictyonic—was religious, not political, in its character, and the Pan-Hellenic gatherings to celebrate the Olympic, Delian, Pythian, and Nemean games had a similar origin. The leagues of which we hear were either religious or commercial leagues between particular states whose commercial interests happened to be united, and were directed more by rivalry with other Hellenic groups than by any general conception of common Hellenic interests.

When the sixth century opened, then, the commercial and colonizing energy of Miletus gave her perhaps the premier position among the cities of Ionia. Away in the west, in Sicily, Syracuse held herself of no less account than any other Hellenic state. In the Grecian peninsula of Europe the primacy was held against all rivals by Sparta, owing to the military reputation of its fighting caste—an aristocracy trained with a single eye to military efficiency, to extreme hardihood and endurance under an iron discipline. Sparta had won her ascendancy only after long struggles with the other Dorian states of the Peloponnese, Argos, and Messene, in which she had definitely proved her superiority. Next to her perhaps in wealth and power now stood Corinth, under the rule of its celebrated and very able tyrant, Periander, whose dynasty, however, was to vanish very shortly after his death. The third was Athens, which was working out its own salvation in a democratic direction, a course which suffered a brief interruption in the course of the century from the temporary establishment of the tyranny of Pisistratus and his son. But Corinth was devoted to the pursuit of luxury and wealth; Athens was engaged in developing at home constitutional principles of political liberty; neither of them could have dreamed of challenging the position of Sparta as the recognized head of the Hellenic world—not intellectually, not in wealth, but simply because she was accounted invincible in the field.

III.—Lydia, Sparta, and Athens, 800-500

When the Hellenes pushed across the Ægean, Phrygians, Carians, and Cretans turned eastward to seek new territory. One group planted themselves as Philistines in the south of Canaan. The Phrygians, pushing inland, gradually consolidated the Phrygian kingdom under the Midas, or "Mita of Mushki" dynasty, which had a good deal to do with the break-up of the Hittite dominion. On the south-west of this Phrygian dominion lay Lydia, with a population of which probably only a small proportion was of the Aryan stock. Its rules, however, seem pretty certainly to have been Aryan, and Hellenic tradition claimed that they were of Dorian kin—Herakleidæ, a royal Dorian house claiming descent from the hero Herakles.

The Phrygian dominion was broken up by the barbarian incursions from the north at about the time when the native Lydian Gyges displaced the Herakleid dynasty of Lydia and seized the crown for himself. He carried the Lydian dominion up to the Propontis, and doubtless contemplated bringing under his rule the Hellenes on the western coast, and the whole of what had been the Phrygian kingdom. He did not actually set about subjugating the Ionians, because he found himself engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Kimmerian invaders; but he was so conspicuously the one man who made head against them that the struggle itself made Lydia practically supreme over all Asia Minor, at least as far as the river Halys. We have seen Gyges inviting, as if he were an equal, the cooperation of Assyria in the struggle with the barbarians. We have seen that he maintained the struggle, without any practical aid from Assyria, with a large measure of success. He himself fell, but the barbarians were finally beaten off under his son Ardys.

The Lydians pushed east of the Halys, but did not succeed in imposing their yoke upon the Hellenic cities on the west. Early in the sixth century they became engaged in the contest with the Medes, ended by the treaty which made the Halys the boundary between Lydia and Media. It was not long after this that Crœsus, the prince of proverbial wealth, followed his father Alyattes on the Lydian throne. Crœsus succeeded where his predecessors had failed, and forced the disunited Hellenic cities of the seaboard to submit to his sovereignty and to increase his treasures by their tribute.

Lydia was not destined to a long supremacy; she was soon to fall a prey to the Persian power; but in the days of her ascendancy she may be said to have introduced a revolution in the civilized world's economic system, for Lydia invented coinage. Gold and silver, reckoned by weight, had long served as standards of value. It was Lydia which invented a currency—coins, pieces of metal each bearing a precise value guaranteed by an official mark. The first coin of history was the Lydian *stater*, made of white gold—that is, gold and silver mixed, but with more gold than silver.

In the middle of the sixth century Lydia was absorbed into the new Persian dominion.

The Greek city-states of Ionia and the great colonies of Cyrene, Syracuse, and others in Sicily and South Italy, so they were free and independent, stood at least on an equality with any of the Greek states of European Peninsula. But the two cities of Athens and Sparta alone hold a distinctive place in the world's history—first as leaders in the western struggle against Orientalism, and then in the intellectual and political development of the west. Between the influence of Athens and Sparta there is no comparison; the world's debt to Sparta is small, but to Athens it is infinite. Yet the debt to Sparta,

the mother of Leonidas, is definitely appreciable, while the rivalry between Athens and Sparta is only of less importance than their temporary coalition. We, therefore, now turn our attention to the development of these two states before the struggle with Persia opened. Of the rest, it is practically sufficient to say here that all or nearly all of them passed through the regular series of phases—from the original hereditary monarchy through aristocracy to Tyranny, and from Tyranny either to democracy or to a new oligarchy in which, as a rule, wealth was a more important factor than descent.

Of the peculiar Lacedemonian constitution it must be said that it was emphatically an oligarchy—the rule of the “Spartiatæ,” who were almost a garrison in the midst of a subject population. It seems on the whole to represent the supremacy acquired one city-state over a whole province, the citizens alone retaining political rights. But within that oligarchy there was an aristocracy of birth, and the old monarchy also survived in the form of the double kingship of which the origin is hopelessly obscure. Possibly it points to an original combination of two cities, of which the royal families retained the joint kingship; but there is no definite evidence that this was the case. The old system of government by the king, the council of elders taken from the aristocratic families, and the general assembly of all Spartiatæ remained in force; but it was supplemented by the democratic institution—democratic as concerned the Spartiatæ, the Spartans proper, but not as concerned the rest of the Laconians—of the annually elected ephors, all Spartans being eligible to the ephorate, which was actually the most powerful body in the government.

In the early days the primacy of the Peloponnese had rested with Argos rather than with Sparta. But the long struggle between Sparta and Messene, from the middle of the eighth to very nearly the middle of the seventh century, established the military prestige of Sparta, which had been achieved by her development of the fighting line of mail-clad infantry armed with shields and spears. From the middle of the seventh century the prestige of the Spartan arms acquired for Sparta her recognized position as the leading state, not only of the Peloponnese but of all Hellas. That position remained unchallenged until Athens developed a sea-power, in the fifth century, which brought her into direct rivalry with Sparta for the hegemony of Hellas. That maritime supremacy was brought into being by the Persian War; but in other respects Athens had long been qualifying herself to become the supreme type of Hellenism.

Sparta was a city which dominated Laconia; Athens was a city which identified itself with Attica; for Attica she solved the problem of unification. She was not the mistress of a conquered Attica, nor the principal city among other independent cities. The citizens of Athens did not deprive the citizens of other cities of their political

rights, but the citizens of all other Attica states became citizens of Athens. When this unification was accomplished no one knows, but it was before the disappearance of the monarchy. Attica was never penetrated by the Dorian invasion; according to her traditions the oldest Hellenic inhabitants always remained lords of the whole land. According to tradition also the old line of kings came to an end as early as the eleventh century, not because of tyranny or inefficiency, but because the last of them, Cordrus, was so good that the Athenians would not permit the office he had held to be desecrated by any one less admirable. That myth may be discarded. However the change came about, it would appear that the first step was the restriction of the royal functions by the appointment of a separate *polemarch*, or war lord. Next came the transfer of most of the rest of the regal functions to an archon, or governor, elected from one aristocratic family. When the archon was appointed, not for life but for a definite period of time, he became really a president; and when, quite early in the seventh century, the period of the archonship was reduced to one year, and all members of the noble families, called the *eupatridæ*, were made eligible, Athens had definitely become an aristocratic republic. It would seem that the actual royal line had at first been allowed to retain the priestly functions of the Crown with the title of king-archon, but that this king-archonship was also presently made elective.

At a quite early stage we find the Athenian citizens divided into three classes, which may fairly be rendered as the nobles, the yeomen, and the craftsmen. But besides these there was a large body who were personally free men but had no political rights—men who might be called free laborers, who worked under the craftsmen for wages or cultivated the lands of the nobles, a service which entitled them to one-sixth of the produce. Also, there were alien settlers and traders. The nobles were divided into clans, corresponding to the *gentes* of the Roman patriciate. The citizens generally were divided into four tribes (*phylæ*), and each tribe was divided into three phratries, or brotherhoods, divisions which were not affected by the first triple classification.

As wealth increased and industry progressed, the division into nobles, yeomen, and craftsmen, was superseded by a classification according to wealth; the old privileges of the *eupatridæ* being confined to those in the first class, while the second class were called *hippeis* (knights), on the hypothesis that they were wealthy enough to take the field as horsemen in time of war. The government in general was in the hands of the archons, representing the old monarchy, the council of nobles, and the general assembly of citizens.

In the seventh century Athens was gradually acquiring a commercial fleet manned chiefly from the class of the non-citizen freemen

called *thetes*. Towards the close of the century the position of the lower classes was probably becoming worse. A noble named Kylon attempted to make himself Tyrant after the fashion which had become prevalent in many other states. He failed, and his family were banished; but the circumstances were attended by an act of sacrilege, for which the noble family of the Alkmæonidæ were responsible, which caused them also to be exiled; whence arose complications in the days to come. The general unrest and disorder led to the first promulgation of a written law, a codification of customs and judicial pronouncements, known by the name of its author Draco—a code of proverbial severity. But the code did nothing to check the system by which the poor were rapidly becoming first the debtors and then the slaves of the rich, since slavery was the penalty for failure to discharge debt. The better men among the wealthier classes, as well as the laborers and the peasantry, viewed the tendency with alarm, and with their support a great reform was carried out by one of their number, Solon.

Solon's laws abolished enslavement for debt and cancelled the existing obligations, thus providing immediate relief, though he rejected the popular demands for the redistribution of property. But, beyond this, he prepared Athens for a democratic government. The *thetes* were admitted to the general assembly, while some of the offices hitherto reserved to the highest class were thrown open to the second and third. But of still more importance was the admission of all four classes to representation on the panels of jurors or judges—*dikasts*—before whom any one might be indicted: thus abolishing the old system under which the judicial functions were discharged by members of one class (the highest), generally in the interests of their own class. The new *dikasts* were elected by lot. At the same time, while the Areopagus, or council, an essentially aristocratic body, retained its own judicial functions, the general assembly became a legislative body no longer dependent on the council's initiative. That initiative was transferred to a new council, to which all the three upper classes were eligible. The selection of public officers was effected by a combination, very curious from the modern point of view, of election and lot. From a certain number of candidates nominated by election the actual office-holder was chosen by lot—the last word was left to the gods.

Such, roughly, was the Solonian constitution which for the time being divided the State into two parties—an aristocratic anti-Solonian party and a democratic Solonian party, headed by the Alkmæonidæ, who had broken with their aristocratic brethren.

Early in the sixth century a war with Megara, on the Isthmus of Corinth, enabled the Athenians to wrest from their rivals the island of Salamis. The victory was in great part due to the general, Pisis-

.....s, and he used his resulting popularity to make himself Tyrant. The hostile parties united to expel him. By an intrigue with Megacles, the Alkmæonid leader, he recovered his power for a few months; but Megacles turned against him, and he was then expelled for the second time. Some ten years after he reappeared; party factions had done their work, supporters gathered to him, and he became Tyrant for the third time in 540. Pisistratus, like many others of the Tyrants, was an able and enlightened ruler, keenly interested in all artistic and intellectual developments—a statesman whose horizon was not bounded by the confines of his own dominion, with popular sympathies, and zealous for the honour of his state. But he was a usurper who had seized his power by force, and could only retain it by a force of mercenaries. The flight of his most determined opponents enabled him to confiscate their estates, and allot them among the laboring classes, reserving a contribution from them for himself. He ruled through the constitutional forms which Solon had created, but he made them only the media for carrying out his own will. He planted an Athenian colony on the Propontis, and probably sanctioned the establishment of the Athenian Miltiades as a Tyrant upon the Thracian Chersonese—thereby incidentally getting rid of a dangerous aristocrat.

When he died, in 528, his son and successor, Hippias, may have intended to follow in his steps, but the assassination of his brother Hipparchus, on account of a purely personal quarrel, by Harmodius and Aristogiton, turned him into a fierce and suspicious despot. The Alkmæonids were eager to return to Athens, which they could not do while Hippias ruled. They intrigued with one of the Spartan Kings, Cleomenes, who joined them in expelling Hippias, who took refuge in Ionia and was soon engaged in intriguing with the satrap, Artaphernes, to procure Persian or other assistance for his restoration.

In 507 Cleisthenes the Alkmæonid was the most powerful man in Athens, although, after the expulsion of Hippias, Cleomenes of Sparta had done his best to keep him out. To Cleisthenes was due the democratic reorganization of the Athenian constitution, for which Solon had only been able cautiously to prepare the way. The fundamental feature of the constitution of Cleisthenes was the new Representative Council, which practically became the governing body of the State. To it the officers of State were responsible, though they were elected as before and still only from the upper classes. The making of war and peace still rested with the General Assembly; but the Council at once controlled administration, and held the initiative in all legislation. Its composition was based in the fact that Attica was already divided into a number of districts called *demes*. Making an artificial division of the whole into three groups—the city group the coast group, and the inland group—he formed the demes in each district into ten

groups, thirty in all. Three demes, one from each region, were combined as a single "tribe," thus forming ten wholly artificial tribes between which there could be neither local antagonisms nor antagonisms based upon the old clan idea. Each tribe sent fifty members of the new Council of Five Hundred, the number being apportioned among the demes of which the tribe was composed. The representatives, subsequently if not at first, were chosen by lot annually, though each member had to be passed as a fit and proper person by the outgoing council. The councillors of each tribe acted as a committee of the whole council, in rotation, for thirty-two days. With the reforms of Cleisthenes, which definitely made Athens as democracy in the last decade of the sixth century, we reach the stage when we can turn to the story of the creation of the Persian power with which Hellas was about to come into conflict.

IV.—The Rise of the Persian Empire, 560-500 B.C.

Between the years 560 and 550 the Persian Cyrus deposed the Mede Astyages, an enterprise in which he was certainly assisted by some of the Median nobles. An Asiatic prince who wins a throne in such circumstances has always found it necessary to establish his prestige and power by aggression against his neighbors.

The new Persian-Median kingdom, along the whole length of its southern border from the Persian Gulf to the Taurus Range, marched with the decadent empire of Babylon. On the west it marched with the powerful and wealthy Lydian kingdom of Croesus, which had just absorbed Ionia. The deposition of Astyages, who was the Lydian king's brother-in-law, aroused the alarm, or the ambition, or both, of Croesus. From Astyages he had had nothing to fear, whereas it was more than probable that Cyrus would attack him. On the other hand, if he himself took the offensive, as the kinsman and protector of the deposed monarch, he might obtain support from the Median nobility, and not only overthrow the usurper, but establish a Lydian ascendancy over the Median dominion.

Croesus was a great admirer of the Hellenes, and before moving he consulted the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi, which advised him, with an ambiguity which he did not detect, that "if he crossed the Halys he would destroy a great kingdom." He did cross the Halys. In due time Cyrus marched against him; and the first battle, though in itself indecisive, taught the Lydian that he had brought upon himself an exceedingly formidable foe. He retreated into his own dominions, and strove hastily to form an alliance with the other Powers for common resistance to the new danger. He appealed to Egypt, to Babylon, and to Sparta as the head of the Greeks. But Egypt was distant, Sparta was ever slow to move, and Nabonidus was immersed in archæology.

Cyrus was on his borders, ready and swift of action, and immersed in the immediate project of conquering Lydia. The Persian mountaineers were quite ready for a winter campaign; the Lydian horse proved unmanageable in the presence of the Eastern camels. The Lydian army was routed; Crœsus was shut up in Sardis, and Sardis itself fell before any ally had arrived to its rescue. The conqueror removed Crœsus to an honorable captivity and annexed his kingdom.

The cities of Ionia, which had probably indulged a hope that the overthrow of Lydia would liberate them from a foreign yoke, made overtures to the Persian. He, however, demanded complete submission, and left Harpagus the Mede behind him to exact it, while he himself turned his attention to Babylon. The Ionians paid the penalty of their want of union. They would not rise—indeed, they could not—to the theoretically sound proposal of Thales, the philosopher and astronomer, who urged the cities of Ionia to form a common government with a common center, and unite as one nation to resist the Mede. It is to be noted that the Greeks habitually used the term Mede in preference to Persian, except when they were referring specifically to Persian troops—much as the world persisted in referring to Great Britain as England when a Scottish dynasty was wearing the crown of the two kingdoms. Another proposal, too, was rejected—that they should emigrate *en masse*, and take possession of Sardinia as a united nation, rather than submit to the yoke of the barbarian, who seemed much less akin to them than the Phil-Hellenic Lydian. Only the people of Phocœa and of Teos chose a voluntary exile to Corsica and Abdera in Thrace respectively. The Ionians submitted to being conquered piecemeal; though Sparta at their invitation sent not an army but a messenger to Cyrus, bidding him do no harm to the Hellenes because “the Lacedæmonians would not allow it.” Cyrus had never heard of the Lacedæmonians, and said so. Their message did not affect the operations of Harpagus.

Sardis fell in 546; in 538 Nabonidus and Belshazzar were dead, and Cyrus was in possession of the citadel of Babylon—King of Sumer and Akkad, lord of the “four quarters of the world.” Phœnicia, Syria, and Palestine acknowledged his dominion, while Amasis of Egypt looked on and did nothing. The remainder of the reign of Cyrus was devoted chiefly to campaigning in the remoter eastern regions behind Persia and Media occupied by the nomadic tribes vaguely included under the term Scythian, among whom he lost his life in 529.

Cambyses, the son of Cyrus, succeeded him, having secured his throne by the privy murder of his brother Smerdis—to adopt the names which were subsequently stereotyped by the Greek historians. The Persian meant to rule the world; and at once he directed his arms against Egypt, where Psamatik III. succeeded the old Amasis almost

at the moment of the attack in 526. For self-defense Egypt had little to rely on but Greek and Carian mercenary troops. Against them came the Persian warriors who had smitten Lydia and Ionia and Babylon; and by the sea the fleets of the Phœnicians, the now subject Ionian states, and the island potentate Polykrates, Tyrant of Samos, who had departed from his original inclination to resist the new power. Naturally, the mercenaries were routed at Pelusium. A furious but unorganized resistance was offered by the Egyptians at Memphis, as in the old days of the Assyrian conquest; and with no better success. Memphis was taken; Psamatik was deported.

As Cyrus, the fire-worshipper, had not scrupled to win the loyalty of Babylon by acknowledging the Babylonian gods, so his son did not scruple, as the Assyrians had scrupled, to adopt the Egyptian religion in Egypt, to pay honor to Amen, and to assume the attributes of Horus as pharaoh. The Persians bestowed a contemptuous toleration on all local religions, which they regarded not as abominations but as mere superstitions, and adopted for purposes of policy the principles which made Henry IV. pronounce that the crown of France was worth a mass. Hence they escaped that rage of religious hostility which had made impossible the absorption of Egypt into the Assyrian Empire.

All Egypt lay at the feet of Cambyses. Egypt did not content him: he dispatched on expedition westward, after the hasty submission of Cyrene; it was lost in the sands of the desert. He led another against the southern kingdom of Nubia, but his convoys of provisions were cut off, and he had to beat a disastrous retreat. The Greek and Egyptian traditions preserve accounts of the frenzy into which Cambyses now fell and the furious excesses he committed—stories which there is hardly sufficient reason for discrediting, since it is more than probable that he did become in effect insane.

The disasters which befell his troops were immediately followed by the alarming news from Babylon that the Magi, the Levites or Brahmans, so to speak, of the Medes, had set up the throne an impostor whom they declared to be that Smerdis whom Cambyses had in fact killed. It is not improbable that this move was inspired partly by Median hostility to the ascendancy of Persians, and partly by the antagonism of the old priesthood to that reformation of the Persian religion which is attributed to the prophet Zoroaster, to whose tenets the house of Achæmenes adhered. At any rate, since the death of the real Smerdis was not generally known, the conspirators found no difficulty in getting the sham Smerdis accepted when Cambyses was away in Egypt and rumor was doubtless magnifying his disasters. Cambyses started from the south with his troops to crush the rebellion, and died on the march, probably by his own hand.

Away in the east of Media, in the province known as Parthia, was

ruling as governor the old Hystaspes, an Achæmenid, cousin of the great Cyrus. His son Darius was with the army of Cambyses, and was perhaps, after Hystaspes, actually the next of kin to the dead monarch. To all who knew that Smerdis had been slain, to all adherents of the Zoroastrian creed, the overthrow of the false Smerdis was an object of first-rate importance—to none so much as to Darius with his claim to the Imperial succession. The army pushed north; Darius and sundry nobles who were in league with him appeared in arms before the castle to which the Magian had retreated, forced their way in, slew him, and proclaimed Darius king, passing over the claims of his father.

A succession, however legitimate, secured by force of arms, necessarily provided occasion for revolts on all sides. Babylon and Elam put up kings of their own; a Mede claiming to be of the house of Kyaxares assumed the Median crown. In Persia another sham Smerdis appeared. In three years Darius had decisively crushed all his enemies or rivals, and reigned the undisputed lord of the whole vast Persian Empire (518).

Darius was the organizer of the Empire which Cyrus had created; he made it not only very much larger, but also very much more stable than any which had preceded it. In Egypt the frenzy of Cambyses had more than destroyed everything that had been gained by the initial conciliation of Egyptian religious sentiment. Darius had no sooner crushed opposition in Asia than he turned to Egypt, where the Persian governor left by Cambyses had indeed extended his own power, but was threatening to set up an independent sovereignty. The approach of Darius caused his hasty submission, but did not save his life. When the Great King (the regular title of the Persian monarch) arrived in person he at once set to work to heal the mischief caused by Cambyses. For the conciliation of Egyptian sentiment he took into his counsel a leading Egyptian. He paid due respect to Egyptian religion and Egyptian ideas; as pharaoh he took the significant throne name of Setetu Ra; broadly speaking, he emphasized the theory that Egypt in becoming a portion of the Persian Empire was not being enslaved by the foreigner, but was to retain its own identity and individuality.

Having stayed in Egypt long enough to settle it and to restore public confidence, he visited Lydia, where he practically secured for the time being the loyalty of the Ionian cities by confirming in their position the Tyrants who were established in most of them; though later in his reign he showed remarkable wisdom in recognizing that the system was not a natural one and substituting for it democratic local government.

His next step was to organize a great expedition into Thrace, in order to establish a control over the Balkan Peninsula up to the

Danube. A great army was carried across the Bosphorus by a bridge of boats. While he secured the submission of the Thracian tribes, an Ionian fleet sailed up the Danube, which Darius and his main army then passed by another bridge of boats, which was left under the protection of the Ionians, while he marched, probably not eastward as Herodotus says, to subjugate the Scythians beyond the Black Sea, but into Dacia, where there were gold mines. The Ionian Tyrants who were present with the fleet guarding the bridge of boats stuck to their post, conscious that a disaster to Darius would mean chaos in Asia Minor and the loss of their own power. The expedition to Dacia produced no results and was unduly derided and misrepresented by Greek tradition; but the king got the bulk of his army home in safety, and the main object with which he had entered Europe, the subjugation of Thrace and Macedonia, was for the time being effected.

It may be that Darius found his expedition into Scythia so costly that he was deterred by it from carrying out an intention of bringing all Greece under his sway; many years elapsed at any rate before he made the attempt, which ended, so far as he was concerned, in the Persian disaster of Marathon. Of his operations in the Far East, beyond the sphere of the old empires, we have less certain information; but the dominions which were partitioned into the Persian Empire certainly extended to the line of the river Oxus, and the district which we call the Pamirs, and beyond Afghanistan into the Punjab.

The Imperial organization was the Great King's great work. The Assyrians, and after the Assyrians, Cyrus, had divided their Empire into military governorships; each Assyrian province was held down by a military force, and the system required that the Assyrian king should himself be primarily a soldier, even though he enjoyed the full prestige of descent from an immemorial dynasty—a prestige which Tiglath-pileser IV. had sought to secure for his own house by assuming that traditional name. The young Persian Empire of the Achæmenids had no such tradition behind it, yet the dynasty remained unshaken for centuries in spite of the feebleness of many of its rulers. Darius achieved his end by the new organization of the provinces, twenty in number, as satrapies. In each the satrap or civil governor stood at the head of the administration, with a commander-in-chief and a royal agent or secretary beside him. Those three officials were independent of each other, while each was directly responsible to the Great King. Rapid communication between all parts of the Empire was secured by the great road which ran through it from Sardis to Susa; while the king himself occupied a controlling position in the royal demesne of Persia itself, which had no satrap.

Each satrap was autonomous; its population retained their own manners and customs, and the main business of the satrap was to produce the regular annual tribute at a fixed assessment and to preserve

order in his province. The separation of the military command from the civil rule made the organization of revolt almost impossible; the difficulty was further increased by the presence of the royal agent; and, besides this, roving commissioners of the Crown were perpetually passing through the provinces and dispatching their reports to the king—a system which had been invented by Thothmes the Great when he built up the Asiatic Empire of Egypt. The danger of popular revolts was minimized, because little was demanded of the subject population except the provision of their quota of the tribute. The Egyptians remained Egyptian, and the Ionians Ionian; the city-states of the latter remained for practical purposes self-governing city-states; and when experience showed that their peoples were antagonistic to the local Tyrant-dynasties, they were permitted to eject their Tyrants and reorganize their own government on their own democratic or oligarchical lines. Hence the general readiness of the cities of Ionia to continue as subjects of the Great King.

The tolerationist principles of the Persian government are illustrated by the restoration of the Jews to Palestine early in the reign of Cyrus. The Persians made no attempt to impose their own Zoroastrian religion, the worship of Ormuzd, upon their subjects. They made no attempt to Aryanize the Empire, and after Darius there were no more kings who were characteristically Aryan, in whom specifically Aryan qualities were displayed by the side of the Orientalism which, for long centuries, had pervaded the Iranians and Indo-Aryans alike. The Persian Empire was as emphatically Oriental as the Assyrian or the Babylonian, though we may flatter ourselves by discovering an element of the Aryan political genius in the organization which differentiated it from its predecessors. If the great struggle on the history of which we are about to enter was technically one between Aryan powers, it was practically one between East and West, between the Oriental and Occidental ideas, which remains to this day, as it seems, in eternal antagonism.

CHAPTER VI

THE CRASH OF EAST AND WEST, 501-476

I.—Marathon

THE great collision between East and West was occasioned by the attempt of the Ionian cities to recover their independence, instigated by the vice-Tyrant of Miletus, who found his personal ambition balked by his relations with the Persian satrap of Ionia, Artaphernes. Histæus of Miletus, the actual Tyrant, had probably started with the design of bringing the Ionian states generally under his own Tyranny. The suspicions of Darius were aroused: Histæus was removed to the court of Susa, and retained there with every profession of friendliness, since he had rendered good service to the Great King at the time of the Thracian expedition. His son-in-law Aristagoras ruled Miletus as his lieutenant. He failed in a project for the capture of the island of Naxos, for which he had invoked and obtained the help of the satrap. The failure brought him disfavor instead of favor, and the miscarriage of his original design induced him to adopt the new one of fomenting a general revolt of the Ionian cities—in the first place against their Tyrants, and in the second against the Persian domination which had confirmed the Tyrannies.

The ejection of the Tyrants was accomplished with ease; the system was already generally detested. Then Aristagoras appealed to leading cities on the European mainland, Sparta and Athens, and Eretria in the island of Eubœa, for aid in a revolt against Persia. Sparta rejected his proposal; Athens and Eretria sent him ships. Aristagoras and his allies marched upon Sardis, and succeeded in seizing it; while they were there a fire, accidentally kindled, spread over the whole city, which was for the most part burnt to ashes. The force retreated upon Miletus, suffering a defeat on its way from a body of Persians, after which the Athenians and Eretrians returned home. The revolt became general. The Persian arms, however, were successful; the Ionians, as usual, failed to act together, owing to the rivalries between the different states; and at last, in 494, five years after the burning of Sardis, Miletus itself was captured. By the help of the Phœnician fleets the whole revolt was soon brought to an end. Miltiades, the Athenian Tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, had taken no

actual part in the revolt; but he had so far compromised himself that he thought it safer to retreat to Athens, where he at once became the leader of antagonism to Persia.

The political wisdom of Darius was shown by his acceptance of the democracies and of the abolition of the despotisms. The Ionians were not, in fact, violently hostile to the Persian supremacy when it ceased to be the power behind the system of Tyrannies which they abhorred.

But the revolt had shaken the authority of Persia in the newly-acquired dominions of Macedonia and Thrace; also the Great King was extremely annoyed by the insolent intervention of the petty states of Athens and Eretria, on which he resolved to inflict condign punishment. An expedition was dispatched, under the king's son-in-law Mardonius, to enforce the submission of Macedonia and Thrace. It succeeded in its purpose, but the attendant fleet which was to have been used for the destruction of Athens and Eretria was broken up by storms. Darius hardly needed the long-ignored entreaties of the exiled Hippias to induce him to prepare a fresh expedition, which Hippias himself accompanied as a convenient instrument. In 490 a great force sailed, after the Greek cities had been offered a way of salvation by a demand for "earth and water," the symbols of submission, which some gave and most refused. The fleet passed through the Cyclades extracting submissions, and made for Eretria, the gates of which were opened by a faction within, after a week's siege. Eretria was burnt, and the Persian force passed down the Attic coast and landed at Marathon.

As usual, the Greeks had offered no organized resistance. Athens herself had sent no force to protect Eretria, but she meant to fight for herself, urged thereto especially by Miltiades, who was at hereditary feud with the house of the exiled Pisistratidæ, and himself had always been on the watch for an opportunity to break away from the Persian supremacy as Tyrant of the Chersonese. A messenger was dispatched to Sparta to pray the aid of the warrior-state; the warrior-state promised its help "after the full moon." With the Persians at their gates the Athenians could not wait for the full moon; they marched to Marathon with no allies but a heroic band from the little city of Platea, on the border of Bœotia, whose citizens thus displayed their gratitude for the protection which Athens had afforded them against the bullying of Thebes, the leading Bœotian city.

The Athenians were commanded by able soldiers, whose skill had been put to the proof in recent wars with other Greek states. They posted their army in a very strong position, covering the only roads by which the Persians could advance upon Athens. The Persians would be obliged either to march past them, exposing themselves to a flank attack, or else to make a frontal assault in a position where the

ground gave the Greeks an enormous advantage. From that position they declined to move.

The Persians then, after some days' delay, resolved to advance, sending on a portion of their force, including the cavalry, by sea. They attempted to march past, detaching a portion of their troops to "contain" the very much smaller Athenian army. The heavy-armed Athenian troops charged across the plain; their center was driven back, but their wings drove the enemy in route, then turned and crushed the Persian center, in which were all the enemy's best troops. The foe fled to their ships, pursued by the triumphant victors, and sailed off to round the point of Sunium and attack Athens itself. But the Athenian force had time to return before them; they made no attempt to land, and sailed away again back to Asia.

The great victory of Marathon was won by a small, highly-trained force of picked men, heavily armed, against a very much larger force, of whom only a few were picked men, who were not armed to resist the shock of the charging spearmen. The great miscellaneous force, with its nucleus of disciplined troops, attempted the difficult maneuver of marching straight across the front of the enemy, thereby exposing itself to a flank attack against which it sought to defend itself by detaching an insufficient covering body—who, in fact, secured to their comrades only enough time to escape hastily to the ships instead of waiting to be completely rolled up. What the actual relative numbers of the two armies were it is impossible to say; five to one would probably be a fair estimate. Thousands of the Medes were left dead on the field, while the slain Greeks could be numbered in scores. As to the meaning of the victory, it was, from the Persian point of view, nothing more than a "regrettable incident." An army had received an unexpected check which could easily be avenged by another and bigger army. It by no means suggested to the Persian a doubt as to the result of a struggle in which he should choose to put forth his might. But the moral effect throughout European Greece was great, while in Athens itself it must have been enormous. The value of the Greek heavy-armed infantry, the "hoplites," had been definitely demonstrated in this the first engagement in which they had been measured at their best against a typical Asiatic force. It had been proved that the Persians, hitherto supposed to be invincible among Orientals, were not invincible when pitted against the spears of the Greeks. When the great struggle really did come, ten years later, the record of Marathon gave courage to many states which otherwise would have reckoned discretion the better part of valor. It also created in the Spartans a wholesome respect for the Athenians—perhaps, too, the feeling that they could not afford to give Athens a second opportunity of winning prestige while Sparta was "waiting for the full moon."

But, above all, it filled the Athenians with a splendid self-confidence,

not the misplaced arrogance born of an accidental triumph, but the consciousness that they possessed, and might possess in yet greater measure, the indomitable qualities which would assuredly be needed in full force the next time the Persian launched his hosts against them; the courage which would face any odds—for the odds at Marathon had seemed overwhelming—the discipline and self-control which makes a regiment worth more than an armed mob twenty times as numerous. The men who had won at Marathon would never yield to a conqueror, and they had set to all Athenian citizens a standard from which none would decline.

But something more was needed than a heroic confidence and a heroic readiness for self-sacrifice on the part of Athens. She must qualify for a moral leadership which should be worth more as a binding force among the Greek states than the military prestige of slow-moving Sparta or the glory Athens herself had won by the rout at Marathon. In the years that followed the great victory the most far-sighted and the most subtle of all Athenian statesmen was moulding Athenian policy to an end hitherto unthought of. The instrument of the glory of Athens was to be her fleet.

Hitherto Athens had owned a fleet larger, perhaps, than those of her neighbors, but not decisively superior. Like her neighbors, she looked upon the navy merely as subsidiary to the land forces, and her ships lay in the open bay of Phalerum. Themistocles conceived the idea of naval supremacy as the grand object for Athens to aim at. Besides Phalerum, Athens possessed in the Piræus, which was farther from the city, a harbor capable of being transformed into a fortified port of immense strength. A contest with the island power of Ægina emphasized in the popular mind the consciousness that the rivals and enemies of Athens were likely to be sea-going folk, with commerce to be raided if Athens were strong by sea, but destructive to the Athenian commerce if Athens were weak. Themistocles succeeded, not without difficulty, in persuading the Athenian state to adopt a great naval program which included the fortification of Piræus and the annual building of a number of vessels, to which objects were appropriated the proceeds of the recently discovered silver mine at Laurium.

A naval program was necessarily democratic. The strength of an army lay with the hoplites, the three upper classes whose wealth enabled them to attend the muster in full panoply with spear, shield, and corselet; the sea-going folk were, for the most part, of the laboring class, the *thetes*, who were of small account in the army. Family traditions in Athens, as in England in the days of Elizabeth, drew the aristocratic element of society to seek renown with the army; the navy was the creation of men who rose from the ranks. The naval service was inevitably a much more democratic service than that of the army, though aristocrats were drawn into it. The geographical situation

of Athens pointed to her development as a sea-power as that of Sparta pointed to her development as a land-power; but the democratic constitution of the one and the aristocratic constitution of the other tended emphatically to urge the two states along the divergent lines to which they were best adapted by geographical position; while the divergent developments themselves tended to intensify the democratic character of the one and the aristocratic character of the other. But what we have specially to observe here is, that it was the energy of Themistocles—who saw in the navy the means not of giving Athens a leadership by sea (which would place her on an equality with Sparta as leader by land), but of eventually raising her to a position of imperial supremacy—which in the decade following the battle of Marathon effected the overwhelming development of the Athenian navy.

II.—Thermopylæ, Salamis, and Platææ

Darius, it cannot be doubted, intended in due time to punish the State which had inflicted such an unexpected check upon his armies, and to complete the subjugation of the Greeks. But the second onslaught was deferred by an Egyptian revolt which it was necessary to suppress before organizing an attack upon the Greeks on the scale necessary to insure success. Before the suppression was accomplished Darius himself died, and the task devolved upon his incompetent successor, Xerxes. When Egypt was suppressed, a Babylonian insurrection again delayed operations, and it was only in 482 that Xerxes was able to set about preparing for a complete and decisive conquest.

Meanwhile Athens had been developing the fleet under the guidance of the statesman who had realized its vital importance for her defense against the Persian, as well as for his other plans. Xerxes collected a vast army from all parts of his Empire; the land forces may have numbered half a million men, for we need give no credence to the fabulous multiplication of their numbers evolved by the Greek imagination. In accordance with the regular Persian system, the land army was to be accompanied by a coöperating fleet—not a naval force acting independently; hence the design of cutting a canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos, in order to escape the danger of sailing round the promontory, which had been sufficiently demonstrated by the disaster to the fleet a year before Marathon. The Hellespont was bridged in order that the vast army might march over. The chief military position was held by Mardonius, the able soldier who had already acquired an intimate knowledge of Southern Thrace and Macedonia. The core of the army consisted of the 10,000 picked troops—the Old Guard—whom the Persians called the Immortals.

The preparations for the great march were completed in the spring

of 480. Meanwhile the Great King had sent his messengers demanding earth and water from all the Greek states except Athens and Sparta, the two defiant cities on which he was bent on inflicting condign punishment.

At last the approach of so overwhelming a danger impressed upon the Greeks the necessity for united action. Sparta and Athens invited the rest of the leading states to attend a general congress to concert measures of resistance. Thirty-one states attended, pledged themselves to united action, agreed to assign the leadership of the army to Sparta, and added to that the leadership of the navy, Athens waiving her conspicuous claim to the premier position by sea in order to insure unanimity. The northern cities of Thessaly stood apart, with a portion of Bœotia; they could not afford to commit themselves without a certainty that the whole Greek force would combine to defend their northern frontier. Without such defence they would merely be courting devastation from the invader; and they were justifiably suspicious that Sparta really cared only for the defence of the Peloponnesus.

They were warranted by the event. There were three points at which the advancing host could be stopped by a smaller force occupying a strong position—Tempe, on the north of Thessaly; Thermopylæ, near the head of the Maliac Gulf; and the Isthmus of Corinth. Had it been possible to secure Tempe, the states between Tempe and Thermopylæ would probably have come into the alliance; but it was found that all the passes could not be held, so that the position at Tempe could be turned. When it was resolved in consequence that the Greeks should make their stand at Thermopylæ, covered by the fleet off Artemisium, the northern promontory of Eubœa, the northern states at once resolved on submission. The Sicilian colonies could send no help, for they were simultaneously threatened by the power of Carthage.

A Greek army of 7,000 men was posted under the Spartan king Leonidas at Thermopylæ, a virtually impregnable pass as it was believed, until it was discovered that there was a possible route, not for an army but for a picked force, to turn the position by following a mountain path. The fleet lay off Artemisium; in it the whole force of Athens was concentrated. A large squadron, however, was kept cruising in order to prevent any attempt of the Persian to send a fleet round Eubœa and so catch them between two forces.

It was August when the Persian force arrived before Thermopylæ. Its attempts to storm the position were easily beaten off, and the fleet held its own at Artemisium. Then the Persians learned of the other path, and dispatched a strong column to carry it and take the Greeks in the rear. The troops detailed to hold it did not venture to make a stand, but only sent a warning message to the main body. The bulk

of the troops in the pass thereupon retreated. Perhaps the intention was that they should take the enveloping force in the flank and cut it up, but no such attempt was made. Leonidas, with his 300 Spartiataë, the rest of the Laconian troops, the Thespians, and the Thebans, remained in the pass. But the position had obviously become untenable. The Thebans are said to have surrendered promptly. Leonidas and his Spartans, resolved simply to sell their lives as dearly as possible, marched down into the open, and fought till the last of them was slain. The fleet sailed back from Artemisium, where it could no longer serve any effective purpose.

The disaster at Thermopylæ decided the Peloponnesians to abandon Greece beyond the Isthmus of Corinth and to fortify the Isthmus itself.

Alone among the Greeks north of the Isthmus, the Athenians, Plateans, and Megarians refused to bow to the Persians. Save for a garrison left in the citadel of Athens, the whole of her population was removed to the islands of Salamis and Ægina, and the fighting men joined the fleet. The garrison stood a fortnight's siege; then the Acropolis was stormed. The only chance for the recovery of Attica, and the protection of Megara, Salamis, and Ægina, lay in the immediate destruction of the Persian fleet. Various stories are told, always from the Athenian point of view, of the means employed by Themistocles to induce the Spartan commander of the fleet, Eurybiades, to fight at Salamis instead of withdrawing the fleet merely to cover the Peloponnese. Whether the stories are true or false, he succeeded in his object. The fleet remained at Salamis; the Persians were induced to attack in waters where they could not make effective use of their superior numbers; and at the end of a long day's fighting, in which the Athenians and Æginetans especially distinguished themselves, the Persian fleet was virtually annihilated.

The splendid but strategically futile self-devotion of Thermopylæ had been followed by a real and tremendous triumph which ruined the original scheme of conquest by the coöperation of land and sea forces; but it still left the huge Persian army undefeated and in occupation of all Greece north of the Isthmus.

The blow at Salamis cut off all supplies from Asia for the Persian army by sea. If communication by land were also cut off, a general revolt of Ionia might be counted upon, and the great expeditionary force would have to live upon the land where it was quartered in the midst of a population which might turn violently hostile at any moment. It was one thing to have marched into Greece accompanied by a fleet carrying supplies, and another to march out again without any fleet at all. Xerxes did not run away in a panic, as the Greeks would have us believe, but took the obvious course of marching for the Hellespont with a portion of his great army, so as to get it back

into Asia and overawe Ionia; while the bulk of it remained under Mardonius to complete the conquest, which had by no means been rendered hopeless by the loss of the fleet. In spite of the urgency of Themistocles, the Spartan commander of the fleet refused to sail for the Hellespont and cut off the retreat.

Mardonius withdrew his army to winter in Thessaly and renew the campaign next year. Salamis had not exhausted the naval resources of Persia any more than the Armada exhausted the naval resources of Spain; but in like manner the Greek fleet had obtained the command of the sea, and had plenty to do in preserving it. The policy of Athens, however, was not in favor of completely paralyzing the Persian naval arm for the moment. If the Peloponnesians were delivered from all possible fear of another naval attack, they would inevitably revert to their idea of holding the Isthmus and leaving the north to take care of itself. It was only their consciousness that the Peloponnese was open to attack by sea, so that the force at the Isthmus might be taken in the rear, and that their sea-defence depended upon the Athenians, which had induced them to fight at Salamis. It was only by keeping that possibility alive that Athens could now induce them to prepare for a campaign on the north of the Isthmus; while the inaction of the fleet could be safely attributed to the caution of a Spartan commander who had no understanding of naval operations.

So the fleet lay in home waters, advancing no farther to the east than Delos. But even so the Spartans would not have moved beyond the Isthmus if Athens, Ægina, and Megara had not warned them in very emphatic terms that they would make their own peace with Persia if the strictly Peloponnesian policy were maintained. Mardonius, in fact, made exceedingly attractive offers to Athens; but she would not desert the cause of freedom unless she were herself deserted. Sparta at last awoke to the fact that her own doom would be sealed if Athens and the Athenian fleet changed sides. Her government resolved on a northern campaign, and when at last a Greek force of perhaps seventy thousand men all told took the field under the command of the Spartan Pausanias, Mardonius, who had been ravaging Attica, fell back into Bœotia.

The decisive battle was fought close to Platææ, under Mount Kithæron. Mardonius left the Greek to take the offensive, reckoning that time was on his side, and that there was always a chance of the Greek confederate army breaking up as well as of their contingents failing to coöperate. The armies fronted each other, that of Mardonius covering the road to Thebes. The Greeks, inferior in numbers, occupied the stronger position; but it was not the Persian's business to force a general engagement. Pausanias attempted a turning movement on the west or right flank of Mardonius; but the Athenians on the left wing, who formed the leading column, found their way blocked

by a Persian column which had anticipated the movement, while the Persian left promptly occupied the position which the Greeks had evacuated. An attempt was made by a night march to recover on the slopes of Kithæron a stronger position than that in which the Greeks had found themselves placed by the unsuccessful attempt upon the enemy's left. But the night march was unsuccessfully managed. The Athenians on the left never started; the center mistook its ground, and halted before reaching its proper post; and the Spartans and Tegeans on the right, who were leading the eastward movement as the Athenians had led the westward movement, were separated from the rest of the army; while delays in their own march brought daylight and revealed the movement to the Persians before their objective had been reached. Mardonius seized the opportunity to open the attack.

To the Spartans and Tegeans belong all the honors of the great victory which was won. The Athenians, hastening up in response to an urgent message, were held in check by the Greek contingent in the Persian host; but the Spartan spearmen not only repulsed the main attack but pressed forward against the crowd of the enemy and swept them away after long and fierce fighting. Mardonius was slain, and the whole force was driven in utter rout. The slaughter was only stayed by the fact that the Greeks had no cavalry to press the pursuit. Forty thousand of the force, under the command of Artabazus, who had taken no share in the fighting, beat a hasty retreat, and made their way back to the Hellespont with such stragglers as succeeded in joining them.

The battle of Plataæ had effected that of which Marathon had been only a promise. It had proved once for all that Orientals could not stand against the spearmen of Hellas. Here was no case of an expedition dispatched for the destruction of a petty state whose inability to face it had been rashly taken for granted. Persia had put forth her whole power. She had sent as large an army as it was possible to handle effectively. She had sent the best troops in her service, under a commander who outgeneralled the ablest of the Greeks. The Greeks had broken that army irretrievably to pieces, and it was vain to dream that the verdict would be reversed. On the sea a like verdict had already been given at Salamis. There was never again the remotest chance that Persia would set out to conquer the European Greeks. And yet a century and a half elapsed before the European Greeks set out to conquer Persia—for the single reason that they never formed a united nation until they were in effect subjected to the dominion of Philip of Macedon.

For immediate purposes the victory of Plataæ was crowned by another victory at Mycale on the coast of Asia Minor, between the island of Samos and the promontory on which stands the city of Miletus. While the Greek fleet lay at Delos there came a message

from the island of Samos begging them to aid the Samians in their revolt from Persia, a revolt induced by the Persian disaster at Salamis and the knowledge that the free Greeks held the command of the seas. The Athenians in the fleet, who knew now at last that if the Peloponnesians deserted Athens it would only be after some great disaster to their arms in Bœotia, were as eager as they had before been reluctant to clinch their own supremacy on the seas. The fleet sailed from Delos; the Persian fleet which was attacking Samos fell back to Mycale, where its army lay. The Greeks attacked by sea and land; the Ionian contingents of the Persian force deserted and joined in the attack, and the victory was decisive of the release of the Ionians from the Persian yoke. Tradition affirmed that the battle was fought on the same day as that of Plataeæ. The Peloponnesians of the fleet sailed home content; the Athenians sailed north, and secured their own moral ascendancy and the independency of the Hellespontine region by capturing the strong fort of Sestos, which commands the Dardanelles.

III.—*Himera*

While Greeks and Persians were engaged in that brief but tremendous struggle which stayed the tide of Oriental expansion, the Western Greeks of Sicily were engaged in another momentous struggle with an Eastern Power—the Phœnician colony of Carthage; wherewith must also be associated another contest with the Etruscan Power in Italy.

The war between Carthage and Syracuse was not actually a part of the war between Persia and the continental Greeks; Carthage was not fighting as the ally of Persia or to further Persian interests; but there can be very little doubt that there was understanding between Carthage and Persia. Between their interests there was no collision, but it was in the interest of each that both should make their attack simultaneously, that the Eastern Greeks should not be able to call the Sicilians to their aid against Persia and the Sicilians should not be able to call their Eastern kinsmen to their aid against Carthage. And the Sicilian War as well as the Persian War must be regarded as a phase in this first decisive struggle between the East and the West.

Between the middle of the eighth and the middle of the sixth century the Greeks had been planting their colonies in Sicily and on the Italian coast from Tarentum in the heel of Italy up to the Bay of Naples. In 600 the Phocæans had colonized Massilia, and some years later started a colony in Corsica. The Phœnicians, as they began to lose what had once been their trading monopoly in the Ægean, threw out their colonies westwards to Carthage and Utica on the African coast, whence the direct voyage to Sicily is only some hundred and

fifty miles; and thence they too began to dispatch colonists to Sicily. In short, the Carthaginians and the Western Greeks found themselves rivals for the trade of the Western Mediterranean, the basin enclosed on the east by Italy, Sicily, and the Carthaginian promontory.

The Phœnician colonies, like the Greek colonies, were states independent of the cities which had sent them forth. It would seem, however, that Carthage when she occupied new stations did not plant colonies in the same sense, but outposts of her own power which remained under her control; in fact, she was tending to the creation of a dominion of her own, though the principal Phœnician ports on the north-west of Sicily were actually independent. In the sixth century she was more or less in alliance with what was then the dominant Power in Italy—the Etruscan confederation or kingdom—concerning which almost the only definite statements that can be made are, that the Etruscans were not Aryans, and that they were to some extent pirates.

Of them we shall hear more when we come to the history of Italy; but what we have to notice here is that in Italy, too, the coming Aryan supremacy was endangered by a non-Aryan Power. Broadly speaking the future progress of the world depended on the successful resistance of Hellenes and Latins to the Oriental Power called Persia, the Libyo-Semites of Carthage, and the Etruscans, who seem to have been more nearly akin to the Orientals than to the Aryan races. Though we shall speak of the Etruscan struggle elsewhere, it has to be mentioned here partly because of its bearing on this crisis of the struggle which we have called one between East and West, and partly because, incidentally, the Etruscans came into collision with Hellenes as well as with Latins.

About the middle of the sixth century, when Cyrus was making himself master of Media, Carthage was waging successful war in Sicily, and securing the western part of the island to herself; for the Hellenic states, as usual, failed to make common cause, not recognizing a common enemy. A few years later the Hellenic settlements in Corsica were captured by Carthaginians and Etruscans. That island was left to the Etruscans, while the Carthaginians planted themselves in Sardinia. When the Great King was preparing to absorb all Eastern Hellas, Carthage saw her opportunity for dealing a decisive blow at Western Hellas and making herself mistress of the whole of Sicily. The Phœnician mother-cities of Tyre and Sidon were a convenient medium for arranging that the Persian and Carthaginian attacks should be made simultaneously.

Messana, Syracuse, Agragas or Agrigentum, and Himera were the four great cities which stood at the four corners of Hellenic Sicily, each of them ruled by a Tyrant, the southern pair and the northern pair being respectively allied by marriage. Gelon of Syracuse estab-

lished his Tyranny in 491. The four Tyrants between them dominated the rest of the colonies.

The opportunity of Carthage was provided in the nick of time by a quarrel between Theron of Acragas and Terillus of Himera. Theron ejected Terillus, and as Hippias appealed to Darius to reinstate him, so Terillus appealed to Carthage. Carthage answered the appeal, not because she took an interest in Terillus, but because it gave her the opening that she wanted at the time she wanted. A great force was dispatched to the Phoenician port of Panormus, thirty miles from Himera, under the command of Hamilcar, a name constantly prominent in Carthaginian history. The Carthaginian fleets gave them practically unlimited power of transport. By sea and land the force advanced against Himera. Theron called Gelon of Syracuse to his aid, and Gelon marched to help him with his whole force. The obvious fact that the struggle was impending had forced him to reject the appeal of Sparta and Athens for his aid against Persia. Before Himera a great battle was fought, and the Carthaginian force was annihilated. Greek tradition, with its love of the picturesque, assigned the victory to the same day as that on which the Persian fleet was annihilated at Salamis. The battle, however, bore a closer analogy to that of Plataeæ, for it was final in its effects so far as the immediate struggle was concerned. In addition to the huge booty taken in the camp, Carthage paid heavy indemnity as the price of peace.

The defeat of Carthage was crowned six years later by a heavy blow inflicted on the Etruscans. That Power was pressing down on the Italian Greeks in their most northern colony of Cyme, not far from the Bay of Naples. Cyme, appealed for aid to Hieron of Syracuse, who had succeeded his brother Gelon in the Tyranny. Hieron, with a more keen perception of Hellenic solidarity than was common among Hellenes, sent the required aid instead of confining himself to sympathetic messages. The Etruscan fleet was shattered by the Syracusan fleet, and the blow thus inflicted was probably the turning-point in the Etruscan advance. From that time the power of the Etruscan state waned steadily.

CHAPTER VII

ATHENS, SPARTA, THEBES, AND SYRACUSE,

478-359 B. C.

I.—The Delian League, 478-460.

IN spite of what we may confidently regard as Athenian misrepresentations crystallized in the story of Herodotus, Plataeæ was a Spartan victory no less than Salamis had been an Athenian triumph; though the honors of the one had been shared by Arcadian Tegea, and of the other by Ægina. Even at Salamis and at Mycale, though the chief credit had been due to the Athenians Themistocles and Xanthippus, the Spartans had been the nominal commanders. It would have been natural, then, to anticipate that Sparta would have retained the leadership of Hellas had Spartan statesmanship been capable of utilizing its opportunities. But Hellas did not mean the Peloponnesus or even the Greek peninsula in Europe; it meant also the Islands and Ionia, and no one could aspire to the leadership of the whole without acquiring the character of a maritime Power. Even at the moment of crisis Sparta had only with difficulty been persuaded to rise above her provincial Peloponnesian conceptions. She never had been a sea Power. To develop sea power would have been a complete departure from her tradition, and she was the slave of her traditions. Consequently Athens, with her more Pan-Hellenic views and her ready acceptance of new ideas, made her bid for the leadership of Hellas. Sparta, incapable of uniting Hellas herself, was able only to foil the Athenians in their attempt to do so.

Sparta had shown the world that her sons could fight magnificently, and she had produced in Pausanias a general of no mean order. But the man was typical of the state. When he tried his hand at statesmanship he failed ignominiously; and though he had actually risen to a crisis, when there was no crisis he played stupidly for his own hand. After the capture of Sestos he was dispatched to command the Hellenic fleet; but it soon became apparent that he was attempting to establish a personal ascendancy, while it was more than suspected that he was engaged in a private intrigue with the Persian court. In fear of disclosure he took sanctuary in a shrine of the goddess

Athene, and was there starved to death—a pitiful fate for the man who had led the Greek armies to Plataæ.

No one in fact, could ever trust to the public spirit either of the Spartan state or of the individual Spartan. As the Spartiata tyrannized over Laconia, so they tyrannized over the weaker states in their neighborhood, with the practical result that half the Peloponnesians, instead of being eager allies, at heart detested their ascendancy; and Sparta soon discovered that Argos on the north, Elis on the west, and the intervening Arcadia must all be reckoned practically as enemies.

Meanwhile Athens, which had taken its cue from Themistocles, was passing forward along the path to imperialism. In the first place she made haste to replace by new fortifications the defences of the city which had been destroyed by the Persians, or before by Pisistratus. In the next place the whole harbor of the Piræus was secured by a great wall and by moles; moreover, two long and strong walls were carried the whole way from Athens to Piræus and the secondary harbor of Munychia, so that the port and the town could not be severed in case of attack. It was doubtless, also, on the initiative of Themistocles that Athens reorganized her military system with an eye, not to military, but to naval predominance. The ten generals who were at the head of the war department held their commands by sea and land, but on the assumption that the sea was their main field of operation. They ceased to be in theory the respective commanders of the contingents of the ten tribes, to which new officers were now appointed subordinate to the generals, and the connection between the generals and the tribes disappeared.

But the naval organization was nearly a necessary part of the larger plan for acquiring a general hegemony by sea. The misconduct of Pausanias and the wilful naval incompetence of Sparta made the way easy for the confederate islanders and Ionians to recognize the greatest of the maritime states as their head; and the Delian League was formed, with Athens as the presiding state. Its primary object was the maintenance of a confederate fleet to which every state was bound to contribute ships according to its resources. The assessment was cheerfully confided to Aristides, called "the Just," a political rival of Themistocles, whose high-mindedness and integrity commanded universal esteem; and no higher praise can be awarded him than the fact that his assessment met with universal acceptance. The Delian League was so called because the sacred island of Delos provided its treasury. Its organization, however, tended, as had not probably at the first been anticipated, to make Athens its complete mistress. Some of the states, like Athens herself, provided their due quota of ships and men; but the smaller states could only go shares, and it was very easy to transform their contribution into

ship-money. Some of the larger states also found it more convenient to give money than ships—money for ships, no doubt—but the practical effect was that the ships were built by Athens and manned by Athenians. Further, at the League congress the vote of every state counted alike; no additional weight attached to population or wealth. The small states, as a matter of course, found themselves following the lead of Athens, which was thus able practically to direct the policy of the whole.

The fate of a man personally so remarkable as Themistocles may not be overlooked. He had acquired his influence by sheer ability; for he did not, like his two famous rivals, Aristides and Xanthippus, belong to a prominent noble family. In spite of the brilliancy of his services he held no command either at Plataeæ or at Mycale. He again appeared prominently as the instigator of the fortification of Athens and the advocate of a systematic naval program; but tradition affirms that from beginning to end he took care to keep up a correspondence with Persia in case of accidents, whereby he succeeded in persuading the Great King to believe that he was always doing his secret best to play into the hands of Persia. The accident did happen, precipitated by the arrogance which appeared intolerable in a new man, though it might have been passed over in a noble. A system existed in Athens called Ostracism, intended to check the acquisition of too much power by any individual. The general assembly, called the Ecclesia, was annually invited to decide whether an ostracism should be held. If, as happened rarely enough, it decided in the affirmative, a special assembly was held at which each individual was at liberty to vote for the banishment of any one person, whomsoever he might think fit. The man against whom the largest number of votes was cast was banished, provided that not less than 6,000 votes had been registered. Thus no one could be ostracized, first, unless there was a general feeling that some one or other ought to be expelled; or, secondly, unless a tolerably solid body of public opinion had fixed upon one person as a proper object for expulsion. Themistocles was ostracized. He went to Argos, where he probably intrigued against Sparta, and was in communication with Pausanias when that unwise general was hoping to get the kingship into his own hands. The Spartans discovered the intrigue, and charged Themistocles with "Medizing"; and, being summoned to Athens to answer to the charge, which is not very likely to have been true, he fled. He ultimately made his way to Asia, found favor with the Great King, and died in Magnesia.

The command of the fleets of the Delian League was assigned to Kimon, the son of Miltiades. He proved himself an efficient commander, completed the emancipation of Northern Ionia from the Persian dominion, and finally, in 468, inflicted a great defeat on the

Persians in the south at the Eurymedon, shattering their army on shore and destroying a great Phœnician fleet, whereby the whole south was brought into the League.

During this time and the following years Athens was converting the League into an instrument of her own power. No member of the League was permitted to secede from it. Naxos, which attempted to do so, was reduced to submission, and was at the same time deprived of its freedom and made subject to Athens. A like fate befell other states with less excuse, and thus by degrees only those states which contributed to the League ships and no money retained their real independence, though theoretically the states which normally paid money instead of ships continued free. Before very long only the three largest states of the League, Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, were left in complete freedom; the rest were all in various degrees dependent upon the president state, had adopted political constitutions of a democratic type at her dictation, and had pledged themselves to provide soldiers as well as ships in time of war. One exceedingly practical result was that the congress of the League ceased to be held, and the treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens. Nearly all the islands had become in effect, though not always in name, merely tributary subjects of Athens. The great city forgot—perhaps she could not apply over so great an area—the principles on which she had succeeded in unifying Attica. The citizens of her nominal allies did not become citizens of Athens. And while for the most part they remained nominally free citizens of free states, actually they knew themselves to be no longer free, but subject to the dictation, and in effect to the jurisdiction, of another sovereign state.

Now, after the ostracism of Themistocles, Aristides, who was held in universal respect, while the soundness of his democratic principles was unquestioned, was indisputably the leading statesman of Athens. Beside him stood the popular soldier, Kimon, a genial aristocrat, not particularly intelligent outside the military sphere, but quite ready to be guided by Aristides, to whom he probably owed his original advancement. The ruling ideas in his mind were antagonism to Persia and admiration for the military aristocracy of Sparta. To war against Mede and to keep on friendly terms with Sparta were two aspects of a policy on which all Athenians could claim agreement; but when Aristides died it seemed likely that Kimon, who succeeded to the leadership, would fall under sway of Spartan influence abroad and of oligarchical influence at home. An opposition grew up, led by Ephialtes, a democrat of the Aristides type, but less acceptable to the aristocratic families and more actively hostile to them, and by Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the former associate of Aristides in the rivalry with Themistocles.

21 The power of Kimon and the official amity between Athens and

Sparta were wrecked by the stupidity and mistrust of Sparta herself. She had been too much occupied with troubles of her own to give her jealousy of the growing power of Athens active expression. In 464, the Helots in Messenia broke out in fierce revolt. The danger was so great that Sparta appealed to her allies for aid. Kimon persuaded the Athenians to send him with an army to help her. The Messenians had occupied an impregnable fortress on Mount Ithome, and when the Athenians failed to capture it the Spartans told Kimon that they had no further use for him. He returned to Athens to find the city seething with wrath over Sparta's insolence, and very ready to vent it upon the man who had persuaded them to the friendly action which had exposed them to the insult. Kimon was ostracized, and the party led by Ephialtes and Pericles became completely predominant. The personal ascendancy of Pericles was insured by the murder of his colleague, which was attributed to the oligarchical group. From 460 to the day of his death the figure of Pericles dominated the political stage.

One other incident of consequence is to be noted in connection with this affair, which has been called the Messenian war. Athens occupied Naupactus, commanding the western entrance of the Gulf of Corinth. When the insurgents in the fortress of Ithome at last surrendered on condition that they should quit the Peloponnesus, the Athenians gave them an asylum and turned them practically into a friendly garrison of the new naval station.

II. Pericles, 460-431

In the whole story of that rivalry between leading Greek states, which militated against their ever combining either into a federal empire or into an empire under the supremacy of one state, there are two factors which have to be borne constantly in mind. Every Greek city was intensely possessed with the idea of its own separate individuality, its own independent sovereignty, and detested the motion of absorption into any larger body by which its own freedom of action should be circumscribed. It did not require any actual tyranny, any unjust oppression, on the part of an Imperial city such as Athens, to make subordinate cities restive; the mere fact that they were subordinate was in itself sufficient. In the second place, every state in Greece was divided into two factions: an oligarchical faction, which sought to keep the control in the hands of a privileged class; and a democratic faction, which sought to reduce privileges to a minimum, with the usual corollary of endeavoring to exclude the oligarchical politicians from office. But incidentally, when we talk of democracy in Hellas, it has always to be remembered that there was a very considerable class of slaves, perhaps half the population, who, except in

the districts under direct Spartan dominion, did not count politically at all, while within those districts the hostility of the subject Helots to their Spartan masters constituted a perpetual danger.

As the outcome of these conditions, there was always a cross division in the states which were leagued with Athens or leagued with Sparta: an oligarchical faction in the cities of the Athenian Empire, which was fostered by Sparta and hoped to recover its own power through the support of an alliance with the oligarchical Peloponnesian power; and in the cities of the Peloponnesian League a democratic faction, which hoped in like manner to achieve an ascendancy by the help of and in alliance with Athens, the Great Democracy. In each League the cities were conscious of the oppressive domination of the leading state, which in itself served as an encouragement to the antagonistic faction; but the active motive of revolt was almost invariably to be found in the desire of the faction which was out of power to capture the control.

The ideal of Pericles was a democratic imperialism. As concerned the Attic state, the government was to be in the form of a pure democracy, wherein whatever survived of privilege should be accompanied by equivalent burdens; while the democracy itself should be swayed by the moral ascendancy of an individual. So, also, the Athenian Empire was to be an aggregate of democratic states, swayed by the moral ascendancy of the one intellectually supreme state, Athens itself. But here the moral ascendancy was insufficient; the state which was intellectually supreme must also exercise a coercive power over her neighbors. The establishment of an Athenian democracy under his own direction, and of a Greek Empire under Athenian direction, were the two fundamental and associated objects in view. The weak points in the Periclean conception lay first in the fact that the ideal demanded a Pericles, not only to bring it into existence, but to preserve it. An ideal which depends on the moral ascendancy of one man requires the existence of the one man fitted to exercise such an ascendancy. The second defect lay in the fact that the moral ascendancy of the intellectually supreme state required to be reinforced by coercive powers.

The completion of the Athenian democracy, the legitimate development along the lines of the constitution of Cleisthenes, was the joint work of Ephialtes and Pericles, and was no contravention of the policy of the three great men of the last generation, Themistocles, Aristides, and Xanthippus. Pericles, the son of the third, might almost be said to have united in his own person the genius of the first and the character of the second. The great democratic advance would seem to have been made at the moment when Kimon, the representative of patriotic conservatism, was engaged in the unfortunate Messenian expedition; though patriotic conservatism,

as represented by the great poet Æschylus, was by no means antagonistic to the movement. The stronghold of aristocracy was in the council of the Areopagus, which had retained some of its political powers when the bulk of them had been transferred by Cleisthenes to the new council of five hundred. It was now deprived of those powers, while it retained its supreme function as a court pronouncing sentences on behalf of the gods; having no concern with offences which did not partake of the character of sacrilege.

Two great changes were introduced in the council and in the archonships. Appointment to the latter was thrown upon first to the third class of citizens, and then to the fourth also; the selection from the candidates was decided exclusively by lot, dispensing with the preliminary limitation of the number of candidates by election, and the office itself became a paid office. Similarly the members of the council were chosen by lot, and the councillors received pay from the state. In short, appointment to office by lot, and the payment of officers of state, were the two principles which made it possible for every citizen, in fact as well as in theory, to take a personal part in administration. The principle was also applied to the dikasts, so that the courts became popular courts in the fullest sense of the term; every idle citizen who preferred a day's pay in the law courts to doing a day's work had his chance of coming on to the jury panel if the lot should fall upon him. It was conspicuously an incidental result that while the dikasts, against whose judgment there was no appeal, knew very little of law, they were liable to be influenced by their political sentiments and by every kind of personal appeal.

At the same time there were offices to which appointment was not made by lot. The *strategi*, the ten generals, were elected; and on each separate military expedition one general was in supreme command. And in another respect an honorable burden was laid upon wealth. For the equipment of triremes, the great ships of war with three banks of oars, the constitution of Cleisthenes had laid the responsibility upon rich individuals among whom emulation was a point of honor. The constitution of Pericles treated the discharge of great ceremonial public functions, the equipment of embassies, the annual public performances of the national theater, and the like, in a similar manner; and it was a point of honor with the wealthy citizens to vie with each other in lavish expenditure and splendor in discharging these burdens.

The Imperial designs of Pericles were not compatible with the partition of power between Athens and Sparta which had been Kimon's ideal. Argos had recovered a good deal of her old strength in the Peloponnese, and Athens allied herself with Argos immediately after Kimon's ostracism. Dorian Corinth, the state most intimately

associated with Sparta, was also the greatest commercial rival of Athens; Megara on the Isthmus was in constant dispute with her southern neighbor, and Athens entered into alliance with Megara. The possession of Naupactus by Athens was a serious menace to Corinthian trade. Corinth and Athens were soon at war, while Ægina, the old maritime rival of Athens, was joined with Corinth, and Megara with Athens. In this struggle Athens held her own. But even while it was going on, she made what was for the time the last great movement against Persia: she dispatched a large expedition to assist an Egyptian revolt. Successful at first, that expedition ultimately ended in disaster—the loss of something like the whole force. It taught Pericles finally that it would be vain to adopt an aggressive attitude towards Persia, at least until the Athenian supremacy in Hellas should be established. But even the Egyptian disaster did not prevent Athens from emerging victoriously out of the Corinthian war, bringing Ægina itself into the circle of the subordinate states, and even drawing under her sway the greater part of the cities of Bœotia in spite of an actual collision with the Spartans.

Before the end of the decade, in 450, the virtual transformation of the confederacy of Delos into an Athenian Empire had been ratified by the removal of the treasury from Delos to Athens; and immediately afterwards an agreement was arrived at with Persia which is known as the Peace of Callias. There does not seem to have been a formal treaty, but an understanding, accepted on both sides, that Athens would countenance no attack upon the Persian coast, and that Persia would send no armaments into the Ægean. On the other hand, an oligarchical reaction in the Bœotian cities immediately deprived Athens of her temporary ascendancy in that region, and in 445 Pericles deemed it advisable to negotiate a peace for thirty years with Sparta.

One of the schemes by which Pericles endeavored at once to increase the influence of Athens among the dependencies, and to provide fresh openings for the poorer classes of the Athenian community, was the creation of a type of colony called *Cleruchia*. In suitable places—in the Thracian Chersonese, in Lemnos and Imbros (islands long ago appropriated for Athens by Miltiades as Tyrant of the Chersonese), in Eubœa and in other islands—land was purchased, paid for by a reduction in the annual tribute or contribution to the funds of the Delian League, and allotted to Athenian settlers taken exclusively from the poorer classes, who alone were permitted to apply for it. The settlers were naturalized as citizens of the states concerned, and were thus at once a garrison and a body exercising a degree of political influence; while the settlements afforded an outlet for the constantly expanding population. In

Attica itself precautions had been taken to prevent the numerous aliens, the *metæci*, who settled there for purposes of trade, from slipping into the position of actual citizens. A law had been passed at an early stage of the Periclean ascendancy excluding from the roll of citizens any one whose father or mother was an alien. Athens was as careful to preserve her own integrity as a state as she was zealous in her own interest to impair that of her neighbors.

More dangerous was the development by which she diverted the funds of the Delian League, which was theoretically intended for the defence of the confederacy, to her own advancement, claiming that she might utilize them as she chose, provided that she duly executed her function of keeping the League immune from external attack. Opposition to Pericles was led by Thucydides (the son of Melesias, not the historian), who was actuated, as Aristides might well have been, by a wholly praiseworthy aversion from what seemed to him dishonest treatment of the dependencies. But the conscientious statesman drew his principal support from the real oligarchical faction, the men who were opposed, not to the policy of Pericles as an Imperial statesman, but to Pericles himself as champion of the democracy which curtailed their own privileges. Such an opposition could easily be condemned as factious, and a trial of strength between Pericles and Thucydides resulted in the ostracism of the conservative leader. The fall of Thucydides established the supremacy of Pericles more firmly than ever.

The policy of maritime ascendancy and transmarine expansion found expression both in the West and in the East. Athens had already overtaken and passed Corinth in the rivalry for the commerce with the Sicilian and Italian colonies; but she had no western colonies of her own. The overthrow of the famous city of Sybaris gave Pericles his opportunity, and the breadth of his ideas is illustrated by the fact that when, in answer to the appeal of the Sybarites, he designed the creation of the new colony of Thurii, he deliberately made it not purely Athenian but Pan-Hellenic by inviting the coöperation of other states; though always with the intention of reserving to Athens the largest interest and influence in the new settlement. In like manner he sought to secure Athenian predominance in the north of the *Ægean*, and Athenian trade with Thrace and with the Black Sea, by an expedition to open up friendly communication with the rulers in the latter region and by the establishment of a colony at Amphipolis on the mouth of the Strymon.

Ultimately, neither Amphipolis nor Thurii proved acquisitions useful to the Athenian Empire. But while Pericles lived the ascendancy over Ionia was maintained; and when Samos, one of the few states which had remained non-tributary, attempted to set at nought an

adverse decision of the President of the Delian League in a quarrel with Miletus, Athenian fleets compelled her submission, extracted from her heavy war indemnity, and compelled her to undertake the supply of soldiers as well as ships when called upon, virtually as a subject of Athens.

The Delian League had been born of the Persian menace, therefore its formation had not been opposed by the Greeks of the Lacadæmonian group. The League as a sea Power was a buffer between the Peloponnesus and Persia. But thirty years later, the fear of Persia had passed away, and there was no active desire for aggression against her; while the League had ceased to be a free confederation, and had become to all intents and purposes the instrument of Athenian power.

Two states in particular were gravely affected, Sparta and Corinth: Corinth because the immense maritime preponderance of Athens, secured by a fleet for which her tributaries paid, was threatening to crush Corinthian commerce; Sparta because her old formal hegemony of Hellas was becoming a mere fiction. The states north of the Isthmus were afraid lest the great maritime state should attempt to develop a land empire as well, though hitherto there had only been a brief threatening of such a consummation when for a short time Athens had held the mastery of Bœotia. Thebes and her Bœotian League were as hostile to Athens as Corinth itself; and the states beyond Bœotia were at least inclined to hostility. In every subject city there was an oligarchical party always on the watch to turn against Athens, thought her command of the sea almost secured her against possibilities of revolt. In the absence of any pressing common danger imposing at least a semblance of unity in Hellas, it was absolutely certain that sooner or later there would be a combined attempt to break down the Athenian Empire, and it was all but certain that the immediate occasion of the conflagration would be a collision between Athens and Corinth.

Pericles had organized the Empire on the lines laid down by Themistocles, with the full consciousness that the time would come when the Empire would have to fight for its existence, and a full confidence that under competent guidance she would emerge victoriously from the struggle. He did not seek war, but he was assured that war would come, and was ready for it when it should come. The Bœotian affair had taught him the one lesson which perhaps he needed: that there should be no wasting of strength in attempts to meet any combination on an equality by land; Athens must fight as a maritime Power, and must concentrate entirely upon an overwhelming preponderance by sea. With the command of the sea she could destroy the trade and cut off the supplies of her foes both in the Ægean Sea and on the west; while her own impregnable

harbors would still secure her position as the leading mart of the Western World. No one could touch the wealth which she drew from her tributaries, no one could at one time engage more than a fraction of her fleets, no one could give aid to her tributaries if they dared to revolt. Also, Pericles could rely wholly upon the spirit of her people—the people who had fought and won at Marathon and Salamis, whose idealism had been kept living for half a century by the inspiration of mighty poets, and was materialized in the noble works of matchless architects and sculptors. He could dare to call upon the people of Attica to display a patriotic self-sacrifice in the national cause such as perhaps no other statesman could have ventured to reckon upon.

The hour was at hand. Not in the Ionia of the Asiatic coast, with which we have hitherto been concerned, but in the Ionian Isles on the west of the peninsula, was the Corinthian colony of Corcyra; and Corcyra, contrary to the ordinary custom, was always on very bad terms with the mother-city. A quarrel broke out between Corinth and Corcyra, which, like Corinth, possessed a powerful navy. Corinth attacked Corcyra, and met with a serious reverse; she prepared to make a great effort against her colony. Behind her were the forces of the Peloponnesian League. Corcyra at once sought to join the Athenian League. The value to Athens of her alliance was manifest; supported by her navy the Athenian fleets would be decisively supreme in the western waters, whereas if she were crushed and absorbed by Corinth, Corinth would be able effectively to dispute that supremacy. Athens accepted the alliance, and sent ships to aid her, but only if she should be attacked. The presence of the Athenian ships converted what would otherwise have been a Corinthian victory at Sybota (433) into a virtual defeat.

Corinth felt that the time had come to turn the whole forces of the Peloponnesian League upon Athens; while Pericles delivered his own counter-stroke, not by a declaration of war, but by excluding Megara, which had now for a long time been an ally of Corinth, from all the ports of the Athenian League. Incited by Corinth, a Peloponnesian congress issued an ultimatum to Athens. She was charged with various breaches of what we may call international agreements, and with having "enslaved" the Greek states of her own League. Unless she set Hellas free there would be war. It was practically possible to retort every one of the charges upon Corinth and Sparta. Pericles replied to the ultimatum by declaring that Athens was ready to accept the Spartan doctrines if Sparta herself would first act upon them, which was the last thing Sparta would dream of. Both sides prepared actively for war, and the hostilities opened in 431.

In the eyes of the first and greatest of scientific historians—the

Athenian Thucydides—the struggle between Athens and Sparta, which we call the Peloponnesian War, was of greater importance than the struggle with Persia. That is a view which we can hardly endorse. The Persian conquest of Hellas would have prevented Hellenism from becoming a factor of first-rate importance in the history of the world; the struggle between Athens and Sparta had no such effect. Still, it is just conceivable that if it had never taken place, or if its issue had been different, an Athenian Empire would have been established which would not have split up like that of Alexander, and would not have gone down before Rome. Yet, apart from that possibility, this contest of cities has a very great significance. It points at least to the political conclusion that the system of city-states is incompatible with a permanent Imperial organization extended over a large area, with the corollary that such a system must go down in the long run before a great territorial dominion with an adequate centralized organization. In Greece the city-state system was developed to its highest capacity. While it lived it bore a marvellous fruit, but its life could only be short, and the story of the Peloponnesian War is the demonstration of its inherent incapacity for a prolonged vitality. We must be content, however, to deal only with the salient features of the war, passing over its picturesque episodes with a reluctant brevity.

III.—The Struggle of Athens and Sparta, 431-404

The war falls into two parts—the first part being the ten years struggle between Athens and Sparta which was closed by the Peace of Nikias in 421, while the second was the outcome of the aggressive policy of Athens, which ended in the ruin of her power at the battle of Ægospotami in 405.

The struggle was opened by the unsuccessful attempt of Thebes to seize on the little city of Plataæ, the ever-valiant and loyal ally of Athens. The attack was a wholly unwarrantable breach of the peace; and Plataæ at once put itself in a state of defense, though Athens could do little for its assistance beyond withdrawing the non-combatants and throwing in a large store of provisions. The policy of Pericles demanded that Athens should take thought for the city, the ports, and the fleet, but should make no attempt at military operations for the defence of territory. The country population, and all the stores that could be brought in, were gathered behind the city walls. All the fighting was to be done by the fleet, and the fleet could not defend Plataæ.

In the early summer of 431 the Peloponnesian army poured into Attica, and wrought devastation; while Pericles braved the popular wrath by refusing to take the field in defense of the land. The

fleet, however, was active on the west coast, and against the Corinthian colony of Potidæa on the Chalcidic peninsula; and it expelled the Æginætans from Ægina, where Athenian citizens were planted.

Next year the second devastation of Attica was a less alarming experience than an appalling visitation of the plague, doubtless sea-borne from Egypt or Phœnicia. Greece in general was spared, but the overcrowding within Athens intensified the virulence of the pestilence, so that perhaps a quarter of the population perished. In spite of the plague, Athens had vigor enough to continue her naval operations in the west and to reduce Potidæa. It appeared that the influence of Pericles was shaken; the moment was deemed favorable for an attack on him; yet it failed, and he seemed more firmly established than ever, until in the next year death carried him off.

About the time when Pericles died, the Peloponnesians had completed the investment of Plataæ, which had been begun earlier in the year. The valor and resourcefulness of the little garrison enabled them to hold out for almost two years through one of the most memorable of sieges. Ultimately they were starved into surrender, and the Thebans glutted their own revenge by slaying the captiv's and leveling the city to the ground. If Athens had not resolved on the general policy of leaving the land unprotected, she would not have ventured to lose her hold on what was an important strategic position covering the road between Megara and Thebes.

Meanwhile one of the allies which were still not tributary revolted. Mytilene, with nearly the whole island of Lesbos, rebelled against the control, which had been exercised without severity, but was nevertheless intolerable according to the Greek ideas of city autonomy. So great was the indignation at Athens that when, after a year's resistance, Mytilene was forced to surrender, the Athenian assembly voted that the whole male population should be put to death. The more moderate and politic party, however, succeeded in procuring an Extraordinary Assembly, which reversed the terrible decision. The sentence was absolutely on the point of being carried out when the vessel carrying the reprieve succeeded by almost superhuman exertions in arriving at Lesbos. Only the ringleaders were actually executed; but the Lesbian fleet was annexed, and the walls of Mytilene were destroyed.

The death of Pericles left no successor of at all the same caliber. The ultra-democratic constitution brought to the front on the one side demagogues, men of the people, with whom it was an axiom that there was no political virtue among men of birth and station, and on the other side men who were thoroughly convinced that every popular leader must certainly be a scoundrel. Respectability chose for its chief the eminently respectable and blameless Nikias. The popular leader was one Cleon, who has been pilloried forever by

the merciless wit of the great comic poet, Aristophanes; but the condemnation is qualified by the fact that beside him in the pillory stands the figure of Socrates. In fact, party spirit ran furiously high, and political antagonists condemned each other as honestly and as unjustly as in the days of the French Revolution. Respectability wanted peace and suppression of vulgar politicians; the vulgar politicians were what modern political slang terms jingoes; while if they had used modern phraseology they would have called themselves Social Reformers.

The most striking success of the war was, in fact, due to Cleon. As the war of the French Republic with the monarchies of Europe brought to the front most distinguished fighting men who were not of noble birth, so at Athens original naval and military talent had been displayed chiefly by men who were not otherwise of distinguished position. While respectable society pinned its faith to the very mediocre military talent of Nikias, Cleon detected and advanced the unconventional abilities of the ingenious but erratic Demosthenes.

In 425 a fleet was dispatched to the west which was accompanied by Demosthenes, though he was not in command. Demosthenes had an idea—which he was authorized to carry out if opportunity offered—that a fortified post might be established in the Western Peloponnese which might be made a source of active annoyance to Sparta. Being delayed in what is now the Bay of Navarino by stress of weather, Demosthenes induced the men to pass the time by fortifying the promontory of Pylos, which is severed by a narrow channel from the island of Sphacteria lying across the mouth of the bay. When the fleet sailed, Demosthenes remained behind with five ships. In some alarm the Spartans summoned the fleet of the Allies to drive the Athenians out of Pylos, whither a Spartan force was hastily dispatched. Demosthenes was able to hold Pylos until the return of the Athenian fleet, after which he had sent a hurried message. Meanwhile the Spartans had thrown a body of a few hundred men into Sphacteria. The Athenian fleet defeated the Peloponnesian fleet, and the result was that instead of Pylos being blockaded by the Peloponnesians, the small force of Spartiatæ was blockaded in Sphacteria.

So disturbed was the Spartan government when it could see no way of relieving the imprisoned forces, that terms of peace were proposed to Athens. The Athenians, incited by Cleon, rejected the terms; but the force at Pylos could not prevent supplies from being smuggled into Sphacteria. Cleon giped at the generals for not taking a force sufficient to conquer the stubborn Spartans. Nikias offered to resign his command to Cleon if Cleon would go and do the job himself. Cleon went, with the reinforcements which he had declared to be necessary. Instead of failing ignominiously, as had

been anticipated by his political opponents, he returned to Athens in three weeks with the surviving Spartans as prisoners of war. Cleon was no soldier himself, but Demosthenes understood his business. On Sphacteria were only some four hundred Spartan hoplites, and as many light-armed helots. Demosthenes had 14,000 men to work with, and in spite of a stubborn defence the Spartans were at last forced into a position in which they had simply to choose between surrendering and being massacred. The 290 survivors were brought to Athens, and the Spartan tradition of "no surrender" was dissipated. The Spartan prisoners remained an invaluable asset for future negotiations.

The success encouraged Athens to desert the principles on which she had hitherto acted, and to engage in the next year in an unsuccessful attempt to master Bœotia. The democratic factions failed to move, and the army commanded by Hippocrates met with a severe defeat at Delium. In the same year there was a sharp reverse in the Thracian region, where, since the fall of Potidæa, matters had been complicated by the hostility of the Macedonian king, Perdiccas. Thither was sent Brasidas, the one Spartan who appears to have shown original genius. The Athenian colony of Amphipolis revolted, and by the end of the year the Athenians were practically driven out of Thrace, though not out of the Chalcidic peninsula.

To Cleon, the failures pointed to the necessity for gaining further successes before peace should be made; to the peace party, they emphasized the folly of continuing hostilities. Sparta wanted peace. She was rather disturbed than pleased by the successes of Brasidas, won by methods which defied all Spartan tradition. An armistice was arranged; but peace was postponed by the continued activity of Brasidas in the north, where the towns in the peninsula of Pallene revolted from Athens, relying upon his active aid. Pallene had not revolted before, chiefly because it was specially exposed to naval attack. Thus the two men who stood in the way of peace were the Athenian Cleon and the Spartan Brasidas. The new revolt roused the wrath of the Athenian populace; Cleon procured a vote that Amphipolis itself should be recaptured, and thither he himself was dispatched in command of the expedition. Brasidas hurried to the rescue of Amphipolis. The Athenians broke before the charge of Brasidas; Cleon was slain, but Brasidas himself also fell. Within a few months, early in 421, a definite treaty of peace, called the Peace of Nikias, was signed between Athens and Sparta, practically on the basis of the *status quo ante*, though including terms distinctly disadvantageous to Corinth, Megara, and Bœotia.

The mantle of leadership of the aggressive and democratic party descended for a moment to another man of the same type as Cleon, but of less ability, Hyperbolus, who, for a short time, was joined

by the brilliant, ambitious, and perfectly unscrupulous young aristocrat Alkibiades. But Alkibiades, when it suited him, joined forces with Nikias in procuring the ostracism of Hyperbolus. A junction between Nikias, the type of conventional mediocrity, and Alkibiades, who set at naught every possible convention of manners and morals, could not long be maintained.

Alkibiades was thirsting for brilliant enterprises; Nikias abominated enterprise of every kind. The opportunity was provided for the younger man by Sicily, which had been the scene of a contest between Dorian and Ionian states somewhat corresponding to that which was going on in Greece itself. There had been some inadequate attempts at intervention on the part of Athens, but her fleets had arrived only when the Sicilians had mutually determined to keep themselves to themselves, and the Athenians were dismissed. Shortly afterwards, however, Sicilian dissensions were again active, and in 416 Segesta and Leontini appealed to Athens for aid against Selinus and Syracuse, which had taken possession of Leontini. Alkibiades carried the Athenian Assembly with him, and it was resolved to send an expedition against Syracuse in answer to the appeal, despite the opposition of Nikias. Nevertheless, by a curious compromise, Nikias himself was joined in the command with Alkibiades and the soldier Lamachus. He had acquired a reputation for military capacity for which it is impossible to discover any explanation; probably, however, popular admiration for the brilliancy of Alkibiades was tempered by an extremely justifiable distrust, and the caution of Nikias was intended mainly to be a check upon his eccentricities.

The whole scheme of the expedition was a piece of political extravagance—virtually a bid for empire in a new region. It was immensely popular, and preparations were made on a scale of unparalleled magnificence. Before the expedition sailed, Athens was shocked by an act of sacrilege—the midnight mutilation of a number of sacred stone figures known as *Hermæ*. Popular rumour pointed to Alkibiades and his boon companions as the perpetrators of an outrage which was in some mysterious way intended as a prelude to the overthrow of the democracy. Nevertheless, Alkibiades was dispatched with the Sicilian expedition, instead of being allowed to stand his trial at once. In his absence other charges of profanation were raked up against him, and he was recalled from the army to face the accusation. He sailed from Sicily, but escaped at Thurii, and thenceforth devoted himself to seeking vengeance against his native city.

The recall of Alkibiades almost paralyzed the Sicilian expedition, because it left Nikias for practical purposes in supreme command. Lamachus was a stout and capable soldier, but he was completely

overruled by the senior general. At the very outset, if his advice had been followed, the force would have struck straight and hard at Syracuse itself, and the chances are that the blow would have been immediately decisive. Alkibiades preferred diplomatizing with the other Sicilian states—a line of action which could be sufficiently justified from the political point of view, but of which the success would have depended chiefly upon Alkibiades himself. Now the Athenians had no diplomatist to do their work, and it would almost seem as if it was the one anxiety of Nikias to avoid any sort of concentrated or decisive action. The winter was frittered away; and meanwhile the exiled Alkibiades went to Sparta to support appeals from Corinth and Syracuse for Spartan intervention. He painted in startling colors the vast ambitious projects of the Athenian state—projects which may have been his own, but were certainly much more sweeping than any designs formulated by the Athenian government. The Spartans took alarm and adopted his advice. They appointed Gylippus to organize the Syracusan defenses, while the Corinthians prepared a naval force; and they seized and occupied the post of Dekeleia, in Attic territory.

In the spring of 414 Nikias carried his forces to the harbor of Syracuse. The plan of operations was for the Athenian fleet to blockade Syracuse on the sea side, and to complete the blockade by carrying a wall across the neck of the Syracusan promontory from the great harbor on the south to the bay of Thapsus in the north, occupying the hill of Epipolæ. Epipolæ was seized and fortified at the very moment when the Syracusans were preparing to secure it themselves. The attempt of the Syracusans to run a cross fortification between Epipolæ and the harbor was frustrated, and in this direction the Athenian walls were completed; but by an evil fate Lamachus was slain in the fighting, and incompetent Nikias was left in sole command. Nikias neglected to complete the wall northwards from Epipolæ to the Bay of Thapsus. The Spartan Gylippus came to Himera, rapidly collected a force from the cities friendly to Syracuse, and dashed into Syracuse through the opening which had been left—a feat which would have been a sheer impossibility if the entrenchments had been completed. The newcomer inspired the citizens with his own energy—he must have taken Brasidas for his model—and a counterwork, carried across the line of that designed by the Athenians, effectively prevented the completion of the investment. No Sicilians came to the help of the Athenians, and Nikias soon found that in effect the besiegers had become the besieged.

His dispatches informed the Athenians that they must choose between sending a relief expedition on a still larger scale than before and withdrawing their force altogether; and in face of the fact that the Spartans were now ravaging Attica from Dekeleia, the

extraordinary vigor of Athens was shown by the dispatch of the new expedition under Demosthenes. But Nikias, in spite of his own entreaties, was neither superseded nor recalled.

Under the direction of Gylippus, the Syracusans, in their own harbor, had been preparing a fighting fleet especially adapted for battle in a cramped space, where the Athenians' triremes could not maneuver. They forced an engagement, just before the arrival of Demosthenes, with encouraging results. Demosthenes at once attempted to remedy the original blunder of Nikias by storming the cross wall; but the attempt failed. The new general grasped the painful truth that success was impossible, and the only course open was retreat. Nikias, having the fear of the Assembly before his eyes, refused. When Gylippus brought in fresh reinforcements from the country, he was at last convinced; but there were still delays in consequence of an eclipse which inspired the army with superstitious terrors. Then the Athenians were defeated in an attempt to fight their way out of the harbor; panic seized them, and the men flatly refused to repeat the effort. The triumphant Syracusans occupied the roads by which Demosthenes had still hoped to make good a retreat into friendly territory. When the force did move off, the van under Nikias became separated from the rear under Demosthenes, and both portions of it were forced to surrender unconditionally, having become utterly exhausted and demoralized by lack of food and water. Both Nikias and Demosthenes were put to death, and all the unhappy captives were sold into slavery. So miserably ended the great expedition, whereof the story has been told by Thucydides in one of the most magnificently dramatic passages in all literature. The original design may be defended. Had it succeeded it would have given Athens at least a temporary supremacy in the west, though it may be doubted whether she could have preserved it. And there is every probability that it would have succeeded, if either Arkibiades or Lamachus had been in command instead of Nikias, whose hopeless ineptitude threw away every chance and made ruin inevitable.

From this point the Persian satraps of Sardis and Phrygia begin to play their part. They stirred up the Ionians to revolt against the supremacy of the Power which had been shaken to its foundations by the great disaster in Sicily. They sought the alliance of Sparta, and Sparta proved willing to aid them in recovering the Persian supremacy over the Hellenic states of Asia, since the power of her rival in European Greece would be diminished thereby. In the summer of 412 half the Athenian Empire was in revolt, and Athens was engaged in a desperate struggle for the preservation of her dominion. Alkibiades, who had quarrelled with the Spartan king Agis, had left Sparta and was playing for his own hand, intriguing with Tisaphernes of Sardis and Pharnabazus of Lydia; his own object now

was probably to get himself recalled to Athens and make himself Tyrant. In Athens itself the disaster had given the oligarchical party the opportunity for laying the whole blame of it upon the system of democracy. A revolution established a new oligarchical government in 411, known as the Rule of the Four Hundred.

But the Athenian navy engaged in the eastern waters was not yet crushed, and it was intensely democratic. In 410 it won a complete victory over the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus. The victory gave the democratic party in Athens the upper hand again; the democracy was restored, and Spartan overtures for peace were rejected. During the ensuing years the Athenian fleet was recovering the Athenian ascendancy in the east.

In 407 there appeared at the head of the Spartan fleet, which had been practically brought into being by the attempt to wrest the east from Athens, one of the most remarkable of her sons, Lysander. In that year he inflicted a reverse on the Athenian fleet. In the next year he was not commanding, and great victory at Arginusæ gave the Athenians such confidence that they again rejected peace terms proffered by Sparta. But the cheerfully resolute democracy led by Pericles had degenerated under the long strain; it could still be fiery, obstinate, perhaps even on occasion heroic, but it had lost its powers of self-control. The generals who won the victory at Arginusæ were condemned to death by a sort of act of attainder, because no adequate measures had been taken to save the lives of the crews whose ships had been wrecked in the fight.

The nemesis was at hand. Lysander was again in actual, though not in nominal, command of the Peloponnesian fleet in the east. He had secured the complete confidence of Cyrus, the son of the great King Darius, who had been sent down to the coast to supersede the two satraps. Cyrus, recalled to Susa, actually entrusted Lysander with the lieutenancy of his government. Secure against any possibility of Persian intervention whatever he might do, he attacked Lampsacus on the Hellespont. The Athenian fleet could not force him to an engagement except on his own terms; he, on the other hand, prepared a surprise attack which was carried out with complete success. Only twenty out of 160 Athenian ships escaped, and with them the admiral, Conon, who did not venture to return to Athens. The Athenian fleet was wiped out; for years it had been impossible to maintain the strong reserves which had been always insisted upon in the earlier stages of the war. Presently Lysander was able to blockade Piræus itself, while Spartan troops cut Athens off from all communication on the land side. The city was, in effect, starved into surrender. Thebes and Corinth urged that Athens should be blotted off the face of the earth. Sparta, with all her faults, was less vindictive. The fortifications were razed, the long walls

were thrown down, Athens was deprived of all her possessions outside Attica, her fleet was reduced to twelve triremes, and she herself was pledged to be the faithful ally and supporter of Sparta.

At home the oligarchical faction reaped the immediate fruits. How far actual treachery on their part had led to the actual disasters remains unknown. With the help of Lysander the government was vested in a body of thirty men—theoretically a provisional government to prepare a new constitution. In effect they ruled arbitrarily and mercilessly; they are known to history as the Thirty Tyrants.

The democratic exiles, headed by Thrasybulus, seized a fortress on the Boeotian frontier, which became a camp of refuge for the discontented. Attica was thrown into what was virtually a state of civil war; Sparta intervened, both parties of Athens accepted the arbitration, a general amnesty was decreed, and a "constituent" assembly was established which finally restored something very like the old democratic constitution.

IV.—The Spartan and Theban Supremacies, 404-359

The brief and brilliant political ascendancy of Athens had passed away for ever. There was only one state forceful enough to enter upon her inheritance, and that state was lacking in the necessary political genius. Sparta had shattered the power of Athens and stood without a rival, but her imperialism consisted in nothing more than the endeavor to impose her own will upon the states which she professed to have liberated from the Athenian yoke; she had nothing behind her but sheer brute force. She had vanquished Athens by allying herself with Persia, using Persian money, and handing over the dominion of Asiatic Hellas to the Persians from whom Athens had delivered it. She could tyrannize over her allies but she could not unite them. The next episode of our history carries us for a brief space into Persia itself.

King Darius II. died and was succeeded by his elder son Artaxerxes, not by the younger, Cyrus, who had been sent to the west as governor, though without displacing the satraps. The ambitious prince determined to seize the crown for himself, and to do it with Greek help; for he had seen the fighting value of the Greek hoplite, and what we may call the long civil war of Greece had produced a crowd of soldiers who were ready to take service in any military adventure. With the professed intention of suppressing insubordinate tribes in the interior Cyrus gathered a great army which included some thirteen thousand Greek mercenaries.

The real object of the expedition, to march upon Susa and dethrone Artaxerxes, was not revealed; but the prince had encouraged preparations in the Greek cities to revolt against Tissaphernes, satrap of

Sardis, whose hostility to his project was certain. For the first time a Greek force was to march into the heart of the Persian Empire; and therein lay the real importance of the expedition, though it failed completely to achieve its actual object. The army had advanced through the mountain pass called the Cilician Gates and descended into the plain of Tarsus, before the Greeks became convinced that they were not to operate, as they had expected, in Asia Minor. The soldiers refused to go farther, but their captain, Clearchus, who was in the confidence of Cyrus, persuaded them, backed by a promised increase in their pay. At Issus Cyrus picked up a troop of Lacedæmonians sent to reinforce him. At Tarsus the men had been told, though they had hardly believed, that their real objective was Syria. When they reached the banks of the Euphrates at Thapsacus, they again refused to advance farther; but this time their only object was to drive a harder bargain. Extra pay was again promised, and they marched on, knowing now that they were making for Babylon.

Artaxerxes was waiting with a huge army behind the entrenchments which covered the road to Babylon. A decisive battle was fought at Cunaxa. The Greeks on the right drove the enemy before them, while the left wing of Cyrus was enveloped by the much larger forces of the enemy. Cyrus knew that if he could drive Artaxerxes off the field the king's flight would involve the rout of his army; he led a desperate charge at the head of a small body of horse upon the spot where the Great King was posted. The king turned to flee, but his pursuing brother fell mortally wounded by a javelin. The death of Cyrus meant the immediate dispersal of all his Eastern followers; and the Greek contingent found itself in the heart of a hostile country, surrounded by the vast hosts of Artaxerxes.

Hellenic pride, consciousness of superiority, and discipline, prevailed. The Greeks refused to surrender, and the Persians did not dare to attack. Tissaphernes, who was with Artaxerxes, offered to convoy them to a route where they would be able to obtain provisions on their further march northwards which should be unmolested, since provisions would not be obtainable if they returned along the route by which they had come. Tissaphernes deliberately played the traitor, seized the persons of the Greek generals by a trick after getting the force into the hill country across the Tigris, and then left the troops to their own devices. They elected the historian of the expedition, Xenophon, as their general, and he successfully conducted the "Retreat of the Ten Thousand" through extraordinary difficulties to the Greek colony of Trapezus at the south-east of the Black Sea, whence they ultimately made their way by sea to the Bosphorus and thence into Thrace; when a new war

between Sparta and Persia gave the veterans a fresh opportunity of military service.

The character and abilities of Cyrus carry the conviction that if he had succeeded in his attempt the Persian Empire would have gained a new lease of vitality under him, and its relations with the Hellenic world would have been entirely altered. He failed, and the conditions remained as before, with the one important difference that Greek soldiers had marched into the heart of Persia, the pioneers of the Greek conqueror who was to destroy the Persian Empire altogether.

Meanwhile the Greek cities had revolted and thrown off the lately reimposed Persian yoke. The Spartan league with Persia had been translated into an alliance with the prince who was now only a dead rebel instead of a live Great King. Sparta took into her service the veterans of the recent expedition, and attacked the northern satrapy of Pharnabazus; and a strong position was established in the Troad. On the strength of this success, Sparta made overtures to Artaxerxes with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Greek states. The overtures were rejected through the influence of Pharnabazus, and the Spartan king Agesilaus arrived in Asia to take command of the Greeks in the new Persian War. The campaigns which he conducted from 396-395 were successful enough, but their effect was soon completely counteracted by the destruction of the Spartan fleet by a Persian armament under the Athenian, Conon, who, after Ægospotami, had remained in exile, thirsting for an opportunity to take vengeance on Sparta. The Greek cities in Asia Minor preferred Persian satraps to the Spartan garrisons, which they forthwith ejected.

The supremacy of Sparta was as little to the liking of her former allies of the Peloponnesian League as the supremacy of Athens. She had annexed all the profits of the war in which they had all been jointly engaged. A quarrel with Thebes led to a Spartan invasion of Boeotia. Thebes called her old enemy Athens to her aid. There, the wisdom of the democratic leaders had reconciled the oligarchical faction to the restored democracy; the Athenian, Conon, had joined the Persian fleet. Athens entered into alliance with Thebes. The ablest of Spartan commanders and politicians, Lysander, was killed in a battle with the Thebans, since he had not waited to effect a junction with second army under Pausanias. Pausanias found himself enclosed between the victorious Thebans and an army from Athens, and obtained a truce only on conditions of his withdrawal from Boeotia. The triumph was immediately followed by the accession of Corinth and Argos to the League between Thebes and Athens.

The new League spread. The Spartans in alarm summoned Agesilaus home with his forces—and order which he obeyed with extreme reluctance, since his own aims were primarily anti-Persian.

He came by the land route followed of old by Xerxes, across the Hellespont and through Thrace and Macedonia. The Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnese anticipated the attack of the allies and marched upon Corinth, before whose walls there was a hot encounter in which the Spartan soldiery maintained their reputation, but without further result. A month later the confederates were facing Agesilaus at Coronea in Bœotia, where they met with a reverse of much the same kind as that at Corinth. In both cases the Spartans actually held the field of battle, but were unable to press the victory and had to fall back.

Just at this time came the news of Conon's victory at Knidos—the one really decisive engagement of the three, since it definitely restored the maritime supremacy to the confederates and bereft Sparta of her dominion in the East. Pharnabazus was wise enough to see the impolicy of attempting to assert Persian supremacy; for the present at least he could not afford to drive any Greeks back to the arms of Sparta. His main object was the humiliation of that Power. Conon's fleet, with Pharnabazus on board, passed through the islands proclaiming their liberation from the Spartan yoke, ravaged the Laconian coast, and came to Athens, where the returned admiral was hailed with enthusiasm. For Athens his work was crowned by the immediate restoration of the fortifications and the long walls.

For a time the war continued to rage about the Isthmus of Corinth with varying fortunes. But the Spartans, who attributed the successes of the confederates to the support of Pharnabazus, sought to renew their former alliance with the Great King through the satrap of Sardis, Tiridates, the rival of Pharnabazus. Their envoy Antalkidas succeeded in winning the favor of Artaxerxes, who was irritated by the support which Athens lent to Euagoras, the Tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, who had defied the Persian supremacy. Antalkidas appeared on the Hellespont with a great Persian fleet, supported by a contingent from Syracuse whence Spartan diplomacy had procured aid from the Tyrant Dionysius. Thus Antalkidas was enabled to dictate to the confederates the terms upon which he had agreed with Artaxerxes. In effect the Great King appeared as the arbiter of Grecian affairs. The cities in Asia were to acknowledge the Persian supremacy, together with Cyprus. The independence of all other cities was to be recognized, except that Lemnos and Imbros were to remain with Athens, to which they had been joined in the days of Miltiades. Both parties had turned to Persia for aid in a Greek struggle, and both paid the penalty when the Great King virtually dictated the terms of their reconciliation in the ignominious instrument known as the Peace of Antalkidas concluded in the year 387.

The peace was a virtual triumph for Sparta. Individually she was

from the military point of view the strongest of the Greek states; her influence was now paramount at Susa; and Greek resistance to her policy was in danger of calling down Persian intervention so long as that policy was not conspicuously antagonistic to Persian interests. It was her own aim to break up any confederations and alliances among the other states which could be represented as contravening the principles of pure autonomy, while the states in isolation were the less able to resist her dictation.

On the north-west of the Ægean the city of Olynthus had been building up a neutral confederacy, but the process involved the application of compulsion to the cities in those regions which were not disposed to come in. Herein Sparta found her excuse for attacking what threatened to become a new and vigorous Power, in defense of the principals of pure autonomy. Her intervention broke up the Olynthian League, and thereby incidentally prepared the way for the development of the power of Macedon; but the Spartan policy was determined entirely by the fear that the confederacy would threaten her own ascendancy. Within the Peloponnese she broke up the union of small townships in Arcadia which had combined to form the city of Mantinea, and elsewhere she gave military support to the oligarchical factions whose establishment in power was a virtual guarantee of her own supremacy. A Lacedæmonian force passing through Bœotia on its way to take part in the war at Olynthus was diverted by its captain to effect a *coup d'état* in Thebes which established the supremacy of the Spartan faction supported by a Spartan garrison in the citadel. The action of the Spartan leader was officially repudiated, but the garrison remained in the citadel. These high-handed proceedings brought their own penalty, for on every side they aroused a spirit of fierce hostility to Spartan tyranny.

The history of Thebes in the past had not from a Hellenic point of view been particularly creditable. Now she was about to achieve distinction under the leadership of one of the most admirable characters in the history of Hellas, Epaminondas. Yet it was not he who struck the first blow for freedom; such a blow could not, in fact, be struck without adopting methods too unscrupulous for a man so high-minded to take an active share in them. The tyranny of the oligarchs was intolerable; the conspiracy which overthrew them was the work not of Epaminondas but of his intimate friend Pelopidas. The conspirators, robed as females, got themselves introduced into the company of the leaders of the oligarchy when they were feasting, and already too far "flown with insolence and wine" to recognize the deception which was being practised upon them. The oligarchs were slaughtered, the whole city rose, the Lacedæmonian garrison in the citadel capitulated, and when the thing was done Epaminondas was ready enough to join Pelopidas in completing the revolution and concerting

matter of no moment. The victorious wedge rolled up the Lacedæmonian force. Cleombrotus was killed, and the defeated army, still outnumbering the Thebans, fell back to an entrenched position behind Leuctra. Reinforcements were dispatched from Sparta, but before they arrived a new ally of the Thebans had appeared on the scene whose intervention was decisive. The Lacedæmonians could not hope to resist the force now assembled before them, and they agreed to evacuate Bœotia.

The new arrival was Jason of Pheræ. It was not very long since Sparta had been active enough in breaking up the northern confederation of Olynthus; but she had been too deeply engaged to realize that a new Power was being created in Thessaly which had hitherto been unorganized. How the despot of Pheræ had built up his organization we do not know; only we become suddenly aware that he is a despot in possession of a powerful mercenary army with all Thessaly at his back, determined, apparently, upon the ruin of Sparta and upon himself assuming the rôle of leader of Greece—the rôle which was presently to be assumed by a ruler still farther north, Philip of Macedon.

Jason's ambitions were cut short by his assassination shortly after the battle of Leuctra. The sudden menace of a Thessalian Power was dissolved by his death. Had he lived he would have been as dangerous to Thebes as Sparta herself; when he died Thebes was left to fight out the duel alone.

The defeat at Leuctra developed immediate revolt throughout the Peloponnese. Arcadia, theoretically independent, formed herself into a federated state. Threatened at once by Sparta, she appealed vainly to Athens, but successfully to Thebes, many of whose former foes had hastened to join the Bœotian League after Leuctra. Thebes answered the appeal and carried an army into Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians retired, and Epaminondas invaded Laconia itself, a thing which had never before befallen. He ravaged the country but did not choose to attack Sparta itself; instead, he turned to Messenia, and in effect organized a new state, largely peopled by the helots and others who, of all men, were most bitterly hostile to the Spartans.

The humiliation of Sparta alarmed Athens, to which the old rival was not so dangerous as the new. She became Sparta's ally. Although Epaminondas was incomparably the best of living generals, Thebes could by no means be sure of establishing a decisive supremacy. We are now presented with the unedifying spectacle of embassies from each of the Powers seeking to obtain the Great King's sanction for its own particular views regarding a settlement. The decision was given in favor of Thebes, but the other states refused to recognize the Great King's authority. Arcadia turned against

Thebes, though not as yet to the extent of going to war with her.

In 366 matters had reached a curious stage in which there was no definite grouping, and it was as likely as not that any two allies of any particular Power were at the same time at war or on the point of going to war with each other. But out of this confused welter presently emerged two incidents disastrous to the power of Thebes. Pelopidas led an expedition into Thessaly against Alexander of Pheræ, the successor of Jason, and was slain through sheer personal rashness in a battle which was technically itself a decisive victory for Thebes. Two years later the chaos of the Peloponnese needed the presence of Epaminondas in order to re-establish the Theban supremacy. At Mantinea the brilliant dispositions of Epaminondas won for the Thebans a complete victory over the combined forces of Spartans, Athenians, and Mantineans. But in the hour of victory Epaminondas himself was mortally wounded. The Theban ascendancy had been practically the work of Pelopidas and Epaminondas; there was no one to take their place. They had not created a vigorous Theban polity. The stage had been reached when in all Hellas there was no city left with the capacity to seize the leadership, with the strength to compel obedience like Sparta in the past, or the moral ascendancy which had originally created the power of Athens. Three years after Mantinea, Athens was on the whole the premier state in an exhausted Hellas. And in that year Philip II. became King of Macedon.

V.—Sicily, 478-359

For some seventy years after the great over-throw of the Carthaginians at Himera, and the blow dealt to the Etruscans at Cyme, the history of the Sicilian and Italian states is concerned with domestic progress or domestic dissensions, or quarrels with each other. In the West as in the East there was a long suspension of the struggle between Orientalism and Occidentalism. This city or that had waxed or waned under tyrannies or democracies, but their strifes had no bearing on world history, nor did they seek even to play an important part in the struggle for power between the cities of Eastern Hellas. There, Sicily was brought on to the stage because Athens chose to intervene in the West, not because Sicily chose to intervene in the East.

But just as we have seen that the Sicilian expedition and the blow which it dealt to the maritime power of Athens offered an inducement to Persia, so the presumed exhaustions of Syracuse after her struggle provided a like inducement to Carthage to renew her attempt to set up a Phœnician power in Sicily. The opportune moment arrived when Hermocrates, who had taken the leading part in the

late war, was banished, and Syracuse was engaged upon a process of constitutional reform upon democratic lines which is not usually immediately conducive to strong and consistent government.

The occasion came when Segesta, having gained nothing in her contest with Selinus by appealing to Athens, tried an appeal to Carthage. Carthage responded by sending a great force under Hannibal, grandson of that Hamilcar who had perished at Himera. Selinus was entirely unprepared, and after ten days' stubborn fighting through the streets of the town was forced to surrender. A Syracusan reinforcement started too late to be of any use, and there was a general massacre of the inhabitants of Selinus. Then Hannibal turned upon Himera. This time Syracuse had sent aid, but the troops were tricked into a hasty withdrawal by the report that Hannibal was moving upon Syracuse itself. Before they could return, the Carthaginian succeeded in storming Himera, which was completely wiped out, while all its inhabitants were slaughtered to gratify the Shade of Hamilcar.

There was no joint movement on the part of the Sicilians for defence against Carthage. Hannibal having done his work of revenge departed, but it was hardly to be supposed that this would prove the end of the matter. Hermocrates, who appears to have been even more a Sicilian patriot than a Syracusan, returned at this juncture, but was refused admittance by his own city. Nevertheless, on his own account, he organized a force, established it in what had once been the acropolis of the now ruined Selinus, and waged a private war upon the Carthaginian corner of Sicily.

Hermocrates fell in an attempt to reinstate himself at Syracuse; but his proceedings provided Carthage with an excuse for sending a fresh armament to Sicily, this time with the intention of effecting a general conquest. The first objective was Acragas (Agrigentum), which looks across the sea to Carthage. The Sicilian Greeks were at last awake to the danger, and sent reinforcements to the threatened city. The assembled troops were strong enough to maintain a prolonged defence, but not to force the Carthaginians to raise the siege. At last, however, the defenders were reduced to severe straits by the success of the Carthaginians in intercepting their supplies. The Italian mercenaries hired by Acragas deserted to the enemy; the Sicilian allies deserted to save themselves. Acragas was left to its fate; the population were allowed to steal out one night and make their escape to Gela. Next day the Carthaginians entered the place, sacked it, and took up their quarters for the winter. In the next year, 405, a treaty was made between Carthage and Syracuse, which gave to Carthage the whole of Sicily to the west of Himera on the north, and of Acragas on the south, and yielded to her as tributaries;

not as actual subjects, the other two principal cities on the south coast, Gela, and Camarina.

This treaty was the work of a man who, since the fall of Acragas, had made himself Tyrant of Syracuse. Dionysius, once a partisan of Hermocrates, had satisfied himself that only through the rule of one man could a Sicilian Power be organized; with the corollary that the necessary man was Dionysius himself. The fight with Carthage was therefore to be postponed to the establishment of his own personal supremacy; he was to be a Sicilian Cæsar, 300 years before Cæsar was heard of. He was to rule, not as a professed despot, but like Pisistratus or Augustus, through the forms of a democratic constitution; while for all practical purposes the nominal democracy had no option but to carry out his behests, sanctioned by the existence of a standing force entirely under his control.

Dionysius effected his purpose first in the rôle of a democrat, denouncing the generals who were responsible for the desertion of Acragas, then by procuring for himself the office of sole general with special power to deal with the existing emergency, and finally by getting a bodyguard voted him. Having achieved the position of a military dictator he made a peace with Carthage, under the terms of which the Carthaginians undertook to guarantee his personal supremacy. Within Syracuse itself he fortified the island of Ortygia and the inner harbor, garrisoning his citadel with his own bodyguard. Having thus secured the conditions without which the exercise of arbitrary power would have been impossible, the maintenance of that power depended upon his own skill. He was successful because he used his power for the advancement of the state, never wantonly for the capricious indulgence of his own passions. He was merciless when he judged terrorism to be politic, but never from vindictiveness. He was at once a constructive statesman and a scientific military organizer who had no equal before Philip of Macedon. The time had arrived when the city-state system had proved itself inefficient for the establishment of organized empires; during the next fifty years the demonstration of the fact was only to be made more complete in Eastern Hellas. But during those fifty years a political prophet might reasonably have anticipated that the coming Empire would be the creation of Syracuse under the despotism set up by Dionysius.

Attempts to overthrow the Tyrant were defeated; all Eastern Sicily was brought under his dominion, and when he felt himself impreguably established he turned to the work of destroying the Carthaginian Power, to which policy had at first compelled him to adopt a friendly attitude, which was only a temporary mask. In 398 he opened the attack. The Greek subjects of Carthage hailed him as a deliverer. He fell upon the Phœnician port of Motye and reduced it

by engineering operations on an unprecedented scale, accompanied by the employment of the new engine of war which he had invented, the catapult, a species of artillery which revolutionized siege warfare.

Next year the Carthaginians appeared in force to defend their possessions. The campaigning which followed is distinguished by the entirely novel fact that Dionysius never sought pitched battles. In his military operations he avoided fighting except where he could bring the engineering arm into full play. The Carthaginian Himilco recovered Motye, and established in its place the new city of Lilybæum. He destroyed Messina, and established the new city of Tauromenium. He defeated a Greek fleet off Catania, and then turned upon Syracuse itself. But Dionysius had so fortified Syracuse as to render it all but impregnable. Plague fell upon the Carthaginian camp. By a sudden concerted attack the Carthaginian fleet was shattered, and a destructive assault was made upon the Carthaginian camp. But Dionysius did not intend to ruin the enemy altogether; he wanted an enemy, lest Syracuse should think that it could do without him. With his actual connivance, Himilco was enabled to make his escape with those of his force who were Carthaginian citizens. Then the mercenaries who were left behind were for the most part cut to pieces. But Dionysius did not proceed to wipe the Carthaginians out of their own portion of Sicily. Five years later there was a recrudescence of the conflict, in which the arms of the Sicilians were again successful; yet though the Carthaginians at the conclusion were confined to the extreme west of the island they were still allowed to remain a possible, though hardly a probable, menace.

Mighty though Dionysius was, he abstained from playing any very active part in the affairs of Eastern Greece, though he made occasional demonstrations in favor of Sparta. His ambitions lay rather in the direction of establishing a Western Empire. He made himself master of Rhegium, the city commanding the Italian side of the Strait of Messina. His influence extended over the Adriatic; half the Greek cities of Southern Italy became Syracusan dependencies. When he died in 367 he left to his son, Dionysius the Younger, an empire more powerful than had hitherto been known in the Hellenic world.

A dominion originating in a military dictatorship has rarely been destined to last; it depends too much upon the genius and prestige of its founder. After the death of Dionysius and the accession of his son, the might of Syracuse fell away. Dionysius II. was a man of wit and culture, capable of temporary enthusiasms, but with no real stability or force of character. Beside him stood his father's minister, Dion, a much more competent person, who wanted to dictate

policy without assuming a dictatorship. He was, in fact, an idealist who had taken up the idea of his friend, the Athenian philosopher Plato, that the ideal state must be the creation of a trained philosophic intellect, a monarchy or a ministry of philosophers. Plato was invited to Syracuse. Dionysius was charmed with the idea, but objected to the preliminary drudgery of turning himself into a philosopher, this being in Plato's view an essential condition of the proper discharge of the task. Plato retired again.

Dionysius, left to his own devices, behaved after the fashion of other Tyrants. Dion succeeded in deposing him, and attempted to govern by a sort of constitutional system in which control lay with an aristocracy to which he should stand in much the same relation as Pericles to the Athenian democracy. The experiment ended in his becoming himself virtually Tyrant for a brief space, until he was in turn murdered. The practical outcome of all this experimenting was that the Syracusan Empire dissolved into its component states, in most of which some one or other made himself Tyrant. For ten years Tyranny was rampant, and once more the Carthaginians saw their opportunity and prepared for a descent upon Sicily.

Under these conditions the people of Syracuse appealed to Corinth, their mother-city, to send them some one who should put an end to the anarchy. By a happy accident the Corinthians hit upon a citizen named Timoleon. Timoleon the Liberator reached Sicily, where Hiketas the Tyrant of Leontini had allied himself with the Carthaginians, presumably with intent to become established as a general Tyrant over the Hellenic cities. The success of Timoleon in an engagement with Hiketas, by whose troops his own were enormously outnumbered, brought him many allies. Dionysius II., who had recently got himself back to Syracuse, where he held his father's old fortress, the island of Ortygia, surrendered to Timoleon and retired to Corinth.

Timoleon demolished the fortifications of Ortygia, which had provided a stronghold for Tyranny. He restored the democratic constitution, seeking nothing for himself, and then proceeded to suppress the Tyrants in one city after another. Then, in 339, the Carthaginians came again in force. Small as was the army of Timoleon he attacked them on the river Crimesus, and inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon them—a defeat so tremendous that Carthage readily made peace. Timoleon knew that it was not for him to attempt the impossible task of ejecting the Phœnician Power. The terms of the peace left Carthage mistress of the island to the west of Himera, but pledged Carthaginians and Hellenes alike to entire non-intervention in the region appropriated to the other.

The pact was observed. Timoleon had done his work. He had freed the Greek cities from domestic Tyrants and from the Car-

thaginian menace. Having done so he laid down his office and retired into private life, content to resign, and to give counsel only when his counsel was sought—an almost unique instance of self-abnegation on the part of a man who might have stepped into the place of Dionysius I. But he did not choose to be a Tyrant, and except through a monarchy a Hellenic empire was impossible. In later years other Tyrants arose, but they were of the ordinary vulgar and selfish type, incapable of succeeding where Dionysius I. had failed—where Timoleon himself probably would have failed for want of a successor, had he attempted to renew the brief Syracusan Empire.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MACEDONIAN SUPREMACY, 359-205 B.C.

I.—Philip, 359-336

WITH the fall of Epaminondas at Mantinea, in 362, ended whatever chance there had been of the establishment of an effective hegemony of Greece by Thebes. Altogether admirable as a man, as a soldier, and as an administrator, Epaminondas was not a great constructive statesman, nor were the Thebans a people even so well fitted as the Spartans to give unity to Hellas. Mantinea was followed by a general peace, and the peace was in its turn soon followed by two wars, which only proved once more the incompatibility of Greek particularism with any scheme of consolidation. For years the idealist Isocrates, standing aside from all party politics, had preached his doctrine that the states of Hellas should cease their quarrels and unite under one leader; but the man had not been forthcoming, though still Isocrates dreamed his dream.

The two wars were the Athenian Social War, the revolt of the Maritime LeLeague against the attempt of Athens to tighten her grip upon them, and the Sacred War, which arose from the determination of the Phocians to break down the Theban ascendancy in Central Greece. The Phocians, condemned by the religious congress of Hellas, the Amphictyonic League, through the influence of Thebes, to pay a heavy fine for imputed sacrilege, answered by laying claim to the sacred island of Delos, and seizing the treasures of the temple, which provided them with revenues for collecting mercenary forces. Thus for a moment Phocis established herself as a military Power, holding in her hands Thermopylæ, the gateway between Central and Northern Greece.

But while the old states were perpetuating the system of disintegrating feuds, a new Power was being consolidated in the north by the genius of one man. Beyond Thessaly and the Chalcidic peninsula lay the great heterogenous territory of Macedonia, whose king exercised a nominal sway over virtually independent chiefs or princes of tribes spreading far up into the mountains inland—Illyrian tribes, originally akin to Hellenes and to Phrygians, but never recognized as brethren by the Hellenes themselves. The

Macedonians proper, however, the clans from which the dynasty sprang, who occupied the territory on the Hellenic border, claimed for themselves that they were Hellenes; and for a hundred and fifty years past the Macedonian kings had sought, and generally obtained, at least a degree of recognition as coming within the Pan-Hellenic pale. Athens in seeking to establish her power in the Northern Ægean had been in frequent contact with the Macedonians. Hitherto, however, none of the kings had succeeded in organizing the Macedonian dominion into a firm polity.

In the expansion of Athenian power Thebes had been brought into collision with Thessaly and into contact with Macedonia. The relations with Macedonia had been friendly, and, incidentally to a treaty, Philip, younger brother of the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, spent several years nominally as a guest, but virtually as a hostage, at Thebes, from 367 to 364. At the age of eighteen he returned to Macedon with his brain full of the lessons he had learned from Epaminondas and Pelopidas. Five years later his brother Perdiccas was killed, leaving an infant, Amyntas, heir. Philip was made regent for the boy, and in a very short time the boy was entirely set aside, and Philip himself was recognized as king.

Philip entered on his career with two definite ambitions. He meant to consolidate Macedonia, and he meant Macedonia to be not only admitted once for all into Hellas, but to become the recognized head of Hellas. He had an intense appreciation of the intellectual supremacy of Athens, coupled with a conviction of her political impotence: therefore he was always equally anxious to favor and to spare Athens, and determined not to let her stand in the way of his political designs. But his first business was with Macedonia itself.

The basis of his policy was the creation of a national Macedonian army imbued with a common national spirit, of which the nucleus was to be found in his own Macedonians. He had learnt the art of war from Epaminondas, the greatest master of the age; but he had ideas of his own, which were to develop a fighting instrument better than his master had ever been able to handle. Philip's great secret was the combination of cavalry and infantry. Like all Greeks, Epaminondas had relied upon the phalanx, the weight of massed spearmen; but he had developed the phalanx on the principle of concentrating the mass at one point in such force as to break the enemy's line and then roll it up. Philip made the phalanx more mobile; it was to do the work not of piercing the enemy's line, but of so engaging and discomposing it as to make it incapable of standing against the cavalry charge. This new use of cavalry was the great innovation upon the time-honored tactics of Greek armies. Philip was the link between the great Theban and his own still greater son. The army of

Alexander was the army organized by his father on the principle of combining cavalry with infantry.

Perdiccas had fallen in facing an Illyrian invasion. Within twelve months, Philip had so trained and disciplined his Macedonian material that he completely shattered the great Illyrian force. His immediate object now was to secure the sinews of war by getting possession of the gold mines, which were commanded by Amphipolis, which he seized, professing to hold it for Athens, which was engaged in the Social War. Nor did he find any serious difficulty in providing pretexts for absorbing by degrees every point actually or nominally held by Athens on the coast. Meanwhile, he continued to organize his army by the multiplication of territorial regiments or brigades on the lines which he had applied originally to the Macedonians. Athens, in fact, had lost the power of controlling her dependencies, and was still less in a position to fight with Philip for their retention. In 347 she accepted a treaty. In the next year Philip, posing as the champion of religion, had broken up the Phocian Power, held the entry to Southern Greece at Thermopylæ, and procured his own admission into the Amphictyonic Council—his definite recognition as a Hellenes—in place of the sacrilegious Phocians.

From this time dates the passionate resistance of the great Athenian orator Demosthenes to Philip. Demosthenes was the splendid champion of a cause already lost: from an Athenian point of view the cause of liberty; from the Pan-Hellenic point of view the cause of that particularism which had been proved to be incompatible with any form of Hellenic imperialism. The cause was already lost because Athens had ceased to be capable, as she had at least seemed to be in the days of Pericles, of taking up an effective leadership. The eloquence of the great orator, the sympathy he evokes, the sentimental attraction of his point of view, have made it peculiarly difficult to render justice to the far-sighted statesmanship, the wide purview, the organizing power, the freedom from pettiness, and the strong originality of the man who was the object of his most fervent denunciation.

For some time after the peace Philip was engaged, partly in diplomacy which was to insure him freedom from hostile combinations, partly in subjugating the territories which permanently threatened the Macedonian dominion upon flank and rear. Demosthenes exerted himself to rouse not only Athens, but other Greek states also, to the peril which he saw threatening from Macedon; for he believed quite wrongly that Philip's machinations were deliberately intended for the ultimate destruction of Athens. The war party which he created became so strong and began to play a part so actively detrimental to Philip's plans, that at last he was obliged to turn upon Athens herself. Another Sacred War of the Amphictyons against the town of Am-

phissa was a plausible pretext for bringing Philip south. Thebes and Athens, not without excuse, regarded his operations as being aimed against them. Their armies took the field, and met with a complete and decisive overthrow at the Battle of Chæronea. With Athens the conqueror dealt gently; Thebes, on the other hand, was entirely deprived of her supremacy in Bœotia. Chæronea had placed in Philip's hands the prize which he had long coveted. There was no longer any possible question of his supremacy in Hellas, and as the head of Hellas he could carry out the great project which had perhaps been suggested by Isocrates. He would measure himself with the Great King; and the West, not content with having stemmed the Eastern tide, should now turn upon the East, not in self-defense, but as the aggressive conqueror.

A general congress of Greek states was invited to assemble at Corinth, from which Sparta alone stood apart. Philip definitely proposed that the united army of confederate Hellas should finally set at liberty the Greek cities of Asia, and should proceed to inflict due penalties upon the barbarians for the sacrilegious proceedings of a century and a half ago. The congress gave its voice for war, and elected Philip general-in-chief. Preparations were energetically pushed forward, and an advance force was sent to secure the Hellespont, when Philip was slain by the dagger of an assassin, and his son Alexander became king in his stead.

II.—Alexander the Great, 336-323

Philip had not unified Greece—he had only imposed his own leadership on her by incontrovertible arguments. When he fell in the summer of 336, his son Alexander was still in his twentieth year. The boy was a marvel of physical and mental vigor: at sixteen he had distinguished himself in the fight at Chæronea; his intellectual training had been entrusted to that greatest among the masters of wisdom, Aristotle. But he was the son of a mother, the Epirote Olympias, whom Philip had repudiated very shortly before his death in order to make a second marriage; the infant born of the second marriage would certainly have its partisans as Philip's heir, and there was another possible claimant in Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas. Envoys from all quarters, and a mighty army also, were assembled at Ægæ at the moment of the murder, and young Alexander was able to insure on the spot the support of all these. But the situation was obviously full of peril and uncertainty. Macedonia was surrounded by hostile tribes which had yielded a reluctant submission to a tried master of the art of war. Two-thirds of the cities of Hellas had only yielded to Philip's ascendancy because they dared not defy. The grandfather of Alexander's young half-brother was with the advance force which

had already entered the Troad. Thessaly led the way in revolting.

Alexander acted with swift daring and decision. He marched upon Thessaly, found Tempe held in force, and literally hewed himself a pathway over the crags which enabled him to threaten the enemy's rear. Thessaly yielded without a blow. He swept south; not a city was ready to meet him in arms. The congress at Corinth promptly elected him captain-general of the Greek forces in his father's room. The infant half-brother and his mother were slain by Alexander's own mother, Olympias; the grandfather by Alexander's own orders.

Garrisons were left at strategic points while the young king flashed north to smite the tribes of Illyria and Thrace, now in revolt. He re-emerged from those wild regions the darling and hero of the troops whom he had led, having proved to them that there was nothing he dared not attempt himself, and nothing that he did not count upon them to dare. But he came back to find also that Thebes was in revolt. While half Greece still believed that he was lying dead in the mountains of Illyria he arrived at the head of his troops before Thebes. Thebes was stormed, its inhabitants put to the sword, and the city leveled with the ground, save that

"The Emathian conqueror bade spare
The house of Pindar."

The Theban revolt had been largely the work of the party of Demosthenes at Athens, but neither on Athens nor on Demosthenes did Alexander stoop to take vengeance.

Twelve months had barely passed since the murder of Philip, and Alexander was already emphatically and indisputably established in all his father's dominion. In another six months he was on his way to Asia to carry out his father's project, which was nothing less than the conquest of the Persian Empire. The government of his European dominion was entrusted to his father's minister, Antipater; the need of an army to hold it in secure subjection materially diminished the forces at Alexander's disposal for the conquest of Asia.

A third Darius now bore the title of Great King, ruling over the same wide dominions as the first of his name, except that he had no foothold in Europe or in India. All save Egypt and the Hellenic fringe was acquiescent. But Persia had learned nothing since the old days, and the "March of the Ten Thousand" had taught the Greeks what Greek discipline and Greek tactics could do among the hosts of the barbarians. The Persian might gather his myriads, and even strengthen them with Greek hoplites from his own subjects, but Alexander had the splendidly organized army left him by his father, supplemented by the hoplites of the allies and the cavalry of Thessaly, hardly inferior to the Macedonians themselves. He had learned the art of

war from a master; he had already tested with brilliant success his own abilities as a leader; and he was starting upon no reckless plunge into the unknown, but upon a systematic and regular scheme of conquest. The most serious weakness of his position lay in the lack of a strong navy; the Persian indubitably had command of the seas.

Asia Minor had first to be subdued. Alexander, advancing, found himself faced by the larger army of the western satraps on the banks of the Granicus. At the head of his cavalry the king forced the passage of the river, the phalanx pressed forward, and the enemy were driven back in total rout. Alexander appointed a new satrap of his own for Phrygia, and marched on to Lydia. Lydia made haste to submit. But it was of first-rate importance that the whole coast should be in the conqueror's hands. He had originally reckoned upon the active support of the Greek maritime states, which would have given him a navy competent to cope with that of Persia. He now found that his confidence had been misplaced—that Athens would at the most play at supporting him. The fleet under his control was in the circumstances unable to challenge the command of the seas; therefore it was necessary to proceed as if he had no fleet at all, and to reduce one by one the ports which were supported in their resistance by the fleet of Persia. Miletus fell, and Halicarnassus; Lycia and Pamphylia received the conqueror. His lieutenant, Parmenio, secured Lydia, and the king struck up from the south, making effective demonstration of his strength, till he came to Gordium, the capital of Phrygia; where he cut through with his sword that knot of which the ancient oracle had said, "He who loosed it should be King of all Asia." Before the end of this second summer, 333, all Asia Minor was under his control, and he was preparing to take his next step, the conquest of Syria.

Meanwhile Darius had left Asia Minor to take care of himself, but was gathering a mighty army behind the Euphrates. By a startling feat of swift marching Alexander surprised and seized the Cilician Gate, the narrow defile through which his army must be poured into the Syrian plain. The Cilician satrap was terrified into immediate flight. But Alexander was in no hurry to engage in a pitched battle with the vast hosts of Darius in the open plain, where their numbers could be given full effect. Sooner or later he would have to fight, but first he would make Cilicia secure. His delay had upon Darius an effect for which Alexander perhaps had hoped. The Great King moved up from the open plain, where all the advantage was on his side, through the hills which separated him from Cilicia, and came down to Issus, where his hosts were massed on the steep banks of a stream, but where there was no room at all to bring the enormous superiority of his numbers into play.

The front line of the Persian's infantry was composed of Greek

hoplites; the masses of his eastern cavalry were posted on his right at the end of the line close to the sea. Alexander posted his Thessalian horse on his own left, to hold the Persian horse. The hoplites of the confederates and the Macedonian phalanx formed his center, with the picked troops on their right; and on the right of these the Macedonian cavalry, who were destined to shatter the left flank of the Persian host; the light armed men stood still farther on the right, to contain any turning movement. The foot pushed forward and engaged the enemy's center; the cavalry charge on the right, led by Alexander himself, broke the line and converted the frontal attack of the picked infantry into a flank attack. The cavalry pushed their way to the post where the Great King had stationed himself, and the Great King turned and fled. When the king fled the army fled also, scattered and slaughtered by the victorious Macedonians and Greeks.

The ladies of the court, who had come to see the Great King overwhelm his foes, were left behind. They were treated with magnificent courtesy by the conqueror, into whose hands they fell, together with vast booty. The Battle of Issus proved to Alexander, if it needed proving, that in a pitched battle he could face any odds that might be brought against him. But the serious business of conquest was not to be effected by pitched battles. The whole of the western part of the Persian Empire was to be mastered absolutely before he would march eastwards on what would otherwise be nothing more than a mighty raid. Darius so far humbled himself as to propose a treaty of alliance and friendship. Alexander replied that he would not treat with Darius as an equal, but only a suppliant whose scepter had passed from him deservedly for the sins of his fathers and of himself. If Alexander had been defeated at Issus, disaffected Hellas would have risen to throw off the Macedonian supremacy; but the news of his triumph taught discretion.

So the victor resisted the temptation to swoop upon Mesopotamia and march to Susa, leaving Syria behind him unsubdued. Syria and Phœnicia were to be conquered first, and their hostile fleets were to become his own. Phœnicia was disunited; some of her cities submitted promptly. But Tyre refused: Tyre with her fleet dared to believe herself impregnable. For the first six months of 332 she endured one of the most memorable of all sieges. But Alexander had learned not only all that Philip and Epaminondas could teach him in the field, but also all that Philip and Dionysius of Syracuse could teach of the science of siege warfare. Yet so huge was the engineering task involved, so skilful and resolute were the men of Tyre in their resistance, that Alexander himself might have failed if the fleets of Sidon and of Cyprus had not placed themselves in his hands. When the Tyrian fleet was no longer supreme, the capture of Tyre became only a question of time. The despairing Darius sent fresh messages:

he would give up all his empire west of the Euphrates; Alexander should marry his daughter, and be his equal and his ally. Alexander replied that he did not need the leave of Darius to marry his daughter, and he would take nothing less than the whole Persian Empire.

Not till the ninth month of the siege was Alexander ready to make the grand attack. At last, in August, Tyre was stormed and won. On her fall all Syria submitted save Gaza, and in November Gaza met with the same fate as Tyre. In both cities the storming was accomplished by a tremendous slaughter, and the men who survived, with the women and children, were sold into slavery.

With Syria conquered, Egypt was an easy prey. Egypt hated the Persian dominion, and was ready to look upon Alexander as a liberator when he showed due respect to the gods of the land. It was said that at the shrine of Amen Ra, whom the Romans have taught us to call Jupiter Ammon, the god recognized Alexander as his own son, thereby giving the religious sanction to the institution of Alexander as pharaoh. But in nothing was Alexander's statesmanship and the keenness of his vision shown more clearly than in his selection of the site of Alexandria for a port, which was to be the grand mart of Mediterranean commerce, and was to make, not Phœnicians or Egyptians, but Greeks supreme in the Mediterranean trade.

Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, were Alexander's; and twelve months after the fall of Tyre he was at Thapsacus with his army ready to cross the Euphrates and carry his arms to Babylon, to Susa, to Persepolis. For the descent upon Babylon he chose the route by the valley, not of Euphrates but of Tigris. Beyond the Tigris, at Gaugamela, he met the host of Darius, a mightier than that which had been routed at Issus. As at Issus, the battle was decided by the charge of the Macedonian horse; as at Issus, Darius lost his nerve at the crisis, turned, and fled from the field, though the battle continued to be far more hotly contested than at Issus before it became a complete and overwhelming rout. The delay gave Darius himself time to escape, a desperate fugitive, into the hills of Media.

Alexander swept down to Babylon, where, as in Egypt, he appeared as the restorer of the ancient religion. By the end of the year he was at Susa; a wonderful campaign carried him swiftly to Persepolis, the treasure-house of the Achæmenid Dynasty.

But in Media Darius was once more gathering an army of his eastern subjects. The conqueror turned from Persepolis and marched upon Ecbatana, the capital of Media. The heart of Darius failed him and he retreated. Alexander, as soon as he had made Ecbatana secure, started in hot pursuit, and still Darius fled before him. There were conspirators about the helpless monarch, who made him a prisoner, having resolved that Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, should be made king in his place. Then his army began to dissolve and come

in to Alexander, while Bessus and his fellow-plotters still fled, carrying Darius with them. A furious night pursuit, at the head of a picked body of horse, brought Alexander up with the fugitives. Though only a few hundred men were with him, the enemy made no stand. Bessus and his comrades stabbed Darius, and left him, dying, to the generosity of his conqueror. The murder of Darius perhaps saved Alexander from some embarrassment, for it certainly would have been difficult to know what to do with him.

To the Greek, Susa may be regarded as having been practically the limit of the known world; certainly what lay beyond the actual home of the Persians was "barbarian" in another sense than the long civilized west of Asia. When Alexander reached Persepolis, he was already lord of the whole civilized world of which the Greek had any knowledge whatever. The man who, at five-and-twenty, had won this vast dominion might have been satisfied with the task of organizing it; and with Alexander organization was the accompaniment of conquest. In Asia Minor, in Syria, in Egypt, he took the institutions of the Persian Empire as he found them, but modified them always so as at once to foster the local spirit of development and to increase the Imperial control. The division of powers by the first Darius between the civil governor, the commander-in-chief, and the secretary of each satrapy had given way to the merging of all their powers in the satrap. Alexander revived the system of Darius, and by further reducing the area of the various commands diminished the capacity of the satraps for independent action. On the other hand, the Greek cities were self-governing; the Jews were protected in their particularism; Egyptians and Babylonians had full play allowed to their idiosyncrasies.

Alexander had started his career simply as a Hellenic conqueror, the champion of the West against the East. In Asia he arrived at a new conception—the blending of East and West, the Hellenizing of the East by an intellectual influence, not by the forcible substitution of Western for Eastern forms, nor by treating the Easterns as the subjects of the Westerns. The new lord of the East assumed an Oriental state distasteful enough to his Western followers, but necessary if he was to render the East sympathetic. So much had become evident by the time that the third Darius lay dead at the feet of Alexander.

But he was not content; he was resolved that the new empire which he had conceived should embrace all that was available of the world. The utmost limits of the Persian Empire were to be brought within its effective control. That he would have stayed his career voluntarily when he was master of the East is incredible; he would have turned to make Asia the base from which his dominion should be extended over all the known lands of the West, as Bonaparte dreamed of doing 2000 years afterwards. In the year 330 there was no thought of

stopping the tide of conquest, especially as the escaped Bessus certainly intended to make a bid for the succession to Darius.

We need not follow the wonderful series of campaigns during the next three years, in the course of which Alexander smote Bessus, subdued Bactria and Sogdiana (now a part of Russian Turkestan), marched through Baluchistan, and planted at Kandahar and near Kabul new cities which bore his name. By 327 he was lord of Asia to the Hindu Kush and the Jaxartes, which we call Syr Daria. He had emphasized his conception of a unified East and West, not subjected one to the other, by taking for his wife the barbarian princess, Roxana of Sogdiana, not without offense to his Macedonians. In 327 he started upon a fresh enterprise—the conquest of India.

Like all the conquerors in India save those who came from the sea, Alexander entered by the passes which lead from Afghanistan into the basin of the Indus. Of Indian history since the Aryan invasion we shall speak elsewhere; here it is sufficient to say that in the regions with which we are concerned, corresponding to the modern Punjab and Sindh, there existed no united dominion. There were kingdoms; there were fortified cities; there were communities, free in the sense that they professedly owned no overlord. Now the invaded conducted a winter campaign among the hill tribes. In the spring of 326 Alexander crossed the Indus unresisted. The king who ruled between the Indus and the Jhelum made submission; but behind the Jhelum the great king, Porus—a title rather than a name—made a stand. While the armies faced each other with the river between, Alexander effected a crossing, undetected, with a part of his force higher up stream; swooped upon the flank of Porus; and after a tremendous fight routed his forces and captured the king himself, who had stoutly refused to flee. Porus was rewarded by being restored to his kingdom, though, of course, as a vassal.

But when the advancing conqueror reached the river Beas, his Macedonians at last flatly refused to move another step eastward. It should be observed that Alexander had no suspicion of the vastness of the territories which lay beyond the dominion he had conquered. He believed himself to be already on the borders of the solid world which the ocean encircles. Doubtless it was a bitter blow to him when even the devotion of his Macedonians would not carry them with him to finish up the conquest; but at least he had pierced the wall which separated Western Asia from India; and in India as in Western Asia he could plant the cities which were a good deal more than symbols of a united empire.

The soldiers had not the same objection to completing the subjugation of the Punjab and of Sindh as to a march into Hindustan. In the course of the ensuing operations Alexander almost lost his life in the capture of the citadel of a strong city where Multan now stands;

he was first over the walls and fought for some time singlehanded, receiving a dangerous wound. When Sindh was subjugated, he planted a city where Haidarabad now stands on the Indus Delta; and then started on his return march, leaving a fleet to explore the coasts and open up a sea route for commerce between India and the Persian Gulf.

The reappearance of Alexander in Persia was followed by the punishment of sundry officials who had misconducted themselves, and by the giving of further effect to what had become Alexander's central idea, the fusion of East and West. The Macedonians were encouraged to take Asiatic wives; for purposes of policy Alexander became a polygamist, marrying the daughter of Darius as well as Roxana. His systematic foundation of cities had been carried out with the same object in view—Greeks and Asiatics were settled in them on an equality, with no distinction of race. Above all, he looked to the formation of an Imperial army to serve the same purpose of unifying the Empire as had been served in Macedonia by his father's formation of a national army, which had taught tribes previously hostile to each other to look upon themselves as one nation. Unification was to be the means to effective Hellenizing.

But one region yet remained to be conquered for the completion of Eastern dominion. With Arabia in his hands the Empire would be in possession of the whole littoral from the mouth of the Indus to the Red Sea. The Southern Ocean, like the Mediterranean, would be made a great highway; and it is likely enough that Alexander expected to encircle Africa, of which the huge extension southward was no more suspected than the extension of Asia eastward. An army was assembled at Babylon in the spring of 323. Alexander was actually on the point of marching, in June, when fever seized him, and in ten days he was dead.

The fabric of his mighty Empire shivered in pieces, not because it had never been possible of realization, but because its completion needed Alexander himself. Had he lived to complete it, it is at least conceivable that, under a reasonably competent successor, it would have become permanent. Had Alexander enjoyed a normal span of life, and lived for another twenty or twenty-five years, he would presumably have left an undisputed heir, and that heir would have inherited an empire much more thoroughly welded together than at the time of the conqueror's death, just eleven years after he first set foot on the soil of Asia. It may be that East and West never could have been fused; it may be that the fusion was still possible until the conviction of its impossibility became ineradicably established. The conviction has stood through the centuries as an insuperable bar, and has never been stronger than at the present day. But assuredly Alexander himself had no reason to suppose that the realization of his

dream would be contrary to the course of nature. He failed because his unfinished political structure went to pieces, and there was no one left to give effect to his designs. He appears perhaps as a destroyer—because destruction was the necessary preliminary to reconstruction—and he died when the reconstruction was only in its initial stages. But that he was essentially a builder, not a destroyer, is proved by the fact that even while he was conquering he was everywhere laying the foundations of the new structure in which the various elements of his Empire were to be harmonized. And although the break-up of the Empire again severed the East from the West, the Hellenic influences which he had planted in the East survived for centuries to come.

III.—*After Alexander, 325-205*

There was no one to claim the allegiance universally yielded to Alexander except an inefficient half-brother, and presently a posthumous baby, the child of Roxana. The only thing to be done was for the generals to take matters into their own hands, parting the Empire into a few great provinces for administrative purposes. But individual ambitions were excited when there was no unquestioned chief. The generals began to fight—each man, perhaps, less to win supremacy for himself than to prevent some one else from doing so. It would be vain to follow out these struggles in detail. When the strongest of them, Antigonus, who at one time seemed likely to overthrow all his rivals, was himself overthrown in 301 at the battle of Ipsus, the Empire was virtually divided between the Macedonian dynasties of Ptolemy in Egypt, Seleucus in Syria and Mesopotamia, Lysimachus in Thrace, and Cassander, who was master of Macedon itself and in some degree of the Greek peninsula. The son of Antigonus, however, Demetrius, surnamed Poliorketes, "the besieger of cities," was for a long time engaged in determined efforts to secure some portion of the Empire for himself; and although he actually failed, it was to his son, Antigonus Gonatas, that the actual Macedonian dominion ultimately fell. Already, when the battle of Ipsus was fought, there was none left of the seed of Alexander; and each of the *Diadochi*, "the successors," the generals among whom the Empire was parted, had taken to himself the title of king.

There was a struggle for the domination of Asia Minor between Seleucus and Lysimachus. Lysimachus was killed, but Seleucus never really made himself master of Asia Minor. The Thracian kingdom melted away; for a time it was dominated by a horde of the Celts, *Galati*, who presently overflowed into Asia and occupied the region called after them Galatia. In Asia Minor itself new kingdoms were formed—Pontus and Cappadocia, between the Black Sea on the north

and the Taurus Mountains on the south; Bithynia, between Pontus and the Propontis; Pergamus, on the southwest of Bithynia. The Galatians were a constant menace to Asia Minor, in spite of a great defeat inflicted upon them by Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, until they were finally quelled by Attalus, the third of the kings of Pergamus, in the second half of the third century. The dynasties, both of Pontus and Cappadocia, were descended from Persian satraps; the Bithynian rulers were native Phrygian princes; the founder of the kingdom of Pergamus was a Greek or Macedonian officer.

Of Egypt during the century after Alexander's death little needs to be said. One or another of the line of the Ptolemies attempted to assert an ascendancy outside the Egyptian sphere, but never with more than a momentary success, except in Coele-Syria and the southern coasts of Asia Minor. Alexandria steadily developed into the greatest of marts; Egypt herself was destined to become the granary of Rome; but she had at this time, as indeed at most times since the days of Rameses III., no specific history demanding record.

The kingdom or dominion which most nearly represents the Eastern Empire of Alexander was the Syrian dominion of the Seleucidæ, the house of Seleucus. Seleucus, at first endowed with the satrapy of Babylon, began by making himself master of the satrapies beyond the Persian Gulf. When, in conjunction with Lysimachus, he overthrew Antigonus at Ipsus, what had been the special dominion of Antigonus was divided between the victors, Seleucus acquiring Syria and a portion of Asia Minor. At a later stage, when Lysimachus and Seleucus went to war with each other, Lysimachus was killed, and Seleucus would have entered upon his inheritance had he not himself been assassinated. The murderer, Ptolemy Keraunos, who had been ejected from Egypt in favor of his brother, for the time took the place of Lysimachus, and the Seleucid dynasty, now represented by Antiochus I., was restricted to Asia.

Seleucus would seem to have been distinguished by the loyalty with which he held to the idea of preserving the Empire of Alexander, so long as the house of the great conqueror was represented. When matters reached the stage where the only question had come to be that of the extent of the supremacy of individual generals, Seleucus himself acquired the lion's share in the East; but he was still loyal to Alexander's idea, and planted his dominion with Hellenized cities on the Greek model, the greatest of them being Antioch, which he named after his father, and which became the capital of his dominions. He designed the reconquest of the Punjab, where a great kingdom was being consolidated by the native prince, Chandragupta; but ended by making a treaty of alliance instead of fighting. Once more the veil between India and Western Asia, lifted for a moment by Alexander, fell back, and India again became a region apart.

In the times of the successors of Seleucus the Ptolemies succeeded in establishing their rule over some of the coastal districts of Asia Minor which had been appropriated to the Seleucidæ. Pergamus and Cappadocia completed their emancipation. The upper satrapies beyond the Persian Gulf revolted, and a native dynasty, the Arsacidæ, laid the foundation of the Parthian kingdom, which survived as an independent Power for nearly five hundred years.

In 223 Antiochus III., called the Great, succeeded to the throne of the Seleucidæ. He recovered the Syrian ascendancy in Parthia and Bactria, but found it politic to leave those regions practically independent; for they were a buffer between the Hellenized East and the wild nomad tribes beyond, and if he drove them to make common cause with the nomads, the whole Hellenizing work of the Seleucidæ would be in danger of perishing. His Eastern campaign had greatly increased his prestige, and as the century neared its close he was contemplating a vigorous attack upon Egypt. But the time had come when Asia and Egypt were passing within the international range of the mighty republic in the West, which was just completing its decisive victory over Carthage; and from this point the history of the East blends with the history of Rome.

Alexander, starting upon his career of conquest, had looked upon himself as essentially the leader of Hellas, but Hellas was by no means reconciled to Macedonian leadership. Even while the conqueror was smiting Darius, Sparta under the guidance of Agis succeeded in raising a revolt which extended over the greater part of the Peloponnese, and had to be crushed by Antipater, whom Alexander had left in Macedon as regent. When Alexander died there was a fresh revolt headed by Athens, known as the Lamian War, because it centered in the siege of Lamia. That revolt too was crushed by Antipater, and was followed by the death of the great orator who had done so much to prevent the reconciliation of Athens to the Macedonian supremacy.

In the first partition of the Empire, Macedonia and Greece went to Antipater. After he died in 319, his son Cassander, whom he had not nominated as his successor, succeeded after a long struggle in making himself master in the West. With the death of Cassander chaos supervened. The rivalries and the deaths of his sons enabled Demetrius Poliorketes to seize the throne for a time. Demetrius was intolerable to Lysimachus in Thrace, who called in to his aid Pyrrhus the King of Epirus, the region on the west of Macedonia of which we have hitherto only heard as the native country of Alexander's mother Olympias. Pyrrhus, a brilliant soldier of whom we shall hear again in Roman history, invaded Macedonia and Demetrius had to fly. By a temporary arrangement Lysimachus agreed that Pyrrhus should hold the Macedonian crown, but shortly afterwards he was expelled again. In 287 Lysimachus was himself Macedonian king. Six years

later Lysimachus was killed in his war with Seleucus, and Seleucus was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunos, who took possession of Thrace and Macedon.

It was at this stage that the Galati—the same people whom the Romans called Gauls and whom we generally term inclusively Celts—poured in force into Thrace. Ptolemy Keraunos was killed in battle against them, and for some years their hordes overran Thrace and Macedonia. Then they plunged down upon Central Greece, but at Delphi they were routed, and not long afterwards Antigonos Gonatas, the son of Demetrius, who had kept his footing in Southern Greece, appeared in the north and again routed the Galati, who withdrew into Thrace, which until almost the end of the century remained under their overlordship.

Antigonos obtained his throne in 278. He held an insecure dominion over Macedon, Thessaly, Boeotia, and some states in the Peloponnese. He set himself to the task of restoring the order to which his kingdom had long been a stranger, but soon met with a check. Pyrrhus of Epirus had passed the time, since his ejection from Macedonia, upon a venture in Southern Italy and Sicily. As Philip of Macedon had trained his mountaineers to form the mainstay of the army of Hellas, so Pyrrhus trained his Epirotes—tribesmen of the Hellenic kin, but outside the recognized Hellenic circle. The Carthaginian Hannibal, than whom there could have been no better judge, pronounced him the greatest of captains after Alexander. The brilliant adventurer returned from his unsuccessful Western expedition bent upon recovering Macedonia. He drove out Antigonos, and then marched to the Peloponnese to capture the towns which owned his rival's sway. Antigonos was not crushed; he, too, appeared in the Peloponnese with an army. Each tried to seize the city of Argos, which they entered by opposite gates, and in the street fighting which ensued Pyrrhus was killed by a tile hurled from a house roof. The fall of Pyrrhus insured the triumph of Antigonos. He still had to reckon with the armed hostility of Athens and Sparta, but in 263, nine years after the fall of Pyrrhus, the resistance of both states was crushed.

The Macedonian supremacy in Greece had never been adequately organized. In theory, even under Philip and Alexander, the Greek states had remained free members of a confederacy, a position in which they were kept only by the fear of Macedonian troops. The city system survived, and various cities were perpetually seeking an opportunity to escape from the pressure of Macedon. Now at last, hardly before the middle of the third century, there arose among the cities which had never claimed a leading position the conception of free federation of self-governing states bound together for purposes of foreign policy.

Two such Leagues were formed—the Achæan in the Peloponnese, and the Ætolian in Central Greece. The ascendancy of Antigonus was provided for by the establishment, in most of the cities, of Tyrants, who were bound to identify their own interests with his. The Achæan League started from small beginnings with a few insignificant cities or districts. It was expanded, partly, at least, by assisting other cities in the expulsion of Tyrants, which was followed as a matter of course by the accession of the emancipated city to the League. The central management was in the hands of elected officials forming a council, with a *strategos*, or captain-general, at the head, and general assemblies in which the states which were members of the League voted according to their population. There was no ostensible revolt against Macedon: in what they did they were within their technical rights; and before Antigonus died in 239, Athens, Salamis and Ægina, Megara and Corinth, and the greater part of the Peloponnese, had become members of the Achæan League.

Yet it was impossible to escape from the old fatal divisions. Sparta stood aloof from the Achæan League, and the Ætolian League on the other side of the Gulf was unfriendly. Macedon under the weak successor of Antigonus was more afraid of attacks from the tribes on north and west than zealous to secure her dominion in the south. The Achæan League became engaged in a war with Sparta in 227, when Macedon was ruled by Antigonus, called Doson, as regent for the young King Philip V. Sparta under the leadership of King Cleomenes showed signs of recovering her old supremacy. The League appealed to Antigonus, who answered the appeal, and Sparta was once more overthrown. But immediately afterwards Antigonus died, and young Philip became the actual ruler of Macedon on his own account.

Meanwhile, the Ætolian League had been acquiring power in Central Greece. Originally it would seem to have been a tribal league in Ætolia, the country immediately facing, on the north, the western coast of Achaia. Ætolia was one of the backward regions of Hellas in which the city system had not been highly developed, and the union was one of clans rather than of city-states, though it may well have provided the model which the creators of the Achæan League sought to copy. For the Ætolian League had actually been in existence as far back as the days of Philip and Alexander. In the general disintegration, the League had attracted to itself all Central Greece as far as the borders of Attica, and had expanded in some degree over portions of Epirus and Thessaly. The association with it of some of the cities of the Peloponnese was the source of friction with the Achæan League, whose expansion had begun with the adhesion of Sicyon in 251.

Thus about the year 220, when Rome was on the verge of one of the great crises in her history—the Second Punic War—the as-

cendency of Macedonia in the south, which Antigonus Doson had recovered, was endangered by the fact that Macedonia had a very young king, and the Ætolian League was threatening to become active. The Achæan League in the south was weak, and Sparta was still weaker, owing to the last blow dealt her. The Greek colonies on the west coast from Corcyra northward were beginning to look to Rome as their future protector against the barbarians of Illyria rather than to Macedon, which had failed to do the duty of Lord Paramount as the defender of its dependencies. Eastward in Europe, Thrace had relapsed under barbarian—that is to say, Celtic—dominion. On the other side of the Ægean, the kingdom of Pergamus was firmly established, and behind it the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, since Attalus of Pergamus had put an end to the Galatian menace. Passing out of Asia Minor, Antiochus the Great was disputing with Egypt for the possession of Lower Syria, and was preparing for his Parthian and Bactrian campaigns.

For him the progress of events in the Far West was as yet too remote to attract his close attention. But to Greece and Macedonia the outbreak of the Second Punic War was visibly a matter of vital moment. Should that war prove to be a decisive struggle, it was practically certain that the victorious Power would turn her attention to the Eastern Mediterranean. There had already been a slight contact with Rome when, a few years earlier, she had intervened in Illyria and planted her foot in Epirus. The contact became collision when in 216 Philip of Macedon chose to ally himself with the Carthaginian Hannibal, who had already dealt to the Romans the two terrific blows at the battles of Lake Thrasimene and Cannæ.

CHAPTER IX

THE RISE AND EXPANSION OF ROME, 753-133 B.C.

I.—The Story of Early Rome.

LONG before the close of the third century the Western Greek world, the Greeks of Sicily and Southern Italy, had been becoming increasingly detached from that Hellenic world which had given them birth. Even in the fifth century they were already concerned less with the common dangers or the internal rivalries of the Eastern Hellenes than with the Carthaginian or the Etruscan menace. After the liberation of Sicily by Timoleon which was contemporaneous with the establishment of Philip's Macedonian ascendancy, their story becomes part of that of the Western world, where the foremost place was being won by the great Power which was destined one day to dominate both East and West. At the end of the third century the ascendancy of Rome in the West was established and she began to absorb the dominion of the East. The rise of Rome is the phase of world history which now demands our attention.

The primitive peoples of Italy, those who were there before either Etruscans or Aryans penetrated the peninsula, were doubtless of that common stock or group of stocks to which ethnologists generally give the name Iberian; peoples who were spread over the west of Europe, and who remained permanently a recognizable element in the Far West, notably in Spain and in Ireland. In Italy they were absorbed by the conquerors. Of the conquerors, apart from Hellenic colonies, there were three main groups: one, the Etruscan, which was non-Aryan; the other two, Italian and Celtic, which were Aryan.

Of these the Celts were the last. It was not, probably, till the fifth century that they poured into the peninsula; and though after that they crossed the Apennines, the tide was rolled back and they were confined to the northern region—Gallia between the Alps and the Apennines, *Gallia-Cisalpina*. The Celts when they came found Italians and Etruscans already in possession. We should probably be wrong, however, in inferring that theirs was a migration from an Aryan cradle much later than that of the Italians and Hellenes. The presumption is that the Celts originally swept westward by a more northerly route than that of Hellenes and Italians; that they reached

the barrier of the Western Ocean and spread northward into the British Isles and southward into Spain; and, having no more room for expansion into the west, expanded eastward again by the southern route, which carried them through the Alps into Italy, and finally, as we have already seen, into the Balkan Peninsula, and thence over the Straits into Asia Minor.

As concerns Italy, however, theirs was a late immigration, and our concern now is with the Etruscans and Italians.

As to the Etruscans, the field of conjecture is almost unlimited. Nothing that we know of them, of their physical type, of their religion, of their language, suggests that they were in any way akin to the Aryans. The uncertainty from which we still suffer as to the early population of the *Ægean* suggests the conjecture that they belong to this group, and possibly came into Italy about the period of the great unrest in the islands and coasts of the *Ægean* at the time of the Achæan and Ionian expansion. Perhaps they had something to do with those "*Shardina*" and "*Tursha*" (*Tyrseni*?) who appeared in Egyptian history in the same half-century as Danaans and Philistines. At any rate, about the beginning of the first millennium B.C., they would seem to have been in possession of Tuscany, the region west of the Tiber between the Western Sea and the Apennines.

By that time Aryans had been for some time filtering into the peninsula on the north and the east from that Illyrian region which was also the cradle of the Dorians. But the Italians proper came in two great streams or groups, known respectively as the Latin and the Oscan or Sabellian. Of these the earlier was the Latin, which pushed through the Apennines and occupied the plains on the southeast of the Tiber. After them came the Sabellians, Sabines, Samnites, all variants of one appellation, and Umbrians, who were always endeavoring to break into Etruria and Latium, while Etruscans and Latins endeavored to hold them back in the mountain districts. Sabines and Latins coalesced with each other more readily, owing to their kinship, than with Etruscans, but the early history is dominated by the mutual hostility of the three forces, Latin, Sabellian, and Etruscan.

In the tenth century then, or thereabouts, the Latins were settled in Latium and were developing the city-state polity with which we have become familiar in Greece. Pressed by Sabines from the mountains and by Etruscans beyond the Tiber, the Latin cities combined to some extent for common defense, and about the middle of the eighth century they selected an exceedingly strong strategic position on the Tiber for the establishment of a military colony to hold the gate of Latium against Sabellians and Etruscans. This is the probable origin of the city of Rome, whose foundation the Romans attributed to the mythical hero Romulus in the year 753 B.C.

According to Roman traditions, the city after its establishment was

ruled by seven kings for a period of 244 years—a longer period than has been covered by seven consecutive reigns in any certified history. The seven kings are probably, to a great extent at least, mythical, for there is little to rely on except tradition until 150 years later. But it would appear that in actual fact there was prolonged and fierce contention between Latins, Etruscans, and Sabines for the possession of Rome on account of its strategical position, and that the kings represent not so much actual individuals as periods of Latin, Sabine, or Etruscan ascendancy (not conquest). The military colony was under a war-lord, not a hereditary king; the last stages of the monarchy represent the ascendancy of an Etruscan Tyranny of the same kind as the Tyrannies in the Greek states in the sixth century; and the expulsion of the kings in 509 corresponds to the expulsion of the Tyrants from the Greek states.

The first four kings, in this view, represent a period when Latins and Sabines vary between fighting each other and coalescing to resist the Etruscans. The city has an artificial and composite character, and its government is in the hands of the families recognized as noble by the Latin and Sabine clans who share it. Being artificial in its inception, the governing council of nobles have not a hereditary king, but a war-lord appointed for life. There is the normal constitution as we shall call it which reappear, repeatedly among the Aryan peoples, of the monarch, the Council of Nobles, and the General Assembly of Freemen. Then in the seventh century, probably when the Etruscan power was exceedingly vigorous, Etruscans forced their way in and endeavored to establish a dynasty, partly at first by posing as liberators of the freemen from the yoke of the nobles. The constitutional forms assume a comparatively democratic shape; but the real power is concentrated in the hands of the Tyrannus.

The new Tyranny differs from that in the Greek states, as ejecting, not an oligarchy, but a monarchy which has not yet been displaced by the nobles. Hence there is not the same appearance of a violent change. The Etruscan ascendancy lasts for about a century; the kings are men of great ability and force, and the Roman city-state becomes extremely powerful in Northern Latium and Southern Etruria. But the Tarquins make the name of King (*Rex*) as hateful to their subjects as was the name of Tyrant to the Eastern Greeks at the same period. The Romans expelled their Etruscan lords, but at heavy cost to their own power for the time; and Rome was reduced to the position of a small state fighting desperately to preserve its liberty.

The expulsion of the Tarquins is perhaps in fact the first sharp check, the first set-back, in the development of Etruscan ascendancy. Its traditional date is 509 B.C. In 476 we have the quite definite date when Syracuse dealt its blow at the Etruscan expansion at Cyme: for

the Etruscans, being a maritime as well as a land folk, had planted themselves on the south of Latium as well as in Etruria, and dominated Campania. It is probable too that by this time the Celts or Gauls were driving the Etruscans out of the districts beyond the Apennines, where they had been in possession; though whether the Etruscans themselves had penetrated thence into Etruria or, as seems more probable, had penetrated thither from Etruria, we cannot tell with any certainty. This much, however, seems clear, that in the first quarter of the fifth century, and in the years immediately preceding and following, the Tuscans were being hard pressed by enemies whom they challenged or who challenged them on all sides. And thus during these years liberated Rome forms alliance with the Latin League, which the Etruscan king of Rome had previously dominated: with the difference that the Latin League is now shaking itself free of Etruscan ascendancy. In 474, immediately after the defeat of the Etruscans by Hieron of Syracuse at Cyme, the most powerful and threatening of the Etruscan cities, Veii, was forced to make peace with Rome, and Rome was again forging to the front as the chief of the Latin League which had combined for self-defense against the essentially foreign Etruscans and their own kindred of the Sabellian group. To that group probably belong the Æqui on the east and Volsci on the south, who are the principal enemies of the Latin League until it comes into collision with the still more powerful confederacy of the Samnites. Rome, with the command of the Tiber, was the standing bulwark of the League against Etruscan aggression, while the Latins and the Hernici, themselves probably a Sabellian group though in alliance with the Latins, were an invaluable buffer between her and the Æqui and Volsci.

We can trace generally the decline of the Etruscan power. Its ascendancy was first checked by the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome; then came the great blow to its sea power at Cyme which paralyzed it for aggression for some time. Its struggle with Rome was renewed in the second half of the century; but the Gauls on the north had shut it into Etruria, it was losing its dominion in the south beyond Latium, and finally lost it when the Samnites captured Capua in 423. Rome was gradually making herself mistress of the Etruscan marches on the west of the Tiber; and the struggle reached its decisive point when the Romans captured Veii in the first decade of the fourth century. And then came the final ruinous blow, the incursion of the Gauls from the north.

Dismissing dubious legendary details, this much emerges as tolerably definite fact. The devastating Celtic horde swept over Etruria. As the storm approached the Tiber, the Romans sent out an army which was routed on the banks of the Allia. There was no time to place the city in a state of defense. The Gauls sacked it, but failed

to storm the Citadel. After besieging it for several months, they raised the siege, and the tide rolled back beyond the Apennines. The Romans claimed that the retreat was due to a tremendous defeat inflicted upon them by the Roman hero Camillus, which may or may not be true. But the incursion had never been more than a raid on a large scale, from which Rome really reaped the profit in spite of her sufferings, because it had finally ruined the Etruscan power.

Hitherto Rome had been only a city, more powerful than any individual among her neighbors, recognizing at least no superior, but more engaged on self-preservation than on extending dominion. The final break-up of the Etruscan power at a time when Latium, which had borne the brunt of the struggle with Æqui and Volsci, was being subjected to increasing pressure from the Sabellians of the mountains, prepared the way for her to establish a definite supremacy. Thenceforth she is seeking not security but dominion over all Italy between the Apennines and the sea, a dominion which would necessarily bring new territories within the sphere of her energies. In effect the period of Roman expansion begins from the time when the flood of the Gallic invasion ebbed back behind the Apennines. It is at this same moment that the Roman historians of later days began to find material to work upon in the shape of written records. Before we enter upon this new phase we must inquire into the character of the institutions which directed the development of the Roman state.

II.—The Institutions of Early Rome

Down to the *Regifugium*, the expulsion of the kings, we have seen that the government of Rome was in the form of a monarchy, with a consultative Council formed of the heads of the noble families, and with an ultimate reference of some important matters to a General Assembly of the freemen. The king was the absolute commander in war, the supreme judge, and the high priest. The Etruscan kings evidently exercised their power in very arbitrary fashion; whereas it may be presumed that the tendency under the earlier kings, at least in time of peace, had been for the nobility to appropriate an increasing share of the functions of government.

The freemen then and afterwards were divided into two groups; one, the noble, or "patrician," *gentes*, the families from whom the *patres*, the "fathers," the Senate, or elders, who formed the Council, were taken; the other the *plebs*, the "plebeians," who formed the bulk of the citizens. Patricians and plebeians probably belonged to the same tribes, of which the ancient chiefs were the ancestors of the noble group. The theory that the plebs were originally a subject or conquered people is now hardly maintained. The whole body was divided into thirty *curiæ*, probably in the first instance a tribal division

modified by topographical convenience. When the General Assembly, the *Comitia Curiata*, was called up to vote, it voted by *curiæ*—that is, each *curia* gave one vote, and the vote of the *curia* was decided by the majority of its members. Probably there were few occasions when it was called upon to vote, except on the demise of a king, when it might accept or reject the nominee who was in effect put forward by the Senate. Probably also its formal assent was required to the promulgation of a new law.

The Senate, the Council, consisted of the heads of the patrician families. From these families all officers of state were selected, and the patricians formed a caste in the specific sense that there was no legal intermarriage between patricians and plebeians.

Now, according to the tradition, which there is no reason to question, the original Assembly of the "people in arms" was, for military purposes, reconstructed within the period of the kingship. It is probable enough that the Etruscan kings had also the deliberate intention of diminishing thereby the influence of the noble families. The Roman territory under them expanded, and they brought into the Assembly all landholders, whether they belonged to the proper Roman tribes or not. They were organized without respect to *curiæ*, as two corps or four legions of foot-soldiery. The units of which the legion was composed were centuries, or companies nominally of a hundred men; and these again were grouped in five "classes," the first three heavy armed and the other two light armed, forming the five ranks of the fighting line, the second and third classes being less heavily armed than the first. The basis of the classification was wealth, since the poorer citizens could not afford the full armor with which the wealthier citizens were expected to provide themselves. Besides the legions, of which the normal strength was 4,200 men, there were eighteen cavalry centuries, who again were composed from the wealthiest classes, though two-thirds were plebeians. The new "*Comitia*" was a considerably more democratic body than the Assembly of the *curiæ*; the patricians could dominate each *curia*, but they could not dominate those centuries in which they were unrepresented, though the classes to which they belonged could outvote the purely plebeian classes. But as many of the plebeian as fell short of the property qualification, even for the fifth class, were excluded altogether, the "people in arms" no longer counted the whole free population. Thenceforth the old Assembly of the *curiæ* lost such political importance as it had possessed.

The institution of the *Comitia* of the Centuries is ascribed to King Servius Tullius, who also instituted a new territorial division into tribes—a very misleading name, since it had nothing whatever to do with kinship. It is somewhat suggestive of the fresh divisions introduced at Athens by Cleisthenes. It is not certain whether at this date

the division into tribes was extended outside the city; but it is probable that when the kings were driven out the area of the Roman state was divided among twenty tribes. In after times, when an exclusively plebeian Assembly came to be summoned, it voted by tribes and was known as the *Comitia Tributa*.

Now, when the kings were driven out, neither of the assemblies had much political power. That was vested in the Senate, the monarch, and, after the fall of the monarchy, in the magistrates. The first and obvious result of the expulsion of the kings was the appointment of magistrates endowed with the powers which the kings had wielded—a supreme authority. But there was this fundamental difference, that when the Crown was, so to speak, put in commission, two magistrates, holding office for a year, jointly, with equal powers, were substituted for one magistrate holding office for life. The new chief magistrates, called at first *prætors*, and afterwards *consuls*, were elected as the kings had been elected; but the Assembly could only accept or reject nominated candidates for office. It could only accept or reject laws submitted to it by magistrates; it had no initiative. And the magistrates could only be taken from the patrician families.

A struggle between the orders of patricians and plebeians began immediately upon the expulsion of the kings. The plebs felt themselves at the mercy of the consuls. If the consuls were in agreement there was practically no check upon them, though if they differed the energy of one consul could always be paralyzed by the veto of the other, against which there was no appeal. A liberal-minded leader in the expulsion of the kings, *Valerius Poplicola*, immediately introduced one check upon extreme violence by a law forbidding the consul to put any citizen to death, except when on active service, without the sanction of the vote of the *Comitia* of the Centuries; but that such a law should have been required shows how helpless was the position of the plebs under tyrannical consuls.

The first move of the plebeians in search of protection against the arbitrary power of the patrician consul is known as the Secession to the Sacred Mount. In effect it would appear to have taken the form of a mutiny of the troops—in other words, of the citizen army—on its return from a campaign. They threatened to leave the city and the patricians to take care of themselves while they established a new city of their own. Actually the fundamental difficulty in the way was that the functions of priesthood were confined to the patricians, without whom the plebs had no intermediaries between themselves and the gods. Still the patricians could not coerce the army, and in the result it was agreed that the plebs should appoint officers of their own, who were given the name of *Tribunes*, who should have power to intervene with a veto to protect plebeians against arbitrary action on the part of the consuls. By 450 the number of the two original tribunes had risen

to ten; they had attained the further power of vetoing legislation proposed by the consuls; and the Publilian law had expressly sanctioned the assembling of the plebs by the tribunes in the new Comitia—which voted by tribes and could pass resolutions binding upon the plebs, to which it was the business of the tribunes to endeavor to give effect. Such resolutions were known as *plebiscita*. This Assembly elected the tribunes annually.

The next step for the protection of the plebeian against arbitrary treatment by the magistrates was the demand for a definite legal code; until the law should be written down, there was no practical means of preventing the magistrates from giving arbitrary judgments. After a stubborn resistance, the patricians agreed to the appointment of a commission of ten, known as the Twelve Tables. Their work was not the making of the new law, but the putting in permanent shape of the law as generally understood. Pending the issue of the Twelve Tables the whole business of government had been vested in the Decemvirs, who now attempted to retain in their own hands the power which had been temporarily entrusted to them. This led to another secession of the plebs, which forced the Decemvirs to abdicate, and restored the rule of consuls, modified by the tribunate—the event to which belongs the legend of the Decemvir Appius Claudius and the slaying of the maiden Virginia by her father Virginius.

The pacification effected by what were known as the Valerio-Horatian laws increased plebeian influence. The statement of the Roman historian, familiarly known as Livy, that these laws gave to the resolutions or plebiscita of the Comitia Tributa, the Assembly of the plebs, the full force of law, is certainly incorrect. Their probable effect was to create a plebeian initiative in legislation. Hitherto a new law could only be brought in on the initiative of the consuls; now it would seem that a resolution of the plebs could be brought before the Comitia Centuriata and passed into law whether the consuls approved or not. At the same time it was made illegal to molest the tribunes. Hitherto they had been protected only by the oaths which had been taken by plebs and patricians to hold them inviolable; now a definite law superseded the oath.

From this time we find the leaders of the plebs working with two separate objects in view, the one political, the other agrarian. The wealthier plebeians were bent on obtaining political equality with the patricians, on breaking down all those privileges which confined the administrative offices to the nobles. The poorer classes, the political privileges appeared of less moment than the practical fact that they were being driven off the land. Whenever new territories were acquired, land was appropriated as *ager publicus*, public land which was, for the most part, in theory distributed among the Roman citizens, making provision for the expanding populations. In practice the

patricians generally managed to secure the bulk of land on the *ager publicus* for themselves, and to turn it into private estates; and there was a general tendency to work those estates by slave labor. As in Athens, so in Rome, the impoverishment of the poorer classes drove many of them out of the ranks of freemen into those of slaves; they got into debt to their richer neighbors and became their slaves on failure to pay the debts. The agitation for the assignment of public lands in small holdings went side by side with the agitation of the wealthier plebeians for the removal of the barriers which stood between them and public life.

We shall find these two agitations combined as one movement a few years after the retreat of the Gauls. Meanwhile, however, the plebeians gained further successes in the political agitation. Almost immediately after the Valerio-Horatian laws, marriage between patricians and plebeians was legalized; and in order to evade the demand put forward that one of the consuls should be a plebeian, the patricians assented to the occasional substitution for the two consuls of six magistrates, who might be chosen from either order, and bore the title of "military tribunes with consular powers." During the next seventy-eight years the patricians habitually sought to procure the appointment of consuls, who might still only be patricians, while the plebeian leaders more often succeeded in procuring the appointment of military tribunes, some of whom were plebeians. It may here be noted that Rome enjoyed an entirely peculiar institution called the Dictatorship. On emergency, the Senate might supersede the consuls by appointing a single dictator in whom absolute powers were vested for six months. As a matter of course only a patrician could be nominated to such a post. The dictatorship was not affected by the legislation which we have been discussing.

Another plebeian victory transferred the appointment of the minor public officers called *quæstors* from the arbitrary selection of the consuls to the vote of the *Comitia* of Centuries, and presently sanctioned the selection of plebeians for the office. Perhaps it was the consciousness that the citadel of the consulship would sooner or later have to be surrendered which led the patricians to transfer some of the consular powers to new patrician officers entitled *Censors*, who, among other duties, supervised the Senate, and had the power of expelling from it persons of dubious character. Hitherto it would seem that the numbers of the Senate were periodically made up by the consuls themselves, though always with the limitation that any one who had once been a consul was *ex-officio* entitled to a seat in the Senate.

From the struggles of the orders, we turn for a moment to the no less important question of the relation between the city of Rome and

her allies. Here we find that throughout the first century of the republic the cities of the Latin League are allied with Rome as confederates on equal terms. The League is merely a league of which Rome is the most prominent member.

The cities can make individual alliances on their own account. All the members of the League enjoy in any city of the League common trading rights and right of intermarriage. The whole group of cities including Rome, is bound together for mutual defence, but Rome holds no legal superiority; her ascendancy is merely the ascendancy of prestige.

III.—The Growth of the Roman Power in Italy

In the period upon which we now enter, Rome advances from her position as the leading Latin state to that of the mistress of Italy; and internally the control of the state passes from the old patrician aristocracy to a new aristocracy of which the patrician families are only the nucleus. The plebeians break down the barriers which have hitherto excluded them from office, but only to set up new barriers by the ennoblement of plebeian families which share control with the patricians.

The sack of Rome by the Gauls destroyed all the earlier records which had not been engraved upon stone. After the sack, the new written records remained to provide material for future historians—frequently untrustworthy, owing to the desire of the chroniclers to glorify their own particular heroes and the families to which they belonged. But though the modern historian has every reason to denounce the Gauls for depriving him of natural sources of information, the Romans rather owed them thanks. For, terrible though the crisis had been, it left Rome stronger in comparison with her neighbors. After the fall of Veii, she already had not very much to fear from the Etruscans; the chance of an Etruscan recuperation was entirely destroyed by the Gallic incursion.

The Latin cities, however, untouched by the Gauls, who had stopped in their southward career in order to besiege the Roman Citadel, seemed to have reckoned that they could shake themselves free from the domination of their powerful confederate, and rather sought opportunities for quarrelling with her. During the next thirty years Rome was engaged in wars with a series of the cities. In every case she had the best of it. And she turned this hostile attitude of her allies to account.

Tusculum was incorporated with Rome itself in 382. Evidently, in some sense, Rome was already claiming a right to dictate to those who had in theory been her equal allies. There was a reconstruction of the League in 358, of which all we can say with certainty is that

the cities felt its conditions as oppressive, but also felt the need of support from the Roman arms too much to offer resistance; for the danger from the Samnites in the mountains had become immediate and pressing.

That pressure was relieved by the first Samnite war, from 343-341. Then the Latin cities turned upon Rome in revolt. The revolt was crushed, though it had been almost universal. The old League was definitely dissolved, and a new League was formed, but upon a new basis. The cities lost their independence. Some were treated like Tusculum and incorporated with Rome. The rest became nominally her allies, *socii*, but they were isolated from each other. They resigned the control of their foreign relations to Rome. They could enter into no alliance on their own account, but were bound by any alliances she made. They lost their mutual rights of trade and marriage, rights which each of them retained in relation only to Rome herself, while she retained them in relation to all. Their forces were under the control of the Roman commanders. The method had been first applied some years before, when Rome was subjugating the south of Etruria.

The same principle was now applied also to the colonies by Rome on the lands of the dependent states and whenever fresh territories were annexed. They bore the name of Latin colonies, not because they were colonies of Latins, but because they had the "Latin rights." These colonies increased the power of Rome, because they were in effect garrisons. It is true that the Romans who settled on them thereby surrendered their political rights at Rome. They lost their vote in the Comitia, and were not eligible for public office; but while they were dwelling at a distance, this was of little moment to them, and they could recover the full rights by returning to residence in Rome, provided that they left a representative of the family behind, and even this was unnecessary if they had served as public officers in the colony itself.

Nor did the system apply only to Latium. The first example had been the city of Cære in Etruria. It was adopted also in Campania, which came under the Roman sway immediately before the Latin war. We saw that in the last century the Samnites had pressed down into Campania, and made themselves masters of the Etruscan cities there. Since that time the victorious hillmen had adopted the luxurious civilization of the inheritance upon which they had entered; Capua was to become a byword. Then their kinsmen in the hills began in turn to push down upon them; they appealed to Rome for aid, and this was the cause of the First Samnite War. Rome expelled the invading Samnites, but the Campanians paid the price by owning the Roman suzerainty. When the cities of the Latin League rose, they rose also, hoping to escape the consequences of their bargain; and

again they paid the penalty by being reduced like the Latins to the condition of dependent allies. In the course of the fourteen years which followed the Samnite War Rome had established the new system over the whole of the lowlands from Southern Etruria to the south of Campania.

Already Rome had acquired such prestige that Carthage, in 348, just before the first Samnite war, thought it worth while to enter upon diplomatic relations with her, and made a commercial treaty permitting her to trade with the Carthaginian towns in Sicily, where her own progress had recently been checked by Dionysius of Syracuse. The reconstruction of the Latin League took place two years before the deaths of Philip of Macedon and of Timoleon. Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great, was interesting himself in the affairs of the Greek cities of Southern Italy, and now the time had arrived when those cities were to enter into the current of Italian history, of which Rome is the fountain-head.

The connecting link between Rome and these cities is to be found in the Sebellian tribes, who occupied the whole hill country of the Apennine chain. On the far south they divide into the Apulians of the heel and the Lucanians of the toe of Italy. North-west of these came the great Samnite group; then the Sabine tribes along the northern marches of Latium; and then the Umbrians, stretching up behind Etruria to the Celtic plain. The activities of Alexander of Epirus probably accounted for the Samnite abstention from interference while Rome was subjugating and garrisoning Latium and Campania. Upon them and their allies he inflicted a great defeat in 332; but his death relieved them from pressure on the south, and they prepared to resume active measures for checking the now alarming advance of Rome.

A pretext was found for intervention in a quarrel between Rome and the Greek colony of Palæopolis ("the Old Town"—near Naples, *Neapolis*, "the New Town"); and in 327 began the Second Samnite War. The Samnites were a very valiant folk, but the support which they received from their Sabellian kinsmen was at the best half-hearted. The Sabine group soon passed from half-hearted helpers into neutrals, and then from neutrals into allies of Rome. Lucanians and Apulians to the south were less afraid of Rome than of the Samnites. In the first years of the war there was much stubborn fighting in which the Samnites held their own. During this period the famous episode of the Caudine Forks, when the Roman army was entrapped, and the Roman consuls with their whole force were obliged to submit to the humiliation of passing "under the yoke," and to engage for the evacuation of Campania by the Romans. But Rome refused to ratify the convention, and merely returned the consuls

as prisoners to the Samnites. A little later the desertion of the Northern Sabellians enabled the Romans to pierce through the Apennines and take Samnium in the rear. After more than twenty years of fighting, peace was made. The main outcome of the war had been a considerable strengthening of the Roman frontier; and incidentally Rome had found an opportunity for the annexation of a great portion of Etruria, a process which meant the establishment of garrison colonies on the conquered lands. The northern Sabellians, too, had been definitely enrolled among the so-called "allies" of Rome.

Six years later the Samnites made another desperate attempt, hoping to rouse Etruria to revolt, and even to bring the Gauls to their aid. The danger was averted by a Roman victory over the Gauls and Samnites at Sentinum in Umbria. The victory was exceedingly costly, but it served its purpose. The new confederacy was broken up, the Gauls retired, the Etruscans submitted, and the Samnites fought on alone. Rome paid them the compliment of acknowledging their valor by making a peace with them in 290, which admitted them to alliance, not as dependents, but on equal terms. During the next decade Rome had extended her dominion across the Apennines, northwest of Samnium, to the sea, and had pushed her borders up to Ariminum.

Since the peace between the Samnites and Rome, the southern hill-folk had again been turning their attention to harrassing the Greek cities of the south, which in 283 took the dangerous course of appealing to Rome. It is observable that the oligarchical factions were always encouraged by Rome, and were favorably disposed to her, while the democratic factions were much more zealous for independence. The appeal of the cities secured the desired help, with the normal accompaniment, as in Campania, of Roman garrisons. In effect, Rome extended her protection; but the price paid by the protected was the emphatic recognition of her suzerainty. The greatest of all the cities was Tarentum, and the democrats of Tarentum, determined to save their independence if they could find an ally to fight for them. That ally appeared in the person of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, who had just lost his brief royalty in Macedon, and was thinking of playing in the West the part which Alexander the Great had already played in the East. Sicily and Carthage were his real objectives. The Greeks of Italy and Sicily were to unite his leadership, and to overthrow the barbarian.

Pyrrhus came with a large force of Epirotes and mercenaries; elephants also, borrowed from the East. He led the Tarentines, whom he forced into his ranks, against the Romans. In a great battle his elephants turned the scale, and the Romans were heavily defeated. The victory induced most of the Greek cities to revolt, and

brought also to his standard the warlike tribesmen who were always willing to fight under a great captain. Next year he won another victory, but only at tremendous cost; and still Rome, with a fine resolution, refused to treat with a foreign foe on Italian soil.

After all, the conquest of Rome was not the object Pyrrhus had in view. He left Rome alone and crossed to Sicily. The Greek cities accepted him, and helped him to drive the Carthaginians back into the western corner. But he could not complete the conquest, and his Greek allies there became restive. He returned in displeasure to Italy; there he found that his Greek allies regarded him as having betrayed their cause by his departure to Sicily. However he attacked the Roman force which had come out to meet him at Beneventum, and this time the victory lay with the Romans. Thoroughly disgusted, the great adventurer threw up the contest and recrossed the Adriatic. The rest of his career has been described in a previous chapter.

In the course of the next few years the whole of Southern Italy had come into the Roman alliance. Virtually the entire peninsula owned her sway up to the Arno and the Rubicon.

Here, then, we may conveniently summarize the position of the mistress of Italy. The actual Roman territory in the occupation of Roman citizens covered a considerable area on both sides of the Tiber stretching down to Tiber mouth, and about an equal distance up the Tiber above Rome. Also there were five not Latin but Roman colonies with full citizenship on the coast of Latium from Ostia to Sinuessa, and two on the Adriatic coast. Half a dozen of the old Latin towns, like Tusculum, had been actually incorporated with Rome. Next to these came the allies with Latin rights, which we have already described, and the "Latin colonies," which were the mainstay of the Roman power—in the towns of Etruria, Latium, and Campania, and the tribes of Latium and east of Etruria, which had trading rights and right of marriage with Rome herself, but not with each other. Below these ranked the rest of the allies, who were classed not as Latins but as Italians, and were more in the position of subjects. The general principle adopted was to leave the communities to govern themselves in strictly local affairs. But where the community was not centered in a city, Rome herself provided annual prefects for the administration of justice. The allies provided their own contingents for war, but the numbers to be sent were regulated from Rome, and all were under the control of the Roman generals.

The period of expansion in Italy was accompanied by the disappearance of the old privileges of the patricians. The struggle between the orders had been to some extent suspended by the struggle with external foes, the final contest with Veii, and the Gallic invasion. Thirteen years after that event, battle again was joined; and after a ten years' struggle, the plebeians won a great victory with the

passing into law of what are called the Licinian Rogations, which embodied both the political demands of ambitious plebeians and the economic demands of the poorer classes. The military tribunes were abolished—they had failed to satisfy the plebs; and the dual consulships were permanently reinstated, but with a proviso that one consul must be a plebeian. The gradual admission of plebeians on equal terms with patricians to all other public offices necessarily followed, and was usually made effective by the proviso that half the appointments must, and the other half might, be made from the plebs. On the economic side, present relief at least was given by an arrangement to facilitate the paying off of arrears of debt by instalments, interest already paid being treated as a repayment of capital; by requiring the employment of free labor in a certain proportion to slave labor; and by setting a limit to the amount of public land which might be held by any one person, and the number of sheep or cattle that any one person might graze on the unallotted public pasture land. Of more importance, however, than any such legislation in appeasing the land hunger and making provision for the increasing population was the planting of the Latin colonies, the garrisons of Roman citizens, on the new lands acquired with the subjugation of Etruria, Latium, and the rest. For the time being, the loss of political status by deprivation of the vote was not felt by the colonists.

A significant accompaniment of the admission of the plebs to the consulship was the appointment of a new prætor, who took over from the consuls the administration of justice; probably until this date the title of prætor had not been superseded by that of consul, which was now appropriated to the two supreme magistrates. Only for a very short time the new prætorship was confined to patricians. The dictatorship, like the other magistracies, was soon thrown open to the plebeians.

In 339 the Publilian law abolished the senatorial veto on legislation passed by the *Comitia Centuriata*. The extension of the wars revived the military tribunes, not as substitutes for consuls, but as minor officers; and the military tribunate commonly provided an entry for plebeians into public life. The concluding measure of which we have to take note is the Hortensian law of 287, which gave to the resolutions of the *Comitia Tributa* the force of law. No recovery of the controlling power of the patricians could be thought of. But the victory was not a victory of democracy; in fact, it is not in the least probable that the mass of the people wished to exercise active political rights. What had happened was that, while the plebs as a body were now sovereign in the matter of legislation, administration was of much more importance. The plebs had won their share of the administration, but practically that very soon came to mean that a quite limited number of plebeian families acquired in practice the

privileges which had once belonged to the patricians exclusively. The holding of a public office gave the holder and his descendants the social rank of nobles, and the new nobles were just as anxious as the old to remain an exclusive body.

IV.—The Struggle with Carthage.

The Hellenes were in possession of the lion's share of the trade in the Eastern Mediterranean; westwards Carthage had almost a monopoly. She occupied points of vantage along the African coast. She was in possession of Western Sicily and Sardinia. Carthage herself was essentially Phœnician, but the Phœnicians there were in effect an oligarchical body of wealthy traders. When she went to war her armies were captained by Phœnicians, by Hamilcars, Hannibals, Hasdrubals; but the armies themselves were mercenaries hired from abroad, or native African tribesmen forced into service or hired from native chiefs or serving for pay.

For more than two centuries she had been wrestling with the Greeks for domination in Sicily. In spite of varying fortunes the Greeks on the whole had held their own, but hardly any attempt had been made to consolidate their power except by Dionysius I. and Pyrrhus. They continued to be a disunited collection of states, and failed to turn to account the possibilities of the situation created by Timoleon. At the end of the fourth century Tyrants were again reigning in Syracuse, and Carthage was again encroaching. In the first quarter of the third century Carthage and Syracuse were in effect the two powers in the island. The retirement of Pyrrhus after his failure to expel the Carthaginians left the Greeks as little united as before, and there was an ominous prospect that Carthage would succeed in acquiring the dominion of the whole island.

Now that Rome had become mistress of the Italian peninsula on the south of the mountain barrier formed by the Northern Apennines, she could not with equanimity contemplate the acquisition of Sicily by Carthage. It had become, in fact, plain that sooner or later there must be a fight for supremacy between Carthage and Rome. But Rome was a land Power, Carthage a sea Power, and *prima facie* the battle-ground between them would have to be Sicily, which was open to attack by land as well as by sea—at least so long as Rome could command the strait between the island and the mainland. The struggle between Rome and Carthage is one of the wars vital in the history of the world, like the struggle between the Greeks and the Persians.

Pyrrhus himself had not been eager for war with Rome. In his eyes Carthage was the enemy, and he would probably have preferred alliance with Rome. In fact, as it appears now, the natural course to

have adopted in view of the Carthaginian menace would have been that of alliance between Rome and Syracuse, which was now guided by an able ruler, Hiero. There were subsisting treaties between Rome and both Carthage and Syracuse. But when Rome actually found occasion to open the contest with Carthage, she chose to act in disregard of her treaties with both the Sicilian Powers.

In our previous account of Sicily we have seen the Greek cities relying upon mercenary troops from Campania and the hillmen of Southern Italy. A band of these mercenaries called Mamertines seized the town of Messina, commanding the Sicilian side of the strait facing Rhegium. Messina was a dependency of Syracuse, and Hiero prepared to expel the Mamertines. One party among the Mamertines appealed to Carthage, another party appealed to Rome. If Rome sat still it was probable enough that Messina would become a Carthaginian city. The Roman statesmen hesitated, and referred the question to the Assembly of the people. The Assembly voted that Rome should support the Mamertines against both Carthage and Hiero. In effect, it was resolved to use the opportunity for establishing a footing in Sicily. Thus, in 264, began the First Carthaginian or Punic War.

Although Hiero himself might well have claimed that the Romans, if they intervened at all, were bound to restore Messina to him, higher considerations of policy induced him in the second year of the war to become the faithful ally of Rome. Rome had never herself been, in any sense, a naval Power; but the Etruscans and the Italian Greeks, who were now her allies, were traditionally maritime peoples. She set herself, with their aid, to the construction of a great fleet. Having no prospect of rivaling the Carthaginians in seamanship, she adopted the plan of seeking to convert every sea-fight into the equivalent of a land fight by the employment of grappling bridges. Her fleets, indeed, suffered terrific disasters when they were caught by tempests, but the new device usually served whenever they could succeed in bringing a Carthaginian fleet to action. Carthage found herself by no means the unqualified mistress of the seas, and the land forces which she threw into Sicily were driven in till she held hardly anything but the fortress of Lilybæum (the modern Marsala), which of old bade defiance even to Dionysius.

In the sixth year of the war the Senate resolved on the invasion of Carthaginian territory in Africa. Roman fleets could now cross the Mediterranean without great fear of Carthaginian fleets, though they were still in peril from tempests. The policy was not unreasonable, since there was good ground to expect that the African peoples whom Carthage held in subjection would welcome the invader. The consuls overran the country. Then appeared evidence that the system which worked well enough in Italy was not adapted to extensive oversea

operations. One consul had to return home to preside at the annual elections, while a number of the troops were withdrawn, as having served the obligatory term. The second consul was a man of rigid probity, limited intelligence, and no tact. A skilful diplomatist could at this stage have extracted extremely favorable terms from Carthage, while carefully conciliating the Africans; but the harshness and arrogance of Regulus drove the Carthaginians to a desperate defiance. To their aid came a Spartan soldier of fortune, Xanthippus. They gave him a free hand; he reorganized their forces, inflicted an overwhelming defeat on Regulus, and took him prisoner.

There is no sufficient reason for rejecting the splendid story of the devotion whereby the consul redeemed his fame. He was sent on parole with some Carthaginian envoys to Rome, in the expectation that he would urge his countrymen to obtain his own release by conceding favorable peace terms. Regulus deliberately advised the Senate to persist in the war, although he was bound in honor to return to Carthage, and knew that the Carthaginians in their anger would put him to a cruel death. The Senate took his advice, the terms were rejected, and Regulus passed through death to glorious immortality.

As a matter of fact the African disaster reduced the Romans to continuing the struggle, not in Africa, but in Sicily and on the seas. The Carthaginian command in Sicily was in the hands of Hamilcar Barca, whose military genius was little if at all inferior to that which was to be displayed in the next generation by his son Hannibal. The Romans were almost driven off the seas; Hamilcar, in the remaining fortress of Sicily, defied all attack and even recovered some ground. At last, however, the Romans resolved on a desperate effort to retrieve the position. Mainly through the public spirit of individuals, they were able once more to equip a great fleet, and the fleet won a decisive victory. Hamilcar, tied and bound by the hostile factions at home, knew that the struggle under existing conditions was hopeless; Carthage was more thoroughly exhausted than Rome. He was authorized to negotiate a peace with the consul Catulus. Carthage agreed to evacuate Sicily and to pay a huge war indemnity.

The twenty-three years of war were followed by twenty-three years of peace between Carthage and Rome. Yet it was only a very short time after the treaty that the Romans succeeded in forcing Carthage to cede Corsica and Sardinia. The acquisition of these islands and of Sicily led to the first establishment of Roman provincial government, in 227. Two additional prætors were appointed—one for the province of Sardinia, one for the province of Sicily. The new governors were responsible to Rome, but within their provinces were virtually absolute. As yet the eastern portion of Sicily was not included in the province, but remained an independent state under Hiero. These acquisitions were of immense importance in securing the

domination of the Northern Mediterranean and insuring Italian immunity from naval attack. But the Roman dominion was still open to invasion through the Northern Apennines from the Celtic plain, the valley of the Po. An incursion of the Gauls into Etruria in 225 resulted in the infliction upon them of a crushing defeat at Telamon and a counter invasion. All the Gallic tribes were compelled to acknowledge the Roman supremacy; three Roman colonies were planted in their territory at Placentia, Cremona, and Mutina; and the Gauls were held in nominal subjection, though they were not enrolled among the Italian allies.

During this period the Romans for the first time carried their arms across the Adriatic, where the Illyrian pirates were working havoc with the trade of the Greek cities. The Macedonian king, Demetrius, the successor of Antigonus, failed to hold them in check, and Rome as the dominant sea Power intervened to smite the Illyrians. At the same time friendly relations were established not only with the Greek cities on the western coast, but with the Ætolian and Achæan Leagues; and Rome procured for herself admission to the Isthmian Games, and acknowledgment that she was not to be looked upon by Hellenes as a "barbarian" power.

Meanwhile, however, the great Hamilcar had been working out his own plans for retrieving the Punic dominion. In Carthage the factions made him helpless; but he conceived the idea of establishing in the Spanish peninsula a Power which should be the base from which in due time an attack should be made upon Rome. For he knew that if Carthage did not destroy Rome, Rome would destroy Carthage. The oligarchy were well enough pleased to get rid of a dangerously powerful citizen; and Hamilcar was given a free hand for carrying out his projects in Spain, upon which he became all the more bent when Rome procured the cession of Sardinia. Thither then he went in 236, taking with him his young son Hannibal, whom he imbued with a double portion of his own hatred of Rome. In eight years he had established his ascendancy over the south of Spain, partly by conquest and partly by conciliation, winning the devotion of the native warrior tribes. On his death the work was carried on by his kinsman Hasdrubal, and the new dominion was carried as far as the river Ebro. There it was stayed, in answer to the demands of Rome.

But on Hasdrubals's death in 221 the army which had been organized in Spain elected the young Hannibal as its chief, and the oligarchs at Carthage dared not refuse to ratify the election. Hannibal had conceived the tremendous design of using Spain as his base, from which to lead an army through Southern Gaul and invade Italy from the north. He counted upon the active support of the newly subjected Celts in the plain of the Po; success at the outset would be the

signal for the revolt of the Italian allies from Rome; and Carthage would be forced to render the active assistance which, as he knew, would be grudged to his father's son by the oligarchs. To carry out this scheme he must pick a quarrel with Rome, and he did so by finding an excuse for attacking the semi-Greek colony of Saguntum, which was allied with Rome by treaty. In 218 the Carthaginian government refused to repudiate Hannibal, and Rome declared war.

From the strategical point of view the leading fact to be observed is that Rome held command of the seas; not, indeed, with such overwhelming force that no Carthaginian fleet could appear in Italian waters, but so strongly that in effect Carthage could not convey troops of munitions of war in any bulk to the Italian peninsula. Hannibal could only get into Italy by the overland route from Spain; and being in Italy it was only by the overland route from Spain that he could hope to obtain reinforcements, unless the naval conditions should be changed. If he were cut off from Spain and isolated in Italy, his one chance of success would lie in the co-öperation of the Gauls and the Italian allies. The Gauls proved fickle, and the Italian allies, almost without exception, held loyally to Rome. The naval conditions were not changed. And yet the genius of Hannibal all but triumphed; for years the presumption appeared to be that it would triumph. But the end was that which could never have been in doubt, if Hannibal himself had not been one of the greatest soldiers of all time.

At Rome it was doubtless expected that the war would be fought out in Spain itself and in Africa. Preparations were made for dispatching a great army to Spain under the consul Scipio. That Hannibal would successfully pass the Pyrenees, cross Southern Gaul, and penetrate through the Alps with a powerful army, might well have seemed incredible. On the other hand, that the Gauls in the north of Italy would rise was almost certain, and a force was dispatched thither to hold them down. But when Scipio touched at the friendly Massilia on his way to Spain he found that Hannibal was already at hand. An attempt to intercept him before he reached the Alps failed, and Scipio sent on the bulk of his army to Spain, returning with a small portion of it to join the Roman army in Cisalpine Gaul—a sufficient force, as it seemed, to cope with the invader. The dispatch of the army to Spain effected its purpose; it severed Hannibal's communications with his base; and his position in Italy when he broke through the Alps was not unlike that of Bonaparte in Egypt after Nelson's victory of the Nile.

But he did break through, bringing with him a force frightfully diminished, but composed of first-rate veteran troops utterly devoted to their young captain. The much larger Roman army was promptly

routed at the battle of the Trebia, and Hannibal was established in Cisalpine Gaul.

Early in the next year he crossed the Apennines and descended into Etruria; ambushed his troops on the line of march of the great Roman army which had been sent north with him under the consul Flaminius, close by the Trasimene lake, fell on its flank, and cut the whole force to pieces.

The way to Rome was open to him, but he was not prepared to sit down and besiege it. He wanted to induce the allies to revolt and join his standard; therefore he marched eastward and descended into Apulia, proclaiming himself the liberator of the Italians. The Italians did not answer the appeal. He expected to effect their conversion by forcing another great engagement and winning another great victory. The Dictator, Quintus Fabius Maximus, declined to be drawn, and all but trapped Hannibal himself. But Fabius was succeeded by consuls of less experience, whom in 215 Hannibal maneuvered with their mighty army into a trap at Cannæ, where the great force was annihilated. One of the consuls, Varro, who was mainly responsible for the disaster, escaped with his life to Venusia and by degrees gathered together some of the scattered remnants. From fifty to eighty thousand Roman troops had perished in the carnage.

Again the road lay open to Rome. But the stubborn fortitude of the leaders allayed the panic behind her walls. The imperturbable Fabius was appointed Dictator, and there was no thought of surrender. A little later, when Varro himself returned to Rome, instead of being condemned as the cause of the disaster he was received with a solemn vote of thanks, "because, in spite of it, he had not despaired of the Republic." Because Rome was mistress of herself, she became the mistress of the world.

But Hannibal did not march upon Rome. He had no materials for siege operations, whereas now if ever was his opportunity for effecting a general Italian revolt. Capua, the second city of Italy, opened its gates to him. Southwards, Lucanians and Samnites declared for him. Then from the east, Philip V. of Macedon offered alliance—for which in due time he was to pay the penalty. Syracuse, where Hiero was no longer reigning, turned against Rome, and the Greek cities of Sicily rose against their new mistress. But the Latin allies, and the Latin colonies, and the bulk of the Italians stood firm. Even Cannæ had failed to achieve Hannibal's object, and the Roman fleets controlling the Adriatic prevented Philip from sending a soldier to join the armies of the enemy of Rome. Five years after Cannæ the Romans had recovered Capua, captured Syracuse, and crushed the Sicilian revolt; while Hannibal was struggling to complete the reduction of Southern Italy. But no help came to him from Carthage.

In Spain the army of the Scipios had established itself from the outset between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, where the tribes were friendly to Rome—thus cutting the communications and preventing Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, from sending him reinforcements. In 212 Hasdrubal won a victory over the Scipio brothers, who were both killed; but a young Scipio, who had distinguished himself, was appointed to the command in succession to his father, though only four-and-twenty. The Roman arms continued to be successful in that country; but Scipio was thinking of conquering it, forgetful of the prime necessity of keeping Hasdrubal shut up in it. Hasdrubal found his opportunity to pass by the Romans and march for Gaul. In 207 he had crossed the Alps. The Roman general, Nero, who was engaged in keeping Hannibal in check in Apulia, left the bulk of his forces in the south, dashed north with a few picked troops to join the second army which had been sent to hold Hasdrubal back, and annihilated his force at the Metaurus.

With the fall of Hasdrubal disappeared the last prospect of aid for Hannibal in Italy. He was fighting with his back to the wall. Rome had the upper hand completely in Spain. Young Scipio, back from Spain, was made consul, though under age; and was sent to Sicily with leave to carry out his project of invading Africa. Thither he went in 204. The Carthaginian war party, though they had failed to give Hannibal the help that he needed in Italy, rejected Scipio's offers for peace, and recalled their great general, in the hope that he might save Carthage herself. The hope was vain. A decisive battle was fought at Zama (202), and the victory fell to Scipio.

The Carthaginians could only turn to Hannibal to obtain the best terms he could from the victor. The vanquished city was permitted to retain what was actually her own territory in Africa. Everything outside of Africa she surrendered. Her navy was restricted to ten triremes, and she was precluded from making any alliances on her own account. Her foreign policy was to be directed by Rome. And finally she had to pay a tremendous war indemnity in instalments spread over a term of fifty years. Hannibal himself remained, and for a time devoted his genius to a desperate effort at reforming the impracticable Carthaginian government; but six years later he was driven from Carthage, to find an asylum in the east with Antiochus of Syria. A further check on the possibility of a revival of Carthaginian power was provided by enlarging the dominions and increasing the strength of the Numidian prince, Masinissa, who had vigorously supported the Roman cause, and might be relied upon to miss no opportunity for harrassing his fallen neighbor.

The victory of Rome was due more to character than to intelligence. She did indeed produce in the course of the war generals of distinguished ability. Fabius Cunctator, the "delayer," thoroughly

understood the very important business of keeping even so brilliant a commander as Hannibal perpetually in play without allowing himself to be forced into an engagement. The Metaurus campaign of Nero was a brilliant performance, regarded either strategically or tactically. Scipio, who won the title of Africanus, was a great captain, though he was guilty of more than one serious blunder. But the Roman system prevented the persistent employment of the best captains; they only got their turn occasionally, and the Senate rarely showed any particular perspicacity in the distribution of its armies and the selection of the objectives imposed on its generals. If Rome had had a Hannibal of her own in supreme control of the war there would have been no Thrasimene and no Cannæ; and the Carthaginians would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers in a very short time. But Rome triumphed over the defects of her own system in virtue of her unshaken resolution, her indomitable refusal to yield to panic. Even the disaster of Cannæ only nerved her to a sterner resolution and a sterner self-control. Rome might, so to speak, lose her head in the hour of victory, but not in the hour of defeat, and therefore she could bear the most terrific defeats without collapsing.

Her great adversary, with all his brilliancy, was always the leader of a forlorn hope—an isolated force in an enemy's country, small enough to begin with, while it could obtain no reinforcements, and every engagement reduced the numbers, which could only be recruited locally with the utmost difficulty. That was the fundamental fact grasped by the intelligence of the Senate, of which the consciousness helped to avert panic. But it may be doubted whether, after Cannæ, panic would have been averted in any city in the world save Rome. And no little credit is due to the Italians, who never forgot that whether or not they loved the Roman supremacy, the alternative to it was not freedom but a Punic dominion.

But Rome paid the penalty for her terrific struggle. She advanced to empire, but she was never again so great as in the days, when she was fighting for life. It is hardly possible to question that her manhood was sapped by the frightful carnage of the Second Punic War. The best of her sons fell in the prime of life in the slaughter at Thrasimene and Cannæ, besides many thousands more, and the breed suffered the inevitable consequence.

V.—Expansion and Degeneration, 205–133

While the Romans were slowly wearing Hannibal down in the south of Italy during the last ten years of the Second Punic War, they were also engaged upon what is called the First Macedonian War. Philip of Macedon had, in effect, challenged them by his somewhat gratuitous alliance with Hannibal. In fact, however, Rome

for the time was only interested in preventing Philip from sending reinforcements to help the Carthaginian. Her squadrons held the Adriatic, while she procured the alliance of the Ætolian League as well as of Attalus of Pergamus. Philip found himself attacked on all sides, though in somewhat desultory fashion, while the Achæan League, in natural antagonism to the Ætolians, gave him its support. A war of this kind is apt to drag on to a quite indecisive conclusion, and a peace was made in 205.

Rome had secured her own object; she had prevented the active intervention of Philip in Italy, and she had attached to herself those numerous elements in Greece which were hostile to the Macedonian supremacy. Incidentally also Egypt had begun to seek her protection against the more than suspected designs of Antiochus and Philip, who were meditating the seizure and partition of the possession of the Ptolemies in the west of Syria and Asia Minor. The Second Punic War was hardly over when the government of Rome found in Philip's dangerous activities a sufficient excuse for attacking Macedon. Theoretically Rome was not setting out on a career of conquest; she was merely suppressing an aggressive neighbor, who would listen to no argument except force, and was endeavoring to thrust his own dominion upon reluctant Greeks. Popular assent was obtained by insistence on the certainty that Philip was preparing to invade Italy.

Nearly all Greece was either actively favorable to Rome or at least passively antagonistic to Philip. The Macedonian's one ally, Antiochus of Syria, was too much occupied in capturing Coele-Syria from Egypt to give any active help. In 198, the third year of the war, the Roman Flamininus overthrew Philip at the battle of Cynoscephalæ; elsewhere his arms met with further reserves. Peace was made in the next year. Philip was treated much as Carthage had been. He was deprived of all possessions outside of Macedon, and surrendered the conduct of his foreign policy to Rome, without whose leave he might make neither wars nor alliances. Rome did not take occasion to substitute her own dominion in Greece for that of Macedon; on the contrary, Flamininus proclaimed the liberation of Greece amid much enthusiasm at the Isthmian games, and the Roman troops which had occupied the three dominating positions at Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias, were withdrawn.

Nevertheless the specially active friends of Rome had their possessions increased at the expense of their neighbors, and their neighbors were annoyed; especially the Ætolians, at whose expense the Achæans had profited. Meanwhile Antiochus had judged the opportunity a good one for appropriating to himself what had originally been intended for partition with Philip. He overran Asia Minor, entered Thrace, and in 192 answered the call of the Ætolians and thrust his way into Greece itself. Rome came theoretically to the

support of her allies, the forces of Antiochus were routed in 191 at Thermopylæ, and his navy was defeated by the combined fleets of Pergamus, Rhodes, and Rome. In 190 the brother of the great Scipio landed in Asia Minor, and Antiochus was completely routed at the battle of Magnesia. He had to accept the Roman terms, which restricted him absolutely to the regions east of the river Halys and the Taurus range. All that was west of that line was "liberated"—that is to say, the states, like those of Greece, were technically recognized as independent, while the fact remained obvious that they were under a Roman protectorate.

The natural result followed. Every state had in it at least a party which objected to a Roman ascendancy as it would have objected to any external ascendancy. The states which Rome had favored thought themselves still inadequately recompensed; the states she had not favored considered that they had been tyrannously robbed. Perseus, the successor of Philip on the throne of Macedon, zealously fomented disaffection. In 171, eighteen years after Magnesia, Rome found it necessary to strike at Perseus. The appearance of Roman armies promptly silenced the advocates of liberty; Perseus procured practically no active support, and his forces were crushed at the battle of Pydna in 168. He was carried captive to Rome, and Macedonia was divided into four republics. Twenty years afterwards the republics were abolished, and Macedon was transformed into a Roman "province."

Though the Greek states had not helped Perseus, Rome naturally found cause to complain of an attitude of aggressive disloyalty. Some of them persisted in acting on the hypothesis that they were really free states, and resenting Roman dictation. The result was that in 146, the year in which Macedon was actually transformed into a province, the Achæan League broke into open defiance. As a matter of course it was crushed. Thebes, Corinth, and Chalcis were destroyed, and the Greek states, still nominally free, were converted into subject allies paying a tribute, and deprived of the right of mutual trade. As yet Greece was not made a province, but the governor of Macedonia was given a general supervision over the whole. On the other side of the Ægean, Rome was still content to keep the states anxious and harassed, while her interference in their affairs remained only intermittent. They were called independent, though some years before, in 168, Egypt had recognized the suzerainty of Rome.

Rome, in fact, was not eager for actual annexation in the East, where she had to deal with peoples whose civilization was older and more highly intellectualized than her own. In the West different considerations and different motives were at work. The Second Punic War made the annexation of all Sicily as well as of Sardinia

and Corsica almost a matter of course; and it was not surprising that the annexation should take a different form from the organization of the Roman dominion within Italy itself. The islands, as we have seen, were converted into provinces under a Roman governor, though it was not till the year 146 that the same method was fully applied to Macedon. Carthage for the time was crushed, and Rome was content to treat her as a subject ally. But the events of the third century had made it necessary to establish a Roman dominion in Spain and a Roman dominion in Italy between the Alps and the Apennines. The Gauls in the plains, and the Ligurian mountaineers, apt to prove troublesome from time immemorial, forced attention upon themselves as soon as the tremendous menace from Carthage had passed. Some twenty years were occupied in their subjugation; at the end of which the region was formed into the province of Cisalpine Gaul, where the Celts became to a great extent Latinized by the planting of Roman colonies.

The Spain in which Hamilcar had hoped to establish a Carthaginian Empire was formed into two provinces, though not without much hard fighting—Nearer Spain, the eastern part of the peninsula from the Pyrenees to new Carthage (Carthagera), and Further Spain or Southern Spain. The pacification was the work of Tiberius Gracchus, the father of the Tribunes, who were to become so famous in the next generation.

But though Carthage had been crushed, Rome could not feel her dominion in the West absolutely secure so long as the ancient rival survived. Hannibal had endeavored to reorganize the government, and the prospect of his success caused his expulsion from his native city. Nevertheless, the trade, and with it the wealth of Carthage, recovered ground steadily. The Roman Senate encouraged Masinissa of Numidia to raid and harass his neighbor, but Rome could find no decent occasion for carrying out the doctrine of the old school that "Carthage must be destroyed." At last, however, a less submissive democratic party got the upper hand in Carthage, bent on offering a determined resistance to Masinissa. They expelled the ruling oligarchical faction, who appealed to the old Numidian. They could not resist his invasion, and the oligarchs were restored. But Rome discovered that Carthage had made war without her leave. The government humbly undertook to comply with any demand that Rome might make. Rome, having first compelled them to surrender their arms, proceeded to order them to demolish the city of Carthage and remove themselves at least ten miles inland.

Then Carthage rose in despair. Utterly hopeless as her case was, the people of Carthage resolved to fight to the last gasp. So amazing was their energy that before the Roman forces were brought up from Utica they had placed their city in a state of defence which defied all

attack for three years. At last the city was stormed by Scipio Æmilianus, the son of Æmilius Paulus, the victor of Pydna, and the grandson by adoption of Scipio Africanus. Having been stormed, it was razed to the ground, and a solemn curse was laid on the site on which it had been built. The Carthaginian territory was formed into the Roman province of Africa.

Tiberius Gracchus had effected the pacification of Hither Spain by displaying a judicious regard for the sentiments of the sturdy natives of that region. He did not display an equal moderation when he was entrusted with the suppression of a prolonged revolt in Corsica and Sardinia—unless, indeed, it is to be accounted a sign of moderation that the Sardinians were not butchered but were carried off in crowds to the Roman slave market, so that, in the slang of the day, a “cheap Sardinian” became very much the equivalent of an “old song” in modern parlance. The settlement made in Spain was not altogether effective; it was one thing to lay down rules and another thing for governors to keep them. After some years the complaints of the provincials began to take a threatening form, culminating in revolts both in the west and in the north.

The revolt in the nearer province centered in Numantia, lying in the hill country between the Upper Douro and the Ebro. In the south-west the Lusitanians found a leader in Viriathus. Roman methods had already degenerated. The successful defiance of the Lusitanian guerilla chief was only terminated by his murder, incited by the Roman general. The Numantians compelled the Romans opposed to them to arrange a convention, the alternative to which would have been the annihilation of the Roman force, which was allowed to withdraw. The Senate repudiated the convention in spite of the indignant remonstrances of the younger Tiberius Gracchus, who had been mainly responsible for negotiating it. Rome was obliged to turn to the one man whose military abilities she had really trusted, Scipio, who had redeemed the discredit brought upon her armies by the prolonged resistance of Carthage, and who now vanquished Numantia by a corresponding restoration of the Roman discipline among the troops in Spain. Numantia fell, and for many years after its fall the two Spains remained at peace, perhaps because the greedier kind of official did not seek appointment in a region where there was comparatively little prospect of plunder.

From the chronicle of public events we turn to the changes in the Roman system and the Roman character involved by the struggle for life with Carthage and the subsequent expansion.

We have seen that in the system under which Rome grew up we had to deal primarily with a city-state in which the government was vested in a king, advised by a council of nobles or elders, and occasionally referring particular questions to the assembled freemen in arms

for their formal sanction. The king, ruling for life, exercising the supreme authority, had given way to the institution of the two joint consuls, ruling only for one year, but sharing the full kingly power during the term of office. In the early stages of society legislation is a function of government altogether secondary to administration. The popular assembly acquired slowly-increasing legislative powers, while the administrative functions remained with the magistrates, though at the same time the magistrates normally acted more and more as directed by the Senate instead of on their own initiative. The Senate, that is, became the real governing body instead of a merely consultative body.

The second great change had been the extension of the area of selection, the admission to office of a large number of new families which gradually created a governing class—a class having to itself the tradition of government and office, though without any theoretical exclusive right thereto, differing from what had originally been an actual exclusive caste of *noblesse*, to which there was no admission from outside. But while the circle of ennobled families increased with rapidity at first, it gradually became extremely difficult for new men to find admittance; and as it became the custom to fill all senatorial vacancies in the first place from the roll of ex-magistrates, that body became practically a collection of men all of whom had held official positions and might be regarded as experts in the business of government. The ordinary Roman citizen had got what he wanted when he knew the office was technically open to him, however small his chance might be of obtaining it; that he had a voice in the election of the magistrates; and that he also had a voice in the election of the tribunes, any of whom could intervene to prevent arbitrary action on the part of the administration. There was no thirst for law-making, and the Roman citizen was not troubled at the thought of losing his right to vote in exchange for the prospect of material prosperity in a Latin colony. Law-making down to the third century had been mainly concerned with two questions—the ambition of patrician privileges, and the provision of land for the proletariat. The land question ceased to be pressing when every decade was supplying openings for new colonies and adding to the public land for settlers; and the last vestige of patrician privileges disappeared with the Hortensian law. During the next century and a half there was hardly any domestic legislation.

Now the system which worked while the city was self-contained, while it was actually a city with a domestic area of adjoining territory, proved itself defective as soon as the dominion of the city expanded, but not at first conspicuously. The Latin and Italian allies had their grievances, but they were of a fixed and therefore of a tolerable kind. Through the great wars the Senate and the nobles

maintained their high character for public spirit in spite of many blunders. But the mere fact that war was being conducted on a large scale brought into prominence the impracticability of a system which annually changed its generals and disbanded its armies. Less obvious was the fact that the popular assemblies were degenerating. The best men in the poorer classes were being drawn off partly to fight in the ranks, partly to occupy new military colonies, so that the baser type became increasingly predominant in the city of Rome and its neighborhood. But there was no system of representation; the man who did not attend the assembly in person had no voice in its decisions; the assemblies had very little to do beyond registering decisions which already had been approved by the Senate, since the Senate could usually procure the veto of a tribune upon any proposal of which it disapproved. There was nothing to induce in citizens dwelling at a distance a habit of attending the assemblies and, in fact, they came to be attended by what was practically the Roman mob—a mob which soon had to be propitiated by the most contemptible forms of corruption.

This was an evil which at first was probably not realized as an evil, and for which no remedy was sought. For the other practical difficulty—the annual elections and annual disbandments—a remedy was found by continuing commanders in office for an extended period of time, with powers inferior or subordinate to those of the newly appointed consuls and prætors in theory, but practically independent of them. So the consul who had been sent to Sicily or Spain might remain in command in Sicily or Spain *pro consule* (in place of a consul), and exercising the powers of a consul, while his actual successor in the consulate had plenty to do elsewhere. Thus when Rome began to form provinces, each province required at the head of it some one having the *imperium* (the authority not to be questioned)—a consul or prætor, who was to stand to the province in what was theoretically the same relation as that of the actual consuls or prætors to Rome itself. But instead of electing consuls and prætors for the provinces, a consul or prætor at the end of his year had the period of his *imperium* extended, and exercised it as proconsul or proprætor of a province, where he had the additional advantage of not being hampered by a colleague, and where, if he behaved tyrannically, any appeal against him must be carried to Rome itself—a process to which it was extremely difficult for oppressed provincials to give effect. Naturally enough the tendency developed for men to seek high office in Rome chiefly with a view to the personal advantages they might expect to reap from a subsequent term of office as proprætor or proconsul.

The extension of the term of office was a thing desirable in itself for the sake of continuity, though it was liable to abuse. The ex-

tension of service with the army was similarly a military necessity for prolonged wars often in remote regions. But it tended to convert the citizen army into a force largely consisting of professional soldiers, who came to look upon themselves as the soldiers, not so much of the Republic as of any particular commander who had won their affections. And hence was presently to arise the danger, that any successful soldier might appeal to the legions under his command if he found himself in disagreement with the government at Rome. Moreover this development of professional soldiery was in some degree demoralizing to the whole population. The man whose trade was fighting lost the taste for the amenities of citizenship. The citizen who took for granted that he could buy somebody to do the necessary fighting instead of risking his own person lost the spirit which had made the old Romans ready to die for the Republic. The organized development, however, of the professional soldiery belongs rather to the next period. By the third quarter of the second century the professional soldier had come into being, but the army was not yet systematically constructed as a professional one.

The provincial system was the creation of this period—the system which was intended to secure the control of the enormously expanded territories of Rome. Theoretically Rome expanded by bringing new states into the circle of the “allies.” There were privileged cities with regard to which that title was not a misnomer; these had special treaties which placed them on the same sort of footing as the Latin and Italian allies. But outside of Italy these “federated” cities were very few. The general method of treatment followed a regular course. The cities or tribes in a given area, where resistance had been offered to Rome acting as paramount power, became first allies under compulsion, bound to reckon Rome’s friends or enemies as their own, having no military or naval force of their own, and paying a tribute to Rome. As between each other they had no rights of alliance, of intermarriage, or of commerce. Otherwise they were left to manage their local affairs in their own way, though with a tendency on the part of Rome to impose upon them a modified form of aristocratic government. The next step was the reduction of the whole area to the form of a province, the “command” of a Roman governor exercising the *imperium*. It was his business to preserve order and to collect the revenue for which his province was responsible. A constitution was laid down for the province, adapted to its special conditions, and the governor was supposed to act in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. But he was responsible to no one except the central authority at Rome; and it was by no means easy to bring him to book if he rode roughshod over the constitution.

At the point which we have now reached, the Italians south of the Rubicon and the Northern Apennines were all allies, while the

few "federated" cities outside enjoyed the same position. But Cisalpine Gaul was a province, Sicily was a province, the Spanish peninsula formed two provinces, Sardinia and Corsica formed a province, the territory of Carthage former the province of Africa, and the eastern peninsula of Europe was practically included in the province of Macedon, which at a later date was divided into Macedonia and Achaia. The Asiatic states were "allies." The first Roman province in Asia came into being on the death of Attalus of Pergamus in 133, since he left his dominions and his vast wealth to the people of Rome as his heirs. His kingdom became the Roman province of Asia.

Two other products of war and expansion have to be noted. One is the development of a powerful class of financial agents and contractors who amassed enormous wealth, partly by lending money and partly through the system of farming the taxes drawn from the provinces. While Italy became almost exempt from taxation, the provinces provided the revenue. The contractors collected the taxes, and were responsible for producing the sums at which their districts were assessed, which were very much short of the sums they were able to extort. These new financiers were about to become a dangerous power. In the same connection we observe the immense increase in the wealth which Roman officials were able to acquire in the provinces, and the corresponding development of a luxury, the introduction of which was generally attributed to the experiences of the army which overthrew Antiochus at Magnesia.

The second point is the enormous development of slavery. Every war, big or little, made its contribution to the slave market in thousands and tens of thousands, or even in hundreds of thousands. The wealth of the richer classes enabled them to accumulate vast estates, and the estates were run by slave labor. The multiplication of slaves in private establishments was demoralizing enough, though ordinarily such slaves were not ill-treated; but the great gangs of rural slaves were not only destroying the old rural conditions under which the free Italian population had been mainly agricultural, they were becoming an actual menace to the community; and even at the moment which we have now reached there was a great insurrection in Sicily of fully twenty thousand slaves, who seized Enna, Messana, Tauromenium, and other places, committed many atrocities, and were only suppressed after three campaigns.

CHAPTER X

A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 133-30 B. C.

I.—The Gracchi and Marius, 133-82

THE year 133 marks the beginning of that revolutionary era which was only brought to a close by the decisive establishment of Augustus as the supreme head of the Roman Empire. The expansion of Roman dominion necessitated the organization of a system of government to which it was not possible for the organization of the old city-state government to adapt itself. In the third century the oligarchy had risen to a crisis, and weathered the storm when the existence of Rome was at stake. The battle for life had brought out all its best qualities. But the character of the expansion which followed was calculated to give play to its worst qualities, to enhance every defect in the system, and to offer temptations individually and collectively to the ruling class, such as few of them were able to resist. The new nobility contained not a few men of high character, but they did not succeed in leavening the lump. Unless these senatorial families reformed themselves, and realized their responsibilities to the Empire as being of a vital importance infinitely greater than their own class interests, the senatorial system was doomed to destruction, and the question was what system should take its place.

But Rome was unconscious of the actual problem with which she was faced. The revolution was started by the attempt to deal with one of those secondary problems, itself of immense importance, brought into being by the wars and the expansion. Italian agriculture was being ruined; the yeoman was being driven off the land. Italy was indeed quite capable of producing its own food supplies, but the bulk of the land had gradually fallen into the possession of great landholders, and had ceased to give employment to an agricultural population, partly because the land holders found pasture more profitable than tillage, and partly because on the great estates slave labor had almost entirely ousted free labor. Moreover, the small occupier found himself in competition not only with corn produced by slave labor in Italy, but with cheap corn imported from abroad. In 133 an attempt to remedy this evil, to revive agriculture, was made by Tiberius Gracchus.

Gracchus came of a plebeian family, which had long been ennobled. His mother was the daughter of the patrician Scipio Africanus. His sister was the wife of the younger Scipio. His father had been a distinguished soldier and administrator. He himself had attracted attention by his services both in Africa and Spain. He was elected as one of the tribunes of the plebs, and he immediately came forward with proposals for the reallocation of the public lands, lands owned by the State, among the poorer citizens. In spite of the Licinian Rogations, the great agrarian law of the fourth century, nearly the whole of those lands had for a long time been in the occupation of the wealthier citizens, whose original illegal possessions had now received the sanction of long prescription. The resumption and distribution of the land was to be placed in the hands of a commission of three annually elected officers, whose business it would be to see that the new law did not become a dead letter.

The resistance of the Senate turned the movement into an attack upon the constitution. They procured a tribune to veto the proposal of Tiberius when he brought it before the Comitia of the Centuries. Tiberius brought forward the proposal a second time, and a second time it was vetoed. Then he took the unconstitutional step of calling upon the Comitia to depose the intervening tribune, which was done, and the law was passed. The Senate were justified in looking upon this tremendous innovation with extreme alarm. The life of Tiberius was in danger, and his one hope lay in his being re-elected to the tribunate, the person of a tribune being sacrosanct. He was at once denounced for attempting to seize despotic power; the Senate succeeded in preventing the new elections from being completed on the day when the tribune's term of office came to an end; there was a wild riot, in the course of which Tiberius was murdered by the aristocratic faction. But in effect Tiberius had inaugurated the revolution, which aimed at giving the Comitia Centuriata the supreme authority through the practical abolition of the senatorial veto, for there was no question at all that what was passed by the Centuries was law.

The law itself was duly put in force, but the commissioners set about resuming public land which had been legally assigned to Latin allies, as well as land which had been illegally occupied. The Latins appealed to Scipio, and Scipio procured the suspension of the activity of the commissioners. He had approved of the Sempronian Law (the law introduced by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus), though he had been utterly opposed to the methods which his brother-in-law had adopted. Immediately afterwards he died, and no one ever doubted that his death was a deliberate murder.

Gaius, the younger brother of Tiberius Gracchus, soon came to the front as a leader of the reforming party. But with him the

completion of his brother's agricultural reform was only a secondary object, though it occupied the front place in his program. His statesmanship grasped the vital fact that the time had come when not Rome but Italy should be the center of the Empire, when the Italians should be raised to the status of Roman citizens, and when effective sovereignty should no longer be vested in the oligarchy. To the motive of statesmanship was in him added the personal hatred of the Senatorial party who had murdered his brother.

In 123 Gaius became tribune. The campaign which he immediately opened against the Senate was directed partly to his true objects as a statesman, partly by the need of capturing the city populace, which was not itself keenly interested in any of his projects, partly by the necessity for gaining a much wider support than the city populace provided. He proposed the enfranchisement of the allies, so that they might participate in the benefits of the allotment schemes, whereby they were at once brought over to his side. He gained over the wealthy outsiders, who were now coming to be known as the Equestrian Order, by transferring to them from the Senate the jurisdiction over appeals from the provinces. He established new colonies, in which the Italians shared. He reorganized the provincial administration which had hitherto been directed by the Senate, and he attempted to secure his own position by legalizing re-election to the tribunate. And very unfortunately he sought to secure popular support by providing the city populace with corn at a very low fixed price at the expense of the revenue.

But the corn laws were counteracted by the resentment of the city populace at the proposal to admit the allies to what had hitherto been their own exclusive privileges. The Senatorial party put up a tribune of their own to outbid him in endeavors to obtain popular support by unworkable schemes which had an air of plausibility. Gaius failed to obtain the tribunate for the third year, and fell, like his brother, in a riot, slain at his own request by a faithful slave, who slew himself when the deed was done. The Gracchi had made it clear that he who was to effect the revolution must have a military force at his back.

The reaction had won for the time. In the next few years the Senate was able to carry laws which partly nullified some of those of Gracchus. But the brief struggle had been intensely demoralizing to both parties. The generous aims and the noble character of the Gracchi had not prevented them from lowering themselves to demagogic methods; the leaders of the reforming party after them were not statesmen but demagogues playing for their own hand. On the other side the victors had won by methods which were at once contemptible and brutal, while the party itself revelled blindly in their success. The administration went from bad to worse, and

even the arms of the Republic suffered ignominious disasters in a struggle with the Numidian king Jugurtha, who had won his throne by murder, obtained senatorial sanction by bribery, and finally defeated the Roman army when public disgust compelled the government to make war upon him. The *Populares*, the popular party, clamored against aristocratic mismanagement, and elected to the consulship a rough but extremely capable soldier, Gaius Marius, who came from what had once been the Volscian town of Arpinum. Marius superseded in Numidia the able but rigidly aristocratic Metellus, his predecessor, in spite of the extension of the latter's powers as a proconsul by the Senate. By his own military skill, materially assisted by the genius both for war and for diplomacy of his lieutenant, Sulla, Marius crushed Jugurtha, and brought him back to Rome in triumph, having in the meantime been re-elected to the consulate.

But there was more for the popular commander to do before the party leaders could make him the tool of their own political designs. While Numidian affairs were absorbing attention, a new horde of barbarians made its appearance in the north, the Cimbri and Teutones, the forerunners of the great German migration. During the last twenty years Rome had created the province of Gallia Narbonensis (Narbonne), on the lower Rhone, and along the French Mediterranean coast. This was the outcome of the strife between the Greek colonists of Massilia, a city which from time immemorial had been an ally of Rome, and the Gallic tribes. The assistance given by Rome to Massiliotes had involved the annexation of territory. Now the Germans, moving south and west from the heart of Europe beyond the Rhine and the Danube, and being apparently themselves associated with some Celtic clans, crossed the Rhine, and came into collision in the Rhone valley with Roman armies, which they routed. In 105 the migrating horde determined to invade Italy. They annihilated a Roman army on the banks of the Rhone, but again for a time their attention was diverted elsewhere. The defeated Roman captains had all been of the Senatorial group; the popular demand that Marius should be sent north to deal with this new danger was irresistible. Year after year he was elected to the consulship in his absence. The Cimbri had moved off to the west, and before they reappeared with the Teutones, he had reduced to submission the Gallic tribes which had revolted. The German host divided. One half of it was to strike down upon Italy through the eastern Alps, the other descended upon the Rhone valley. Marius destroyed the latter in the battle of Aquæ Sextiæ, twenty miles from Massilia, and then the former at Vercellæ, in the Raudine plain, some forty miles from the modern Milan. In these two engagements the barbarian forces were annihilated, and the German menace was postponed for a century.

Marius returned to Rome at the head of an army which he had entirely remodeled in his prolonged period of office, and which was devoted to its victorious chief. He himself was no politician, but it was easy enough for the politicians who had procured his repeated appointment to make him their figurehead and their tool. Yet they did not know how to make use of their chance. A Gracchus in the position of Marius would have taken the opportunity of reorganizing the whole system, having an army behind him to guarantee that there would be no subversion of his reforms. But Marius had no program of his own; he would not give whole-hearted support to the demagogues, who still tried to obtain their ends by violence; and finally he actually found himself supporting the Senate in crushing them.

Marius was not the man to save the State, but his reorganization of the army had made it into the instrument through which the salvation of the State would have to be accomplished. He had improved it as a fighting machine; and he opened its ranks to all classes by voluntary enlistment; he had abolished the old distinction of classes within the legion. And in so doing he had completed the work of making the legionary into a professional soldier who would follow a leader whom he trusted, even if the leader were technically a rebel.

Once more a civilian, Marcus Livius Drusus, attempted to take up the work of reform by constitutional methods. He was not demagogue enough for one party and was too much of a reformer for the other; also, he had taken up the frustrated plan of Gracchus for enfranchising the Italians, a measure quite distasteful to the Roman people of all classes. Drusus was murdered ten years after the overthrow of the Cimbri, and thirty years after the death of Gaius Gracchus.

The death of Drusus was the signal for the outbreak of a revolt which must have been in preparation for some time. The Italian allies doubtless thought that the last chance of obtaining political equality with the Roman citizens by constitutional agitation had vanished, and all the Sabellian tribes from the Sabines on the Tiber to the Lucanians in the far south rose in arms. In the worst days of the struggle with Carthage they had been stubbornly loyal, but their loyalty had never been rewarded. They felt themselves entitled to go on an equality with the citizens of Rome, and that equality had been obstinately refused. (The Social War (the war with the allies, *bellum sociale*) opened badly enough, though the Senate recovered something of its old vigor, and both Marius and Sulla took the field. Those two very able commanders did indeed deal serious blows to the allies; On the government awoke to the fact that the hostility of Italy could involve the destruction of the Roman power, however thoroughly in Italy might be defeated. They changed their policy, and

first passed the Julian Law bestowing the franchise upon all the allies who had not yet revolted, and then the Lex Plautia Papiria, giving the franchise to any citizen of an allied community who, being domiciled in Italy, should claim it within two months. A third law, the Calpurnian, allowed any Roman magistrate in the field in effect to confer the franchise at his discretion. These measures broke up the revolt. Nearly all the allies at once became Roman citizens; though for a time their political power was still seriously hampered both by the difficulty of attending the Comitia at Rome and by the fact that they were only enrolled in a restricted number of the tribes. Moreover, the whole mass of the Italians were outside the senatorial families, and there must still be enormous difficulties in the way of their entering the charmed administrative circle.

But if the Italians were more or less pacified, the Senatorial and the popular parties were on the point of flying at each other's throats. There was a new war on hand in the East, with Mithradates, the King of Pontus, to the explanation whereof we shall presently revert. Here it will suffice to say that the general on whom the command should be conferred would, if successful, inevitably be master of the situation on his return to Rome at the head of a victorious army. The Senate fixed upon the brilliant aristocrat, Lucius Cornelius Sulla; the popular party were determined that Marius should have the command. Sulla was in Campania with the troops, at whose head he had been conducting a brilliant campaign against the allies in the south, who were still in revolt. His election to the consulship demanded his presence in Rome. The tribune Sulpicius proposed that the command should be transferred to Marius, coupling with this proposal others distributing the new citizens through all the tribes and applying a purge to the Senate. Both sides appealed to force. The new consuls were driven out of the city, and the proposals of Sulpicius were carried; but Sulla hastened to his legions in the south, and marched back to Rome at their head. The tables were turned. Marius and Sulpicius fled. Sulla carried through the now obedient Comitia a law which forbade any legislation to be introduced except with the sanction of the Senate. Then he departed to take up the command in the East.

In his absence came civil war and chaos, fighting in the streets of Rome between the "Popular" consul Cinna and his senatorial colleague, Octavius. Marius, who had fled to Africa, came back to join Cinna; his old soldiers gathered to him. They marched upon Rome, entered it in triumph, indulged in a general massacre of their political opponents, and then Marius, having been elected consul for the seventh time, leaving Cinna master of the situation.

For three years Cinna ruled, nominating the consuls by his own authority. But he did not organize; and in the meanwhile Sulla, in

the East, was doing his own business in very thorough fashion quite regardless of the government at Rome. He had gone to the East at the beginning of the year 87; at the beginning of 83 he reappeared in Italy with a force of 40,000 veterans. Both his fighting and his diplomacy had been entirely successful, and he had concluded a peace with Mithradates. He found Cinna already dead, slain in a mutiny of his soldiers. The consuls marched against him; he routed the army of one, that of the other joined his own standard. The winter delayed operations; Sulla dominated the south, but the Samnites were fiercely hostile—the Italians had always found their political allies in the Democratic party.

In the spring one army of the Optimates—the name by which the Senatorial party is now known—marched into the north, another under Sulla marched upon Rome. The consular army, under the son of Marius, was routed and driven into the town of Præneste; Sulla entered Rome, and went on to crush the northern army. A great force of Samnites came up to relieve Præneste, which was blockaded by Sulla's lieutenant. The successes of the Sullans in the north dispersed the government's armies; the Samnites, expecting the whole force to converge upon them, flung themselves upon Rome, and were cut to pieces under its walls by Sulla. The battle of the Colline Gate was decisive, though sundry cities held out for some time longer.

II.—Sulla and Pompey, 82-49

The one perfectly obvious fact was the irresistible supremacy of the victorious general, and the one obvious necessity was a complete reorganization of the government. Sulla regularized his position by procuring from the Senate and the Comitia of the Centuries his own appointment as perpetual Dictator with absolutely unlimited power; thus giving new form to the practice which had been in abeyance for more than a century of appointing a Dictator with absolute powers for six months to deal with grave emergencies. He might have merely made himself a Tyrant and ruled as an autocrat; he chose instead to reconstruct an aristocratic system which placed the sovereignty in the hands of the Senate. His methods were absolutely cold-blooded. He does not appear to have been moved by any personal rancour, but the simplest and easiest way of annihilating all possible resistance was terrorism. He put to death some thousands of the popular party, accompanying the slaughter by confiscation of goods and lands. He made Samnium a desert; the cities which resisted him he gave over to massacre. The Marians had achieved their temporary power by a reign of terror initiated at least in hot blood, and excused, if it could be excused at all, as the outcome of an uncontrollable passion.

of revenge. There was no passion of revenge about Sulla; he killed simply because it was convenient to kill, relentlessly, remorselessly, and with entire detachment.

On the confiscated lands Sulla's veterans were established as garisons. The conditions of an irresistible government being thus secured, Sulla abolished the increased legislative power of the *Comitia* by restoring the sanction of the Senate as a necessary preliminary to legislation. The tribunate was made a bar to the magistracies, so that it ceased to be a stepping-stone for the ambitious. No magistrate could be re-elected to the same office for a second time till ten years had elapsed; no Marius should again be consul for six years in succession. The Equestrian Order was deprived of its judicial functions, which were restored to the Senate. The consuls and prætors were to hold office in Italy for a year without a military command; the next year they might hold commands abroad as proconsuls and proprætors. The Senate, depleted during the recent struggles, was filled up and its numbers were increased. There was a property qualification, but the hitherto subordinate office of *quæstor* now gave the holder a title to enter the Senate. As there were twenty *quæstors* annually elected by the Centuries, this gave the Senate a certain electoral character.

Having arranged his new constitution, Sulla startled the world by resigning his Dictatorship and retiring, to kill himself by extravagant debaucheries. The best things he had done were the reforms of criminal procedure and of the system of taxation in the province of Asia; the worst was the calculated atrocity of his proscriptions and massacres. The constitution he had built up was destined to certain collapse, because in the first place the Senate was incapable of discharging the responsibilities laid upon it, and in the second place the State was not protected against subversion by another general at the head of victorious legions. The root of the evil lay in the incapacity of the Senate; democracy was out of reach, and only in a monarchy could the Roman Empire find salvation.

Sulla died a year after his resignation of the Dictatorship in 79. He was hardly dead when the inefficiency of the system began to be manifested. Sulla had distinguished and brought into prominence a very young man, Gnaeus Pompeius, familiarly known to us as Pompey, who possessed great talents and many virtues, but was a quite curiously inefficient politician. Another still younger man, who was destined to eclipse and overthrow him, Gaius Julius Cæsar, was as yet only known as a clever and dissipated boy, a nephew of Marius, who had married his aunt; his youth, more than anything else, had saved him from the general destruction which fell upon the kin of Marius. Both Cæsar and Pompey were as yet too young to assume

the leading rôle, though that Pompey would soon do so was a foregone conclusion.

Sulla had triumphed completely in Italy, but in Spain the Marian Sertorius had acquired a great influence over the native tribes, and Spain was not unlikely to become a center of defiance to the Sullan government. One general after another on being dispatched to that country was worsted by Sertorius, who himself chose to act in the character of a Roman governor while he organized the Spaniards, shaped an army which was kept under strict discipline, and did his best by personal influence to Latinize the Spanish chiefs. In Rome a democrat of patrician family succeeded in obtaining the consulship and plotted the overthrow of the Sullan constitution, the revival of the corn doles which Sulla had abolished, and sundry other democratic measures. The result of his plots was an insurrection which was duly crushed, chiefly by Pompey, who then procured his own appointment to the command in Spain. Sertorius was finally overthrown by the dagger of an assassin, and with his death resistance ceased. Pompey returned to Rome in 71, with the credit of having brought Spain to subjection.

While Pompey was in Spain, a slave revolt, headed by an escaped Thracian gladiator named Spartacus, emphasized the danger to the State from the slave system. Spartacus, a born soldier, gathered to himself not only runaway slaves, but every kind of outlaw in the south of Italy. He occupied the Samnite country laid waste by Sulla, and three times routed the troops sent against him. He is said to have collected a force of 70,000 men. It required a force of 30,000 men, commanded by the prætor Crassus, to whom Sulla's victory at the Colline Gate had been largely due, to put an end to the insurrection. This was effected at the moment of Pompey's return from Spain. He was just in time to participate in the concluding operation, though not in the actual destruction of the force of Spartacus, and somewhat audaciously attempted to claim for himself the credit of the victory.

Now Crassus was already the richest man in Rome, an officer who had achieved some distinction, ambitious to exercise power, but without any political program. Pompey was a young man, also extremely anxious to possess power, but afflicted with a conscience which allowed him repeatedly to act in defiance of the constitution, but forbade him to overturn the constitution itself. He wanted to do great things in a lordly and magnanimous fashion.

He had achieved prominence as an Optimate, but his political ideas were extremely indefinite, and he now found that the Optimates were not at all inclined to help in his own further advancement. Cæsar, the nephew of Marius, who was naturally associated with the Democratic party, and was already acquiring considerable influence, saw his opportunity to make use of Pompey. So did Crassus. The

democrats came to terms with Pompey and Crassus, who were elected to the consulship, though Pompey could not legally stand, as he had never held the preliminary offices required by the law. Crassus and Pompey had their soldiers behind them, and the Senate could not venture to offer resistance. The immediate result was that laws were passed restoring the old powers of the tribunate, reinstating the system of farming the taxes in Asia, whereby the Equestrian Order recovered a lost source of revenue, and to a large extent restoring the judicial authority of which the knights had been deprived. These things were the price paid for the democratic and equestrian alliance with the consuls. Practically all that Pompey had got was the permission to enjoy a triumph which flattered his vanity. At the end of his consulship Pompey retired.

During the next three years, however, the state of affairs in the Mediterranean and in the East provided Pompey with a fresh opportunity. While he was in Spain a new war had broken out with Mithradates of Pontus. The command had been given to a very able soldier, Lucullus, whose military fame was obscured to later generations by the unique reputation he acquired for luxurious living when he had come home, and was living as a private citizen. Lucullus was unpopular with the soldiers and with the financiers. When Pompey became consul, Lucullus had practically destroyed the power of Mithradates; and the Eastern command, for which Pompey had hankered, no longer seemed a prize for which it was worth while to press. But Lucullus now found himself impelled to attack Tigranes of Armenia, with whom the defeated Mithradates had found an asylum. Again Lucullus was successful in his own operations, but his troops were mutinous, he was very inadequately supported, and where he was not himself present other Roman officers were badly beaten. Besides the disasters in Asia, the credit of the Roman government had been almost destroyed by the immense development of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The seas swarmed with pirate fleets; the needed supplies of imported corn were almost cut off, commerce was at a standstill, and Rome made no effective attempt to suppress the corsairs.

In 67 Pompey came forward again to introduce new laws through the Assembly of Tribes. One of the new consuls to supersede Lucullus, and the Senate was to appoint from the *consulares*, those who had at one time or another been consuls, a general with practically unlimited powers, holding the command of the Mediterranean and of the coast for fifty miles inland, for three years. Obviously Pompey himself was to be the general. The democrats, who hated Lucullus, resolved to accept the risk of bestowing these vast powers upon Pompey. None of the tribunes except Tribellius, ventured to interpose a veto, and then Tribellius was frightened into withdraw-

ing. The bill was carried. Pompey was completely successful in his operations against the pirates; the consul Glabrio did nothing in Asia, and within twelve months a proposal was made that Pompey should supersede everybody else in the East. Pompey's powers were already so enormous that democrats and Optimates were both mainly anxious to secure his favor, and the proposal was carried.

Pompey did his work efficiently enough, but he did not return to Rome until the year 62. Crassus and Cæsar had gauged their man, and knew that he would not play the part of Sulla. In the party of the Optimates there had arisen a new man, a brilliant orator, Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero was amiable, eloquent, broadminded, sincere, but rather shallow, rather irresolute, and more than a little vain. He was pre-eminently a conservative with a strong tincture of cultured liberalism and an intense dislike to anything in the shape of democracy. He looked to the middle-class Italians, from whom he himself sprang, as the real backbone of the State. He wanted at least to believe that he could guide Pompey into the right way and make him the saviour of society, but he was not of the stuff to attempt taking supreme control himself. Cicero, in fact, represented the best aspirations of the best of the Optimates, without having any real grasp of the political situation, any suspicion that his ideals were impossible of realization; that there was no more "sweetness and light" in his own party than among the demagogues.

Cæsar was thirty, perhaps thirty-two, in the year of Pompey's consulship. It is tolerably certain that the democratic party by this time recognized him as its most effective member. Whatever motives we may attribute to him—whether we suppose that he deliberately took upon himself the mission of setting the crooked world straight, moved by an august altruism, or regard him merely as a self-seeking politician who, when he posed as a reformer, did so only to serve his private ends, or take a third view distinct from either of these—the one fact must be recognized that he was a democrat because it was only through the democratic party that he could rise to that supremacy in the state which he was bent upon attaining. That there was much in the democratic program which his intelligence approved, and a good deal which he only accepted because party exigencies made it expedient to do so, is equally certain. Most certain of all is that he would not allow any commonplace scruple to prevent him from achieving his primary object.

If Cæsar rejected any ally or any tool, it was only because he was shrewd enough to perceive that the ally would discredit him and the tool would probably pierce his own hand. He allied himself with Crassus because from Crassus he could get the money he needed. He allied himself with Pompey because he did not want Pompey's soldiers

turned against him. He posed as an advanced democrat, but he successfully avoided identifying himself with the most extreme members of the party. But what he definitely wanted was to get for himself precisely such a supremacy as lay within Pompey's grasp had he known how to make use of it. He wanted to achieve that supremacy, to acquire that power, while Pompey was still abroad; but his plans were spoilt by the action of the democratic extremists headed by Catiline, who designed a revolutionary conspiracy. Probably both Cæsar and Crassus played with that conspiracy, expecting to be able to control it to their own ends though they were able publicly to repudiate any connection with it. Catiline's plot came to a head when Cicero had been elected to the consulship; Cicero deserves the credit for detecting and crushing it. But the whole business was indubitably damaging to Cæsar.

Catiline's conspiracy had hardly been crushed with much self-gratulation on Cicero's part when Pompey reappeared on the scene. Cæsar went to Spain as *proprætor*, while Pompey disbanded his own army and at the same time failed to attach to himself any party in the state; and Cæsar on his return, instead of taking the line of antagonism, again allied himself with the famous soldier and with Crassus, forming a coalition which is known as the First Triumvirate. The alliance secured for Cæsar the consulship, to be followed by a prolonged proconsular military command. For Pompey it secured the ratification of his proceedings in Asia, which hitherto adverse influences had succeeded in preventing. For both it secured the money of Crassus. What exactly it secured for Crassus it is difficult to see, unless it was a freer hand and a stronger position in conducting his financial operations. For Cicero it involved a hasty retreat. The extreme democrats meant to have their revenge on the man who had crushed the Catilinarian conspiracy and had been chiefly responsible for the execution of its ringleaders without appeal to the *Comitia*.

There was a quarrel between the Knights—the Equestrian Order, which at this time included not only the financiers of Rome, but a number of middle-class Italians, from whom Cicero himself sprang—and the Senate; so that their temporary coalition, the pet plan of Cicero, was broken up. Cæsar captured the knights by giving them what they wanted, procured an agrarian law for the purchase by the state of lands for allotment since there had for a long time been no lands to resume, and obtained for himself the governorship as proconsul of both Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul for a period of five years. With a view to the proper understanding of later events, it must be borne in mind that the Italian peninsula was now in two divisions—Italy proper (the home country) and Cisalpine Gaul—separated from each other by the Northern Apennines and by the

river Rubicon just north of Ariminum. Cisalpine Gaul was a province, and, like all the provinces, was under the military command of the proconsul. The home country (Italy proper) was under no military commander, but was directly controlled by the Roman government. No provincial governor could enter Italy at the head of his troops unauthorized without being technically at war with the Republic.

In 59 Cæsar departed for Gaul, and Pompey and Crassus sat still, while the demagogue Clodius virtually dominated Rome, and Cicero was pronounced an outlaw. The violence of Clodius produced a reaction especially among the Italians, who were always favorable to Cicero personally. In 57 the orator's outlawry was revoked. He returned and tried in vain to attain his favorite object—the coalition of the Senate, the knights, and Pompey. Cæsar on the other hand succeeded in binding Pompey and Crassus to himself in a fresh agreement, whereby the two latter procured the consulship themselves in 55, and the provinces were virtually to be divided between the three as proconsuls for the five years following: Cæsar retaining the Gauls, while Syria was given to Crassus, Spain and Africa to Pompey.

Cæsar was engaged in Transalpine Gaul. Crassus went off to Syria, engaged in a war with the encroaching Parthian power beyond the Euphrates, and was killed at Carrhæ. Pompey remained in Rome, but could not keep the demagogues in order. At last he came to terms with the Senate, and was nominated sole consul. The Senate had learnt not to be afraid of Pompey, but they were very much afraid of Cæsar, who had now achieved a very high military reputation and was at the head of an extremely powerful army in Gaul. Cæsar's command would expire in March of the year 49, but he would naturally retain it until the appointment of his successor at the beginning of the following year. He could only retain it if he remained in Gaul; but technically he could not stand for election as consul unless he were present at Rome in the autumn of 49. His election as consul was necessary if he was to remain in power; but if he resigned his command to go to Rome without an army behind him his political fate would be sealed. Therefore Cæsar demanded that he should be allowed to stand for the consulship in his own absence.

Pompey was now committed to the senatorial side, and Cæsar's demands were refused, while Pompey was authorized to take measures for the protection of the state. At the beginning of 49 Cæsar sent to the Senate what was virtually an ultimatum; it was rejected, and Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, passing out of his province into Italy at the head of his army. The die was cast.

III.—Outside Italy, 133-49

Since the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus, a period covering a little over three-quarters of a century, we have confined our attention to events in Italy, with only such references to the outside world as have been necessary to make the story intelligible. We must now review the events which had been taking place elsewhere.

By the year 130 B.C. we saw a Roman province established for the first time in Asia, when the kingdom of Pergamus became the possession of Rome by the will of King Attalus. This "province of Asia" covered the greater part of Asia Minor on the west of the river Halys, with the exception of the states of Bithynia and Paphlagonia on the shore of the Propontis and the Euxine. East of the Halys were the considerable kingdoms of Pontus and Cappadocia, extending to the mountains of Armenia and the Taurus range. In Armenia was another kingdom. South of this was the Seleucid dominion of Syria and Mesopotamia. On the east lay the Parthian kingdom, for the Parthians had there ejected the Seleucidæ and were masters of the whole region beyond the Tigris.

The Syrian dominion was going rapidly to pieces, and Mesopotamia was very soon absorbed by the Parthians, whose westward expansion, however, did not pass the Euphrates or push into Armenia. We need not concern ourselves with the disintegration of Syria or with the dynastic disturbances of Egypt; both Syria and Egypt had, in fact, ceased to be Powers which needed to be reckoned with.

But in Asia Minor itself an ambitious prince was soon building up a Power which for a short time threatened to push Rome back into Europe. The kings of Pontus claimed that the blood of the Achæmenids, the great Persian dynasty, ran in their veins. In 114 Mithradates the Great came to the throne. He was able, ambitious, and extraordinarily vigorous both of mind and body. His Persian descent and his Greek education enabled him to pose as the successor both of Cyrus and of Alexander. While Rome was engaged in civil strife, the Numidian War, and the critical struggle with the Cimbri and Teutones, Mithradates was unostentatiously consolidating a power extending over Bithynia and Paphlagonia, and even across the Bosphorus along the Euxine shore up to the mouth of the Danube, having placed creatures of his own on the thrones of Bithynia and also of Cappadocia. When Rome protested and threatened he promptly reinstated the rightful kings of those two countries, but only because he was not yet ready to fight. But by the year 89 he had completed alliances with Tigranes of Armenia and the Parthians, was in treaty with Egypt and Syria, and had equipped a large and powerful army. The Roman governor in Asia incited the King of Bithynia to attack

Pontus, and in effect forced war upon the now by no means reluctant Mithradates. His arms were completely successful; the Greek cities of Asia rose against the Roman residents, and half the cities of Greece itself joined the alliance. It appeared as if Mithradates was going to snatch her whole Eastern dominion from Rome, and it was this alarming prospect which caused the appointment of Sulla to command the Eastern armies in the year 87.

With Sulla's appearance in Greece the situation changed. The Peloponnesians at once deserted Mithradates. Athens held out for a long time. Sulla, when he had reduced it, met the armies of Mithradates in Bœotia and routed them at Chæronea and Orchomenus. Then in Asia and the islands Galatians and Greeks rose against the King of Pontus, having realized that his tyranny was worse than that of Rome. In the meantime the Marians had made themselves masters of Rome and had outlawed Sulla, who was therefore willing enough to make peace with Mithradates on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. But the negotiations dragged on; Sulla's lieutenant, Fimbria, advanced into Asia, and Sulla himself had to hurry after him to prevent him from appropriating the credit of the peace which was now dictated to Mithradates. The King of Pontus retired into his own dominion, and the former kings were once more restored in Bithynia and Cappadocia.

Before returning to Rome, Sulla imposed an immensely increased burden of taxation upon Asia. He went back to Rome, but he had omitted to make any provision against a recurrence of the struggle.

Sulla was no sooner dead than Mithradates set to work again. He procured the alliance of his son-in-law Tigranes, King of Armenia, who had already made himself paramount over Syria. He made friends with the pirates whom Pompey was soon to destroy. Then the King of Bithynia died, and, after the example of Attalus, left his kingdom to Rome. Mithradates at once advanced upon Bithynia, and was besieging the city of Cyzicus, when Lucullus arrived to take the field against him. The new commander's generalship forced Mithradates to raise the siege without the fighting of a battle; the enemy's fleet was destroyed and Lucullus marched into Pontus. There, in 72, a panic among the troops of Mithradates enabled him to seize their camp along with much treasure. Mithradates had to take flight to Tigranes in Armenia.

Lucullus then spent some time in reorganizing the affairs of the province of Asia, much to the benefit of the provincials and to the extreme annoyance of the financial folk. Then, in spite of much discontent in the army, which disliked his rigid discipline, he marched into Armenia, having realized that Tigranes must be crushed. An overwhelming victory, almost bloodless for the Romans, but for the enemy a terrific slaughter, gave the Armenian capital Tigranocerta

into the hands of Lucullus. Another campaign laid Armenia practically prostrate, but the legions refused to move any more; and meanwhile Mithradates had effected a rising in the rear and defeated two Roman commanders. Lucullus had to fall back, kept inactive by his mutinous troops through 67. In 66 he was superseded by Pompey, crowned by the fresh laurels won by the suppression of the Cilician pirates.

Pompey had his fresh legions with him, and the demand of the legions of Lucullus to be allowed to go home was granted. Mithradates was driven out of Pontus and Tigranes submitted. The north was crushed, and Pompey, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers granted him, turned upon the enfeebled Syria and annexed it. The practical outcome of Pompey's campaign was to bring under the Roman dominion all Syria and Asia Minor, with the exception of Cappadocia and Galatia, which were left as buffers between Rome and the Eastern Power of Parthia. Pompey in effect defined the permanent boundaries of the Roman Empire in the East. Only Parthia was left to challenge the Roman supremacy. A few years later, Crassus, having acquired the province of Syria, made an attack upon the Parthians with disastrous results. Crassus was killed and his forces were cut to pieces or made prisoners in the catastrophe of Carrhæ. But the Parthians did not invade Roman territory, and no attempt was made by Rome to avenge the overthrow of Crassus.

In the West we saw that a Roman province was established before the end of the second century along the Gallic coast of the Mediterranean and up the valley of the Rhone. We have seen also how this province and the Gallic province in North Italy itself were threatened by the hordes of the Cimbri and Teutones, and how those hordes were thoroughly shattered by Marius at the battles of Aquæ Sextiæ and of the Raudian Plain. During the next few years these two provinces became rapidly Latinized, especially Cisalpine Gaul. To the command in them bestowed upon Cæsar in 59 was added that of Illyricum, commanding the northeastern entry into Italy where the peninsula was still open to attack from the regions of the Upper Danube, in which there were already signs of that migratory movement which was disturbing all Central Europe and urging the German tribes westward. The migratory impulse was affecting not only the Germans but the Celtic tribes of the Helvetii occupying the modern Switzerland. Helvetians and Germans began to descend upon the Gallic tribes who were falling under the Roman influence. Cæsar on arriving in his province found himself facing the tremendous menace of the Germanic pressure upon Gaul.

Now, if we are to understand the operations of Cæsar in Gaul, to say nothing of much which will demand our attention in later chapters of this volume, we must take close heed of our geography. If we

examine our maps we shall see that there are two rivers whose upper waters come almost into touch with each other about half-way up the eastern side of France. One is the Saône, which flows approximately due south till it reaches Marseilles, having been joined by the Rhone, flowing westward from the Swiss Alps, about half-way down at Lyons. From that point the river continues to be known, not as the Saône, but as the Rhone. The Saône takes its rise in the west of the southern spur of the Vosges mountains. The second river is the Rhine, which comes westward from the Swiss mountains and turns northward to flow ultimately into the North Sea, passing up to the east of the Vosges mountains. The valley of the Saône and Rhone lies between the Swiss and Italian Alps on the east and the Cevennes on the west. The first part of the Rhine's northward journey lies between the Vosges mountains on the west and the Black Forest on the east, the regions generally known as Alsace. Any one invading France from the east is practically compelled to make entry by the path between the Vosges and the Swiss mountains (Jura), or farther to the north beyond the Vosges as in 1914; except, of course in the case of peoples inhabiting the Alpine regions. The invader must cross the Rhine; if he enters by the natural gate he descends upon the Upper Saône; and then if he is merely in search for new territory, he will naturally push down the Rhone valley.

Now at the time of which we are speaking the Roman province extended up the Rhone valley nearly to Lyons. Beyond that point the country was held by the Gallic tribes of the *Ædui* on the west of the Saône, and the *Sequani* on the east, stretching up to the Rhine. On the Rhine and beyond it were the German tribes. North of the *Sequani* and up to the coast were the Gallic tribes of the *Belgæ*. South of the Rhine and east of the *Sequani* were the Celtic *Helvetii*, the Celtic belt extending on this side up to the Danube, which starts on its eastward journey from its sources in the Black Forest.

Cæsar, then, was no sooner in Gaul than he found imminent a westward movement of the mountain Celts headed by the *Helvetii*. Their intention was to cross the Upper Rhone and to descend upon the Roman province. Cæsar promptly destroyed the bridges near Geneva and blocked the passage. This diverted that movement through difficult passes into the valley of the Saône, giving Cæsar time to bring up fresh troops and shatter the invading force. The survivors were allowed to go back to their own country.

But now the more northern Gauls, the *Ædui*, were being attacked by the allied forces of the *Sequani* and a horde of German *Suevi* (*Swabians*) led by *Ariovistus*. The *Ædui* appealed to Cæsar; for *Ariovistus* was practically taking possession of the country of the *Sequani*, and fresh hordes of *Suevi* were flocking to join him. The protests of Cæsar's envoys were met with defiance. Cæsar marched

against Ariovistus, succeeded in forcing an engagement, and scattered the Suevi, who retired behind the Rhine.

The advance of the Roman legions alarmed the Belgæ, who gathered a vast host. But when Cæsar pushed north, the Southern Belgæ joined him. In a very short time one tribe after another had come in, and practically all the east of Gaul had acknowledged the Roman suzerainty, for the Belgic tribes occupied virtually the whole of the country between the Rhine, the Seine, and the sea.

There can be no doubt that Cæsar intended a Roman supremacy to be recognized over the west of Gaul also, and the Western Gauls woke up to the fact. In the winter of 57-56 the western tribes were rising in arms; and the Veneti, clans dwelling about the mouth of the Loire, seized and imprisoned a Roman envoy. Cæsar, on his return from a visit to Cisalpine Gaul, detached Labienus to keep order among the Belgæ, Publius Crassus to keep the southwest in check, a third force to contain the northwestern tribes, and himself fell upon the Veneti. The northwestern tribes submitted, and Crassus subdued practically all the southwest. In a little over three years the whole of Gaul from the Rhine to the Pyrenees had been brought under the Roman suzerainty. At the beginning of the next year the Eastern Gauls were again negotiating with the Germans beyond the Rhine, who were crossing into what Cæsar now claimed as Roman territory. Cæsar attacked the invaders, cut them to pieces, and made a military demonstration for the first time on the east of the Rhine, which from this time was virtually the boundary of the Roman Empire.

Then he turned his attention to the Celtic peoples across the Channel who had been giving some help to their kinsfolk. He crossed from Boulogne with a couple of legions to see how the land lay, returned to Gaul for the winter, and in the spring of the next year, 54, conducted a larger expedition, when he more or less subjugated the southeastern corner of the island. But the conquest of Britain was not an undertaking to which the eminently practical Roman was prepared to commit himself until the control of Gaul was much more thoroughly organized than was yet the case. The tribes were restive, insurrections were breaking out among the Eastern and Northern Belgæ, and in the summer Cæsar withdrew his legions from Britain in order to suppress them. The insurgents were duly suppressed, but the unrest was extending westward, and the business of pacification occupied Cæsar through the greater part of the next year, at the end of which he returned to Cisalpine Gaul.

His departure was followed by a much more formidable insurrection of the whole of the tribes in Central Gaul west of the Cevennes, between the Seine on the north and the Garonne on the south, headed by the extremely able chief whom the Romans called Vercingetorix. A tremendous battle was fought, in which the Gauls made repeated

desperate attacks upon the Roman entrenchments, but after a fierce struggle were finally beaten off by the legions. Vercingetorix saw that the contest was hopeless; the Gauls had put forth all the strength of which they were capable. He advised submission, and his advice was adopted. He himself voluntarily surrendered, and was one of the very few opponents of Cæsar who suffered ungenerous treatment at his hands; for he was ultimately taken to Rome, carried through the streets in Cæsar's triumph, and was then put to death. The overthrow of Vercingetorix completed the conquest of Gaul. But its organization as a province was deferred by the approach of the great crisis which drew Cæsar across the Rubicon.

IV.—Julius Cæsar, 49-44

When Cæsar startled the world by leading his legions into Italy and in effect declaring war upon the Roman government, Pompey realized that, as the protector of the State, he had to deal not with an insurrection, but with a foe against whom the whole Empire must put forth its strength. Ten years earlier, Cæsar's military genius had not been revealed; but in the long campaigns in Gaul his immense powers had been developed and demonstrated. And he had at his back a veteran army ready to follow its chief whithersoever he might lead it, even against the man hitherto reputed to be the greatest soldier of the age. Pompey could not make Italy the battle-ground, for he had on the spot no legions to match against Cæsar's veterans. His lieutenants held Spain and Africa; but it was in the East that his reputation was overwhelmingly predominant; in the East the armies were to be raised which should crush the rebel preconsul. He had, too, a complete command of the sea; Cæsar was without a fleet. Pompey withdrew from Italy to organize his forces, without, however, taking the precaution of securing the treasury, of which Cæsar possessed himself upon entering the abandoned capital in March. In fact, practically no resistance was offered, or only just enough to enable Cæsar to quiet the public alarm by his unfailing lenity. All Italy was quick to realize that here was no Sulla coming to smite and spare not.

As Alexander after the battle of Issus made no haste to pursue Darius, but deliberately subjugated the West and secured it before advancing into the East, so Cæsar abstained from pursuing Pompey until he could make Spain secure. Otherwise, while he was engaged in the endeavor to overthrow his rival in the East, the Pompeians might easily make Spain their base for recovering possession of Italy, since they held the command of the sea. By midsummer he was in the northeastern corner of Spain with his legions from Gaul. Pompey's lieutenants barred the way to the Ebro; it will be remembered that the Spanish provinces had been assigned to Pompey, and

the legions in the peninsula were under the command of the officers who represented him. Cæsar, who could only draw his supplies from Gaul and was attacking an enemy who was already securely posted before his appearance, was in a critical situation. Nevertheless, by extremely skilful maneuvering, he succeeded in working the Pompeians into a position where their supplies were cut off and they could not hack their way out. They were obliged to surrender at discretion; Cæsar merely disbanded their troops, and the rest of Spain made prompt submission. Cæsar returned to Rome, where his temporary assumption of the Dictatorship enabled him to pose as acting within the lines of the Roman constitution, and prepared for the decisive struggle with his rival. The Dictatorship had been conferred on him in his absence at the instance of Lepidus, who had been left in charge of the affairs of Italy. Cæsar's stay in Rome was brief. He procured his own election as consul in preference to the Dictatorship, pacified popular sentiment by arranging a diminution of the burdens of debt, though without cancelling all debts as the demagogues had demanded, and then crossed over to Epirus with seven depleted legions, numbering not much more than twenty thousand men.

For some nine months past Pompey had been collecting his forces; he certainly cannot have expected that Cæsar would be able to settle affairs in Spain, return, and invade Epirus, in so short a time. It is difficult to understand why, with his complete command of the sea, he made no more effective attempt to prevent Cæsar's passage. His admiral, Bibulus, having let Cæsar through, was active in preventing the reinforcements under Marcus Antonius (Antony) from joining him. Though the important cities of Apollonia and Oricum on the coast admitted Cæsar, he was prevented from advancing on Dyrrhachium by the arrival of Pompey with his forces from Thessalonica, the modern Salonica. Pompey held the passage of the river Apsus, and was not to be tempted to fight, still less to take a vigorous offensive. At last Antony succeeded in crossing the Adriatic above Dyrrhachium. By skilful and rapid movements Cæsar evaded Pompey, joined his lieutenant, and severed Pompey himself from Dyrrhachium. Pompey was reckoning upon further reinforcements from the East and was satisfied by, as he thought, keeping Cæsar where he was, till he found that his adversary was drawing an enclosing line round him. Then he broke through, and in the process Cæsar barely escaped destruction.

Cæsar at once marched east, with the apparent intention of breaking up Pompey's reinforcements before a junction could be effected. His real object was to draw Pompey himself. Pompey followed, keeping himself between Cæsar and Macedonia, and occupied a strong position near Larissa, in the center of Thessaly, some miles north of Cæsar's position at Pharsalus. The impatience of the nobles who were with

Pompey drove him to move from an impregnable position to Cæsar's neighborhood, and at last Cæsar was able to force a decisive engagement. The success of his plan was due to the entirely deserved confidence which he placed in his favorite tenth legion, which was intrusted with the task of preventing his right wing from being out-flanked, and in the picked cavalry which supported it. The charge of the cavalry shattered the flanking movement. Pompey's left wing was broken; the rest of the line which had resisted the direct attack was rolled up and scattered in flight, and the battle of Pharsalus ended in the complete rout of the Pompeians. They had double the numbers of their daring opponent, but a large proportion of them were Eastern levies which once more showed themselves unable to stand against the Ægean, hoping to raise new forces. But the magic of his name in the East as an ever-victorious general was gone. There was no response to his call, and he hurried to Egypt, where he was assassinated in the act of landing.

Pompey was dead, but the resistance of the Pompeians was not yet over. Before Cæsar could return to the West he had to crush Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates, who had seized the opportunity to re-establish himself on the throne of Pontus. By the time that this was accomplished, the Pompeians had gathered in force in Africa, and the position in Spain had become extremely doubtful. The Pompeians in Africa were crushed by Cæsar at Thapsus in 46 B.C., nearly two years after Pharsalus. Only six months later he was called to Spain, where, in March 45 the last of the Pompeians were finally crushed at the battle of Munda. After that decisive victory he was at last able to return to Rome and set about the organization of the government, to which end he was appointed Dictator for a term of ten years. But only a few months were left him for the accomplishment of his task; almost exactly twelve months after Munda he was assassinated in the Senate House by a band of the Optimates who imagined that by murdering him they could restore the Senatorial Republic.

Five years and a few weeks only had passed since the day when Cæsar had to make his choice between his own political annihilation and civil war. During four years out of the five he had been engaged in perpetual campaigns, with very brief intervals, and no time was left to him to complete a reconstruction. That he failed was no fault of his—the thing could not be done in a year; but that he came so near to doing it in a year, and laid down for his adopted son the main lines on which it was to be done, is conclusive proof of his perhaps unparalleled genius. At what stage in his career his conception of the new monarchy took shape it is impossible to tell. That from the outset he was immensely ambitious and supremely self-confident is obvious. He meant to make himself the most important person in the State, and his personal connections pointed to his association with the

Democratic party as the way by which pre-eminence was to be attained. If he had died before Pompey's return from the East he would have been remembered merely as a very able popular leader who had just managed to escape positive implication in the great revolutionary conspiracy of Catiline.

But by that time at any rate he had grasped the fact that the existing constitution made no provision for preserving the influence of one man continuously; that if one man was to be in continuous authority he must be continuously the master of legions; and that until one man had such authority the interests of the Empire would be the shuttlecock of parties in Rome which were entirely devoid of Imperial conceptions. Cæsar, we may be tolerably sure, wanted the province of Gaul because he wanted to be the master of legions, to get for himself the power which was Pompey's had Pompey known how to use it. But we may also be sure that he had grasped the Imperial conception, and that he wanted power not only as a matter of personal gratification, but in order that he might use it for the building up of a genuine empire. Not because he was a sentimentalist, a patriot ready to sacrifice himself for his country, or a hero craving to right all wrongs, or, on the other hand, merely because he wanted to enjoy the exercise of power, did Cæsar wish to rule the Roman world, but because to his essentially and intensely practical spirit anarchy was offensive and permanent order was incompatible with the existing system. If he could have induced the Senate to place him in Pompey's position, he might have reorganized the government without an obvious revolution; but at the end of the year 50 a revolution was the only method open to him, and must necessarily involve the assumption of monarchy, even though it might continue advisable to keep up some pretense that it was not monarchy. In fact, he erred in not making enough of that pretense, in giving an opening to the enemy for, clamoring of kings and tyrants. By grasping that fact his adopted son, though endowed with far less genius, was able to succeed where he had failed.

What was it, then, that Cæsar did actually accomplish? He had put beyond all possibility of serious question that if the Empire was not to fall to pieces it must be under the control of one constant and consistent will, not changing from year to year or fluctuating with the fluctuating ascendancy of this or that group of politicians, not liable to be overturned by a popular pro-consul at the head of victorious legions. Cicero's conception of a ruling Senate composed of high-minded and public-spirited men devoted to the interests of the State was impossible of realization. Still more impossible would have been a government based theoretically upon the will of the people, because the people neither had nor could have any possible means of expressing its will.

Cæsar had not only shown that the Empire could not be held together without a monarchy, but he had shown also that by means of monarchy it was feasible. He had made his supremacy an actual living reality, with just the one weak point in his own armor—that he omitted to secure it against the dagger of an assassin. With the whole authority concentrated in one individual, with all military commands in the hands of lieutenants responsible directly to him, vanished the independence of military governors and the perpetual menace of civil war. No lieutenant could treat Cæsar as Cæsar the proconsul had treated the Central Government under the Senate. Cæsar had given effect to the fundamental principle that the rulers of provinces and the masters of legions must have no independent authority, but must be directly as well as ultimately responsible to the *imperator*, the one person endowed with unqualified *imperium*.

We are tempted to credit Cæsar with another great move—the definite delimitation of the Roman Empire; but the temptation must be resisted. It is probable enough that the conception was his which fixed as the limits the Rhine, the Danube, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Euphrates. But it was Pompey who set the eastern boundary; and though Cæsar fixed the Rhine boundary, yet from the Swiss mountains to the Black Sea the marches of the Empire were undefined; there was no fixed barrier against the pressure of barbarian attack. It was to Tiberius, under the rule of Augustus, that Rome owed the establishment of what we may provisionally call the Danube frontier.

But while Cæsar inaugurated the monarchy he did so on his own responsibility, with no better constitutional pretext than was provided by the formal Dictatorship. To his practical mind the work of establishing order took precedence of the work of giving the government a constitutional shape. He had no time given to him for adapting his monarchy to republican formulas, or for securing its continuity beyond the life of one man—two conditions necessary to its permanence, which it afterwards became the business of Augustus to secure.

Cæsar had made manifest the fundamental principles on which the centralization of the government was to be carried out. The permanent central authority was to be the repository of the *imperium*. The same man must also be the supreme civil magistrate combining in his own person the powers of the various magistracies, while preserving concurrently the existence of those magistracies themselves. Virtually this concentration deprived the Senate of its theoretical position as the governing body of the Empire, and reduced it to its natural function, as the supreme Council of Italy in general and Rome in particular, just as the magistrates became in effect not imperial but local officials. The enfranchisement of the Italians after the Social War had broken down the barriers so long maintained between the people of Rome and

the people of Italy. Cæsar carried the principle farther, conferring the full Roman citizenship upon all the inhabitants of the Italian peninsula up to the Alps, and upon many provincials as well. The fundamental point of this citizenship was not the possession of a vote in the Comitia, which was a matter of no importance, but the possession of full rights of citizenship in every part of the Empire. Nowhere was the Roman citizen an alien, and wherever he went he could appeal from the local to the Roman government.

The Comitia represented no one but the city populace, as for practical purposes the magistrates stood for the city government; they had lost any working control over Imperial appointments and Imperial affairs. Cæsar's extension of the franchise was not a recognition of democracy, but it was a step towards the inclusion of the subjects and allies of Rome in the category of Romans.

V.—Antony and Octavius, 44-30

The murder of Cæsar opened a ghastly period of anarchy and civil war. Among the conspirators who had slain him were doubtless some who were inspired by a genuine though misguided zeal for something which they miscalled liberty. Cicero had had no hand in the plot, but he deluded himself with the belief that Cæsar's fall had made possible the restoration of a republican government of the old grand type. The materials for such a government did not exist. The first effect of the murder was to induce a complete paralysis; no man knew what was in store. The conspirators themselves had no definite program, and the consul Antony was not yet ready to attempt to snatch the power which had been torn from Cæsar. For the time there were formal reconciliations; but Antony soon found an ally in the young Gaius Octavius, a lad of eighteen, whom Cæsar by his will had adopted and named his heir. It would be vain in our brief space to attempt to follow the complications of the next eighteen months; but in the autumn of 43, the ablest of the conspirators, Decimus Brutus, was dead, the two most prominent leaders, Marcus Brutus and Cassius, were in the East, and Antony had formed a coalition with the young Octavius and Marcus Lepidus; and these three had procured their appointment at Rome as a commission (the Triumvirate) for the establishment of the Republic, with power for five years.

For the establishment of the Republic it appeared that the first measures necessary were wholesale proscriptions and confiscations. The Triumvirate surpassed Sulla himself in cold-blooded and vindictive slaughter. Agreement was arrived at between them, through each of them surrendering any of his own friends whom one of the others desired as a victim. Of these the most notable was Cicero, who had striven vainly after his own ideals and had denounced Antony

with a virulence which it would have taken a man of another temper than Antony's to forgive. Italy lay helpless at the mercy of the masters of the legions brought up from Spain and Gaul.

The immediate struggle was to be between the slayers of Cæsar and his avengers. Brutus and Cassius were masters of Syria, Macedonia, and Achaia. Sextus Pompeius, the son of Cæsar's old rival, had turned corsair and made himself master of the seas and also of Sicily. When the Triumvirs were tired of putting victims to death in cold blood, Antony and Octavius, in the autumn of 42, carried their troops over to Macedonia, and marched to do battle with Brutus and Cassius at Philippi. As at the battle of Pharsalus, the legions of the West were pitted against forces largely composed of Easterns. The first engagement was inconclusive, but Cassius was misled into believing that the day was lost, and killed himself. A second engagement was forced upon Brutus in which he was completely routed, and chose death at the hand of a friend rather than flight or captivity. An idealized Brutus has been presented to us by Plutarch and Shakespeare. He enjoyed the reputation as the last representative of the old Roman virtue, but he was quite unfitted for public life, and the very much abler Decimus Brutus had been the one man amongst the conspirators endowed with either statesmanship or generalship. The fleet of the defeated party joined Sextus Pompeius.

Octavius and Antony could afford to ignore the inefficient Lepidus. They divided the Empire between them for settlement, Antony undertaking the East, while Octavius took over the task of settling the West and dealing with Sextus Pompeius. Hitherto Octavius had been waiting upon Antony, to whom he had only set himself in opposition for the brief period during which he had been securing his own position by posing as the defender of the State. The separation now enabled him to take his own time. Antony probably underrated his extremely youthful rival, and took for granted that when the time came he would be able to brush him aside and grasp the sole dominion for himself. Antony paraded the East very much as if he were already the lord of the world, with no apparent consciousness of the political task to be performed. He met and fell desperately in love with the fascinating Queen of Egypt, Cleopatra, who still further beguiled him from paying any attention to his responsibilities.

Meanwhile Octavius in Italy was, at first, engaged in the business of rewarding the troops by allotments of land. The business was interrupted by Antony's brother Lucius, who endeavored to create a party of his own and to supersede the ascendancy of Octavius. At the beginning of the year 40 Lucius was forced to surrender at Perugia and Octavius made haste to secure his own predominance in Gaul before Antony should be moved to make the attack which his brother's defeat had rendered probable. The collision, however, was for the

time averted. Antony came to Italy, but neither he nor Octavius was, at this stage, eager to settle matters by the sword. They came to terms. Lepidus was mollified by receiving the province of Africa; while Italy and all the Western provinces were formally assigned to Octavius, and all the Eastern provinces to Antony. An agreement was also made with Sextus Pompeius which left him in control of the seas.

It was time for some one to take the East in hand, for at the court of the Parthian king Orodes was a Roman, Labienus, who had been sent by Brutus and Cassius to make alliance with him; and Labienus, bent on revenge after Philippi, incited the Parthian to make himself master of the Roman provinces in the East. At the time when Octavius, Antony, and Pompeius were making their agreement, Labienus and his Parthian allies were overrunning Syria and sweeping the Roman troops out of Asia Minor. The necessary work was now done, not by Antony, but by his lieutenant, Ventidius, in a series of campaigns during 39 and 38, whereby the invaders were again driven back with heavy slaughter beyond the Euphrates. Antony himself returned to his round of self-indulgence and pleasure.

Though a truce had been patched up with Sextus Pompeius, Octavius in the West did not intend to leave him for long master of Sicily and of the seas. A lieutenant of Sextus went over with his squadron to Octavius and gave Sardinia into his hands. Hostilities began at once; but Octavius was very soon taught that he could do nothing against his opponent's fleet. His own military abilities were of a very secondary order; but, from the outset, his most intimate personal counsellor and friend had been the very able and supremely loyal Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, to whom he had recently intrusted Gaul, and to whom he now resolved to intrust the task of dealing with Sextus. Agrippa's skill and energy created one fleet, while a second was placed in his hand by Antony in exchange for some Roman legions. Agrippa's operations were completely successful; in the autumn of 36 the fleets of Sextus were annihilated, and his forces in Sicily promptly surrendered. Next year the son of Pompey the Great was captured and put to death by Antony's officers.

There remained only one obstacle to the supremacy of Octavius in the West, for Antony was showing no disposition to interfere. Lepidus, with the province of Africa, was nominally the third of the Triumvirate who ruled the Empire between them. He had been too inert to be a serious menace, but he was now showing a disposition to assert himself. He had joined Octavius in the suppression of Pompeius, and arrived in Sicily with many legions. His adoption of an aggressive tone decided Octavius that he must be set aside once for all. He boldly appealed to the legions of Lepidus, who, without hesitation, transferred themselves to his standard. Lepidus could only

submit. He was deprived of his office as triumvir, and of the province of Africa, and was relegated to a dignified obscurity for the rest of his days.

Now, after the long turmoil, came four years of peace in the West. There was no possibility of disputing the mastery of Octavius—or Octavianus, as he should be called—on the assumption that his adoption by Julius Cæsar had been valid. Now, at six-and-twenty, he was called upon to show whether he possessed the qualities necessary for the man who should take up the task of Julius. In one respect he had the advantage of his mighty uncle. He had two servants of equal loyalty and ability in Agrippa and Mæcenas, and he could hardly have found two ministers more thoroughly suited to the conditions—Agrippa, the man of action, a great captain and a great administrator; Mæcenas, the man of letters, diplomatist and conciliator, the type of sympathetic intellectualism. In the early days of the Triumvirate Octavius had shown strength of will, an immense precocity and self-confidence, but little enough of the generosity, the absolute freedom from vindictiveness, which had been so marked and so valuable a quality in the Great Dictator. But now that Octavius was master, he set himself to the task of pacification upon the lines which Julius himself had followed. There were to be no more reigns of terror. A complete amnesty for the past was guaranteed by a public holocaust of all penal sentences; the brigands with whom Italy was infested as a natural consequence of the prolonged civil wars were sternly put down. The burden of taxation was diminished; debts to the treasury were canceled; public works for the public benefit were undertaken, under the able directorship of Agrippa. The West was rapidly settling down into a state of almost unprecedented confidence and peace when Antony threw down the challenge.

During these years Antony had been alternately occupied with futile campaigns in Asia and surrendering himself to the fascinations of Cleopatra. The witcheries of the Egyptian queen, the daughter of the Ptolemies, proved his ruin. He assigned a number of Roman provinces to her, and allowed it to become manifest that he had become her obedient slave, and that she herself was dreaming of queening it in Rome. Roman indignation rose to fever heat; in the year 32 the Senate pronounced his deposition from office, and war was declared against Cleopatra. In the next year the struggle was decided in the great sea-fight at Actium, where Agrippa ruined the fleet of Antony, partly owing to the desertion of Cleopatra's squadron, joined by Antony himself. The couple made their way back to Egypt.

Octavius at once turned, not to Egypt but to Greece and to Asia. Everywhere he followed the same policy of seeking not vengeance but reconciliation. The princes whom Antony had set up found that they were not to be penalized as his supporters, but confirmed in their

position on condition of their loyalty to Rome. Everywhere Octavius was welcomed as the champion of order and peace. Then he turned upon the Egyptian queen and Antony, for whom there could be no pardon. Antony's troops deserted him; he slew himself, and Cleopatra followed his example. Egypt was formally annexed to the Roman Empire; and now Octavius stood alone without a rival, the unquestioned head of the Roman world from the Euphrates to the Atlantic.

CHAPTER XI

THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 29 B.C.-A.D. 395

I.—The Principate.

IN January 29 B.C. Octavius returned in triumph from the East to Rome. For two years he conducted what was avowedly only a provisional government, through the exceptional powers bestowed upon him. In January 27 B.C. he announced the restoration of the Republic and laid down his powers—to receive them again in a modified form, and with them the title of Augustus, by which he is known as the first of the Roman emperors, the founder of the Principate. In the forty-first year of his Principate, A.D. 14, he died, having accomplished his great task of establishing the fabric of the Roman Empire. Throughout the forty years his supremacy was unchallenged; there were no more struggles between rival powers and rival individuals within the State. Our first concern is with the character of the monarchical system which he created.

In theory there was no revolution; the Republic was restored with all the old machinery of Senate and magistrates. In actual fact the operation of the old machinery hardly extended outside Rome, while the entire control was concentrated in the hands of Augustus—the *Princeps*, the “First Citizen” of the State; but everything was done through the preservation of republican forms. The consuls were elected with the imperium, the supreme power, primarily the absolute military authority within Italy as in the old days. But in the later days the imperium outside of Italy had been exercised by the proconsuls and proprætors, transferred to the provinces after their term of office in Rome, each within his own province. Now, the important military provinces were assigned to Augustus; he was proconsul of Syria and Egypt, of Gaul and of Hither Spain. But whereas under the old system the imperium of the consul in theory took precedence of the imperium of the proconsul even in the province, Augustus enjoyed the imperium in Rome as well as in the provinces; and his imperium everywhere took precedence of that of the consuls. His own provinces were administered by his lieutenants, *legati*—his own nominees who were directly responsible to him, not independent at all as the old proconsuls had been. Thus in effect

Augustus had the control of the whole military force of the State, since in the senatorial provinces, the provinces to which the Senate continued to appoint proconsuls and proprætors, provinces which were not exposed to external attack, there was need of only a very much smaller military force. Even in these provinces, as in Rome, the imperium of Augustus took precedence of the imperium of proconsul or proprætor. And with him alone rested the making of war and of peace. It is true that, technically, in Rome itself, his imperium was only equal to that of the consuls, though, like theirs, superior to that of the other magistrates; but it is sufficiently obvious that in effect their power must yield to his.

For the first four years Augustus continued to be elected to the consulship himself. His refusal to retain it after that time involved certain difficulties in constitutional procedure, which were evaded by the bestowal upon him of the *Tribunicia Potestas*—the authority of a tribune, practically conveying the right to summon the Assemblies and to introduce and to veto legislation. This power, coupled with the proconsular imperium, virtually made his authority absolute. Julius had made the name of Imperator, the holder of the imperium, prominent; Augustus avoided emphasizing the military foundation of his rule, while he sought to enhance its legitimate dignity. The courtesy title of Princeps carried with it no powers, but merely expressed the public recognition of the exceptional distinction of its bearer, like that of Augustus. Increasing spheres of departmental work were detached from the magistrates and appropriated to the Princeps, so that in fact he very soon had under his direct control all that did not fall specifically within the departments of the two consuls.

The power, then, of the Princeps was absolute; but there was a weak spot in the system, an inevitable consequence of the fiction that the government was a republic, not a monarchy. The power of the Princeps was in form conferred upon him by the Senate and people of Rome, it might be for a term of years, as was at first the case, or for life. But there could be no one with a legal title to succeed to the authority. When each successive Princeps died, there was an interregnum until the Principate should be conferred upon a successor. There was nothing in the form of the constitution which even required a successor to be appointed at all, and there was a permanent danger that at any time the election might be taken out of the hands of the Senate by the legions. It is difficult to guess what would have happened if Augustus, instead of living out a long life, had fallen like his uncle in middle age beneath the daggers of assassins. That risk Augustus accepted. He did not nominate a successor; but when he died, there was no real doubt as to the need of a successor, or as to the person who must succeed.

The Empire, then, consisted of Italy, with Rome as its central city,

and the Provinces. These at the beginning of the Principate of Augustus were not yet completely organized even within what was unquestionably Roman dominion. In the course of the rule of Augustus the original province of Gaul, Gallia Narbonensis, was transferred to the group of Senatorial provinces, having ceased to be in any sense a frontier district. This group included most of Asia Minor west of the Halys, Macedonia, Achaia which was now a separate province, Sicily, the province of Africa (the territory that once had been Carthaginian), Corsica and Sardinia, and Bætica, the southern province of Spain.

Gaul, outside the original province, was organized as three new provinces—Belgic Gaul, between the Rhine and the Seine; Aquitania, forming the south-west; and Gallia Lugdunensis, lying between them, with Lugdunum (Lyons) as its chief city. In Spain a third Spanish province was formed, corresponding very roughly to Portugal, called Lusitania. These three Gallic provinces, with Hither Spain and Lusitania, were provinces of the Princeps. So also were Numidia and the rest of Africa westward to the Atlantic, after their (later) formal annexation to the Empire; so were Egypt, Cilicia, and Syria—Syria marching with the Parthian Empire on the Euphrates. Between the Powers still outside the Roman Empire—Parthia and Armenia—and the senatorial provinces of Asia Minor were the, as yet, allied buffer states of Pontus and Cappadocia. Again, in the course of the reign of Augustus, all the regions south of the Danube were brought under the Roman dominion, and became the five provinces of Illyricum on the Adriatic coast, Rætia, Noricum, Pannonia, and Mœsia, all of which except the first were bordered by the Danube, and all of which were assigned to the Princeps. It may here be noted that Galatia and Pamphylia, buffer states when Augustus assumed the Principate, were annexed and added to the Imperial provinces during his reign.

The centralization of the control of the provinces was a matter of vital importance. Throughout the Imperial provinces, as opposed to the senatorial, the control was complete; the governors ruled, not as enjoying the imperium like the old proconsuls, but as the representatives and servants of the Princeps, by whose fiat they were appointed or recalled. The more important of them were entitled *legati*; those in charge of the less important were called *procuratores*, agents or stewards; in some cases, as in Egypt, the chief officer was a *præfect*. Where there was a legate, an officer entrusted with military command, there was usually a procurator as well in financial charge—not a subordinate of the legate, but an officer responsible to Cæsar himself for his special department. (Octavius had become a Cæsar by adoption; his successor was a Cæsar by adoption; and the title of Cæsar became permanently attached to the Principate.)

Although in the senatorial or public provinces the governors were not selected by Cæsar, but by the Senate from persons who had not less than five years before been consuls or prætors and although they held office for a year and were technically responsible to the Senate, the Princeps, in fact, was able to exercise over them a considerable control, though less directly than over his own lieutenants. The finances were partly in the hands of his procurators; the mere geographical position of these provinces excluded the governors from any military activities; and if the Princeps chose to issue instructions to them they would perhaps have been technically warranted in paying no attention, but such a course would have been manifestly dangerous. On the other hand, Augustus and other Cæsars after him were generally careful to avoid any exercise of authority which could be called in question as unconstitutional.

The reorganization of provincial government without an obvious overturning of the theory of the constitution was comparatively easy, because the Senate had never exercised effective control of the provinces. It could be carried through by conveying the proconsular authority in several provinces to one man, which had been done before, and by extending the period of his authority, which had also been done before. We may say that it was done by treating the whole of the frontier provinces as a single proconsular command. Cæsar sent his legates to take charge of the different parts of it, just as Pompey had done in Spain and Africa when Cæsar went to Gaul.

In Italy it was the aim of Augustus to reinstate the Senate in all its old dignity without giving it any opportunity of encroaching upon his own supreme control. Its prestige had of recent years been much injured by what may be called a swamping process; its numbers had been filled up and doubled or trebled by the introduction of new blood for party purposes. Augustus purged the Senate to begin with, and then established the practice by which its reduced numbers were to be maintained by adding to it only men who had been quæstors, in accordance with the old rule of Sulla; and at the same time restricting the quæstorship to the sons of senators and to nominees of his own. This group—senators and persons within the charmed circle of those who might become senators—formed a new nobility, hereditary within limits, but to which Cæsar could add at his pleasure. The Senate, with its increased dignity, was on the other hand reduced to what had always been its theoretical position, that of an advisory body. In theory, the magistrates had been the rulers who consulted the Senate when they thought fit to do so; in practice, they had learned always to consult it and to treat its advice as a positive injunction. Now, as of old, the regular magistrates sought its advice, but the regular magistrates were very little more than municipal

officials. They had nothing to do with the direction of policy; and in respect of policy which had passed into the hands of the Princesps, the Senate was consulted only as a matter of courtesy or convenience.

The consuls and other magistrates were formally elected as they had been in the past, by the Roman people to discharge their old civil functions; for their military functions had gone when Italy ceased to be an area of possible warfare. But even those functions were partly absorbed into the department of the Princesps, which was constantly expanding. Moreover, since there was nothing to prevent Cæsar from nominating and openly supporting candidates of his own, it was very soon obvious that no other candidates could enter the field against them, and the consuls became as much Cæsar's creatures as his provincial legates. The *comitia* which elected them were merely gatherings of the city populace, which neither knew nor cared anything about politics and accepted Cæsar's nominees as a matter of course. The things that principally mattered even to Rome itself—police, the corn supply, the water supply; the things that mattered to Italians outside Rome—the preservation of order, the maintenance of roads, the policing of the coasts—had all passed or were passing into the administrative department of the Princesps. The magistracies in Rome became little more than stepping-stones to appointments abroad, conferring a certain social distinction upon those who attained them.

But the vast range of the reorganization under Augustus did not end here. He took in hand the financial arrangements of the Empire, which had at no time been satisfactory. He set on foot a great survey—to which we may find some analogy in the Domesday Book of William the Conqueror—a survey which should provide a reasonable basis for the assessment of taxation. Working out the scheme primarily in his own provinces, he may be said to have put the finances of the Empire on a business footing, with something in the nature of an annual balance-sheet. The weight of taxation was concentrated in the two main taxes on land and on property. The barriers to internal trade between different parts of the Empire were to a great extent removed, and the expenditure upon public work increased productive capacity.

Julius had displayed a possibly premature disposition to place all the parts of the Empire on an equality by wide enfranchisements of the provincials. In this, as in other matters, Augustus was more conservative. His ideal was not a cosmopolitan Empire, but an Empire in which Roman citizenship was a mark of the Roman ascendancy. For him Rome meant Italy; there was more Italian than Roman blood in his veins, and all his sympathies were with the Italian view; but he had no inclination to place the provincial on an equality with the Italian. The provincials were to have the

benefit of law, justice, and protection, but at the price of a definite subordination. Roman citizenship and its privileges were to be the right of Italians; but for others a reward possible but not easy to earn, and therefore the more to be prized.

In a like spirit Augustus preserved and even intensified the distinction of classes among Roman citizens themselves. We have already observed how he remoulded the order of nobility by restricting it to senators, the sons of senators who had the opportunity of becoming senators themselves in due course, and besides these only to individuals whom Cæsar chose to favor. To these the highest offices of State were restricted, the Roman magistracies with the social distinction which they conferred, and the highest provincial commands. Under the Republic the Equestrian Order had formed a sort of upper middle class based simply upon wealth; this order again, under Augustus, became more definitely limited and enjoyed a more definite social status. Admission to the roll of membership was not a right, but a privilege conferred by the Princeps; a member of the order was a member of a military body, as had been the case in the old days, when all citizens were called upon to serve in the armies and the knights were those who served as cavalry. From the order were selected the præfects and procurators, the officers who stood only below the magistrates and provincial legates. There was no hereditary title to enrollment among the knights, no actual claim to admission of any sort; enrollment was, theoretically at least, a privilege to which any citizen might aspire.

Of supreme importance was the reorganization of the army. The citizen army of old Rome had long disappeared. Marius had reconstructed the legion, and the professional character of the soldiery had been developed by retaining them with the standards year after year on foreign service. But there had been no fixed term of service, no system of pensions for the discharged soldiery who had been long withdrawn from their civil occupations. Only, every successful general had endeavored, with varying success, to obtain from the Government allotments of land for his veterans when the war in which they had been engaged was over. For a long time the legions had been made up, mainly at least, by voluntary enlistment. When in 30 B.C. the long civil strife came to an end, there were fifty legions in being, considerably more than a quarter of a million of men. Of this number one half were disbanded and provided with allotments; twenty-five legions were retained and distributed among the provinces—not the public provinces, where no soldiery was required, but in those which were directly under the Princeps. They were the legions of Cæsar, and to Cæsar every recruit swore allegiance. Only Roman citizens might be enrolled in them; but there seems rarely to have been serious difficulty in maintaining the numbers by voluntary en-

listment. The term of service was sixteen years, followed by four years in the reserve; and at the end of the twenty years the soldier received a sum of money on his discharge. The extension of the franchise before the Principate began had expanded the recruiting area in other regions besides Italy—the legionary, though a Roman citizen, was not necessarily an Italian. Each legion consisted of 6,000 fully armed infantry, having attached to it a cohort of 600 cavalry and a supplementary corps of sappers and the like.

Here we must also call attention to that very important body, the Prætorian Guard. Long ago Scipio Africanus himself had instituted a bodyguard, and the practice had been continued by other generals. Augustus organized his bodyguard, his household troops, quite separately from the legions. They formed a corps of ten cohorts, 10,000 men in all, picked troops who received double pay and enjoyed other privileges, and were quartered at or near Rome under the command of a præfect appointed by Cæsar himself. As the one body of troops always in a position to overawe the capital, it is obvious that any one who controlled them could bring, if necessary, irresistible pressure to bear upon the Government. They were a permanent guarantee of the power of Cæsar, being under Cæsar's control; but it is equally obvious that when Cæsar died the prætorians, acting together, virtually had it in their power to control the election of Cæsar's successor.

The legions, however, did not make up the whole of the army. Additional regiments, cohorts of "allies" as the dependent peoples continued to be called, were raised in the provinces, officered mainly by Romans. Such troops were organized, not rigidly on the lines of a legion, but with due regard to their own traditional methods of fighting, and service in these "auxiliary" cohorts was ultimately rewarded by the Roman franchise. As the discharged soldiers' children were also Roman citizens, the legions themselves came in course of time to be largely recruited from them, so that at a later stage the bulk of the legionaries themselves were no longer drawn from the old Italian stock.

The conception of Augustus may be described as the unification of the Empire, not by the equalization of its parts but through the ascendancy of Rome and the supremacy of Cæsar. To the modern mind, the most curious device adopted for the attainment of this end, and developed by the later Cæsars, was the institution throughout the Roman world of the worship of Rome and of Cæsar as deities. It is not easy to imagine that any one really believed that the individual Cæsar was endowed with divine powers, or that there was a goddess of Rome who actually interfered in the affairs of men. Deification, however, was a familiar idea throughout the ancient world. The Egyptian pharaohs had claimed to be actual gods in the flesh; Alexan-

der the Great had claimed to be the son of a god. The world was not disturbed when the dead Julius was added to the Pantheon. Augustus did not proclaim himself a god, but in the provinces shrines and altars were set up to "Divus Augustus" and "Diva Roma;" and the actual cult was established which was in effect the expression of homage to the idea of the Empire, of the feeling that disloyalty to it was in the nature of sacrilege. Only to Jews, and presently to Christians with the Judiac conception of the God-head, did there appear to be any possible objection to the offering of sacrifices to the new deities.

II.—The Julian Emperors: Augustus to Nero, 29 B.C.-A.D. 68

In the course of the reign of Augustus, the tribunitian and proconsular powers were both bestowed upon him for life. As long as he lived the Principate was secure; the only reason for anticipating its continuation after his death was the consciousness of its necessity. Nor was there any reason to assume that, if it were continued, the next Princeps would be a member of Cæsar's family. For a good many years it must have been the general expectation that, if Augustus died before his great minister Agrippa, who was of precisely the same age, Agrippa would be the next Princeps. It was Agrippa who had conquered first Sextus Pompeius and then Anthony; for fifteen years after the assumption of the Principate, whenever there was work of special difficulty or responsibility to be done, it was intrusted to Agrippa; and he was actually associated with Augustus both in the prætorian and in the tribunitian power at the time of his death in 12 B.C. As long as he lived, the succession was hardly an open question; but with his death it became increasingly certain not only that there would be a successor, but that the successor would be of Cæsar's kin. Such, in fact, were all the immediate followers of Augustus; but the family connections were of so complicated a character that it will be well at the outset to endeavor to get them clearly arranged.

In 39 B.C. Octavius, who had no sons, had divorced his second wife, Scribonia, the mother of his infant daughter Julia, and married a third, Livia Drusilla, who was already the wife of a husband from whom she had to be divorced, Tiberius Claudius Nero. By this marriage she already had a son, a second Tiberius Claudius Nero. This stepson of Augustus, by whom he was afterwards adopted, succeeded him as Princeps, and is always known by his first name, Tiberius. Six months after the marriage of Octavius and Livia, she bore another son, who was named Nero Claudius Drusus. The death in 23 B.C. of Marcellus, the young nephew of Augustus by his sister

Octavia, thus left two stepsons and a daughter as the actual representatives of Cæsar in the next generation.

Then the daughter Julia, who had first been married to her cousin Marcellus, was bestowed upon Agrippa, who had by her several children. Drusus, on the other hand, had two sons, of whom the elder is always known as Germanicus, while the younger was the Claudius who was fourth in the line of Roman emperors. Germanicus married Agrippina, daughter of Agrippa and Julia; and they had a son Gaius, who is most familiarly known as the Emperor Caligula, the third in the line. Among their other children was a second Agrippina, whose son became the fifth Emperor, Nero. Thus Tiberius was the stepson and also the son by adoption of Augustus; Caligula was his great-grandson, Claudius his grandson, and Nero his great-great-grandson. With Nero the line of the Julian Cæsars came to an end in A.D. 68, when the institution of the Principate had been established for ninety-five years. With the ground thus cleared we may return to the story.

The long reign of Augustus was occupied with the organization of that Imperial system which established law and order and prosperity within the Empire on a permanent footing. This aspect of it we have already discussed. In its second aspect it was the period of Rome's greatest intellectual splendor, the Augustan age, in which men, looking back to the historical or legendary glories of days long gone by, were moved once more by splendid conceptions of Rome's great destiny as the law-giving and peace-giving mistress of the world; and of this we shall have something to say later. In the third view it was the period which decided that the Rhine and the Danube should be the boundaries of the Roman Empire in Europe.

At the beginning of the reign it was an open question whether the Rhine or the Elbe was to be the western barrier between the Empire and the Germans. It is probable that Julius Cæsar had designed carrying the supremacy of Rome up to the Elbe. The Rhine province of Belgic Gaul, and the Upper Danubian provinces, Rætia and Noricum, had all been organized twelve years after the institution of the Principate. Then began the definite effort to push the Germans back. First Drusus, holding the command in Belgic Gaul, in a couple of northern campaigns pushed up to the river Weser. In 29 B.C. he crossed the Weser, but was killed by a fall from his horse, and his work was carried on by his brother Tiberius, who had hitherto been engaged in Pannonia, the district on the east of Noricum. Tiberius achieved some further successes; and although he was withdrawn after a couple of years, having obtained a formal submission from the Northern German tribes as far as the Elbe, the work of organization was continued for some time under minor captains. In A.D. 4 Tiberius returned to North Germany, and an energetic

effort was made to give reality to the Roman dominion in the north. One expedition was carried by sea to the mouth of the Elbe, while Tiberius marched north-east by land until the two forces effected a junction, the Germans for the most part retiring before them. The management of the expeditions reflects very high credit upon the military abilities of Tiberius.

But again Tiberius was withdrawn to take the command on the Danube; his place was taken by Quintilius Varus. Among the Germans there had arisen a leader of exceptional ability, known to the Romans as Arminius. Arminius enticed Varus with three legions into the region known as the *Saltus Teutoburgensis*, and there the entire Roman force was cut to pieces. The disaster finally put an end to the Roman advance, and insured that the Rhine should be the permanent boundary, though there were later excursions into the German territory. Tiberius, it is true, was once more dispatched across the Rhine in the year following the disaster. The retreat of the Germans before the experienced general showed at least that aggression on their part was improbable, but it was realized that the attempt to hold Trans-Rhenish soil would be impracticable. Young Germanicus, the son of Drusus and nephew of Tiberius, husband also of Agrippina, the granddaughter of Augustus, was left in charge of the legions on the Rhenish frontier. Augustus had no craving for expansion, and never went beyond playing with the idea of following up Julius Cæsar's expedition to Britain.

Tiberius had done good work in North Germany, though it was destined to be without practical results for the Empire. Not so was it with his equally successful work on the Danube. After the organization of *Rætia* and *Noricum* he was largely occupied in *Pannonia* (roughly speaking, the district enclosed on the west by a line drawn from Vienna to the Northern Adriatic, on the north and east by the Danube, and on the south by the river *Sava*), which was not yet formally treated as a Roman province. He had had much to do with the subjugation of *Rætia* and *Noricum*, but *Pannonia* provided a yet harder task. There his work was repeatedly interrupted, chiefly by the calls made upon him by Germany, and he was unable to do more than to bring *Pannonia* itself into a definite state of subjection. He did, indeed, conduct a second admirably managed expedition across the Danube into the modern *Bohemia* some three years before the disaster of Varus; but it was not safe to withdraw troops from *Pannonia*, and a revolt on his rear compelled him to return to south of the Danube. *Pannonia* became definitely a province of the Empire in A.D. 10.

In the East the boundaries of the Empire were already fairly defined. On the Euphrates they marched with those of *Parthia*; northward the practically subject states of *Commagene*, *Cappadocia*, and

Pontus, and the almost independent Armenia, lay as buffers between the Roman and the Parthian Empires. No further change was made by Augustus. Only for the sake of redeeming Roman prestige, an expedition was dispatched into Parthia to demand from the King Phraates the restoration of the standards and the prisoners captured by the Parthians when they had destroyed the army of Crassus. Phraates was indisposed to challenge a war, and acceded to the demands. Rome felt that her honor was redeemed.

In A.D. 14 Augustus died, being then in his seventy-sixth year. There could be no doubt in men's minds of the necessity for a successor or of the person who should succeed. Tiberius was fifty years old. Throughout the reign of Augustus, Agrippa alone had shown military talents of so high an order as Cæsar's stepson, who had borne the burden, heavy and exhausting, of administration in the turbulent frontier provinces for many years with remarkable success. A naturally morose and somewhat cynical temper had been embittered by the treatment he had received. He was repeatedly employed to counteract the failures of others, to carry out tasks in remote regions, where there was little chance of winning glory in the eyes of the public and every chance of disgrace in case of failure. He had never failed, yet Augustus had never received him into conspicuous favor. Honors had been bestowed on him when they could not with decency be withheld; powers had been granted to him because he could be absolutely trusted and there was no one else in whom equal confidence could be reposed, and because his mother Livia was watchful of his interests. A year before the death of Augustus he had been finally associated with the Princeps in the possession of the tribunitian and proconsular powers. When, in virtue of the tribunitian power, he summoned the Senate on the old man's death, the Senate at once formally invested him virtually with all the powers which had been vested in Augustus.

The annals of the reign of Tiberius were recorded for posterity by a brilliant historian, Tacitus, who painted the Emperor in lurid colors. But Tacitus wrote from the point of view of an aristocrat of the republican school; and although he was honest enough, and even on occasion almost went out of his way to repudiate the most extravagant of popular scandals, he was quite overmastered by his prejudices. And in describing the career of an unpopular emperor he habitually dwelt upon the adverse view of everything that Tiberius did, while neglecting aspects of his reign which were of the first importance. The fact remains that under the auspices of Tiberius the provinces were well administered, the internal prosperity of the Empire advanced, the frontiers were securely held.

But in Tiberius there were none of the elements which make for popularity. He was unloved and unlovable. In private intercourse

he was reserved and wholly devoid of geniality or personal charm of any kind. He detested public display, which was the surest road to popularity with the Roman populace. He was surrounded by sycophants, and made no secret of his contempt for them. He lived in an atmosphere of distrust, and would never make any effort to conciliate either the aristocracy or the populace. For a long time his chief confidence was reposed in the equestrian Sejanus, whom he made præfect of the prætorians. His confidence was misplaced: he discovered that Sejanus was plotting his destruction and his own elevation to the Principate. The fall of the favorite was sudden and complete; the punishment which fell upon his hapless kinsfolk was brutally vindictive. Tiberius never recovered from the moral shock, and his last years were spent in a seclusion befouled, at least according to popular rumor, by the most disgusting debaucheries. He became a prey to the fear of conspiracies. Rome was filled with spies and informers, whose victims generally found a short enough shrift, so that no man of prominence or wealth could feel his own life secure; and when at last the old Emperor died—rumor as a matter of course declared that he had been murdered—Rome felt for a moment as if it had been relieved from a sickening nightmare, though no such feeling touched the world outside Rome.

The prestige of Rome was, on the other hand, increased during the first years of Tiberius by the exploits of his nephew Germanicus. The son of Drusus, left in command on the Rhine, conducted a series of campaigns into Germany, in the course of which severe repulses were inflicted upon the gallant Arminius, who had destroyed the legions of Varus, and the lost standards were recovered. His vigor was by no means to the liking of the Emperor, since no man knew better than he the unwisdom of attempting to establish the Roman dominion across the Rhine. Moreover, these achievements were winning for his nephew a popularity with the army and with the general public would have been dangerous enough had Germanicus proved disloyal. Germanicus was recalled from his command, to be dispatched upon a less dangerous progress through the East, where he completed the voluntary annexation of Cappadocia and Commagene. His death in the course of his travels was attributed by popular rumor to poison, administered at the instigation of Tiberius by Gnaeus Piso, a noble of ancient blood, who had been sent with him as a companion. Tiberius summoned Piso to Rome to answer a series of charges formulated against him, and Piso killed himself. Again popular rumor declared that he had been assassinated by order of Tiberius in order to prevent inconvenient disclosures. The popularity which Germanicus had enjoyed was transferred to his widow Agrippina and their young son Gaius, on whom the soldiers had bestowed the pet name of Caligula, from the *caligæ* (the military boots) which

his family to Rome, where he passed his last years in an honorable exile. The struggle was afterwards renewed. Boudicca (Boadicea) and her Icenii raised a tremendous revolt, and very nearly wiped out the Roman legions while Nero, the successor of Claudius, was Emperor. But that insurrection too was crushed. Practically the conquest of Britain and its annexation to the Roman Empire were the work of the government of Claudius, though the complete establishment of the Roman dominion up to the Tyne was effected under the Flavian emperors.

In 54 Claudius was poisoned by Agrippina, who was bent on securing the succession to her own son before other influences should rob her of her control over the Emperor. The boy, who was now sixteen, had been adopted by his stepfather, whereby he received the name of Nero—the name by which he is infamously known. Claudius already had a son of his own called Britannicus, but Agrippina had no difficulty in setting him aside and securing the succession to her own son. His education had been in the hands of the philosopher and poet Seneca, from whom he had at least imbibed that love of artistic culture which was the one redeeming feature in his character. But Agrippina had laid her plans carefully; she meant to rule herself, but she also meant to make sure that her son's position should be unchallenged, and she had made a shrewd choice of the Ministers who were to establish him in power. These were Seneca himself and Burrus, a soldier of high repute in his profession, who was also regarded as a living example of the old Roman virtues.

For five years all went well. Seneca and Burrus, who was præfect of the prætorians, dominated their pupil, angered Agrippina by keeping control in their own hands, and governed the Empire with credit. Publicly it seemed that Nero was an apt pupil; already he was at least an excellent actor. He coined or had coined for him graceful phrases and modest expressions which impressed the public favorably; and he left the business of the State to the men who understood it. The *Quinquennium Neronis*—(the "Five Years of Nero") became a proverbial expression for a season of just and temperate government. But he paid little enough heed to the wise saws and solemn lectures of his instructors; it could not be altogether concealed that he was privately following dangerous courses of dissipation.

Presently the young Britannicus died suddenly. Then it was the turn of the mother who had made him Emperor. She had struggled to retain her influence over him, then quarrelled with him fiercely, then tried again to win his affection. He repaid her by having her murdered. Seneca and Burrus had watched with alarm the young man's increasing ferocity and self-will. With criminal weakness they yielded to him instead of making a bold stand. Now they even went so far as to defend the matricide, declaring that Agrippina had

been plotting against her son's life. The Senate cringed, and congratulated him on his escape. Burrus died of poison. Seneca, though he went into retirement, could not be spared. A charge of treason was trumped up against him, and he was condemned after the fashion of the times to commit suicide.

Nero plunged into a frantic course of dissipation. He horrified Roman decorum by publicly taking part personally in the competitions of the circus, and insulted the dignity of the old families by forcing their prominent members to appear on the stage. A terrific fire broke out in Rome which consumed half the city. Men suspected Nero of having kindled the conflagration for his own amusement. He found an escape for himself by proclaiming that the thing had been done by the members of a vile sect concerning which men were beginning to gossip with superstitious alarm and contempt—the Christians—and gratified the Roman populace by presenting them with a spectacle of burning martyrs till even they were nauseated. No man dared raise hand or voice to check him; to express disapprobation even by silence was a certain precursor of death. Intoxicated with his power, Nero made a progress through Greece, only to indulge in further extravagances of an equal repulsiveness. But in remote regions, whither the fear of him had not reached, men began to think it was time that these things should stop. Vindex, the Gallic governor of Gallia Lugdunensis, opened communications with Galba, the old soldier who held the main Spanish command. Suddenly the rumor reached Nero that Spain and Gaul were both on the point of rising. The legions on the Rhine obeyed their orders from Rome and turned upon Vindex, who was defeated and slew himself. But the army of Spain was already entering Italy. Nero was seized with terror; the prætorians would not answer to his call, and he fled from Rome. The Senate proclaimed him a public enemy and doomed him to death. Men said afterwards that he was too much of a coward to take his own life with his own hand, but found a slave to stab him when he heard the avengers of blood at the doors. "*Qualis artifex pereo*" ("What an artist is lost in me"), were his last words. The world could afford to do without such artists.

III.—The Flavians and Antonines, A.D. 69-192

The moving spirit in the revolt against Nero had been the Gaulish chief Vindex, who held the office of legate in the middle province of Gaul. It was he who had urged Galba to wrest the Imperial crown from the tyrant. Galba, an old soldier of high patrician descent, was supported by his troops, who hailed him Emperor. Nero was already dead when he entered Italy, accompanied by the much younger

legate of Lusitania, Otho. The impression was general that Galba was both capable and upright, and that, old as he was, he was the right man for the place. Nevertheless, three months after he entered Rome Otho had won over the prætorians, Galba was murdered (January, 69), and Otho in turn was duly invested by the Senate with the authority and insignia of the Princes. The dangerous precedent had been set of allowing one of the many armies of the Empire to put forward its own chief as claimant to the throne, and the other armies saw no reason for giving way to such dictation. Even before the murder of Galba the legions on the Rhine frontier, whither Aulus Vitellius had just been sent to take up the command, hailed Vitellius as Emperor, and a strong column was immediately on the march for Italy. By the middle of March the lieutenants of Vitellius had passed the Alps; in April they met Otho in battle and defeated him. Otho committed suicide, and in July Vitellius was in Rome, invested by the Senate with the Principate.

Galba, if any one, had had a reasonable claim to come forward as the savior of the Empire; neither Otho nor Vitellius had any claim at all, and the legions in Egypt had declared their allegiance to their own chief, Flavius Vespasianus, before Vitellius entered Rome. Vespasian was a man of humble birth, whose great-grandfather was reputed to have been merely a peasant and whose father was a tax-farmer and money-lender. He himself had risen by his sheer merits as a soldier and administrator. The armies of the East followed the army of Egypt; the armies of the Danube declared in favor of Vespasian; in October they had entered Italy. The fleet in the Adriatic supported them; in December the prætorians who had been dispatched to fight them joined them instead. Vitellius was caught and killed, and a fourth Emperor was proclaimed within the eighteen months following the death of Nero. Vespasian was a first-rate officer and a level-headed man of business. There was no one to put in a counter-claim, and the new Emperor set about organizing matters so as to prevent any repetition of the recent chaos. The necessity for a single head and a centralized government was manifest to every one; the alternative was a complete break-up. But the events of the last eighteen months and the accession of Vespasian himself had destroyed the possibility of fixing the course of the succession in the family of the Cæsars. Vespasian adopted the fiction of hereditary descent, although the facts were against him. He not only took the title of Cæsar himself, but from thence forth that title was bestowed also upon the heir-apparent, the natural successor, or, failing a natural heir, upon a son by adoption. Thus a working theory of the succession was established.

The Principate had been established by Augustus on the hypothesis that the Republic had been restored, and that the Princeps was an

officer of State on whom certain exceptional powers and dignities had been bestowed. The fictions which had cloaked the revolution were no longer necessary, and there was no further pretence that Senate or magistrates were not subordinate to the Princeps; the title of Emperor was more in evidence. Senatorial rank became merely a social dignity mainly conveyed by the favor of Cæsar, no longer demanding even residence in Rome. Consulships and prætorships were but complimentary offices; even in the city of Rome the real administration of justice was transferred to an officer whom we should not have expected, the præfect of the prætorians, and the general administration of the city to the præfect of the city. The Emperor's personal department of administration had from the outset steadily encroached upon the other departments, till an enormous amount of the work was passing through the hands of the Emperor's private servants, often merely freedmen. The men now charged with these functions became officers of State with a regular course of promotion.

While the administration was systematized, and the Emperor's authority was emphasized and his dignity increased by the persistent practice of deification after death, the idea of unity was developed by repeated extension of the Roman citizenship and of the Latin rights which brought those who received it nearer to Roman citizenship. The time was past for emphasizing the supremacy of Rome; the great-grandson of a Sabine peasant could not be closely associated with the old Roman idea like his predecessors, all of whom, except Otho, had been of actually patrician descent. And after the Flavians, Vespasian and his two sons, the next group of emperors, commonly called the Antonines, were none of them Romans at all in the proper sense, but only in the new extended sense which included many Spaniards and Gauls and provincials of every kind. Legions were recruited from the new Roman citizens, not from Italy; and by the side of the legions fought the cohorts of the allies or auxiliaries who were not even Roman citizens at all, though they were rewarded with the citizenship on retirement. The idea of Rome, even the supreme dignity of the Eternal City, continued to be the unifying factor, but it was a different idea from that which Augustus had put forward.

All this was not the work of Vespasian, but of the series of strong and worthy emperors, of whom he was the first, who ruled for more than a century, but it was he who initiated it. The foundations were laid by the cool man of business, who could be mean and sordid, but took problems as they came before him and treated them in a purely practical spirit, quite untroubled by grandiosities or niceties, and quite impervious to the lust of the flesh and the pride of life. Vespasian, like Henry, bore an unsavory character from the shifty devices to which he turned in order to fill the Imperial exchequer. But his methods were legitimate; it was better to be sneered at as a

huxter than to be cursed as a robber, and he put the money he raised to good use.

The event of his reign which most appeals to the imagination of the world is the siege and destruction of Jerusalem by his son Titus. Two years before the death of Nero, the Jews had risen in revolt against the oppression of the provincial governors. When Vespasian left the East for Rome, Titus remained behind to crush the resistance which was still offered by Jerusalem. With stubborn defiance the Jews held out heroically in their almost impregnable city till at length Titus succeeded in taking it by storm. The temple was destroyed, its treasures were carried off, and its defenders were sold into slavery or perished in the amphitheater.

The defiance of Judæa was a small matter, only made great by the character of the Jews. Very much more serious, from an Imperial point of view, was a sudden rising on the Rhine. Julius Civilis, the Batavian captain of one of the auxiliary cohorts, stirred up a great mutiny among the troops which had been loyal for half a century. In this one region the experiment had been tried of raising the cohorts retained there for service from the local clans; elsewhere it was the practice for the auxiliary troops to be sent to serve in other provinces than their own, lest they should become centers of disaffection among their kinsmen. The soundness of that principle was exemplified by the mutiny of Civilis. Other cohorts and other tribes joined the revolt; the Germans across the Rhine began to move. Half the Roman legions had gone to Italy to make Vitellius Emperor. The insurgents captured the great camp at Vetera on the Upper Rhine. For a moment the whole position on the Rhine seemed to be threatened. But before Vespasian had been Emperor for a year the insurgent forces had been broken up, partly by dissensions between Germans and Gauls, partly by a fresh force which was sent to take matters in hand. An end was put to the system of local clan cohorts; the auxiliary troops in future were drawn from other regions, and the cohorts raised on the Rhine were sent to serve elsewhere, notably in Britain. Presently the Roman boundary was carried across the Upper Rhine and the triangle of territory was annexed which has its apex about Frankfort and the Lake of Constance as its base. This work was completed under Domitian, and was really in its character the rectification of a military frontier rather than an acquisition of territory.

Even during the lifetime of Vespasian, his son Titus did his best to counteract the impressions of sordidness produced by his father. Rome viewed with complacency his triumph after the fall of Jerusalem. Perhaps it was fortunate for his reputation that Titus reigned for only two years during which he gained credit for a generous and liberal spirit; since on more than one occasion before he became Emperor he had given indications of a relentless spirit of cruelty

and at the moment of his accession he was more feared than loved. As matters turned out, his brief reign was distinguished chiefly by acts of kindness and generosity which stood out in the stronger relief when he was compared with the brother who succeeded him.

Domitian had won an ill name by his arrogance and self-assertiveness, but at the beginning of his reign he kept himself in hand. The Imperial officers found themselves under a strict and just supervision, and there almost seemed to have been in him a change such as that which popular tradition attributes to the madcap Prince of Wales who became Henry V. But like Henry, Domitian aspired to martial fame, and unlike Henry he did not achieve it. He went campaigning in Germany and on the Danube, but met with no success; after his return to Italy he degenerated rapidly, and during the greater part of his reign he appears personally merely as a bloodthirsty tyrant. In one direction, however, there was material advance. Agricola had taken up the command in Britain in the last year of Vespasian, and during the four following years he established the Roman supremacy as far as the Tyne, organized the government, and carried the Roman arms at least up to the Forth.

When in 96 Domitian fell by the hand of an assassin, the army did not intervene, and the Senate were allowed to select as his successor Cocceius Nerva, an elderly and respectable person, who had the wisdom immediately to adopt and to associate with himself in the government the commander of the legions on the Rhine, the Spaniard Trajan. Trajan was a distinguished soldier whose selection as successor made sure of the army; and within eighteen months Nerva was dead and Trajan was Emperor.

Vespasian alone in the list of Cæsars since Tiberius had proved himself an able soldier and a shrewd statesman. For Trajan it may be fairly claimed that he was a great statesman as well as a great soldier, though his soldiership has the more impressed posterity. He won and deserved the affection of the Roman people. Of his statesmanship the best evidence is to be found in the prosperous and beneficent government of the provinces, and the correspondence with his governors which shows how far that prosperity was owing to his own supervision and instruction. But statesmanship more than the lust of military glory was also, at least until his closing years, the motive of the wars for which he is most famous.

Of these the first was the conquest of Dacia, corresponding to the modern Roumania, from the Carpathians to the Danube, and including the Carpathian highlands. The eastern Danube frontier in particular was menaced by the growing strength and restlessness of the trans-Danubian tribes. They had been more than troublesome in the time of Domitian: they had defeated Roman armies, and a peace had been made with their king Decebalus, without any empathic demonstration

of irresistible power on the part of Rome. He was in alliance with German tribes on the West; and although the Rhine frontier might now be regarded as secure, it had become imperatively necessary to establish a check upon the Dacians. In two campaigns Trajan forced Decebalus to come to terms, to acknowledge Roman suzerainty, to admit a Roman garrison to his capital, and to engage to make no independent alliances on his own account. Two years later he was manifestly preparing to renew the war. Trajan again marched into Dacia; Decebalus was crushed and slew himself, and Dacia was formally annexed and converted into a Roman province. The whole system of frontier defence in those regions was reorganized; Dacia serving as an outpost to hold the trans-Danubian barbarians in check.

Frontier defence also engaged Trajan in the East. But fifteen years after his accession he made up his mind that the activities of Parthia necessitated an extension of the Roman frontier. Armenia must no longer be a buffer state alternating between allegiance of Rome and to Parthia, but should be definitely included in the Roman Empire. Its king, it would seem, himself a Parthian, had been becoming actively aggressive. Between 112 and 114 Armenia was subjugated and annexed; and in the following year Upper Mesopotamia was also made a Roman province.

It is only at this stage that Trajan seems to have become possessed with the idea of conquest for its own sake. Next year he crossed the Tigris, but in spite of initial successes, he was forced to beat a retreat, and then he fell ill and died in 117.

Trajan had chosen as his successor his younger cousin Hadrian, whom he had adopted. The selection was confirmed, and Hadrian, who was with the Eastern army, began by recognizing the unwisdom of Trajan's schemes of expansion, evacuated the territory which had been partially subjugated, restored the boundaries, and reorganized the system of defence. The same dislike of extending the bounds of an empire already so large that the control of its marches was a matter of extreme difficulty was displayed by his partial evacuation of Dacia; though not until Roman legions had proved their superiority to the barbarians. From the Danube Hadrian travelled to Britain, and here again he built the wall from Tyne to Solway, which marked what he regarded as the real limit of the Empire in that quarter, although the Roman rule had nominally been extended as far as the Forth.

Thence he passed through Gaul and Spain, where there was no disturbance; thence to Mauretania which he quieted; and thence back to Syria, to overawe the Parthian king, Chosroes or Khosru. When Chosroes had made a sufficient submission, Hadrian returned to Rome by way of Asia Minor and Athens; and having thus travelled over practically the whole extent of his Empire, he paid yet another entirely peaceful visit to Greece, Syria, and Egypt. Now, however, the last

blow was dealt to Judæa, which in spite of the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus again rose in revolt. The Jews were crushed, a Roman colony was planted in the Holy City, and the Jews were finally dispersed from Palestine, never again to enjoy a fixed habitation of their own, but always to remain a single and separate people in spite of their dispersion.

In accordance with what was now the established custom, Hadrian adopted a successor. His first choice was unfortunate. Verus seems to have been merely a young man who happened to please him. Three years later, however, Verus, having proved his incompetence, happily died; and Hadrian at once made the wise selection of a fresh heir in the person of Titus Aurelius Antoninus, surnamed Pius, whom he required also to adopt two heirs in case of accidents.

To Hadrian was probably due the perfected organization which made his reign and those of his two successors a sort of golden age, an age of continuous peace and prosperity, until at the close of the period new disturbances arose on the borders. It is to be noted that he created a sort of Privy Council of the Emperor's personal advisers, chosen entirely on account of merit and fitness, which was the prototype of the Papal Consistory.

Antoninus succeeded in the purple in 138. The twenty-three years of his benign and virtuous rule passed almost without incident. He had adopted two sons—one the child of Verus, whom Hadrian at first had intended to be his successor; the other his own nephew, a man like-minded to himself, who on his death became the famous Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The younger Verus was actually associated with Marcus as Emperor, but left to him the cares of State, and died before him without doing any harm.

Marcus lives as the standing example of the Platonic ideal of a philosopher king, whose fine character is portrayed in his book of "Meditations." Naturally contemplative, the call of duty compelled him to devote himself to the work of his high office, which had for him little natural attraction though he discharged it with high if not the highest ability and supreme conscientiousness. But, through no fault of his, his reign of nineteen years was marked by presages of troubles to come. The legions in distant Britain seized the moment of his accession to endeavor to compel their own commander to assume the purple. German tribes and Mauretanian tribes raided the borders. Then in the East the Parthians took up arms and inflicted a serious defeat on the Roman forces, though they were presently suppressed by the vigorous general in Syria, Avidius Cassius. Then Cassius himself revolted, though he was slain by the soldiery, who had at first followed him, but at last proved more loyal to the Emperor than to their captain. Then came the great onslaught of the trans-Danubian tribes, the Germans from Bohemia and Sarmatians

from beyond Dacia. Marcus took the command against them in person, though he had no experience as a soldier; and the closing years of his life were spent in a struggle which promised indeed a successful termination, but was in effect brought to a close by the Emperor's own death on the eve of the campaign which should have been decisive. Peace was made without any actual loss of territory or apparent gain to the barbarians; but the unfortunate precedent was set of transplanting large numbers of the barbarians themselves into Roman territory as subjects of the Empire. Even at Ravenna in Italy itself lands were granted to barbarians, though they were enrolled in the Roman armies.

The most serious weakness in the character of Marcus was the misdirected virtue which blinded him to the vicious character of his wife Faustina and of his son Commodus, whom he nominated as his successor. For twelve years the Empire bore with Commodus after the death of the good Emperor, in 180. At first the young man was content to leave the government in the hands of the experienced officials who had served Marcus. Then he broke out in excesses after the fashion of Nero. His tyrannies and cruelties victimized principally the people who were within his immediate reach without materially affecting the Empire at large, though the Imperial purple was further degraded by his repeated participation in gladiatorial contests and similar exhibitions, until he too fell at last in 192, by the dagger of an assassin.

IV.—The Prætorian Emperors, 193-284

For a hundred years after the death of Marcus the Empire presents an unlovely spectacle. That a decent government prevailed on the whole was due to the excellence of the machinery which had attained its perfection under Hadrian. The period brings into painful prominence the grand defect which made no adequate provision for a recognized law of succession. During the period one Emperor, Septimius Severus, reigned for seventeen years, from 194 to 211. The other twenty-five emperors, between the death of Commodus in 192 and the accession of Diocletian in 284, averaged three years apiece. One was killed in battle, one died of the plague, one ended his days a prisoner in the hands of the Parthians. All the rest died by violence. One after another was raised to the purple by the legions; one after another was killed by mutineers or by a rival pretender to the Principate.

Commodus was killed by the præfect of the prætorians, Lætus, who nominated as Emperor not himself but the præfect of the city, Pertinax, a capable statesman and soldier. The Senate and the prætorians accepted him; but when the latter found that the lax discipline they

had enjoyed under Commodus was to be brought to an end, they mutinied and murdered him. Then they literally put up the purple for sale to the highest bidder, and a wealthy senator, Didius Julianus, bought it by promising them about two and a half millions of money. Thereupon the armies on the three main frontiers, the Danube, the Rhine, and the Euphrates, each of them proclaimed its own commander Emperor. The nearest to Italy was Septimius Severus on the Danube, an able soldier of African descent. He was promptly on the march for Rome. The prætorians were not prepared to fight his veterans, and made terms. Julianus was handed over and put to death. Severus disbanded the prætorians, and reorganized a new prætorian guard of 50,000 men. Then he marched against the Eastern candidate, Pescennius Niger, routed his forces, captured him and put him to death. Then he turned westward and dealt in similar fashion with Albinus from the Rhine, though not without a hard fight. For the rest of his reign he ruled unchallenged.

Severus was a soldier, and after a time he left the conduct of his civil administration to the great legist Papinian, in whose control it was well managed. His own attention was absorbed chiefly in warfare on the frontiers. He conducted successful campaigns against the Parthians, and passed the closing years of his life in Britain, where he died, leaving the succession jointly to his sons, Bassianus and Geta. Bassianus, better known by his nickname Caracalla, murdered Geta, and reigned alone after putting to death his father's minister, Papinian, for refusing to pronounce a justification of Geta's murder. Caracalla perhaps surpassed any of his predecessors in the number of the victims of his cruelty, and in his fears of assassination; but the one outstanding fact of his six years' reign was the decree conferring the Roman citizenship upon all the communities of the Empire. He was assassinated when in Syria by the præfect Macrinus, who bribed the soldiery to make him Emperor.

Now there was dwelling in Antioch one Mæsa, who had been a sister-in-law of Septimius Severus and an aunt of Caracalla. She had two daughters, each of whom had a young son. The elder boy, Elagabalus, whose name has been corrupted to Heliogabalus, was fourteen years old, and had been made a priest of the Eastern sun-god whose name he bore. Macrinus, though ambitious, was inefficient; Mæsa claimed the purple for this grandson. The soldiers were already annoyed by the attempts of Macrinus to restore the discipline which had become agreeably relaxed under Caracalla; they turned against him, the troops he brought to the field were routed, and he was killed.

For some five years the boy Elagabalus indulged in the wild excesses common enough among boy rulers in the East. Then he was assassinated, and his young cousin, who is known as Alexander Severus, was made Emperor at the age of thirteen. He was a well-

behaved boy, and accepted the guidance of the sensible counsellors whom his grandmother selected for him. His Council, for the most part eminent lawyers, did their work well, so that Alexander bears the character of an amiable and meritorious prince. Neither he nor the lawyers, however, were able to keep the soldiers in order. He had to go fighting on the frontiers, and obtained credit for a great victory over the Parthians, or rather the Persians; for a Persian dynasty, the Sassanidæ, had just at this time overthrown the old Parthian dynasty, and the Empire beyond the Euphrates is henceforth known no longer as Parthian, but once more as Persian. Then the young Emperor had to betake himself to the Danube frontier to head the defense against fresh onslaughts of Germans and Sarmatians. The bulk of the troops there were Illyrians, a general term covering the very varied barbarian population between the Danube and the Adriatic. They were commanded by Maximus, himself an unadulterated barbarian, whose enormous physical strength had attracted the surprised admiration of the old Emperor, Severus, and led to his rapid promotion. His countrymen preferred him to the young Emperor, mutinied in his favor, killed Alexander, and hailed Maximinus Emperor in 235.

During the next dozen years a series of emperors were made and unmade, of whom it need only be remarked that one, the Arabian Philippus, is reputed to have been a Christian. Then in 249 the supremacy was seized by Decius a descendant of an ancient Roman family which had been highly distinguished in the "brave days of old."

Alone among the emperors, Decius fell in the field leading the legions against a barbarian foe, the Goths, who were overrunning the province of Mœsia, which corresponds generally to the modern Bulgaria and Serbia. Then Gallus, the governor of Mœsia, was proclaimed Emperor. Two years later he was deposed by a new governor of Mœsia, Æmilianus, who had again been winning laurels against the Goths. He in turn was overthrown by Valerian, the governor of Rætia. Valerian sent his son Gallienus to take care of the Rhine frontier while he himself went to the East to quell the aggressive Persian power. Instead of quelling it he was taken prisoner, and died in captivity. Gallienus succeeded to the Empire, while a sort of sub-empire was established over Gaul, Spain, and Britain by Posthumus, and another in the East, with its center at Palmyra, by Odenathus.

Gallienus was deposed and murdered in 268, and another Illyrian general, Claudius, became Emperor. Claudius again defeated the Goths, but died of the plague, and his brother who succeeded him abdicated in favor of the army candidate, Aurelian.

During this chaos of deposition and assassinations in the five-and-thirty years which followed the murder of Alexander Severus, there

occasionally emerges the names of capable men—Posthumus in Gaul, Odænathus in the East, Decius and Claudius among the emperors themselves. But it is obvious that no consistent imperial policy could in such circumstances be adopted or carried out. The armies were perpetually fighting on the frontiers against ever increasing hosts from beyond them, and every army wanted its own pet commander to be Emperor. And, meanwhile, the hosts across the marches were increasing in strength and in aggressiveness. The Germans by this time were becoming massed in three groups of confederate tribes. On the Lower Rhine they were beginning to be known by the general name of the Franks, and on the Upper Rhine and Upper Danube by that of *Allemanni*. Farther to the east the old peoples, who may have been Slavonic, the *Saramatians*, were being displaced by another Teutonic group more akin to the Scandinavians than to the Germans proper, the Goths, who were pushing down from the Baltic regions. There was no question now of the Roman Empire expanding beyond the Rhine and the Danube. The Teutons were the invaders, perpetually surging up against the Roman barrier, and not infrequently bursting through it. In the middle of the third century the Goths were not only crossing the Danube but had taken to the sea, swarmed upon the Black Sea coast, burst into the *Ægean*, and ravaged the shores of Greece and Asia Minor.

Farther to the east the Persian Dynasty had thoroughly established its dominion over the Parthian Empire, which Rome herself had been unable to quell. The *Sassanidæ* mastered Armenia and raided Asia Minor, while Arab tribes were marauding in Syria and even threatening Egypt. These were the conditions which forced Posthumus in Gaul to discard the imperial authority which was incapable of discharging its imperial duties; while Odænathus in the East in like manner took upon himself the defense of the Empire, but in order to do so was virtually obliged to act as an independent sovereign while professing allegiance to the Empire. At the time of Aurelian's accession, Odænathus had been recently murdered, and the government of the East was in effect being conducted by his widow, the heroic queen whom Westerns called *Zenobia*.

The Roman Decius and the Illyrian Claudius had both done good service to the Empire by the hard blows they struck at the Goths. But the career of each had been cut short before either could do much to stay the impending disintegration of the Empire. The Illyrian Aurelian set himself to the task, which with war on all the frontiers of the Empire at once was unmanageable. Claudius had just given the Goths a severe lesson, and Aurelian thought the opportunity a favorable one for establishing friendly relations. The effective subjugation of the territories beyond the Danube was impracticable. He ceded Dacia to the Goths, and transplanted the Roman population from that prov-

ince to Mœsia. If the Empire was to be reunited the independence of Palmyra must cease. Aurelian marched against Zenobia and overthrew her. Egypt was secured by his lieutenant, Probus. In Gaul the third successor of Posthumus, Tetricus, made submission. Aurelian celebrated a great triumph in Rome, in which both Zenobia and Tetricus figured, though no farther vengeance was taken upon them for having exercised an independent sovereignty. A great incursion of the Allemanni, who pierced into Italy itself, was driven back; and the Emperor then dealt with them much as he had done with the Goths. But even Aurelian was a victim of conspiracy; he was murdered after a reign of five years.

The army assented to the Senate's nomination of the elderly Tacitus as his successor; but Tacitus too was murdered, and the army insisted on the election of its own nominee, Probus, another Illyrian, the ablest of Aurelian's lieutenants. For six years Probus conducted vigorous campaigns on successive points of the frontier, clearing Franks out of Gaul and Allemanni out of Rætia. Then he was killed in a mutiny, and the Rætian troops made Carus Emperor. Carus was killed by lightning while conducting a campaign for the recovery of Armenia. His son, Numerianus, was murdered, perhaps by his lieutenant Aper, who claimed the purple, which was also claimed by another son of Carus, Carinus in Gaul. But Aper was immediately slain by another captain of legions, Diocletian, whom, when Carinus also was killed by mutineers, the whole Empire acknowledged as Emperor.

V.—The Reconstructed Empire (A.D. 284-395)

The hour and the man had come for a reorganization. During the last fifteen years four vigorous soldiers, three of them Illyrians, and one, Carus, a Gaul, had prepared the way by their activities on the frontier and by the suppression of independence in East and West, for an attempt to adapt the system to the new conditions which had arisen. Like so many of his predecessors, Diocletian was an Illyrian from Dalmatia, who had risen from the ranks to high command. To him Rome was not the Empire, nor had he any respect for the Roman tradition. He had to deal with a dominion having a vast frontier extending along the Rhine, the Danube, and the Black Sea, the Armenian mountains, and the Euphrates; and along the whole of that line there were hordes of warlike tribes pressing upon the frontier, and pressed upon by more migrating tribes behind them. To keep that dominion together there must be one supreme lord, whose supremacy must be felt from end to end of it, and yet one man could not be perpetually present in every quarter to assure his own ascendancy. In some form a partition was necessary, and the problem was to make that partition compatible with unity.

Diocletian sought to solve it first by associating with himself, as a colleague, another loyal and trustworthy soldier of his own race, Maximian, who shared with him the title of Augustus. Maximian was to be responsible for the West, his senior colleague for the East. They were not, however, to be independent potentates, but colleagues, and the senior emperor was to enjoy a higher authority. But this did not go far enough. After eight years two more emperors were associated with them, though in a definitely subordinate position, the subordination being marked by the title of Cæsar without that of Augustus. To one Cæsar were assigned, Britain, Gaul, and Spain; to the other the Danube provinces. Italy and Africa, including Mauretania, were assigned to Maximian; while to Diocletian himself were appropriated Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, and Thrace—the senior emperor fixing his headquarters no longer at Rome, but at Nicomedia on the Propontis. The Western Cæsar (Constantius Chlorus) was subordinated to the Western Augustus, and the Eastern Cæsar, Galerius, to the Eastern Augustus, who still retained a supreme authority over all his colleagues.

A uniform system of administration was established throughout the Empire. Italy no longer enjoyed the immunities which she had so long possessed. Each of the grand divisions was parted into provinces—smaller provinces than those of old—grouped in twelve dioceses. Each diocese had its own *vicarius*—lieutenant-governor; subordinate to him were the presidents, with various titles, of the provinces themselves. The military functions were entirely separated from the civil, and the later dukes and counts derived their titles from the military titles, *duces*, *comites*, of the principal commanders. There was a complete system of subordination, a regular pyramid both on the civil and military side, culminating in the senior Augustus at the apex.

The system worked; for Diocletian had chosen colleagues on whose loyalty he could depend. There was a curious episode before the scheme took its final shape. Maximian, in charge of the West, found that he not only had to guard the frontiers, but had to deal with the development of Teutonic piracy in the North Sea and the Channel. The Franks and the Saxons behind them were taking to their ships, raiding Roman territory. A Briton or Batavian warrior, Carausius, was appointed by Maximian to command a fleet for the suppression of the pirates. Carausius made himself master of the seas, but when he was called to answer charges of questionable conduct brought against him, he threw off his allegiance and made himself lord of Britain, where he was apparently welcomed. The naval power he had built up gave him security, and he scattered the imperial fleets that were sent against him, though he had to give up what had probably been his dream, the creation of a Gallic Empire. In fact Dio-

cletian and Maximian came to terms with him and left Britain to him. It was not till Carausius had been assassinated that Constantius was able to reëstablish the imperial dominion in Britain, by the overthrow of Alectus, the successor of Carausius.

The frontiers were adequately defended. On the Rhine and the Upper Danube the Franks and the Allemanni were held back. Goths on the Danube were enrolled in the imperial armies, and marched under Galerius to take part in the defense of the Syrian frontier against the Persians. After twenty years of rule Diocletian deliberately chose to retire into private life and to enforce a similar retirement upon Maximian. The two Cæsars became Augusti, but Galerius, who was named as the senior, nominated the two new Cæsars; passing over Constantine, the son of Constantius, of whom he was evidently jealous, to nominate his own nephew, Daza, as Cæsar of the East, with the imperial name of Maximin, while Flavius Severus as Cæsar, succeeded to the dominion of Maximian. Constantius, however, was dying. His abilities and character had won him great popularity in the West, and the moment he was dead the legions at Eboracum (York), the headquarters in Britain, proclaimed Constantine his successor. Galerius accepted the situation, but only allowed him to take the title of Cæsar as the junior member among the colleagues in the Empire. Constantine made no attempt to disturb the settlement. He was absolutely secure of the loyalty of Gaul and Britain, where he completed the reorganization which his father had taken in hand, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Franks, who had broken across the Rhine on the news of the elder Cæsar's death.

But elsewhere confusion arose. Maximian, who had retired very reluctantly under irresistible pressure from Diocletian, thrust himself forward and backed up his son Maxentius in seeking to gain recognition in Italy as Augustus. Diocletian refused to intervene in public affairs, though there is no doubt that if he had chosen to do so his authority would have been recognized. Flavius Severus was killed; Maxentius ruled in his place, and drove his own father Maximian out of Italy. Galerius nominated an old comrade, Licinius, as a new Augustus. Happily, he died himself of a horrible disease, which the Christians regarded as a punishment for the last persecution which he had inaugurated; and then the four emperors, Constantine, Licinius, Maxentius, and Maximin, came to terms with each other.

The accord was short enough. The two Western Augusti, Constantine and Maxentius, were soon engaged in a deadly struggle, in which Constantine proved entirely triumphant. Maxentius was finally routed, and lost his life at the battle of the Milvian Bridge, close to Rome, in 312, which made Constantine master of the whole West. In the next year he issued from Milan, which had for some time displaced Rome as the imperial capital in Italy, a decree

guaranteeing toleration and favor to the Christians, who had hitherto not only received no imperial recognition, but had been the one sect which had been excluded from the otherwise universal religious toleration. It was affirmed by Constantine himself that while he was on the march through Gaul he had seen in a vision the Cross of Christ with the inscription—“*Hoc signo vinces*”—“By this banner thou shalt conquer.” Licinius accepted and confirmed his colleague’s edict, and with his approval turned upon the third surviving Augustus, Maximin, and overthrew him.

The two emperors of the East and West preserved an appearance of amity in spite of bitter jealousy for nine years. But Licinius, who naturally regarded the Christians as being the mainstay of his rival’s power, turned against them. Hostilities broke out, Licinius was crushed by Constantine, and a single emperor once more ruled over the whole Roman world—this time, an emperor who was prepared to establish Christianity as the official faith of the Empire. Of the vicissitudes through which that faith had passed we shall speak in another section, since hitherto they had not actively influenced the general course of events.

The sole supremacy of Constantine was finally established in 325. Instead of Diocletian’s two Augusti, of whom one held the priority, Constantine appointed four præfects under the Emperor, although his sons were also nominated Cæsars. It is further to be remarked, that whereas until the close of the second century the conception of the position of the Emperor had been consonant with Western ideas, the tendency throughout the Prætorian period had been to Orientalize his style. Under the old Principate the Princes had been the incarnation of the State, the person in whom the State was concentrated; in the Oriental view the King of Kings is the despotic master of the world, who may only be approached with genuflections and prostrations. Aurelian, Diocletian, and Constantine himself were all actually Illyrians, but all of them developed the Oriental attitude, as had Alexander the Great before them. From the time of Diocletian the East had taken precedence of the West, and the fact was emphasized in the transference of the seat of supreme authority from Italy and Rome to Nicomedia. It was still further emphasized when Constantine rebuilt Byzantium and made Constantinople, the city of Constantine, the center of the Empire. At Constantinople Oriental influences were persistently at work; but the west was not destined to be Orientalized, and it became more and more inevitable that sooner or later East and West would again be parted.

The pyramidal bureaucratic government of the Empire was the creation not of Constantine but of Diocletian. But the favor shown by Constantine to Christianity introduced a new element, by giving a new authority in the State to the already elaborated theocratic sys-

tem of the Christians. The Emperor did not suppress paganism; theoretically, there was no differentiation between religions, and all alike were tolerated. It is doubtful, whether Constantine was ever technically a Christian himself, and he certainly did not give up the assertion of the Emperor's position as the supreme head of the old religion, the high priest of Jupiter, and a claimant to admission among the circle of divinities on his own demise. But the recognition of the Christian ecclesiastical organization actually gave to that body an immense influence and power, forcing upon it a political as well as a spiritual authority.

Constantine arranged for the re-partition of the Empire on his death between his three surviving sons, who for the confusion of posterity were named, Constantine, Constantius, and Constans. Constantius held the East. Constans and Constantine, holding the Middle and the West, quarreled. Constantine was killed in battle, and then Constans was assassinated in a mutiny. Constantius turned upon the successful mutineer, smote him, and once again there was a single emperor.

In 361, twenty-four years after the death of Constantine, Constantius was succeeded by his nephew Julian, known as the Apostate, because he reverted from Christianity to a philosophic paganism, and zealously sought to restore the worship of the old gods. As subordinate Cæsar in Gaul, Julian had admirably defended the frontier; as Emperor he led a great campaign against the Persians, which was attended with success until his sudden death. The legions in the field chose one of their officers, Jovian, as his successor. Within a few months, however, he fell ill and died, and another Illyrian soldier was elected to the Empire, Valentinian, who associated with himself his brother Valens, taking the West for himself, while Valens had the East. The brief reign of Jovian had been marked by an immediate withdrawal from the newly conquered territories in the East. Valentinian held the Rhine and the Danube frontier successfully. A year after his death, Valens allowed the Goths, who, across the Danube, were being harried by the hordes of a Mongolian people from Central Asia, the Huns, to settle in Moesia. But again, two years later, the Goths rose against Valens, defeated and killed him at Adrianople, and threatened to carry fire and sword over the Balkan peninsula.

Meanwhile Gratian, the son of Valentinian, had succeeded his father in the Western Empire, where he successfully beat back the Franks. On the death of Valens, Gratian named one of his captains, Theodosius, as successor to the Empire of the East. Theodosius successfully conciliated the Goths. Maximus, the governor of Britain, revolted against Gratian and killed him, making himself master of Gaul, Spain, and Britain, while Gratian's younger brother, Valentinian II., ruled in Italy and in Africa. Then Maximus endeavored to overthrow

Valentinian; Theodosius came to the rescue, crushed Maximus, and established Valentinian as Western Emperor. Then Valentinian was assassinated by another officer, Arbogast, himself a Frank, who seized the reins of power, though putting up nominally a puppet named Eugenius. Again Theodosius marched to the West and crushed the pretender. No second emperor was nominated; but three years later Theodosius died, and the permanent division of the Eastern and Western Empires was established by the accession of his two sons, Honorius in the West, and Arcadius in the East.

VI.—The Rise of Christianity

More than four years before the date fixed upon by later generations, while Herod, monstrously misentitled the Great, was still living as vassal king of Judæa, and when Quirinus, whom St. Luke calls Cyrenius, was first governor of Syria, the Christ was born in Bethlehem in a time of what was practically universal peace, under the principate of Augustus. While Rome was quaking under the fear of Tiberius in his later days, Christ's ministry upon earth was closed by what all Christians must account the most tremendous event in history. The world paid no heed to the crucifixion of the Jewish teacher. It knew nothing of the mighty moral force which had been set in motion; it did not suspect the birth of a religious organization which was destined to shake the thrones of kings.

The followers of Christ were but a small community of humble folk, of no account outside Palestine—a group proscribed by the dominant classes in Palestine itself. But that small community was possessed with an intensity of conviction, a passion of faith, such as the world had never known. Among them were numbered men of high intellectual capacity and moral force. They found a recruit of indomitable vigor and supreme ability in Paul of Tarsus, not a peasant or fisherman, but a scholar of great attainments, who from a persecutor was suddenly converted into an intensely zealous believer. The small community, striving to live after the precepts of their Master as veritable brethren having all things in common, yet inspired by a missionary zeal for spreading the Gospel among the chosen people of God, soon realized that their message of salvation was to be delivered to Gentiles as well as to Jews. They organized themselves for common worship, common obedience to the moral law as revealed by Christ, common service; while their missionaries went out into the world to sow the good seed in all lands.

Mightiest of the missionaries was St. Paul himself. In three great missionary journeys he spread the new doctrines over Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Greece, confirming converts in the faith by epistles, writing even to the Christian society which had risen in Rome itself,

before he visited the center of the world. Seized in Jerusalem by the fanatical Jewish mob as a subverter of the Jewish law, the military authorities rescued him, and finding that he was a Roman citizen, not subject to arbitrary jurisdiction, dispatched him for trial before the governor, Felix, at Cæsarea. As it was impossible to prove that he was a lawbreaker, Felix could not punish him, but continued to hold him in custody, vainly hoping to extract a bribe for his release. When the place of Felix was taken by Festus, Paul refused to stand trial in Jerusalem, and asserted his right as a Roman citizen to appeal to Cæsar himself. He was sent, therefore, to Rome. He was released: tradition says that he even took a missionary journey to Britain. Ultimately he was put to death by Nero, when the tyrant thought fit to curry favor with the Roman populace by encouraging their hostility to the Christian sect.

St. Peter perished at Rome in the same persecution. Before the end of the second century there was a firmly established tradition among Christians that Paul and Peter were in some sense joint founders of the Christian Church in Rome. A little later we have evidence of a tradition that Peter went to Rome before Paul, and that he was the official head of the Church there during the five-and-twenty years, from A.D. 42 to his martyrdom in 67. Such traditions are not conclusive, but they hold the field in the absence of any definite evidence against their correctness. Where actual contemporary evidence is so meager, there is room for a vast amount of conjecture and of quite unwarranted dogmatism as to actual facts.

It would seem, however, to be tolerably clear that in the primitive Christian society the local branches each recognized some one person as having an authority, with whom were associated some other seniors, elders, or presbyters—three terms which are identical in meaning. This principal authority was naturally in the patriarchal position of being at once the overseer and the guardian of the flock. Further, in each community there were set apart for special services a number of ministers—*diaconi*, “servants” of the community; not in the sense that they were under the orders of the others, but in the sense that public officers are servants of the public. At a later stage of more elaborate organization the patriarchs had become overseers—*episcopi*, bishops; the presbyters had become the order of priests, and the *diaconi* had become the order of deacons.

At some stage or other special consecration or ordination to these duties was established; later ecclesiastical tradition declared that Ordination had been primitive, an institution from the beginning, but on that head it can be certainly affirmed that there is no positive evidence of a conclusive character. Modern Christians of whatever Church who insist upon their own right to be called “Catholics,” while refusing that name to other sects, base their claim upon the argument

that authority was primarily conferred upon the priesthood through the Apostles and upon bishops by the laying on of hands, whereby the "Apostolic succession" was conveyed to the person consecrated. Regarding Ordination as the source of spiritual authority, they deny that the spiritual functions can be duly discharged where the Apostolic succession had failed through so-called Ordination by persons not themselves capable of conveying the Apostolic succession. Rome denies the validity of Anglican orders which Anglicans maintain; Anglicans generally deny the validity of Presbyterian orders which some Presbyterians maintain; whereas the great majority of sects outside the Roman, the Greek, and the Anglican Churches repudiate the Catholic position altogether and regard Ordination as a merely human institution introduced only for purposes of organization after the primitive times. The evidence being inconclusive, the historian is unable to arbitrate between the theologians, however strong his convictions as a theologian may happen to be.

Christianity originated among the Jews of Palestine. There were colonies of Jews in many of the cities of the Roman Empire, especially in Egypt and in parts of Asia Minor, and there had long been a large colony in Rome. The Jews everywhere were naturally the first persons reached by the missionaries, with the natural result that when the name of Christianity first began to be known the Christians were regarded as a Jewish sect. The Jews were not popular. Wherever they went their law made them hold themselves apart, accounting all who were not of their own faith as heathens and idolaters. Other folk generally had a miscellaneous pantheon into which they were quite ready to admit new gods. Generally speaking, in the eyes of the world at large, there was no sort of sacrilege in propitiating unaccustomed deities; whereas the Jew stubbornly refused to recognize any God save one, and was indeed obliged to obtain special exemption from participating in sacrifices to the dead or living and deified Cæsars and to the recently invented Goddess of Rome. The Jewish colonies were already looked upon, in the same light as they are to-day in many parts of the world, with a dislike which was partly superstitious and partly social. The Christians from the beginning appeared to the populace as the worst kind of Jew; a Jew with a particularly fantastic creed against whom even the other Jews told evil stories while they held themselves aloof from the world and pretended to obey a superior morality. The mob viewed them with suspicion; cultured society swallowed the common rumors, and looked upon them with mingled contempt and disgust, as evidenced by the scathing terms in which Tacitus speaks of them. The Roman world and the Roman law tolerated all religions, but here was a religion which condemned all others as positively false, and encouraged disloyalty by repudiating the gods officially recognized by the State.

Therefore, when Rome was burned down, Nero sought a cheap popularity by fixing upon the Christians as the perpetrators of the crime. There was a ghastly persecution of the Christians in Rome. On the evidence of informers "vast numbers," says Tacitus, "were condemned more as being enemies of the human race than for the crime of setting the city on fire. They were clad in the skins of wild beasts and torn to pieces by hounds; they were crucified; they were condemned to die by fire, and were burned to serve as illuminations when the daylight had departed," Nero lending his own gardens for the purpose. Christianity, so the same authority tells us, was a most pernicious institution, which had been very properly checked by the procurator Pontius Pilate; but had broken out and become popular in Rome, "where every kind of abomination accumulated and was welcomed. The Christians deserved to suffer the sharpest penalties for their crimes, but the appalling cruelties of Nero transformed them into objects of pity." Tacitus himself was probably about fifteen years old at the time.

Although in the nature of the case the popular mind associated Christians with the Jews, and the God worshipped by the Christians was avowedly the God of Abraham, the zeal of St. Paul at an early stage convinced the Christian community in Palestine not only that the Gospel was to be preached to the Gentiles, but that the Gentiles were to be admitted to the Christian society without being required to adopt the Jewish law. Also from the first the missionaries sought to convert Gentiles as well as Jews. To the Jew the new doctrine necessarily presented itself either as a peculiarly blasphemous heresy or as the consummation of prophecy. To the Gentile it presented an entirely new conception. Certainly it did not directly appeal to the upper classes of society whose conventions it attacked, although there may have been some converts in high places. The bulk of the converts were undoubtedly in the middle and lower strata of the community, who would not be *prima facie* deterred from listening to a doctrine which offers the same salvation to a slave as to an emperor. Members of "Cæsar's household" became converts; but Cæsar's household is a wide term, not restricted to members of the Imperial family or those connected with it. Persons of any social standing who gave ear to the new doctrines were probably from the first regarded at best as dangerous cranks who had better be ostracized.

Nero's persecution, however, seems to have produced a mild reaction, and the situation was again modified very shortly afterwards by the Jewish rebellion which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. That definitely severed the Christians from the Jews, for the object of the insurgents made no appeal to the Christians. They did not join in the revolt, and after the destruction their headquarters ceased to have any connection with any Jewish community.

A later generation connected the missionary journeys of others of the Apostles with this dispersion. Tradition says that Andrew went forth to convert the Scythians of South Russia, and that Thomas and Bartholomew betook themselves to India. If those apostles took these journeys, it was probably at an earlier date than the eighth decade of the Christian Era; but the dispersion may well have had the effect of developing missionary activity in distant lands. We have at least the certainty that there is no part of the Roman Empire to which Christian missionaries had not penetrated before the end of the first century.

Meanwhile the sect was subjected to a social persecution which the average provincial governor was probably disposed rather to encourage, though there does not appear to have been active official persecution until Domitian turned upon them. For it was one of the *rôles* of Vespasian's younger son to pose as a champion of old Roman morals and the old Roman religion, which, he found, were being sapped by these new Semitic doctrines. In fact, the official authorities, who made no effort themselves to inquire into the fundamental tenets of Christianity, were easily led to take the superficial view that the whole movement was anti-social, anarchical, opposed to the conception of the ordered State.

Christians were liable to legal penalties, since all men could be required by the law to offer sacrifice to the State gods, the Jews alone having obtained exemption. Also secret gatherings might be construed as treasonable. In practice the governor had a large discretion. The position at the beginning of the second century is illuminated by the correspondence between Trajan and the younger Pliny, who was governor of Pontus and Bithynia. Pliny declared that in those regions the new doctrine had taken so strong a hold that the temples of the gods were deserted, and that trade in connection with the temples was perishing. This was eminently unsatisfactory; it certainly appeared both that it ought to be stopped and that the law warranted severe punishment of the Christians. At the same time inquiry seemed to prove that, if these people would only let the worship of the gods alone, they were harmless enough in spite of their foolish superstition. In Pliny's view the case would be best met by encouraging the Christians to return to saner ways, giving them a free pardon if they would offer sacrifices like reasonable men. Of course, if they persisted in being contumacious, they ought to be punished; but it seemed superfluous to Pliny that they should be hunted out on the strength of anonymous informations. Trajan in his reply indorsed Pliny's views. Christianity was demoralizing, because it undermined the principles of conduct based upon the ancient faith. Christianity must be treated as a serious offense, but it should not be persecuted, not hunted down. Anonymous informations should be dis-

regarded, *bona fide* charges should be investigated. If the accused were willing to offer sacrifices to the gods of the State they should be pardoned; if they were not, the law should take its course.

During the greater part of the century and a half following Domitians, the principles of Trajan's rescript were those upon which the governors acted; much being left to their own discretion. Christians were occasionally put to death; almost at the moment when Pliny was writing to Trajan, there was an outcry against the Christians of Antioch, and the bishop, Ignatius, was sent to Rome like other criminals to be torn by wild beasts in the Coliseum. Popular superstition everywhere was apt to attribute all sort of natural calamities—drought, earthquake, floods, pestilences—to the Christians; and on such occasions there was a crop of informations and usually of martyrdoms. The mobs were not at all inclined to give the Christians even such benefit as the law allowed them. But while this was the character of the persecution, and the Christians themselves were firmly convinced that martyrdom opened to them the gates of heaven, they held steadily on their way, and their doctrines spread through all ranks of society. It is somewhat melancholy to observe that the severities were emphatically increased in the time of the Emperor whose personal virtues set him above the rest—Marcus Aurelius—because to him it appeared more necessary than ever to revive or intensify the faith in the old gods. Under him the law became more active in seeking out Christians. After Marcus the severities again slackened. The unfortunate Alexander Severus was himself a student of Christian doctrines, and tradition affirms that the Emperor Philip the Arabian was actually a Christian. But in the middle of the third century there came in a new era with Decius, a Roman of the old blood, who drew his ideals from the great days of old Rome five hundred years before. For him the revival of the ancient worship was imperative. The flood-gates were opened; the arenas were deluged with the blood of the martyrs.

But the persecution revealed the fact that the Christians were no longer a small sect, but were to be found in large numbers everywhere. The most stringent laws, the most merciless execution of the laws, failed entirely to crush them. Of all the persecutions the most tremendous broke out in 303 under Diocletian, who for some years had persisted in a policy of fines and confiscations rather than of bloodshed. A decree was issued, absolutely forbidding Christian meetings of every kind; every Christian who refused to renounce his faith was to become a slave. Then disorders broke out which were attributed to the Christians, and a last desperate effort was made to quell them by all imaginable tortures and slaughters, although Constantius in the West declined to enforce the decrees.

Finally, the era of persecution was brought to an end in 313 by

Constantine's Milan decree, his formal recognition of Christianity as an authorized, if not an actually favored religion. Thenceforth the hierarchy which had grown up in the Church became actively associated with the government of the Empire. Christianity had conquered, and soon became emphatically the official religion of the State. Under the auspices of Constantine himself was held at Nicæa the first "Œcumenical" Council of the Church, which condemned as heresy the doctrine of Arius, who held that Christ was not of the same substance (*homoousios*) with the Father, but only of like substance (*homoiousios*). The rift between Arianism and Orthodoxy formed an outstanding cleavage in the Christian world for a couple of centuries—a cleavage of great political importance, because most of the Teutonic invaders adopted the Arian, not the orthodox form of Christianity.

CHAPTER XII

THE FAR EAST

I.—India

HITHERTO we have followed the broad stream of history—the history of Western Asia and Northern Africa, and of so much of Europe as was comprised in the Roman Empire. During one stage of our story we were carried eastward beyond the Trans-Tigris mountains into the regions lying between the Caspian, the mountains of the Hindu Kush, and the Persian Gulf. One episode of the history even took us through the mountains into the Punjab. It is time for us now to turn our attention to the peoples dwelling in the area of which we have hitherto had little or nothing to say, because they barely came into touch with the main current. For while the West was developing, there were growing up in the East two independent civilizations in India and in China, both of which had reached an advanced stage at the moment of time which we have selected as conveniently marking off a division between the ancient and the medieval world.

In speaking of the four main racial groups of humanity, we divided the Mongolian into two sections, the Eastern including Chinese, Indo-Chinese, and Tibetans, and the Central Asiatic or Turki. To these a third should probably be added, the Dravidian—covering the aboriginal peoples of the greater part of the Indian peninsula, though probably modified in considerable areas by a negro strain. But from very early times, if not from the first, one corner of India—Bengal—was occupied by Mongolians of the Indo-Chinese type. But successive migrations or irruptions, always entering through the mountain barrier of the North-West, introduced, probably between 2000 and 1000 B.C., a Caucasian and Aryan-speaking element. Later, but before the Christian era, came a “Scythian”—presumably Turki—irruption. The Scythians disappeared, but some ethnologists believe, with reason, that their absorption by the Dravidian population produced the race known as the Mahrattas. Between the tenth and sixteenth centuries A.D. Mohammedan hosts, mainly Turki, but partly Caucasian, poured through the passes and established a domination which finally yielded to that of the British. But these latter changes belong to a period altogether later than that with which we are here concerned.

Indian history based upon records begins with the Aryan invasions of the second—possibly even the third—millennium B.C. Urged probably by changing climatic conditions to seek fresh fields, Aryan tribes—of whose antecedents we know no more than that the Caucasian element predominated in them, and that they regarded themselves as of common stock—began to drive their way through the passes. By 1000 B.C. they had certainly dominated the Punjab and the Ganges basin as far as what is now Oudh.

According to the best authenticated view, the Indo-Aryans in the first instance pushed in as complete migrating tribes, with their wives and families, sweeping the Dravidians completely away on their first entry; so that in the Punjab and part of Rajputana the Dravidian element is very slight. Probably at a later stage there came a fresh migration of Indo-Aryan from beyond the mountains—chiefly bands of fighting men, comparatively few of whom brought wives and families with them, who pushed past their kinsmen in the Punjab and drove their way down to the Jumna and the Ganges. They did not wipe out or expel the Dravidians; at any rate for obvious reasons, they preserved the women. Hence the type of the inhabitants of what may be called the Ganges basin above Bengal is mainly Aryo-Dravidian, derived from a mixture of the Aryan and Dravidian stocks. The later Scythians, we incline to believe, left small traces of themselves among either the Aryans or the Aryo-Dravidians, but generated the Scytho-Dravidian stock of the Mahratta country. The rest of India remained mainly Dravidian, though the Aryans forced their way in sufficiently to form dominant classes of more or less Aryan descent and to superimpose upon the native religions their own religious system; so that in course of time Hinduism prevailed all over India, and with Hinduism its peculiar system of caste.

The date of the Aryan invasions is a matter of complete uncertainty. The presumption is, on the whole, that there were two eras of invasion in the first of which the Punjab was occupied early in the second millennium; while the second was that prolonged migration, in the course of which Hindustan proper, Gangetic India, was occupied—a process which may have been completed quite early in the first millennium, if not sooner. The Aryans from Oudh had certainly penetrated to the utmost southern limits of the peninsula during what was still the legendary or heroic period, which can hardly have been prolonged later than the sixth century B.C.; and the inference is that the full occupation of Hindustan had been achieved some hundreds of years earlier.

It was in Hindustan that the sacred books of the Hindus took shape—the *Vedas*, the *Brahmanas*, and the *Upanishads*, as well as the later *Puranas*. The *Vedas* are a series of collections of hymns. The earliest of them, the *Rig-Veda*, go back to a time when the Aryans

were on the march from Afghanistan to the Indus Valley, or, at any rate, belong to the traditions of that time. They seem to have taken their permanent shape somewhere about the fourteenth century, somewhat in the same way as the long cycle of the heroic ballad poetry of Hellas took final shape in the Homeric epics in the eighth century. When the last book, the *Atharva Veda*, was composed, the Aryans were on the Gangetic Doab, the land lying between the Ganges and the Jumna, above their confluence. In these hymns the gods of the Aryans are the great powers of nature: *Dyausha Pitar*, the *Zeus Pater* of the Greeks, *Diespiter* or *Jupiter* of the Romans; *Varuna*, the Greek *Uranus*; *Agni* (Latin *Ignis*), the god of fire; *Indra*, the god of rain; gods of the storm, and others.

Another stage is reached with the compilation of the *Brahmanas*, attached to the four books of the Vedas: prose works which may be called commentaries, mainly dealing with ritual and the functions of the priesthood, which are generally dated about the eighth century. By this time the priesthood had acquired a separateness and a prominence of which there is no appearance in the earlier hymnology. The *Upanishads* represent a slightly later stage, in which the old mythology has become spiritualized, and the gods are not so much separate powers as separate manifestations of one supreme divinity, headed by the Hindu trinity—Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, and Siva the Destroyer and Renewer. The sacred books were shaped by the Brahmins, the priestly caste, who ultimately polished the old popular dialects, the "Prakrit," in which the Vedas were composed, into the literary language called Sanskrit, which was never a popular language at all, and which in course of time became unintelligible to the populace.

The laws and customs of Brahmanic India were formulated in a work known as the *Institutes of Manu*, which modern scholarship now attributes to a date probably not earlier than A.D. 300—quite a thousand years later than the date which used to be assigned to it, though in the main most of those laws and customs must have been at least in course of establishment at the earlier period. Quite possibly the institutes themselves represent, not any organization which actually existed, but Manu's idea of society logically organized upon Brahmanic principles. The peculiar Hindu organization of caste is essentially the classification of the community into groups, severed from each other by the prohibition of intermarriage. When caste appears, there are four such groups, the formation of which must be associated with the Aryan conquest of Hindustan. In the first place, there are the "twice-born" and the "once-born," a division obviously racial, the twice-born being the superior Aryan race, the "Aryas," with exclusive religious privileges; while the once-born include the whole of the conquered races, which were held in a state of relative degradation and

social inferiority—the Sudras. The twice-born are in three groups, the lowest of which are the Vaisyas, a name originally applied to the whole Aryan population, out of which have now emerged the two superior groups with distinctive names: the Kshattriyas or Rajputs—the princes and warriors; and the Brahmans—the priests, counsellors, and men of letters. A long struggle between these two latter groups has finally established the superiority of the men of religion over the men of war.

The Vaisya is assumed to be a husbandman, the cultivation of the soil being always among the Aryans appropriate employment for the freemen. The Sudras, the conquered population, serve the others, and are engaged in all the meaner employments. The marriage law permits the man to take a wife from an inferior caste, in which case the offspring takes an intermediate position. But if a woman marries a man of lower caste, not only does she fall to his level, but their offsprings are on a still lower plane.

The Brahman claims a superiority over the Kshattriya or Rajput in virtue of his holy office, a superiority not unlike that claimed for churchmen by the medieval Church over the laity; but Brahmans do not themselves become princes and kings—those functions belong to the Rajputs—just as medieval princes and kings in Europe were not priests. But the distinction must be borne in mind that in the medieval Church celibacy prevented the formation of a priestly “caste,” whereas the Brahman caste continues from generation to generation. The churchmen were recruited from the sons of the laity; but no Rajput, Vaisya, or Sudra can become a Brahman. The marriage did not come into play early enough to prevent a large admixture of Aryans and Dravidians in Hindustan; but as it became comparatively rigid, it did much to prevent further admixture, so that the Aryan type has been in the main preserved among Brahmans and Rajputs in Northern India—less so in the south, where the conditions made it much less possible till a much later date to insist effectively upon rigid adherence to the marriage law.

This is traditionally the origin of caste, which in later ages became enormously developed. The evolution of innumerable castes used to be accounted for on the basis of intermarriage between castes and the hereditary appropriation of particular occupations to the offspring of such intermarriages. It is clear, however, that many other considerations came into play. Among the primitive peoples the custom of endogamy kept tribes separate—that is, marriage was restricted within the tribe. Occupations, too, tended to become hereditary, the sons following the father's employment from generation to generation. The Brahmanic religion did not prevent the earlier peoples from continuing to worship their own gods, or the Aryans from introducing those primitive deities into their own pantheon. The special

worship of some particular deity, preserved from generation to generation, tended, when the idea of caste was introduced, to make the worshippers look upon themselves as a separate hereditary group; and hence in the course of centuries each of the four castes became subdivided into an enormous number of groups or sub-castes, rigidly differentiated from each other and excluded from intermarriage, under an all-powerful religious sanction applying religious penalties to breaches of the caste law.

As to the actual history of the expansion of the Aryans in India we have no information. Physical types and philology together lead to the conclusion that they obtained almost exclusive possession in the northwest, formed a minor but still substantial proportion of the population of Hindustan, where they were the dominant race, and succeeded in planting a hierarchy and an aristocracy in the Dekhan, the general term for Southern India. They did not write their own history; what passed for history was embodied in the Sanskrit epics—the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*—which have as little historical authority as the medieval romances concerned with King Arthur or Charlemagne or Alexander the Great. These are Brahmanic compositions, written for the glorification of the Brahmans and Rajputs, especially Brahmans. But from the dates which we may infer from the sacred books, we may safely conclude that the Brahman ascendancy was established in Hindustan some time before 600 B.C.; also that there was no homogeneous Empire, but that Brahmanic India was broken up into a number of territorial dominions which were perpetually expanding and contracting, conquering and being conquered.

Somewhere in Oudh, in the heart of Hindustan, probably in the sixth century, arose the great teacher Gautama, called Buddha, the "Enlightened," and bearing also other names, less well known. He was a prince; but although he was fitted to shine as a warrior, he cared nothing for the joys of the world and the flesh. He deserted the court, and sought purification and salvation first by practising austerities. But he found no peace in asceticism; and in solitary contemplation he evolved the new creed of loving-kindness to all God's creatures, and ultimate salvation in *Nirvana*, the Eternal Rest, absorption into the World-Soul, to be attained not by ceremonial observance but by the holy life. By his own life every man makes his own fate, conditioned by his own previous life or lives. It may be that he can qualify in this life for *Nirvana*; it may be that he can only qualify himself to qualify by another life hereafter; and, on the other hand, by not living rightly, he is multiplying his disqualifications. For the right life there are three base principles—self-mastery, kindness to other men, care for all living things.

While Buddhism was emphatically an actively missionary religion, its sanction was exclusively intellectual and moral, and it made no

appeal to force. But its spiritual note and its note of charity, together with the extraordinary personality of its founder, caused it to find an immediate and ever-growing acceptance. It did not overthrow the old Brahmanism, but it became dominant for several centuries, Brahmanism living side by side with it. Ultimately Brahmanism and priestcraft won the day, and Buddhism was driven almost entirely out of India, leaving only traces of its influences. On the other hand, it spread beyond the borders of India, entirely conquered the southern Mongolian peoples, and obtained a permanent foothold in some parts of China; so that at the present day the professed Buddhists perhaps outnumber the professed followers of any other religion in the world. Here, however, what we have to observe is that the development of Buddhism, with its universal humanity, its disregard of caste, and its repudiation of the theory that the divine powers must be propitiated through the mediation of the priesthood, dethroned the political influence of Brahmanism; so that during the Buddhist period the great dynasties and the most powerful kingdoms are not dynasties of Rajputs dominated by Brahmans, but dynasties which might be even of Sudra origin.

In an earlier chapter we took occasion to remark that during the brief period at the beginning of the Hebrew monarchy, when commerce was vigorously fostered by David and Solomon, the evidence points to a considerable trade with India through the Red Sea. At that period the trade was with Dravidian kingdoms in the south, in regions to which the Aryans, the Hindus proper, had as yet penetrated not at all or very little. The Hindu expansion in the south, which never amounted to a conquest, cannot well have taken place at least until the first millennium B.C. was well advanced. But of the southern Dravidian kingdoms we have even less of what may be called authentic records than in the north.

In the latter part of the fourth century Alexander the Great invaded the Punjab, into which two centuries before the first Darius had penetrated, including it nominally within the bounds of the Persian Empire. There was said to be an Indian contingent with the army of Xerxes at the time of the great invasion. But the Persian hold on the Punjab was very slight, and adds nothing to our information. Alexander's invasion has been already described. For some time after it there were Macedonians in the northwest of India, where the name of "Sikander" has never been forgotten.

Alexander, we saw, did not strike east to the Ganges basin, where powerful kingdoms had long been established. Among the Indians who came in contact with him was one whom the Greeks called Sandrakottos, who at that time was simply an adventurer. This Sandrakottos is identified with Chandragupta, who very shortly afterwards made himself master of the kingdom of Magadha, which more or less

covered the regions afterwards known as Bihar and Oudh, extending up the basins of the Ganges and the Juma from the modern Patna. When, some years after the death of Alexander, Seleucus became master of the eastern portion of his divided Empire, Chandragupta was forming a mighty dominion. Seleucus proposed to attack him, but finally made a treaty by which Chandragupta was recognized as lord not only of the Ganges basin (Hindustan proper), but also over the Punjab, though the Macedonians were not expelled from the latter. For some years Seleucus had an ambassador at the court of Chandragupta named Megasthenes, who recorded his impressions for the benefit of posterity. He gives the Indians a very high character for honesty. He describes seven castes instead of four, though three of them would seem to have been subdivisions of the Brahmans, unless one of them is to be identified with the monastic orders established among the Buddhists. India, whatever he means by the term, was divided into more than a hundred kingdoms; Chandragupta was "king of kings," a supreme lord recognized by most, if not all, of them, while others claimed suzerainty over their neighbors.

Fifty years after Chandragupta, his grandson Asoka was reigning over Oudh—greatest of the Buddhist rulers. Asoka ruled over the whole of Northern India. He was one of those rare monarchs, like Alfred the Great, who were equally famed for power and for virtue. Asoka's rule was eminently educational, and was directed upon the highest principles of humanity and justice. Under his auspices Buddhism flourished greatly, Asoka himself having adopted that religion a few years after his accession. Early in Asoka's reign a new treaty was made with Antiochus, the grandson of Eeleucus. The Greeks never renewed the attempt to establish a dominion in India, though traces of the influence of the Greek residents are to be found in the sculpture of the third century B.C.

After Asoka the power of his dynasty diminished, and it was completely overthrown some years after his death. This was the time apparently of the beginning of the Scythian incursions. These Scythians were nomadic Mongolians, driven southwards perhaps by their more northern kinsfolk, called by the Chinese the Hiung Nu, who are identified with the later Huns. These Scythians extended their dominion over the greater part of Western India. As we have already seen, there are grounds for supposing that the Mahratta race descend from their amalgamation with the earlier stock. The Scythian domination of the west seems to have continued through some five hundred years of the Christian era; but in the main they received the civilization which they found there, not modifying it very materially, though they wiped out what was left of the Greeks. The theory which identifies them with the Rajputs of the northwest or with the Jats, who are of the Rajput caste, is based mainly on the iden-

tification of the names *Jat* and *Geta*, a Scythian tribe, and a group of Jats called the Dhe with another Scythian tribe of the Dahæ; but if the Scythians were Mongolians, the identification collapses, the physical type of the Jats being not Mongolian but Aryan.

No adequate historical record of this period is given. In fact, after Asoka, we have only dim and disconnected glimpses of Indian history for nearly a thousand years.

II.—China

China provides us with a definite and unanswerable refutation of the favorite theory that races, nations, or states follow the law of human life—are born, grow up, and die in accordance with a definite rule. The Chinese people, the Chinese nation, the Chinese State was in existence before Hammurabi was born, has been in existence ever since, and for all we can see may go on existing as long as there is human life on this planet.

The presumption is perhaps that the Chinese originally migrated from the region of the Lower Tigris and the Euphrates. They bear a resemblance to the pre-Semitic Mongolian type of Sumer and Akkad, and their discovery and development of the canal system seems more easily derived from a previous acquaintance with the Babylonian system than referred to an almost simultaneous coincidence of inventive genius. The points of resemblance are at any rate sufficiently strong to give a high plausibility to the theory which connects them with the Sumerians and suggests that they arrived in China after they had already developed an advanced civilization.

At any rate it can hardly be doubted that whether or not they came originally from Western Asia the Chinese were established in the Far East not later than the middle of the third millennium B.C. They have preserved a very much longer legendary history; but legend is beginning at least to be blended with a record of something like actual facts before the end of that millennium, the period with which Confucius, writing in the sixth century, began his history. Confucius himself had records to work upon, though we have no means of estimating their value, and we seem warranted in accepting the story that a definite Empire was organized, extending from Peking on the north to Canton on the south by Yao and Shun, some centuries before the days of Hammurabi and Abraham. About the time of these latter a tremendous overflow of the Yellow River led to the first great effort to deal with the lasting problem of damming in its superfluous waters. The engineer Yu who conducted these operations was the successor of Shun on the throne, and inaugurated the Hsia dynasty, which we are told ruled from the end of the twenty-third to the middle of the

eighteenth century B.C. These three great sovereigns are held up to posterity as model rulers.

The dynasty decayed; the successive emperors fell away from the moral standards of their great predecessors, until Tang arose and overthrew the last and worst of the family. Tang began the Shan dynasty which bears the name of the province to which he belonged, though the title was subsequently changed to Yin when the capital was removed to the town bearing that name.

The meritorious Tang was again followed by decadent successors, and the last of his house, Chow Sin, was overthrown towards the end of the twelfth century by Wu Wang, the "Warrior King," whose father was Chang, the admirable but ill-treated Minister, who under the title of Wen Wang, the "Lettered King," is accounted the founder of the new Chou dynasty, so called from the lordship of Chou which belonged to the family. These two princes are held in like honor to that of the four great predecessors already named.

The Chou dynasty ruled for the best part of a thousand years, until the middle of the third century B.C. To them is attributed the creation of what may be called the Chinese feudal system, under which the country was divided into great fiefs governed by nobles who became more or less independent. There is a plausible theory that the dynasty was really of Tartar origin, from the northwest, set up largely by the aid of Tartar chiefs, upon whom lands were bestowed somewhat as William the Conqueror bestowed lands upon his Norman followers. About the first half of the tenth century reigned the Emperor Mu Wang, reprehended by posterity for introducing the system of commuting punishments for criminal offenses for fines of varying severity. Nomad tribes, now and for some time to come, were hammering on the northwestern marches of China; and in the eighth century the nobles of the province of Tsin were officially intrusted with the defense of the border, whereby they acquired a military ascendancy which ultimately led to the overthrow of the Chou dynasty. The Emperor already possessed only a shadowy supremacy, and the great nobles were developing more and more into independent princes.

The sixth century was the time of the two great men who have most dominated Chinese ideas, Lao Tse and Kung-Fu-Tsze, known to the West as Confucius. The doctrines of Lao Tse, the older of the two, are known as Taoism. If we may attempt the difficult task of summarizing a highly abstruse doctrine, we may say that Lao Tse taught that there was a fundamental principle, a Being whom he called Tao, itself the unconditional cause of all things, a Divine Being who called order out of chaos. It was just at this time, we observe, that the Buddha was evolving his spiritual doctrines in Hindustan, and possibly that Zoroaster was giving a new form to the Persian religion.

Taoism unfortunately degenerated afterwards into what became little better than a system of necromancy.

Confucius, on the other hand, concerned himself very little with abstract questions of philosophy, but was a practical, moral, and political teacher who tried everything by a standard of common sense not always overpenetrating and generally materialistic. He was a conservative person, not much troubled with theories, and convinced, with considerable justification, that the wisdom of the past had been forgotten in the follies of the present. To some of his contemporaries the application of common sense to politics seemed useful; to others it was inconveniently embarrassing; consequently he died a disappointed man, with the conviction that the rulers of China had not duly appreciated his counsels. After his death, however, he began to receive due honor as the teacher who had pointed out the right way of conduct both in public and private life; and in course of time his merits became as much exaggerated as they had been officially depreciated while he was alive.

A hundred years later, in 371 B.C., was born the greatest of his disciples, Meng Tsze, Latinized as Mencius, a person it would seem of greater insight than the master, but a less dominating personality, since some hundreds of years passed before his position as a great teacher was recognized.

Both Confucius and Mencius had recognized the need of strengthening the central authority as against the feudatories; and Mencius went so far as to desire the ejection of the effete and incompetent Chou dynasty in favor of more competent rulers who would govern for the benefit of the people. None of the rulers were particularly anxious to govern for the benefit of the people, so that Mencius was unpopular with the authorities.

Circumstances, however, favored the practical success of his theory. The prince of Chin overturned the Chous and made himself Emperor, as founder of the Chin dynasty. The fourth of the line, Shih-Huang-Ti, went a great deal farther, for he asserted himself as the real first Emperor of China, decreed the abolition of the feudal system, and reorganized the Empire as a group of thirty-six provinces. Shih-Huang-Ti was a person of energy and thoroughness. The Chinese system had given great weight in the government to the learned classes of society, and the learned classes disapproved strongly of the subversion of the feudal system, basing their objections upon the historical records which proclaimed the prosperity of the nation under the first of the Chous, who had created feudalism. The Emperor adopted the drastic method of ordering the entire destruction of the literature to which these conservatives appealed. People who declined to give up their books were summarily executed to the number of several hundreds. They had hidden their literary treasures away, and thus some

were preserved from the general holocaust, to be brought out again in the happier days; but the decree of the "Burning of the books" finally deprived posterity of an immense proportion of the old literature. In another field Shih-Huang-Ti distinguished himself by completing the great northwestern fortification—the barrier against the nomads known as the Great Wall of China—establishing garrisons along it which served effectively to put a stop to the barbarian inroads. By thus blocking the eastward movement of the Hiang Nu (the Huns), he probably gave them the first impulse in a westerly direction, of which one of the results was the Scythian invasion of India. For the building of the Wall, if not the destruction of the books, Shih-Huang-Ti deserved well of his country; and he was also distinguished by his energy as a builder of roads and bridges which immensely improved communications throughout his dominions and materially advanced the prosperity of the country in general, though his Philistinism caused him to be held up to perpetual obloquy by generations of men of letters.

Shih-Huang-Ti left no worthy successor. Four years after his death the Chin dynasty was overthrown, and the Han dynasty was founded by Kao Tsu, who did his best to redeem the iniquity of the first Emperor by bringing to light all the books that had been preserved and by getting rewritten as much of what had been lost as the learned men of the country could reproduce from their memory. In spite of a painful lapse during the fifteen years which followed his death in 193, the rule of this dynasty is accounted the most glorious in the history of China. The next Emperor, Wen-Ti, not only encouraged literature with great zeal, but materially mitigated the barbarity of the criminal laws. In other respects Shih-Huang-Ti was taken as a model, communications were further improved, the defense of the frontier was strengthened, war was waged against the Hiung Nu, and intercourse with the West was opened up by the envoy Chang Chien, who travelled through Central Asia to Western Turkestan, was twice made captive by the Hiung Nu and twice escaped, and who brought into China the earliest report of Buddhism, toward the end of the second century B.C.

The rule of the Han dynasty was a period during which the Empire flourished exceedingly. Not that the dominion was greatly enlarged: the Chinese themselves were never aggressive conquerors, nor were they really a military people. The ages of glory were those in which the arts of peace flourished. The dynasty was brought to an end about the beginning of the Christian era by a usurping Minister who lives under the name of Wang Mang, the "Traitor," who killed the child Emperor. He was not allowed to retain his power long; a dozen years later there was a general insurrection, and he was overthrown. After a brief interval a member of the former royal house was made Em-

peror, and founded what is called the eastern Han dynasty, which ruled for some two hundred years from A.D. 25 to 220. In the reign of his son Ming Ti, Buddhism was definitely introduced into China with the Imperial sanction. The dynasty was not generally distinguished. The succession frequently descended on a child, and there were a number of regencies, the mothers being the regents and the real rulers being generally the eunuchs who controlled the palace.

After 200 years the Empire was broken up into three kingdoms of the North, the South, and the West. In 265 A.D. the Northern and Western kingdoms were again merged under the founder of the Chin dynasty, whose son Wu Ti also mastered the Southern kingdom some twenty years later. But the merging of the kingdoms did not result in any Imperial consolidation; the barbarians broke over the northern border; the short lives of most of the emperors were ended by assassinations. Towards the end of the fourth century the barbarians, called Hsien-Pi, established their dominion in the north; and in 420 the Chin dynasty finally fell, and the Sung dynasty was established in the south. The great Northern kingdom extended far to the north and west beyond the borders of China proper over Mongolia and Tartary. Ki-Tai, the name of one of the great Tartar tribes, gave to China the name of Cathay, by which it was long known to the European peoples. The Hoang Ho or Yellow River was the main boundary between the north and south.

CHAPTER XIII

SOME ASPECTS OF ANCIENT WORLD

I.—The Orient

THE Oriental empires of the ancient world belong to one general type; their histories are mainly the histories of dynasties and conquests. They have no constitutional history; they are always monarchies of the same order. The monarch is the absolute despot of the whole of his dominions; his will is law, held in check only by two fears—the fear of the supernatural powers which may impel him to propitiate a priesthood who stand between gods and men, and the fear of armed insurrection. His dominions are governed by his deputies; if they are wide and inclusive, the deputies may be hereditary kings who have become tributary to him or to his predecessors; in which case they, within their kingdoms, are absolute monarchs of the same type. From the monarch's point of view his subjects exist primarily in order to provide him with riches and soldiers, that he may have everything he wants, may live in splendor, and may display his power by waging victorious wars against his neighbors. If the monarch happens to be beneficently minded, his splendor may take the form of beneficial public works, irrigation, drainage, road-making, and the like; in any case he will probably seek the favor of the gods by temple building. But there is present no conception of the State, no political life among most of the people whom he rules over, no idea that the people have "rights."

Outlying kingdoms, provinces, or tribal confederacies are looked upon by no one, least of all by themselves, as forming integral parts of an empire. Their obedience to the Great King is strictly regulated entirely by his capacity for protecting or coercing them. Judah will pay homage to Pharaoh instead of to the Lord of Nineveh if it thinks Egypt will defend it against Nineveh; if not, it sends its tribute to Nineveh so long as it thinks that the arm of Nineveh can reach to Judah—but no longer. The Hebrew does not think of the Elamite as a fellow-citizen because both are under the orders of the same supreme monarch.

The empire under these conditions has nothing to do with nationality, though there may be a lively sense of nationality in individual

sections. When the monarch of Assyria proper expanded his rule over Mesopotamia, over the Upper Euphrates, over Syria and Phœnicia, the Assyrian retained his own sense of Assyrian nationality; he was one of the conquering race. There was a very strong sense of nationality in the Southern Hebrews at least, based upon their religious separatism; there was a sense of nationality, also based on religion, in Babylonia, and in Persia based both on religion and race; but the varying elements never had any sense of common nationality at all. The same thing was true of Egypt, whenever her Empire was extended beyond the basin of the Nile or southward beyond the Cataracts; the Ethiopians did not become Egyptians. The Oriental Empire, in short, was entirely without homogeneity; it was simply a greater or smaller congeries of communities all of which paid tribute to one monarch and supplied contingents to his armies. Normally the several communities followed their own laws and customs, subject to the arbitrary methods which the Imperial deputies might apply to them; protected from attacks by other communities just so far as the central authority felt it to be in its own interest to secure them in a reasonable prosperity.

There was no common social structure. The communities fell under three main types—the pastoral, the agricultural, and the urban. Where the pastoral type prevailed, there was comparatively little in the nature of serfdom or slavery. Where agriculture was the dominant occupation, the tillers of the soil were mostly serfs—that is, they were not free agents, and enjoyed only a proportion of the produce of their toil. Where there were great cities with a commercial and industrial population, there were also large numbers of slaves, who worked entirely for their owners and were in effect merely chattels, though the law might grant them some degree of protection even against their masters. Even in agricultural districts estates were worked by gangs not merely of serfs but of actual slaves. The normal result of war was the carrying away of captives into slavery, and sometimes whole populations were deported.

The great engineering and architectural works of the ancient East were the product of a system of slave labor which was entirely heedless of human life and human suffering. Domestic slavery was not generally cruel; common sense forbade the wantonly cruel treatment of humans as much as any other kind of cattle. But for public works the supply was practically unlimited, and there was no reason why the wretched slaves should not be literally worked to death under the lash. In short, where some sort of personal relation subsisted between the owner and his slaves—as in the case of domestic slavery, and even of industrial slavery on a small scale—the lot of the slave was endurable. But where the industrial slavery was on a large scale, where the slave had no personal relations

with his master, but was merely one of a gang controlled by an overseer, his humanity was overlooked; it was his taskmaster's business merely to get every available ounce of work out of him as long as he was capable of doing any work at all, and to throw him away as soon as his utility was exhausted. The pyramids of Egypt and the hanging gardens of Babylon were doubtless in their way triumphs of human ingenuity and skill, but the life-blood of innumerable human victims went to the making of them.

Moral progress is largely bound up with the human conceptions of Deity. Primitive man makes to himself gods because he wants to account for the manifestations of nature. The irregularities of nature, its unexpectedness, excite his attention more than its inevitable sequences, the certainty with which he can calculate upon the succession of cause and effect. His gods are irresponsible and capricious beings who send earthquakes and thunderstorms, floods and droughts, without any apparent reason. These things come without any apparent reason, therefore they must be the work of some capricious power, and these powers have to be propitiated. Whenever man under primitive conditions has been the subject of direct scientific observation the powers that he worships are of this irresponsible character, rather malignant than beneficent, but open to conciliation; neither gods nor fiends, but demons. How the idea of a moral law came to be generated we cannot now inquire; what place, the "demons" have become "gods" when we find them definitely connected with the moral law—when they reward virtue and punish the evildoer.

At the best of times the gods of antiquity retain their capricious character; they are not exclusively moral; they must be propitiated by sacrifices and ceremonial observances, involving the mediation of specialists in divinity, so to speak—a priesthood set apart. And still the several gods retain their specific functions. There is a hierarchy among the deities; according to circumstances it is more necessary to propitiate one than another. We propitiate the gods of our own tribe, of our people, but other tribes and other peoples have their own gods; it may be as well to propitiate them also; it may give us an advantage over our enemies if we even transplant the shrines and sacred images of their gods to our own territory.

Again, a great advance is made when the monotheistic idea supplants the polytheistic idea, when the conception is attained of one supreme eternal Almighty God, who before all else is the God of Righteousness. It is the grand characteristic of the Hebrews, a people who never became an international power of the first rank, that they alone among the peoples of antiquity attained to this conception, which, consummated in Christianity, ultimately conquered the Western world. They alone arrived at the perception that one

Righteous God alone is to be worshipped, though they, too, did not escape from the belief that He must be propitiated by sacrifice and ceremonial. Through Christianity, and also through Mohammedanism, the monotheism of the Hebrews has differentiated the modern from the ancient world, in which it had only a local habitation. The conception of the one Almighty God ruling the universe was, indeed, grasped by philosophers and reformers. We have seen how Akhenaten in Egypt attempted most unsuccessfully to establish it; but except among the Hebrews it never found general acceptance; and even philosophers who divined it saw nothing incompatible with it in conforming to the popular polytheistic ideas.

II.—Hellas

The extreme of contrast is presented when we turn from what may be called the pre-Hellenic empires to the picture of the Hellenes. In the East all is vast and vague and loose, amorphous, directed no-whither. In Hellas all is clear-cut and concentrated. In the East there is no political life among the populations; in Hellas every one is actively concerned in politics. In the East there is to the Western mind a very large element of the incomprehensible; Hellas is the fine flower of the Western intelligence itself.

Hellas is intensely human and real to us; the East is inhuman, unreal. We have some sense of kinship with the unsophisticated Persians of Cyrus, who summed up education as learning "to speak truth and to draw the bow." But for the rest, the pharaohs, with their pyramids and spinxes; the Assyrians with their winged man-headed lions, Chalden Magi, barbarian Hittites and Scythians, all seem to belong to some other impenetrable world. Among them only the Hebrews stand out alive and intense, the embodiment of indomitable Puritanism—the one element in Christianized Europe which is wholly wanting in the Greek. The old Hebrews live, not only because the Hebrew religion is the foundation of our own, but because they alone among the Easterns left a literature which is vividly human, a record more convincing, more lasting, than any hewn in the living rock.

Perhaps the essential difference between the East and West is most effectively conveyed in the pronouncement of Aristotle that man is a political animal—an animal, that is, which seeks its own development through organized society. According to Aristotle, men are divided into natural rulers and natural slaves, and it is the natural rulers with the gift of initiative who are the "political animals." The Hellenes belong to this category. Non-Hellenes might belong to it, but the barbarians, which in effect means the Easterns, belong to the natural slave category. The Hellene is naturally a free man,

though accident may have reduced him to slavery; the barbarian is naturally a slave, though among slaves circumstances may have made him a ruler. We may protest against the assumption of any such fundamental distinction; but Aristotle was face to face with the actual fact that in the Eastern communities the enormous mass of the population were servile and had been servile from generation to generation, while only a fraction were in any sense free; whereas among the Hellenes, though those who were legally free might be an actual minority, half the slaves were slaves by accident. The same idea presents itself in the dictum of Plato that Hellenes ought not to enslave Hellenes but only barbarians.

The Hellene, then, was naturally a political animal, in whom the idea of the State developed; the Eastern was not, and among Easterns the State idea did not develop. Among the Hellenes, on the other hand, this development was extraordinarily sudden and complete. The geographical conditions of Greece and the seaboard of Asia Minor, over which Achæans, Ionians, and Dorians spread when they moved from the mountains of Illyria and Epirus and the broad plain of Thessaly, tended to break them up into small isolated communities, cut off from their neighbors not by impassable barriers, but by such barriers as checked without preventing communication. The several communities of freemen, each gravitating towards one center, developed an urban as well as a rural life, a large proportion of the population sharing in both lives. The several communities had no common foe to induce them to combine for mutual protection, but each had its own inducement to organize itself for self-defence against the rivalry of every neighboring community. An active political life arose in each; there was a sufficiency of slave labor to give the freeman a tolerable amount of leisure; and under these conditions there was room for high intellectual activity and a cultivation of vigorous energies directed to pleasurable ends. The Hellene had the best possible opportunity for obtaining the maximum of enjoyment through the free development of all his energies, physical and intellectual. He exercised and trained his muscles and his brain, not under compulsion, not from the mere need of keeping body and soul together, not under the moral impulse of a sense of duty, but because he found a free activity in itself pleasurable, and because the competitive spirit was in him particularly keen.

Until the Hellenes came into Hellas they were living under those tribal conditions which appear generally to have characterized at least the primitive Aryan stocks, conditions of freedom which among the Oriental peoples had vanished centuries earlier excepting among nomadic pastoral tribes. When they took possession of Hellas the spirit of freedom remained with them, and it was fostered by their

concentration in small communities. The armed freemen of the migratory tribes remained the armed freemen of the settled community; the community being small, each of them had a personal interest in its common affairs; and being concentrated in a small area, it was comparatively a simple matter for them to assemble *en masse*, and, if they chose, in arms. It was only in exceptional cases, as in that of the Dorians, that conquering Hellenic tribes enslaved the populations which preceded them in the lands in which they settled; and thus the whole of Hellas in its wide sense became a great aggregate of free communities under conditions which gave the fullest possible play to their natural inclinations in the direction of self-development; inclinations wanting in races less happily endowed by nature, apt to find their bliss not in activity but in inertia.

The small community centering in a city, the city-state, provided the best possible environment for intellectual progress. It fostered in each state that sense of its own unity which on a large scale becomes the spirit of nationality. It caused the state to supersede the tribe as the unit—as the tribe had superseded the family and the family the individual. The city-state was sufficiently limited to be a practical unit. The state became supreme to its citizens, and the individual existed for the state, not the state for the individual. But at the same time the state was the *polis*, the city, a fact impressed upon us by the very names “polity” and “politics”; it stood in the way of further unification because of its own completeness and self-sufficiency. The Hellenes did not acquire the idea of national unity except to an extent sufficient to induce them to combine in the face of a great crisis. Even then the unity was almost broken up by individual jealousies and rivalries, and did break up again as soon as the crisis was passed. The city-state system prevented Hellas from dominating the world by conquest; Hellas only achieved dominion when temporarily unified by Hellenic power which had not developed as a city-state at all but as territorial dominion. Not Athens nor Sparta conquered the East or led the Greeks to the conquest of the East, but Macedon. And since Macedon had not given true unity to Hellas, the Hellenic Empire governed by Alexander the Great broke up immediately when he was gone.

And yet in another sense, by the intellectual force generated in the city-state, Hellas, even it might be said Athens, did conquer the world. When Alexander's Empire broke up, the Hellenism which he had brought with him half dominated the Orientalism of Western Asia, though later Oriental floods were destined again to submerge it completely. And when the Roman legions established the Roman authority over the East, the Hellenized East remained not Latin but Hellenic; the Oriental religion which ultimately

mastered the Western world was Hellenized on its intellectual side, and Hellenism colored it if it did not conquer the Latin intellect itself. Its advance in the West was stopped by the flood tide of Teutonic invasions, and that separation of the Occident into East and West which confined Hellenism to the eastern half of the Mediterranean, where it still stood for centuries as a barrier against Orientalism. But when another thousand years had passed, Hellenism, driven back by the Oriental advance, made re-entry into the West, where it dominated the intellectual revival commonly called the Renaissance.

The intellectual force of Hellenism attained its highest expression during the fifth and the fourth century B.C. During that period it gave to the world the supreme masterpiece of the Athenian stage, the tragedies of Æschylus, of Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of Aristophanes; the two typical histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, each in its kind unsurpassed, and first both in time and in achievement; the rhetorical triumphs of Demosthenes and Isocrates; the dialogues of Plato, and the treatises of Aristotle; as well as the masterpiece of the sculptor's art which have never been matched.

Long before Æschylus the spirit of Hellas had found inspiration and expression in the poetry which was consummated in the two great Homeric Epics. Long before Aristotle the Ionic intellect had endeavored to probe the secrets of the material universe. Critics and scholars in the sixth century had taken in hand the Homeric poems and produced what may be called the authorized version of them, so that they became almost the Sacred Scriptures of Hellas. Other poets, too, there had been, accepted as classics before the time of the great Persian war. But it was after the Persian war that prose literature came into being, and the Hellenic drama attained its great development. All Western thought, except what was inspired by the Hebrews, has been derived directly or indirectly from Plato and Aristotle; and Plato and Aristotle were made possible by their great predecessor Socrates, who left no written word of his teaching, the character of which we have to infer for the most part from his disciples Plato and Xenophon. The Roman literature was the direct offspring of Greek literature; the mediæval culture of the Western world was derived directly from the Roman literature, and the intellectual development of the sixteenth century was largely born of the revived study of the Greek writings.

The Greek legacies to posterity were the systematic pursuit of knowledge and the systematic pursuit of beauty, scientific method and artistic expression. What they could not create in other peoples was their own intelligence in the one field and their own perception of the beautiful in the other. In both fields when they lost their own

freedom they lost also their power of achievement. The eminently practical Roman directed his pursuit of knowledge mainly to the two particular branches of engineering and law; his perception of beauty was essentially limited. And then scientific inquiry was all but annihilated by a theological system which rested upon supernaturalism, and believed that all control over the powers of nature was derived from traffic with the devil; while it found in the beautiful things of this world the instruments of a Power ever seeking to tempt men into forgetfulness of the world to come. In the fullness of time men shook themselves free from that conception, and Hellenism, harmonizing with Christianity, again took its place in the development of the Western world.

III.—Rome

Among the Orientals we have observed that the idea of a state was never developed—the idea, that is, of a homogenous community occupying a definite territory with interests common to all its members, which it is its primary duty to safeguard. To this general statement the Hebrews to some extent form an exception, since David at least endeavored to form them into such a state, though their unity survived for only one generation after him. Even then the state idea survived in the two sections into which the Hebrew community was divided, but neither of them was strong enough to preserve its own independence of other more powerful monarchies, or to indoctrinate other peoples with a similiar conception.

Among the Hellenes, on the other hand, the state idea acquired such force that it precluded the national idea—the idea of welding into one the aggregate of states or tribes akin to each other in race, language, and religion within a large area. The Orientals created empires—aggregations of races and communities all under the domination of one master; but the empires were never homogeneous, and were always ready to fall to pieces.

The Italians started upon a basis much like that of the Hellenes. City-states were developed among the tribes occupying territory adapted to that form of policy, while the hillmen retained the tribal organization like the mountaineers in the Hellenic peninsula. But the whole group of city-states in the plains of Latium, unlike the Greek states, were perpetually called upon to face common foes—the Etruscans and the Sabellians. They were obliged to form a standing league—a step towards the formation of a national state instead of a congeries of city-states. That consummation, however, was prevented by the great predominance of one of their number—Rome, which, owing to its strategical position, was compelled to develop its military capacities to the utmost, so that equality within the league was pre-

vented by the imperative ascendancy of one particular state—an unqualified ascendancy such as no single state in Hellas ever succeeded in acquiring. The nearest thing to it that Hellas could reach was a hegemony over maritime states by one state, and over non-maritime states by another, which kept each of the two groups in a perpetual condition of endeavoring to break up and to undermine the league of which the other was the head. In Italy no maritime power developed, and Rome followed out her career of expansion without any single rival to divide the hegemony.

Development could proceed in the Italian as in the Hellenic city-state. A like system existed among the Greek cities on the Italian coast their kindred in Sicily, and apparently to some extent among the Etruscans. Rome gradually acquired an ascendancy over both the urban and the tribal communities, but always in the character of a leading state with a circle of subordinate "allies"—the Latins, who stood on an equality with each other, and a second circle of allies still more subordinated, the Italians. Only in a small number of cases allies were granted the complete Roman citizenship and were merged in the Roman people. Thus Rome solved the problem which the Greeks had failed to solve, because among them no one state could achieve an unqualified ascendancy. She succeeded in giving to Italy a unity which Sparta could not give to Greece because her own outlook was too narrow, and which Athens, with her wider outlook, could not give to Greece because Sparta stood in the way. Rome did succeed in making Italy into a single territorial power, as was proved by the loyalty of the subordinate states throughout the prolonged struggle with Carthage. If the Persians had won at Salamis or at Plataeæ, such unity as the Greeks had achieved would have gone completely to pieces. The unity of Italy was strong enough to survive the disasters, the terrific disasters, first of Thrasimene and then of Cannæ.

The city-state system proved adequate for Italy, but it proved inadequate for imperial expansion. When Rome extended her dominion beyond the bounds of Italy proper, she could not place her new allies upon the same footing as the old. They could not be held by the general concession of self-government, coupled with the planting of colonies enjoying Latin rights, to provide a garrison as in Italy. Rome attempted to solve the new problem by the system of provincial governorships, which could not be harmonized with her own organization. The expansion required a standing army, and the city administration did not provide efficient central control over that army on distant soil, though the central control over a citizen army on Italian soil had been sufficient. The Roman city-states had attained its own highest efficiency as an aristocratic form of government tempered by the democratic Comitia and Tribune. But the Roman aristocracy was

using that term not in its technical, but in its ordinary accepted sense. Their perception of beauty was limited; material utility, not beauty, was the criterion they applied.

Rome was great through her moral rather than her intellectual force. The Romans were singularly unimaginative; but within certain limits they had a highly developed moral sense and an absorbing devotion to their moral standards. The standards were defective enough, but such as they were, they were applied for the most part with a strict and unyielding austerity. Of sympathy, of mildness, of generosity, the Romans knew little. Their ideas of good faith were strong. The story of Regulus, even if, as some historians judge, it had little foundation in fact, is a sufficient proof of their sentiment on the point; but their ideas of fidelity were marred by an abnormal capacity for justifying breaches of faith on some purely technical plea. Yet a Roman rarely broke faith, unless he could manage to persuade himself that he was not really doing so—that the other party had done something which released him from his obligation. He did not act on the cynical view that a promise is binding until it becomes convenient to break it, and no longer. Perfidy shocked him when he recognized it, though he did not readily recognize it as perfidy when his own interests were furthered by it. His self-righteousness was consequently irritating; but on the whole he was very much more inclined than most other people to recognize the obligation of dealing righteously according to his lights. And, above all, he had the supreme political virtue of reckoning loyalty to the State as of higher account than any personal interests.

The corruption of the old Roman character was the product of the first period of expansion outside Italy. The Roman abroad became demoralized. Immense temptations were before him, and he soon forgot how to resist them. Men brought back from the East new ideas of luxury and unprecedented wealth to give them effect. The ruling class forgot that the State meant the whole community, not the particular section of it to which they happened to belong. The idea of the State threatened to be submerged by the *esprit de corps* of groups with specific interests with their own. The old idea had not adapted itself to the new conditions. The State had to be re-conceived with an imperial instead of an urban basis before it could become the object of the old loyalty, the mainspring of the old virtue. The Roman, in short, had to recover his sense of responsibility. Half the greatness of Julius Cæsar lies in the fact that with the achievement of the supreme power he accepted responsibility himself, emphasized it, and imposed it upon his officers. Antony failed, though a man of high ability, because he flung his responsibilities aside. Augustus succeeded, because he followed his great-uncle's example, assumed responsibility himself, and revived the idea of responsibility to the

State—to a Rome whose mission was to be read in a mighty past, the mission of imposing order upon the world.

For the Roman ideas of righteousness and of patriotism had found their most characteristic expression in concentrating upon reverence for law; and reverence for law is the supreme influence in the maintenance of order, even when it tends, as in the case of the Romans, to lay more stress upon legality than upon abstract justice. Even-handed administration of the law by the State in its aspect of the governor, absolute obedience to the law by the State in its aspect of the governed, formed the basis of the Roman imperial system as in the great days of the Republic; and that fundamental principle was the grand legacy of Rome to the modern world.

The Hellenes, like the Celts, were an imaginative people, a people among whom the imaginative capacity was almost universally diffused. But among them, unlike the Celts, it was also very highly concentrated in individuals, with the result that they produced great imaginative statesmen, such as Themistocles, Pericles, and Alexander the Great, and also the most splendid imaginative literature that the world has known. Among the Romans, on the other hand, even a low degree of imaginative power was rare. Rome produced no imaginative statesmen before Julius Cæsar, unless we except Gaius Gracchus. She produced no literature of her own worth the name, until her expansion beyond Italy brought her directly under Hellenic influences. The struggle with Carthage did not produce in her such an effect as the struggle with Persia upon Hellas.

Nevertheless Rome, or rather Italy, did during one period produce a great literature, though in no single department attaining to the Greek level. The Greeks taught their culture to the Italians, if they could not endow them with their own creative genius. Cicero added nothing to the philosophic wisdom of the world, but he talked philosophy with a charm of style which made his treatises popular textbooks, and the same charm of style made his oratory the one classical model for centuries. To the same century with Cicero belong the only three born poets of ancient Italy—Lucretius, Catullus, and Virgil. But at the same time Horace, by his consummate style and perfect mastery of phrase, achieved a supremacy in the *genre* called specifically minor poetry, from which nothing will ever depose him; and Ovid attained a mastery of versification which made him, along with Virgil, the model of all future generations. On the mechanical side of literary production, a perfection was reached which established permanent standards, though the matter was essentially conventional and devoid of permanent value. In one field only, that of satire, were the Latin poets originators; and they were able to be so because satire is not, in the higher sense, poetry at all but rather a form of rhetoric.

Yet there was one man who at once transcended the Roman genius

and embodied in his poetry the Roman ideal—who perhaps did more than any other to revive the ancient spirit of Rome, to reintegrate her moral force. Augustus might organize the machinery, but something besides machinery was needed to give vitality to the Empire. Virgil's great epic, the *Æneid*, was not only, like many other products of the time, a masterpiece of style; it was inspired by a definite purpose—the purpose of glorifying the spirit of ancient Rome and of breathing the same spirit into the new Roman world. There is something of the same intent, something of the same effect, in the work of Livy, who told in his history the inspiring story of the “brave days of old.” But Virgil made his appeal not through the deeds of the men who had made Rome great, but through the mythology of her origin, concentrating attention on the single heroic figure of the fabled ancestor of the race, pictured as the ideal of Roman virtue—in something of the same spirit in which Tennyson endeavored to typify his conception of the ideal Englishman in King Arthur. Not that the heroism of *Æneas* is over-convincing any more than we find Tennyson's “blameless king” altogether convincing. But the whole poem is permeated with a passion of religious feeling, a consciousness of the Divine Will working through his chosen instruments, a sense of the hero's devotion to the divine mission laid upon him, which gripped the nobler minds, leavened the whole Roman world, and exercised such a fascination that mediæval Christianity, which condemned the whole pagan world, would not condemn Virgil, but, revering him in its own despite, almost succeeded in raising him into the same category with the prophets of Israel.

THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER XIV

THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST AND THE EASTERN EMPIRE, A. D. 396-630

I.—The Teutons

HITHERTO we have seen the Teutons, more or less kindred peoples of Teutonic speech, encroaching upon the Roman Empire, but not dismembering it. They have not come as conquerors; the Empire has succeeded in beating them off, or else has admitted them within its borders, nominally at least, as an act of grace. We have now reached the point when they are no longer to be held back, but are to sweep over the European half of the Roman world, professing perhaps allegiance to the Empire, but in fact establishing their own supremacy. Two centuries after the death of Theodosius the Goths were lords of Spain, the Franks of Gaul, the Saxons of two-thirds of Britain, and the Lombards of three-fourths of Italy. Before the rise of the Franks and the Lombards the Goths had established their dominion over half Gaul and over all Italy, and the Vandals had destroyed the Roman fabric in Africa, though their own dominion was feeble. We may, before entering upon the story of the conquest, give a short account of the common characteristics of the social structure among the conquering peoples.

The basis of Teutonic society was the tribe, the folk who were nominally at least of one kindred, as it appears to have been also among the early Latins and Hellenes. Unlike Latins and Hellenes, however, the Germans came under the observation of critical and cultivated persons, the children of a highly developed civilization, while they themselves were still in a relatively primitive stage. At the end of the first century Tacitus noted their characteristics, as to some extent Julius Cæsar had done before him. We have, therefore, the materials of a tolerably accurate knowledge, borne out by what we know of their later history. At that time the German clans had not formed states or territorial kingdoms, but were shaped into tribal aggregates bearing

a common name. As a general rule, the territory occupied by a tribe was divided into a number of separate communities, each community being a group of farmsteads called, if we use the Latin term applied to them, *vici*, villages. A group of villages formed the *pagus*, corresponding to what the English called the Hundred. Each village managed its own affairs and had its own headman. The freemen—the warriors—of the hundred, met in periodical gatherings to settle their common affairs. Periodically also the whole tribe gathered in arms in a General Assembly, to which each Hundred was supposed to send its contingent of a hundred fighting men. The hundred had its headman, and the tribe when it went to war elected a warlord from among the headmen. The headmen formed a superior council, who, so far as was necessary, submitted their plans and proposals to the Assembly of the tribe in arms. The same process was repeated on a larger scale when the tribes combined. The basis of the system, therefore, was what may be called the Executive Council of Headmen, the Assembly of the tribe in arms, and the War-lord elected as a leader in battle. Particular families of high descent enjoyed a prescriptive preference in eligibility. But the tendency was for the War-lord to retain his ascendancy when the fighting was over, for the position to become a permanent one, and finally hereditary in his family. Thus kingship came into being.

As the association of tribes became comparatively consolidated there came to be a definite social distinction between the group of nobles, men of high birth, and the ordinary freemen, wealth and power gravitating into the hands of the nobles, who were the natural if not always the necessary leaders of the contingents. But as the headmen had once had each his own bodyguard, selected warriors who attended his person, his *comitatus* (in Latin), or band of *gesiths*, to use the Saxon term, so each noble had his *gesiths*, and the king had his own body of *gesiths* or *thegns*, whom he employed as his personal officers. The system developed, with the minimum of modification by outside influences, among the peoples who were most remote from the Roman marches, and most completely of all in England.

Where the English settled as conquerors, they had arrived under a war-lord who habitually claimed to be of divine descent, and who was soon recognized as king, his family ruling by hereditary right, though the rule of primogeniture was not yet recognized, a brother succeeding in preference to a son who was not a grown man. The king had his council of wise men, the *Witan*, or *Witenagemot*, the original council of headmen, which had naturally become a council of magnates, including the hereditary nobles, called *eorls*, the principal members of the king's *comitatus*, his *thegns*, and, after the introduction of Christianity, the bishops. Conquests by mixed hosts tended to break up the tribal divisions, and the grouping of the communities became terri-

torial. The village and the hundred governed themselves as of old, but the assembly of the tribe became the assembly of a territorial division which, in England, became the *shire*. And with the expansion of the kingdom, the old assembly of the whole body of armed freemen fell into desuetude, although the theoretical right of the armed freemen to assemble survived; on great occasions, however, as on the election of a king, it is probable that the National Council was in form, though hardly in effect, a General Assembly, not merely a gathering of magnates. In every shire the king was represented by his own officer, who, as representing the king, summoned the hosts and led them in battle, while he presided over the folc-moot, the assembly of freemen. Descent gave no claim to holding these high administrative offices, though obviously as a matter of practice the king's officers were usually noblemen, and the tendency prevailed for the office to become permanent, and for the son to be appointed on his father's death.

The English, who effected their conquest in the face of no organized power, were free to develop on their own lines, obliterating the Latinism which had preceded them; but the Goths and Franks established their dominion in regions where the Roman system had been firmly fixed for centuries. They had to adapt their own methods to the Roman environment; they could not wipe out what they found before them—in fact they were too much impressed by it to wish to do so. The Goths, military masters of an alien and orthodox population, clung to their own institution for themselves, and to their own Arian Christianity, seeking to keep the two systems going side by side. But they started in a different position from the Angles who conquered England. Angles and Saxons invaded Britain not as one migrating nation, but in a long series of war-bands. Centuries elapsed before they attained to anything in the shape of a national organization; they were settled on the land long before they became distinguishable even as a group of kingdoms. But before the Goths entered the Roman Empire they had become organized practically as two great tribes (not territorial states), Visigoths and Ostrogoths. Alaric, universally accepted as chief by the Visigoths, was the head of a family which all looked upon as royal, and whom half the Goths, in spite of their Christianity, believed to be directly descended from Odin, Father of the Gods. Around him were a number of other chiefs, of descent only less high than his own. Every chief had his own *comitatus* of sworn followers vowed to his personal service.

When the Visigoths withdrew from Italy and overran Southern France and Spain, every noble became a territorial magnate, whose band of followers were the masters of a population who were not theoretically their subjects. Those chiefs could not be superseded by the king's officers; they formed an aristocracy of a much more marked character than the English eorls; and when the actual royal line

became extinct, its real authority could not be resuscitated in any other elected king, so that there was never any strong central government controlled by a monarch through his own servants. Out of these conditions arose that characteristic of Continental feudalism which made the king dependent upon the personal allegiance of the great nobles. The king was no more than the first among a group of nobles, any one of whom, if he felt himself strong enough, might assert his own claim, not only to disobey but actually to rule. Whereas in England hardly a case occurred of a king being deposed by a noble.

So it is with the Ostrogoths. Led by their universally accepted leader, the Amal Theodoric, they poured into Italy and made themselves masters of the whole country. The great king was able to establish for himself a complete supremacy; he governed the native population by means of the machinery which he found already in existence. But within a few years of his death there was no Amal left to command certain allegiance, the Ostrogothic power was destroyed by the generals of the Eastern Empire, and the Ostrogoths themselves vanished from the face of the earth.

The same fate did not befall the Franks, partly because no strong outside power attacked them, partly because the royal line was not extinguished for centuries and the Crown continued to command the allegiance of the nobility, and partly because the dominant Franks were not in antagonism to the prevalent religion of the populace, but allied themselves with the Church. The Franks in Gaul fused with the Gallic population. On the other hand, the power of the Crown under the early Merovingians created an aristocracy of service which, when long minorities threw the control of the government into the hands of the nobles, placed the supreme power in the hands of officials, virtually hereditary, so that in Gaul also a feudal aristocracy came into being.

II.—The Empire in Dissolution, 395–476

The United Roman Empire came to an end with the death of Theodosius. We have chosen this point for the division between the ancient and mediæval world because it supplies us with a convenient landmark. After Theodosius, although there was a period during which the West recognized a formal sovereignty of the Emperor at Constantinople, it never for any practical purpose acknowledged his authority. The definite breaking up of the Roman Empire began in the reign of his son Honorius in the West with the evacuation of Britain, although this was not effected by a formal withdrawal of troops. For the second time in the history of the city of Rome it was sacked by a foreign invader, in A. D. 510. Throughout the fifth century the barbarians were establishing a complete mastery, even while pretending

to recognize a Roman emperor. No other date seems to have a stronger claim. With the end of the fourth century, therefore, we close the history of the ancient world, and introduce the story of the Middle Ages by the story of the break up of the Empire.

When Theodosius died, Germanic tribes lay upon the European frontier of the Empire almost the whole way from the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Danube, although, at the eastern extremity, the barbarians near the Black Sea generally belonged to the Slavonic group. It was already long since there had been any question of the Empire extending its dominion beyond the Rhine and the Danube; on the contrary, though the barbarian incursions had actually been held back, large numbers of Germans, and still more of their Gothic kinsmen, had been admitted to settlement within the frontiers; Goths and Germans served in the Roman armies; a Frank Argobast had set up the last puppet Emperor in the West; a Vandal, Stilicho, was the soldier to whom Theodosius entrusted the care of his son Honorius, his successor in the West, while his elder son Arcadius, Emperor in the East, was similarly confided to the care of the German soldier Rufinus.

Of the two great Teutonic stocks, the German and the Scandinavian, we have found the Germans occupying the whole of the western region in the angle of the Rhine and the Danube, and latterly, at least, generally grouped as Franks between the Elbe and the Lower Rhine, and Allemanni on the Upper Rhine, with whom are generally connected the Suevi, or Swabians, a name less prominent than it had been at an earlier stage. Behind these were the groups of the Saxons, the Burgundians, and the Langobards, and then, pressing upon the frontiers of Pannonia, the Herulians, Rugians, and Vandals. These bring us in contact with the more definitely Scandinavian group—the group pressing south from the Baltic, who had to a great extent pushed aside the probably Slavonic groups which had formerly occupied Dacia as well as Thrace. Next to these comes the largest single group, the Goths, whose territories extended from the Baltic itself, approximately over the basin of the Vistula and the greater part of modern Hungary, whilst vast numbers of them had been allowed to settle across the Danube in Mœsia and Pannonia. The Goths in general, it may be remarked, had already, nominally at least, adopted Christianity, though in the Arian form. And still on the east of the Goths there were those nomadic peoples, more or less Slavonic in all probability, who had been included with Mongolian nomads under the general title of Scythians.

At the end of the fourth century the Alans and the Huns, of whom the latter, at any rate, were unmitigated Mongolians, were beginning the invasions of the West, which devastated half Europe in the fifth century, though in the latter half of it the tide, for no very definite

reason, rolled back again to the East or dispersed. The pressure of these ultra-barbarian hordes drove even the war-like Goths to seek a place for themselves within the Roman Empire across the Danube barrier. Roughly speaking, the Goths now on the Danube were the Visigoths, the western division of that people, while their very near kinsmen, the Ostrogoths, lay on their north-east and east.

When the young Arcadians and Honorius succeeded to the Eastern and Western thrones of the Empire, the burden of the defence of the whole of it was thrown upon the shoulders of Stilicho. Across the British Channel, Picts from the north and Scots from Ireland were already harrying the coasts and the border, and Saxon pirates had for some time displaced the Franks as the plague of the northern seas. Since the days of Carausius the Empire had employed an official guardian of the seas, who bore the title of the Count of the Saxon shore—which meant, mainly, that he had the command of what we may call the North Sea and Channel fleet. The organizations, however, in those parts, had for many years been extremely defective, and matters had been made worse for Britain when Maximus sought to set himself up as Emperor, and in order to do so carried from Britain into Gaul, not indeed the main army of auxiliary cohorts, but the Roman legions, and perhaps the pick of the cohorts themselves.

The strong hand of Stilicho was immediately felt, and for a time the attacks upon Britain stopped; while the Franks on the Lower Rhine were for the time disposed rather to defend than to attack the Empire. But while Stilicho was engaged in the West, Rufinus at Constantinople was not following his example. The restless Visigoths had been quieted by Theodosius, but they were very ill-satisfied with their position. It may have been with actual encouragement from Rufinus that they broke out under the leadership of their great chief Alaric—who had served loyally as an officer under Theodosius—and stormed over the Balkan peninsula. Rufinus was killed, and there seemed to be every prospect of the establishment of a Gothic dominion, when Stilicho came to the rescue, carried his armies into the Peloponnese, and beat Alaric back. The Vandal and the Goth were both of them fine generals; but the Vandal was the better, or his troops were better organized. Alaric was forced into submission, and promised obedience to Arcadius, who set him in military command of Illyria.

But Alaric was by no means satisfied. When Stilicho had gone back to Italy, the Goth did not renew his attack on Greece, but led his armies into Italy itself in 402. Stilicho hurried Honorius away from Milan, the Imperial residence, to the greater security, of Ravenna, gathered troops from every available quarter, and attacked Alaric, who had advanced into the plain of Lombardy. By two great victories at Potentia and Verona, he drove Alaric back to the mountains. Hardly had the Gothic invader been repulsed when a new storm broke.

A host of the still heathen tribes, now occupying the angle of the Upper Danube and the Upper Rhine, burst into Italy in a confederate horde, under their war-lord, Radagaisius; and once more Stilicho saved Italy by annihilating the invading force.

But triumphs of Stilicho were alarming to Honorius, as they had been to Arcadius. The great Vandal had shown a suspicious inclination to come to terms with the great Visigoth; and Honorius, incapable himself, was petulant under the domination of the able captain, whose daughter had been given to him for his wife. A plot was formed for the overthrow of Stilicho; in the summer of 408 he was condemned for treason and executed. Honorius had deliberately destroyed the bulwark of the Empire.

If Stilicho had lived, Alaric would probably have measured swords with him again as soon as he felt strong enough to renew the struggle. Now that Stilicho was gone there was no one to measure swords with. Two months after Stilicho's death the armies of Alaric were under the walls of Rome.

Alaric did not trouble himself about the Imperial court at Ravenna, a city extremely difficult to attack. In 408 he contented himself with exacting from Rome a heavy ransom and retiring. Next year he came again and set up in Rome a puppet rival to Honorius named Attalus. In 410 he came the third time, removed his puppet, and sacked the Eternal City itself, which he had hitherto spared. It is to be remarked, however, that he sternly repressed sacrilege; there was no violation of Christian sanctuaries, no robbing of churches. Nevertheless the mere fact that Rome, inviolate for eight centuries, had actually been sacked by the barbarian came upon the whole world as an overwhelming shock.

And yet Alaric did not choose to make himself Emperor. There could be no more convincing demonstration of the tremendous impression made by the idea of the Roman Empire upon all who came in contact with it than this: that the conqueror would not overthrow it, but, accepting it as a necessary fact in the world, elected to be himself called not its head but its minister, demanding official recognition as captain-general of its armies.

Alaric left Rome and led his Goths into Southern Italy, sweeping in spoils. He contemplated an advance into Sicily and thence to Africa, but his career was stayed by his sudden death. His kinsmen and chosen successor, Athaulf, dropped the design. He, even more than Alaric, had been conquered by the conception of Imperial Rome, and chose to look upon himself as the servant of the Empire of which he might have been master, though he paid little enough heed to the Emperor at Ravenna. He did not wish either to be a mere destroyer, or to repose in Italy in inglorious and enervating ease. The West offered a field for his energies, and thither he betook himself with his Gothic

host. For in the meanwhile other barbarians had broken in, and he could please himself with the belief that his warriors in the West would be recovering it for the Empire.

Almost at the moment when Stilicho was destroying Radagaisius, another host of confederate tribes, Vandals, Suevi, Burgundians, and Alans, burst into Gaul. The Burgundians abode in the regions of the Upper Rhine and the Upper Rhone and Saône; but the bulk of the host, in 409, when Alaric was at Rome for the second time, struck south-west and crossed the Pyrenees, though a considerable proportion remained in Gaul. When Athaulf marched to the West, the Vandals and Sueves were already establishing their dominion in Spain.

And in the meanwhile, also, the soldiery in Britain, disgusted by the farther withdrawal of troops to strengthen the armies of Stilicho, and left to do their best on their own account to resist the attacks of Picts, Scots, and Saxons, nominated an Emperor of their own. Constantine, the third in rapid succession of these Emperors, of "Tyrants," sought to expand his dominion and revive the old idea of a separate Gallic Empire. In 407 he crossed to Gaul to establish his power, taking with him more large bodies of the auxiliary cohorts of whom the army in Britain was now entirely composed, the last Roman legion having been withdrawn by Stilicho. Constantine himself was overthrown by the Imperial troops under the Illyrian captain Constantius, aided by Athaulf the Goth. But Constantius betook himself to Italy to marry the sister of Honorius, and to obtain for himself the position of co-regent; and the Goths, first under Athaulf and then under Wallia when Athaulf was killed, restored the Imperial supremacy in Aquitania and in Hither Spain, or, in other words, set up their own dominion there with their capital at Tolosa, the modern Toulouse.

It is to be observed that there was no formal evacuation of Britain. The very considerable body of troops which had been left there after the drafts upon the island by Maximus, Stilicho, and finally Constantine, still remained there. But no reinforcements were sent, notification was made that none would be sent, and no attempt was made to bring Britain again within the sphere of the Imperial government. Left to itself, it seems to have broken up into a congeries of principalities under local magnates incapable of presenting an organized and united resistance either to Celtic or to Teutonic invaders from across the seas. In the strictly technical sense, Britain was not evacuated, but for all practical purposes the departure of Constantine for Gaul had the effect of an evacuation.

Without interferences from the central government, the Burgundians gradually spread, establishing themselves over the greater part of the valley of the Saône and Rhone, and the adjacent territories east and west. The Goths mastered most of Southern France, and in Spain drove the Sueves before them into the north-western corner

of the peninsula and the Vandals into the south, where the name of Andalusia perpetuates the memory of the Vandal occupation. The Franks established themselves in the modern Belgium, Picardy, and Champagne; the north-west of Gaul, Armorica or Brittany, its least Latinized division, retained its Celtic characteristics as a separate dominion.

In 423 the contemptible Honorius died, and was succeeded by his nephew Valentinian, the son of his sister Placidia and Constantius, the co-regent, who had himself died two years before. Africa, not subjected to barbarian attack, had hitherto proved a source of weakness only when, in the latter years of Honorius, its *comes* Heraclian had made a bid for the Empire and invaded Italy, to meet with a complete and crushing overthrow. Africa was, in fact, the part of the Empire in which the old Roman characteristics had most firmly retained their hold. At this time it was under a governor named Boniface. Boniface fell under suspicion at the Imperial court, and was summoned to Italy; he had been loyal enough, but now, fearing disgrace and ruin, he invited to his aid the Vandals of Southern Spain, whose chief was the crafty Genseric or Geiserich. Geiserich seized his opportunity for escaping from the domination of the Goths and creating a new dominion of his own. The whole Vandal host poured in Africa. Boniface, realizing too late the ghastly blunder he had committed, returned to his allegiance and fought stubbornly but vainly against the invaders whom he had himself summoned. In ten years Geiserich and his Vandals had made themselves complete masters of the province of Africa. Although, like the Goths, they had adopted Christianity, they remained the most savage, the least amenable to civilization, of all the Teutonic barbarians. Roman Africa was entirely ruined, and in its stead was set up a pirate dominion, the forerunner of the many pirate states which from time to time have exercised dominion in the Mediterranean waters. The Vandal kingdom lasted for only a century, but before its end it had done its work of destruction, from which Africa never recovered.

The Vandal conquest was effected between 429 and 439. During that time another equally terrible foe to Rome and to civilization was consolidating his power in the region which we now call Hungary. For half a century past the hordes of the Huns had been terrorizing the eastern Teutons and Slavs. (It should, perhaps, be remarked incidentally that there is no connection between the names Huns and Hungary; "Hungarian" is a corruption of the name Ugrian, borne by later hosts of Mongolian invaders.) In 433 the terrible Attila became khan or chief of the Huns. They belong to that group of races which have appeared from time to time, always as destroyers, sweeping over the world in devastating storms, but very rarely either creating a

civilization of their own or assimilating that which they have already found.

Like Zenghis Khan and Tamerlane, Attila was a mighty warrior. While the Vandals were conquering Africa, Attila was spreading the terror of his name in the region of the Lower Danube, and even threatening Constantinople itself. But the West offered to him a stronger attraction than the East. In the middle of the century the Huns, under his leadership, swept towards the Rhine, leaving devastation behind them wherever they went, and absorbing into their army large numbers from the Teutonic tribes. In 450 Attila burst across the Rhine, making pretence that he had come to serve the Empire by smiting the rebellious Visigoths and to rescue the Franks from the Gothic domination. The Franks feared the rescuers more than the oppressors. They resisted the Huns, but Attila's hosts poured over Eastern Gaul till they reached the city of Aurelianus, of which the modern name is Orleans. Orleans closed its gates and defied the invader. Meanwhile, Theodoric, the Gothic king at Toulouse, was preparing to resist the storm, and the Roman armies were gathered under the great soldier Aëtius, himself probably an Illyrian, the real director of the Western Empire. Aëtius and Theodoric joined forces and marched to the relief of Orleans, which was still offering a successful resistance to the Huns, who were unskilled in siege operations. Attila fell back to Chalons, where he reckoned that the plains would provide him with good fighting ground, but in a tremendous battle in the early autumn of 451 his forces were heavily defeated by Aëtius and Theodoric.

The deluge was stayed so far as Gaul was concerned. Attila fell back behind the Rhine; but the battle of Chalons had by no means shattered his power. Checked in his Western advance, he led his hosts down upon Northern Italy. The population fled before him, those of them who escaped taking refuge in the lagoons at the head of the Adriatic, to become the progenitors of the Venetian state in a later age. Aëtius, without Theodoric's Goths, could not hope to conquer the man who was said to take a pride in the name the Romans gave him, "the Scourge of God." The Imperial Court negotiated; the persuasive eloquence of one of the ambassadors, the great pope, Leo I., was effective in persuading the Hun to abstain from sacrilegiously sacking the city of Rome. Attila consented to retire, though he demanded and was promised the hand of an Imperial princess, who was to take her place in his harem. He never married his princess, for before she could be sent to the Hungarian home whither he retired, he died suddenly and mysteriously, and after his death the tide of Huns surged back to the East, and dispersed itself, to reappear, it may be, as the Avars and, perhaps, the Bulgars, of later generations. Aëtius at Chalons had saved the Empire from the Huns, but only

to meet himself with the same reward as Stilicho. As Honorius slew Stilicho, Valentinian slew Aëtius; and as the death of Stilicho brought the Goths upon Rome, so the death of Aëtius brought the Vandals upon her. Valentinian died, the deserving victim of a conspiracy; the chief conspirator seized the Imperial crown and sought to make Valentinian's widow his own wife. The enraged Empress called upon the Vandal king to avenge the murder of the Emperor whose sovereignty he professed to acknowledge. Within a few months, in 455, Geiserich with his fleets was at the mouth of the Tiber. But he came not to avenge Valentinian but to gather spoil. Again Leo sought to save Rome from the invader; the Vandal was less persuadable than the Hun. Geiserich condescended to restrain his followers from miscellaneous slaughter, but they sacked Rome with a thoroughness which put Alaric to shame. They pillaged and destroyed, and carried away with them innumerable priceless treasures as well as crowds of captives, including the Empress, who had so rashly invited their intervention.

The Vandals went back to Africa. The usurper was dead, and there was none of the seed of Theodosius to set upon the Imperial throne. Upon the advice of Theodoric of Toulouse the Senate nominated Avitus as Emperor. The Emperor at Constantinople was Marcinus, who had married Pulcheria, the sister of Theodosius II.—the son of Arcadius, who died in 450. But Avitus in the West was a mere shadow. The effective power was seized by the Sueve Ricimer, who bore the title of "Patrician" like Aëtius, an able soldier who was now at the head of the army in Italy, the army composed from the "federated" tribes of barbarians within the Empire. Ricimer did not care to call himself Emperor, but he was dissatisfied with Avitus, whom he forced to abdicate and who was shortly afterwards assassinated, perhaps by Ricimer's orders.

Ricimer set up as Emperor a man of his own race, Majorian, who showed unexpected capacity, appointed new and capable officers, and prepared to wage war upon the Vandals; not simply as a matter of vengeance, but because the Vandal pirates were cutting off the corn supplies of Italy, which had long been mainly drawn from the African continent. Majorian prepared a great fleet. Treachery, however, not only gave Geiserich warning, but enabled him to destroy the fleet before it was ready to sail. Ricimer, jealous of an Emperor who was proving by no means a puppet, took the opportunity to foment a conspiracy against him. Majorian in turn was compelled to abdicate, and died immediately afterwards, probably by foul play. After an interval Ricimer set up a new Emperor, Severus, but found him, on the other hand, too incapable. The "Patrician" turned him out again, and, probably with a view to alliance with the Eastern Emperor, Leo the Thracian, accepted his nominee, Anthemius, in 467. Anthemius

proved as little to the liking of Ricimer as his predecessors; he, like Majorian, was too much inclined to go his own way. Ricimer pronounced his deposition, nominated a new Emperor—his fourth—Olybrius, and marched against the recalcitrant Anthemius at Rome. Anthemius was defeated and killed, and Rome was sacked once more.

Within a few months Ricimer and Olybrius died. Gundobad, a nephew of Ricimer, with a claim to the Burgundian kingdom—these barbarian princes called themselves kings not of a territory, but of the Goths, the Burgundians, or the Franks—was Ricimer's successor as Patrician. Gundobad named a certain Glycerius Emperor, and then went off to secure his own kingdom among the Burgundians. An Eastern candidate, Julius Nepos, deposed Glycerius, whom he did not kill, turning him into a bishop instead; and then the new Patrician, Orestes, turned out Julius Nepos, and made not himself but his young son, whom he had named Romulus Augustus, Emperor.

Augustulus, as men called him in derision, was the eighth puppet who had been put up in the last twenty years, and the farce had become intolerable. Odoacer, a German, probably a Herulian, won the confidence of the soldiery. He held the command of the various German contingents of the Imperial army. At the head of his German troops, reinforced by the tribes from the hills, he overthrew Orestes, deposed Augustulus, to whom he assigned a comfortable private estate, and then formally notified the Eastern Emperor Zeno that the Western world would have no separate Emperor, but would own the sovereignty of the Eastern Augustus. Odoacer himself, however, with the title of "Patrician," was to be the Emperor's viceroy and, for all practical purposes, independent monarch. Thus in 476 the separate Empire in the West came finally to an end; but practically it had been turned into a Teutonic dominion.

III.—The East, the Goths, and the Franks, 476–527

During these years the Empire in the East had fared better in the West. In Asia there had been little serious disturbance; nothing at all which corresponded to the commotion created in the West by the barbarians. In the Balkan peninsula Alaric had raged for a brief period before he turned upon Italy, and Attila had harried the northern districts. But the storms had descended chiefly on Western Europe; the impregnability of Constantinople or Byzantium itself caused the barbarians to surge against it in vain. The long reign of Theodosius II. had not been marked by any vigor, but it was at least not disastrous; and when Theodosius died in the middle of the century, and was followed to the grave, after a few years, by his brother-in-law Marcian, leaving no seed of his own house, the emperors elected were at least reasonably efficient men, who were not the puppets of the

barbarian chiefs of an army composed of barbarian mercenaries. Leo the Thracian counteracted the Teutonic element with troops drawn from the Isaurian mountaineers of Asia Minor, and he proved himself the master of the *Magister Militum*, the Captain-General Aspar, who would have liked to play the part of Ricimer.

Leo was followed by Zeno, himself an Isaurian, whose real name was not Zeno but something barbarically unpronounceable. Zeno became Emperor at the time Odoacer in Italy was overturning Orestes and deposing Augustulus in A. D. 475. He was less vigorous than Leo; something perhaps of a coward. His position was less assured than that of Leo, whose daughter he had married. But he was not without shrewdness and skill in choosing men who might be trusted; and he came safely through sundry conspiracies.

One serious insurrection, that of Basiliscus, had just been suppressed, when Odoacer announced to Zeno that the West recognized him as sole Emperor. Immediately afterwards was enacted a story which up to a certain point bears a marked resemblance to that of Alaric. When the Visigoths had moved to the West, the Ostrogoths had stayed behind on the Danube, and had presently occupied Pannonia, whence they moved eastward into Mœsia. Among the Ostrogoths in 477 there were two chiefs. One was Theodoric the One-eyed, an old soldier, captain of the German mercenaries in the Imperial army. The other was also the Theodoric, of the divinely descended house of the Amals, which might be called the Gothic royal family. Theodoric the One-eyed had supported the revolt of Basiliscus; now he demanded from Zeno the title of captain-general. The young Amal was at first ready to obey Zeno's summons to suppress the other Theodoric, but was persuaded by the One-eyed that the Goths ought to make common cause instead of fighting each other. The result was that for some five years Theodoric the Amal conducted a series of devastating raids over half the Balkan peninsula, while the One-eyed got his own terms out of Zeno. The death of the One-eyed left the Amal the unquestioned chief of the Goths, and in 483 Zeno made terms with him, appointed him captain-general, and bestowed additional lands on the Goths.

Five years later Zeno encouraged the dangerous captain-general to find scope for his own energies and those of his Ostrogoths in the West instead of in the East. Theodoric turned his arms against Italy, with results which we shall shortly see. Between 483 and 488 there had been a great revolt in Syria, led by Leontius, which Zeno suppressed with the help of Theodoric. The emigration of the Ostrogoths left the greater part of the modern Bulgaria and Serbia almost depopulated, but for some time the hordes of barbarians—Teutonic, Slavonic, Mongolian—made no effort to effect a permanent settlement south of the Danube.

On Zeno's death in 491, leaving no heir, Anastasius was chosen Emperor. He was already over fifty years of age, but he reigned with ability and success for twenty-seven years. At the end of his rule he left a full treasury, a healthy army, and a secure frontier; and at the same time he had very materially reduced the burden of taxation. There had been sundry revolts, but each of them was successfully confined to a limited area and was duly suppressed—a demonstration of the general excellence of the rule of Anastasius. He, too, died without an heir, and the Imperial guard raised to the purple their captain, Justinus, an Illyrian, who reigned quietly for nine years, and was succeeded in 528 by his famous nephew, Justinian.

Odoacer in the West acted on the sound principle of endeavoring to establish a solid and firm government, within a manageable area, covering Italy, Rætia, Noricum, and Dalmatia. Theoretically he was only "Patrician," the Emperor's viceroy; actually he was a king, who controlled the government, even making war when he thought fit without reference to the Emperor. In effect he inaugurated a German kingdom in Italy. During the period with which we are here dealing the German kingdom in Italy has very little concern with the German kingdoms in the West—the Burgundians, Visigoths, and Franks. The death of Geiserich immediately after Odoacer's accession left the Vandals in Africa to grow continually less formidable outside their own continent and more oppressive within it. For the numbers of the Vandals themselves were always small, and when Geiserich was gone they had not among them statecraft enough to organize government on any more intelligent basis than that of pure terrorism.

In Italy, on the other hand, Odoacer, while maintaining a vigorous policy as concerned the security of the frontier which he had laid down for himself, abstained from any costly intervention in the regions beyond it, deliberately ceding to the Visigoths the portion of Southern France which had hitherto remained under the direct control of the government in Italy. He Germanized the peninsula itself by expropriating the greater landed proprietors from one-third of their lands, which were bestowed upon the Germans. But he made no change in the machinery of government; he did not upset existing institutions; he did not attempt to impose his own Arianism upon the Church. There seemed to be every prospect of his establishing a Germanic kingdom of the same kind as those of the Burgundians and the Visigoths.

But in the East, Zeno wanted to get rid of Theodoric, and he was also annoyed with Odoacer, whom he believed to have fostered the revolt of Leontius. As Emperor he announced the deposition of Odoacer from the position of Patrician and the appointment thereto of the Ostrogoth Theodoric. In the spring of 489 Theodoric pushed his way through the mountains, with the whole Ostrogothic people

at his back, into the northern plain of Italy. Odoacer had naturally disregarded the decree of Zeno, and marched to face the invader at the head of his own German troops. But the Goths were a migrating nation; the troops of Odoacer were a mercenary army. They had no sentimental or traditional attachment to their chief like that of the Goths to the Amal. Odoacer was routed. He succeeded in rallying the remnant of his army so as to offer battle again at Verona. Again he was routed, and fell back to Ravenna. Theodoric mastered the plain of the Po; but in Ravenna Odoacer held out till 493, when the Ostrogoth offered him generous terms, which he was not intended in fact to enjoy. One crime was apparently necessary from Theodoric's point of view: when Odoacer came to his camp he was assassinated.

For thirty-three years, from 493 to 526, Theodoric was lord of Italy. Odoacer had been efficient, but Theodoric was much more. He had proved himself a great soldier; he was now to prove himself a great statesman. The Goths, the army who had won him his throne, were themselves very much the most advanced in civilization among the Teutonic peoples. They had been Christianized for more than a hundred years; they had been in contact with the Hellenized East; they had had long experience of the Imperial methods of government. Theodoric had himself spent several years of his youth at Constantinople, while he enjoyed among his own people the prestige not only of a brilliantly successful captain, but of a scion of the house of the Amals. In Italy there was no fighting force which could challenge the Gothic supremacy, and there was no fear of rivals to the Amal rising up among the Goths themselves.

It was the aim, then, of Theodoric to establish not a Gothic conquest, but a consolidated dominion. So complete had been the destruction of Odoacer's soldiery that the lands of which they had been in possession sufficed almost without confiscations for the settlement of the Goths themselves. Like Odoacer, the Ostrogoth took over the system of administration which he found, but beside it he set up for the Goths their own traditional methods of government. The Italians were given the law in Italian courts with Italian judges; the Goths had their own law and their own courts. Where both Goths and Italians were involved, the case was heard in a joint court. Theodoric had his own personal court, his bodyguard—thegns, as they would have been called by an English king—while he also had his official bureaucracy; and he was careful to chose the best men, regardless of any consideration except their fitness for office. An Arian himself, he refused to countenance persecution of any kind, pronouncing that no man can be compelled to belief against his will. He was energetic in his public works. He improved the system of taxation so that he filled his treasury without imposing any op-

pressive burden. In all respects it may be said that the government of Italy was better organized under him than it had been for centuries.

We must turn now to the West, where a new Power was asserting itself which was destined to hold a dominant position for many centuries, and was ultimately to give its name to France.

The Frankish group of German tribes had for a century past occupied the basin of the Lower Rhine, and the lands to the westward as far as the Somme. The Franks were in two groups—the Salian Franks, who lay, roughly speaking, on the west and south of the Meuse or Maas; and the Ripuarians, who lay beyond that river. Southern Gaul was divided between the Gothic kingdom of Toulouse and Burgundy. The other quarter of Gaul had kept itself free from one after another of the torrents of invaders. When Odoacer became Patrician in Italy, this last region was ruled over by Syagrus, who was called himself by the title of Patrician. The Gothic kingdom covered not only more than a quarter of Gaul, but also three-quarters of Spain, where, in the north-west quarter, the Suevi preserved their independence, as also did the older population of Basques, who have given their name both to the Bay of Biscay and to Gascony.

In A.D. 480 the great King Euric was reigning over the Visigoths—a prince under whose rule the Gothic dominion attained its largest extent, who is also distinguished for having issued the first written code of Visigoth law. In 485 he died, and was succeeded by a son, Alaric II., who was not yet twenty.

Now the Franks were the least civilized of the German tribes who had been in contact with the Roman Empire. They were still heathens. They had not formed a consolidated dominion, but were split up under a number of petty kings, the more important of whom, both among Salians and Ripuarians, claimed to be descended from the house of the Merwings—more familiar to us as the Merovingians. In 481 one of these chieftainships passed to the young Merwing Chlodwig (Cloves), the original of Ludwig, Lewis, or Louis. Young Clovis and an ally attacked Sygarus in 445. Sygarus was killed, and Clovis made himself master of the whole region of the Seine—in effect, of France west of the Somme and north of the Loire, with the exception of Armorica or Brittany, where the Celtic population defied the invader. Clovis appropriated these conquests instead of sharing them with his allies, upon whom he then turned, and whom he subdued, slaying every prince of the house of the Merwings until there was none left, and he alone remained of the seed royal of the Franks.

His next attack was made upon the Allemanni, whose confederacy was established in Alsace and the Black Forest, beyond the Rhine. The conquest of the Allemanni gave to the whole district the name of Franconia. A little earlier Clovis had obtained the hand of the

niece of the Burgundian king, Gundobad, who, as it happened, was not, like most of her kinsfolk, an Arian, but an orthodox Christian. Clovis, when he had conquered the Allemanni, elected to adopt Christianity, and received orthodox baptism, along with some thousands of his people. Within a few years all the Franks had become professedly orthodox, with the result that the expansion of the Frankish power meant the simultaneous suppression of the Arianism which had hitherto threatened to dominate the whole of the West—almost all Transalpine Europe.

Clovis next turned upon Burgundy, which he conquered one year and lost again the next, whereupon he made peace with Gundobad. Having found Gundobad too strong for him, he sought his alliance against Alaric the Visigoth, an Arian who maltreated his orthodox subjects. Clovis put Alaric to rout, and killed him in a great battle near Poitiers. Franks and Burgundians overran the Gothic dominion in France; and just at this time, by a stroke of fortune, Anastasius of Byzantium, who had become involved in a boundary dispute with Theodoric, chose to recognize Clovis and bestow upon him the title of Patrician, in the hope of finding him a useful ally; whereby the position of the Frankish monarch was, so to speak, legitimized in Gaul, of the whole of which he was now all but master.

In another respect, however, Clovis derived disadvantage from this event. Theodoric was not satisfied with organizing the government of Italy. He had initiated that system of international marriages which in later centuries was to play so large a part in European international relations. He had begun by marrying the sister of Clovis, and had then married his own two daughters by a previous wife to Alaric and to Sigismund, the son of Gundobad. Theodoric was ill-pleased when his brother-in-law killed his son-in-law; and in 509 he perhaps found in the nomination of Clovis as Patrician a further incentive to intervene in Gaul. The Burgundians held by Clovis, but Theodoric routed their armies with immense slaughter near Arles, and then occupied the whole coastal district on behalf of the young Amalric, Alaric's son, as far as the Pyrenees.

Still, when Clovis died, in 511, all the Franks recognized him as king and all Gaul, from the Rhine to the Bay of Biscay, was under the dominion of the Franks, with the exception of Burgundy—the district afterwards known as Languedoc and Provence—and Brittany. That dominion held together not because the Franks were politically efficient—they were little better than the Vandals, and on a plane altogether lower than the Goths—but principally perhaps because accident had made them adopt orthodoxy instead of Arianism, whereas the Arianism of the Goths was always a barrier between them and the Gallic and Latinized population over whom they ruled.

The kingdom of Clovis was divided between his four sons—the

eastern half between Chlothar or Lothaire and Theuderic; the west between Childebert and Chlodomer—though a part of Aquitaine was appropriated to Theuderic, who pushed out eastwards and annexed a great deal of Trans-Rhenish territory. The other three brothers attacked both Burgundy and the Visigoth province of Narbonne. In the Gothic War Amalric was killed, and the race of the Baltings, the house of Alaric, came to an end. Theudis, an able soldier who was acclaimed king by the Goths, drove off the Franks, and retained the province as part of the Visigothic kingdom; but the disappearance of the recognized royal race deprived the rulers of that divinity which had hedged the former kings. The Gothic power itself was permanently weakened when every powerful noble regarded the crown as within his own reach.

The attack on Burgundy was more successful. At first, indeed, it was defeated, and one of the three Frankish brothers was killed. The other two divided the dead brother's kingdom between them, and ultimately made a complete conquest of Burgundy in 532. In the following year the fourth brother, Theuderic, was succeeded by his son Theudebert, a capable person, who for a Merwing proved himself almost respectable. The earlier attack of Clovis upon the Visigoths had been frustrated, as we saw, by Theodoric the Ostrogoth in 509, when Amalric was a child. Until 522 Theodoric ruled, in Spain as well as in Italy, on his grandson's behalf, having as his lieutenant or regent the same Theudis who succeeded Amalric as king. During Theodoric's life the sons of Clovis did not venture any aggression. The Ostrogoth also impressed the fear of himself upon the Vandals.

Theodoric died in 525. The closing years of the great ruler were stained by some acts of cruelty and injustice; they revealed also the weakness of the Goths' position in Italy. They were Arians, the Italians were orthodox. The Eastern Empire was orthodox, and under Justin the Arians were receiving harsh treatment. Impartial as was the government of Theodoric, the Italians sighed for the supremacy of orthodoxy; and the religious division stood permanently in the way of that amalgamation or unification of Goths and Italians which was the great aim of Theodoric's statesmanship. The fabric he had built was destined to no long survival; it needed that Theodoric should have a successor endowed with the same kind of qualities as the great king himself. But his successor was a grandson of eight, whose mother, Amalaswintha, found the task of training her ill-conditioned son and managing the Gothic nobles more than a woman could accomplish with success. The Gothic dominion did not at once go to pieces; but we shall presently find that it was unable to resist the attacks made upon it from outside.

IV.—The Era of Justinian, 527-565

Justinian, who succeeded to the purple in 527, was, like his uncle Justin, an Illyrian; but, unlike his uncle, he had been highly educated. Also he was a man endowed with extreme versatility, and a passion for hard work which was inexhaustible. The reign of Justin, with whom he had been associated as Emperor, had given him a thorough training in the system of administration. At the beginning of his own reign he discovered in Belisarius a general of the highest class, who was also unswervingly loyal; and he further astonished and hocked the world by discovering in a notorious and singularly beautiful dancer on the stage, Theodora, a wife hardly less fit to exercise the Imperial authority than himself.

Justinian reigned for thirty-eight years. During that period he destroyed the Vandal kingdom in Africa and the Gothic in Italy, bringing both once more under effective Imperial dominion. In the East he waged great wars with the Persians. He surpassed all his predecessors in his vast expenditure on the building of churches and fortresses. But his building operations and his wars exhausted the Empire by the tremendous drain on its financial resources as well as on its manhood. The world was well rid of the Vandals; but the overthrow of the Ostrogoths broke up the most progressive element in the West.

Justinian was a powerful and successful ruler, perhaps the most powerful and successful since Constantine; but his permanent service to the world lay not in his conquests nor even in his buildings, but in the field of law. The great codification of the law in the three great works—the *Code*, the *Pandects*, and the *Institutes*—shaped the system of jurisprudence which became the permanent basis of the law of almost all Europe, and made his name supreme among the lawgivers of the world.

The Roman law had in fact arrived at a state of confusion. It consisted of what on English analogies we might call two branches—Statute law and Case-made law. That is to say, there were on the one side the actual laws, the edicts issued by emperors; and on the other, the decisions of judges in the interpretation of the law, which were taken as precedents. Old edicts had not been formally repealed when new edicts had been issued, so that there were plenty of contradictions in what we have called the Statute law, apart from the fact that many laws had fallen into desuetude. The *Code* collected and dealt with the series of edicts, cancelled those which were obsolete, harmonized the rest, and, so to speak, brought them all up to date. What we have called case-made law was treated in a similar manner in the *Pandects*. The authoritative precedents

were collected together, the weight of the authorities on which they rested was compared, and thus a definite body of finally authoritative precedents was given effect. The original precedents themselves, it may be remarked, had been either actual judgments delivered on genuine cases, or pronouncements made by lawyers of weight on hypothetical cases. The third of Justinian's great legal works, the *Institutes*, was rather in the nature of a commentary or exposition of the principles upon which the legal edifice was constructed. England was almost the only European country which did not base its legal system upon the Roman law formulated in the great work of Justinian.

Here we may turn aside to make note of one aspect of affairs in the Empire which we have hitherto passed over: In the fourth century the Christian world had been split between the orthodox upholders of the Divinity of Christ and the Arian heretics, who denied the completeness of that Divinity. But in the eastern portion of the Empire there subsequently arose another split. There was no room for Arians, but the orthodox were divided over what is called the Monophysite of Christ, but in effect His Manhood, declaring that He had not the dual nature of God and man, but the single nature of God. Orthodoxy in the East meant rejection of Monophysitism, and the two parties were as hotly antagonistic to each other as both were to the Arians; in the same sort of way as, a thousand years later, Calvinists and Lutherans were hardly less fiercely opposed to each other than were all Protestants to Papists. The Western Church was uncompromisingly in favor of the orthodox view, rejecting Monophysitism as heretical. In the East, while the emperors had been emphatically anti-Arian, some of them had lain under the taint of suspected Monophysitism—a fact which had tended to prevent a closer adherence of Western orthodoxy to the authority at Constantinople.

The most curious development was the associating of these ecclesiastical parties with what might be called the sporting clubs, who flaunted the colors of the "Blues" and the "Greens," according to their devotion to orthodoxy or Monophysitism, and to the political parties with which the theological parties were associated. On more than one occasion there had been furious riots between Blues and Greens in Constantinople, and when political disturbances arose these "factions of the hippodrome" were habitually called actively into play.

We can now turn to the story of Justinian's reign. He had hardly succeeded his uncle when the Persian king, Kobad, declared war. After some indecisive campaigning, the Persians in 530 met with a severe defeat at the hands of young Belisarius, who, though he was not yet thirty, had won his way up to the chief command of the

Eastern armies. In the next year Kobad's successor, Khosru, obtained a peace on the basis of the *status quo ante*. It did not seem likely that Persia would give further trouble for the time.

In 532, however, Justinian went near to losing his throne. His finance minister, John of Cappadocia, was equally able and unscrupulous. Justinian was orthodox, and was favored by the Blues. The Greens raised a clamor, by no means without justice, against the unpopular præfect John. Blues and Greens fell to blows. Justinian punished both with a heavy hand, whereupon the disgusted Blues joined forces with the Greens, and would have frigtened Justinian out of Constantinople but for the resolute courage of Theodora. The capital had been almost denuded of troops, but Belisarius had returned. The great armed mob captured the unwilling Hypatius, a nephew of Anastasius, and, imagining themselves masters of Constantinople, were just proclaiming him Emperor in the great hippodrome when Belisarius broke in upon them. Vast numbers were put to the sword in this "Nika sedition;" but the populace of Constantinople were taught such a lesson that they never again raised sedition during the life of Justinian.

Belisarius had checked the Persians in the East, but Justinian dreamed of restoring the old authority of the Empire throughout the West. The Vandal kingdom was his first objective. At the time of Justinian's accession, the Vandal throne was occupied by that singular phenomenon, a king who was not an Arian, named Hilderic. His orthodoxy, among his other defects, made him unpopular with the Vandals. In 530 he was deposed by his Arian cousin Geilamir. This was not to the liking of the orthodox Emperor, who was nominally suzerain of the African states: he ordered Geilamir to restore Hilderic, and Geilamir replied by telling him very literally to mind his own business. He was cheerfully confident that he was out of reach, and sent off his Vandal soldiery on an expedition to Sardinia, paying no attention to the threats of the Emperor.

Consequently, when Belsarius arrived in Africa in 553 at the head of a small force of 15,000 men, he took the Vandal kingdom completely by surprise. The subject population received him with enthusiasm. Geilamir killed Hilderic, and scraped together all the Vandals he could muster, numbering perhaps twice as many as the army of Belisarius. The Vandals could fight, but their general did not understand his business. Belisarius routed him completely, and in the next year, when the rest of the Vandal force had returned from Sardinia, inflicted upon Geilamir a defeat with such tremendous slaughter that the Vandal race practically ceased to exist. So ended the Vandal kingdom.

It was now the turn of the Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy. There the boy Athalaric died. The only available Amal was a certain

Theodahat, a nephew of the old Theodoric, who had put him on one side as thoroughly incompetent and vicious. Theodahat was now associated with Amalaswintha as the head of the State; he seized his opportunity, murdered her—for she was unpopular on account of the severe measures which she had found herself forced to take against some of the nobles—and became sole king of the Goths.

But this was not to be tolerated by a vigorous suzerain at Constantinople. Justinian dispatched Belisarius with an army of little more than ten thousand men to deal with Theodahat. He sailed to Sicily, where there was only a small Gothic garrison, and the orthodox population hailed him as a deliverer from Arian rulers. Theodahat lay idle, while the Goths raged at his inaction. Then Belisarius advanced into Italy, laid siege to Naples, and actually captured it, while Theodahat kept 55,000 men doing nothing. The rage of the Goths boiled over; they deposed Theodahat, who was shortly afterwards killed by a private enemy, and made a certain Witiges king, under the mistaken impression that he was a capable soldier.

But Witiges did not fall on Belisarius. The Frankish kings were seizing their opportunity to invade the north of Italy. Thither marched the new Gothic ruler, and before he had arranged a composition with the invaders, Belisarius had marched with 5,000 men upon Rome, which was evacuated by its small Gothic garrison, and opened its gates to him. Then Witiges returned with 50,000 men to besiege Belisarius with his 5,000 in Rome. The siege of Rome lasted for a year and a few days. The valor and skill of Belisarius beat off the attempts to storm the city, and Witiges had not enough intelligence to cut off the supplies which continued to find their way into the city, as well as some reinforcements. At last Belisarius was able even to dispatch a column to threaten Ravenna, the Gothic capital. Witiges raised the siege of Rome, and marched north.

The Goths, in effect, by this movement evacuated all Italy south of Ravenna, though the Imperial armies were by no means large enough to carry out a vigorous scheme of conquest in the north. Justinian, troubled by a fresh outbreak of hostilities on the Persian frontier, offered Witiges terms. He would have accepted them, but the enraged Gothic nobles offered to depose Witiges and acclaim Belisarius himself either as king or as emperor. They opened the gates of Ravenna; Belisarius entered and secured Witiges and then explained to the Goths that he had no intention of accepting their offer, but was occupying Ravenna for Justinian. Witiges and the contents of the treasury were sent off to Constantinople. The Goths dispersed; there was nothing else for them to do. A few towns in the valley of the Po were still defiant. Justinian thought that what remained to be done could be done by smaller men than Belisarius, whom he recalled (540).

Again we turn to the East, where King Khosru of Persia had just seized the opportunity to revive hostilities, encouraged by the absorption of the Imperial armies and the greatest of the Imperial generals in the affairs of Italy. The suggestion had, in fact, been made to him by Witiges himself when it dawned upon him that a useful diversion might thus be effected. In 540 Khosru invaded Northern Syria, and captured the great city of Antioch. Next year Belisarius appeared on the scene; but Khosru changed his point of attack, and fell upon the Roman territory at the eastern extremity of the Black Sea. Then he returned southward to face Belisarius, but before any great conflict could take place a terrific outbreak of the plague paralysed the armies. Before active hostilities had been renewed, Belisarius was again recalled, owing to Justinian's suspicions, fomented by court intrigues. In 545 the Persian war was ended by a truce which left to Khosru his conquest in the region of the Black Sea.

Meanwhile the work of Belisarius in Italy was being undone. The Imperial armies there were left without any one supreme chief. The Goths found a new and able leader in Hildebald, the nephew of Theudis, king of the Spanish Visigoths; and after his death a leader still more brilliant in his nephew, whom the historians have taught us to call Totila, though apparently his real name was Baduila. By two victories Totila won back the whole of the valley of the Po and Tuscany. The Goths flocked to the standard of the new hero, and most of the Teutonic soldiery in Italy were eager to join them. A hero indeed Totila fully deserved to be called, for besides being a brilliant captain he appears to have combined in his own person all that was best in the ideals of mediæval chivalry. So alarmed was Justinian by these successes that he felt it necessary to send the displaced Belisarius to deal with the Gothic warrior; though the great captain was insufficiently provided with troops. Totila besieged Rome; Belisarius himself could not succeed in making him raise the siege, and after a year Rome surrendered. The city was plundered, yet so high was Totila's authority that hardly a score of the Roman population lost their lives in the sack. But they were ordered to depart from Rome, and the city was left desolate.

The fighting went on, but Belisarius was never strong enough to inflict a decisive blow upon an enemy so worthy of his steel. In 548 Belisarius was again recalled; the Goth then rapidly cleared the Imperialist troops out of the whole country, except the one almost impregnable stronghold of Ravenna. He invited Justinian to revert to the relations which had subsisted between the East and the West in the days of Theodoric.

But Justinian had found a new general in a very unexpected quarter—the Chamberlain Narses. He gave to Narses the support

which he had refused to Belisarius, and Narses made effective use of it. In a tremendous battle at Taginæ he succeeded in overwhelming the whole force of the Goths by the combined use of heavy infantry with archery against the Gothic cavalry charges—tactics highly suggestive of those to be adopted by Edward III., Totila was slain and his army cut to pieces. In the next year the last remnants of the Gothic forces were overwhelmed at Sarno. Those who were left of them were allowed to clear out of Italy whither they would, and vanished for ever into the unknown. All that remained for Narses was to rout utterly a Frankish incursion into the north. But the overthrow of the Gothic dominion had left the whole of Northern Italy all but depopulated.

During the last years of Justinian the Persians were again driven out of their Black Sea conquest, and one more opportunity was given to Belisarius of distinguishing himself by dispersing a great Hunnish raid which swept up to the walls of Constantinople. It may be remarked that the old legend of Belisarius passing his old age in disgrace as a blind beggar in Constantinople has been proved to be a fiction. Both he and Justinian died in 565.

V.—After Justinian, 565-630

The Vandals in Africa and the Goths in Italy had vanished forever. An Imperial official called an Exarch ruled Africa from Carthage, while another ruled Italy from Ravenna. In Italy the Imperial authority soon became shadowy as it had ever been. Fresh Teutonic hordes poured in from the north, the emperors at Constantinople could spare neither generals, troops, nor money to preserve their dominion in the West, and when little more than half a century had passed after the death of Justinian there arose in the East a new Power—not merely an Oriental Power antagonistic to Occidentals, but an infidel Power, hostile to Christendom as such. The Greek or Byzantine Empire became the bulwark of Christendom; but having become engaged in the struggle with Islam, it could never again attempt to assert effective supremacy in the West. Our immediate task is to set forth the disorderly and complicated story of the period between the death of Justinian and the rise of Mohammed.

Justinian was succeeded by his nephew Justin II. The new Emperor did not recognize the financial exhaustion of the Empire consequent upon the costly wars and the enormous expenditure upon buildings by Justinian. The old Emperor had found it at the last worth his while to pay a subsidy to Persian king in the East and to the Khan of the Mongolian Avars across the Lower Danube, in order to keep the former quiet and to induce the latter not only

themselves to abstain from raids into the Empire, but to hold the neighboring tribes, Mongolian or Slavonic, in check; since for some time past, although there had been no attempt on the part of barbarians to effect a permanent settlement in the depopulated districts on the south of the Danube, there had been perpetual incursions into Imperial territory. Justin withdrew the subsidies; consequently the Avars became hostile instead of friendly, while the Empire became involved in a Persian War, which was a continuous drain upon it for nearly twenty years. Meanwhile, the Teutonic Langobards, or Lombards, were flooding Italy and establishing their supremacy over the greater part of the peninsula. No marked successes distinguished the struggle in the East.

Justin made a wise selection in nominating as his successor the capable and upright Tiberius; but Tiberius outlived his predecessor by only four years. He had found an able soldier to lead his armies in the East—Maurice—whose campaigns against the Persians were attended by some notable victories. By the nomination of Tiberius himself, Maurice succeeded him as Emperor in 582. But Maurice though an able military tactician and a man of many virtues, was an inefficient ruler. Realizing the financial exhaustion of his dominions, he endeavored to find a remedy in such singularly unfortunate economies as curtailments in the pay of troops and in the provision of the commissariat, which made the men mutinous and hampered the successful operations of his generals, who defeated the Persians, but were prevented from carrying out decisive campaigns. The war was in fact, brought to an end not by Imperial victories, but by strife within the Persian dominion. A usurper killed the king and seized the throne. The murdered king's son Khosru sought the friendship of Maurice, who helped him to overturn the usurper and recover the throne, and the grateful Khosru agreed to terms which practically amounted to a return to the *status quo ante*.

But before this peace with Khosru in 591 Slavonic tribes, in flight from the Avars, were overflowing the Balkan Peninsula, and the Khan of the Avars was raiding across the Danube. At the end of the century, after a successful campaign against the Slavs, the soldiers in the field mutinied—being engaged by the economies of which they were made the victims—proclaimed an illiterate Thracian soldier named Phocas Emperor, and marched on Constantinople. Maurice found that he could rely upon none of his troops, and fled, but was captured and put to death. For the first time since the old days of the prætorian emperors, an emperor had been deposed by the soldiery, and the Imperial purple had been made the prize of a successful rebellion.

Phocas was merely a brutal and tyrannical boor. Slavs and Avars poured back into the Balkan Peninsula, while Khosru of Persia pro-

claimed himself the avenger of the murdered emperor, to whom he owed his throne. The savageries of Phocas, who suspected every one and ruthlessly struck down every prominent person who inspired his jealousy, had a ruinous effect on the armies. The Persians were allowed to overrun Northern Syria and the whole of Asia Minor, Eight years after the death of Maurice, Priscus, the captain of the Imperial Guard, and Heraclius, the Exarch of Africa, conspired to overthrow the tyrant. The Exarch's son, the younger Heraclius, was sent with a great fleet to Constantinople; the Imperial Guard joined him; no one would fight for Phocas, who was seized and put to death. Heraclius (the son) was promptly proclaimed Emperor.

The disorganization had become so complete, the army had gone so badly to pieces, that for the next ten years the Persians continued to overrun Imperial territory. They captured Jerusalem, massacred the inhabitants, and carried off the supposed True Cross. They invaded Egypt, which submitted to them; again they swept over Asia Minor. But at last Heraclius resolved to break through the standing rule which forbade the Emperor to take the field in person. By an immense voluntary effort, in which the Church played its part, money and troops were collected. The effects were immediate. Heraclius struck straight upon Cilicia instead of attacking the Persian hosts in Asia Minor, who were cut off from their base. In a series of vigorous campaigns he carried the war into the farther Persian dominion. In 626, the Persians sought, in conjunction with the Avars, to capture Constantinople itself. The attempt was decisively foiled by the officer left in command, and in 627, at a spot close to Nineveh, Heraclius himself inflicted a final and crushing defeat upon the Persian armies. The Persians, who had long been weary of the war, deposed Khosru, whose successor sued for terms. All Roman territory was restored, the True Cross was surrendered, all prisoners were released, and a heavy indemnity was paid by the Persians, whose power had been finally shattered. Heraclius returned in triumph to Constantinople.

Three years after the death of Justinian the Lombards invaded Italy. They were a great Teutonic tribe which had settled beyond the Upper Danube, but had not hitherto come into direct collision with the Roman Empire. But Lombard mercenaries had fought in the army of Narses, and the Lombard king, Alboin, saw in the fall of the Goths an opportunity for taking their place. With their wives and families the whole Lombard people broke over the Danube and descended through the hills into the depopulated plain of the Po. With little difficulty they mastered the whole of what had once been Cisalpine Gaul. When Alboin was murdered four years later, the Lombard tribes acknowledged no single king, but spread in great miscellaneous war bands over Italy, established not one dominion

but many; though after a time they acknowledged a sort of supremacy in one of the chiefs who ruled at Pavia—a shadowy supremacy like that exercised from time to time by one or another of the Angle or Saxon kings under the title of Bretwalda. The practical result was that in Cisalpine Gaul—the plain of “Lombardy,” where the invaders found an insignificant population—the country became superficially Teutonized under the institutions of the Lombards, themselves much more primitive than their Gothic predecessors in Italy. In the districts about Ravenna, Genoa, Perugia, Rome, and Naples, and in the extreme south, the Lombards did not establish themselves, so that in Italy south of the Arno and the Rubicon the country was divided between Lombard and Imperial duchies.

In 583 the Lombard dukes recognized Authari as Lombard king, and on his death, seventeen years later, elected as his successor Agilulf of Turin. Agilulf himself was converted by his wife from Arian to orthodox Christianity. Through his influence the rest of the Lombards gradually followed his example. He was a ruler strong enough to suppress the revolts of turbulent dukes, besides being a person of some enlightenment; and during his twenty-five years’ reign the land comparatively had peace.

The story of the Merwings, now as in other times, was singularly unedifying. After the death of Theuderic, King of the Eastern Franks, his son Theudebert again extended the Frankish dominion over German tribes to the eastward, brought modern Bavaria under his sway, and sent two expeditions into Italy, while Witiges the Ostrogoth was struggling with Belisarius. His uncles in the West attacked the Visigoths in Spain and were soundly beaten. While Totila was fighting Narses, a Frankish host poured into the Venetian region, but was annihilated a year afterwards by Narses.

Theudebert died, and the East Franks voted the crown to Chlothar, the younger of the two surviving sons of Clovis. Chlothar tried his hand at conquering the Saxons on the north-east, but was very thoroughly defeated. When his elder brother Childebert died, however, leaving no child, the Frankish kingdom of Clovis was once more united under a single crown. We have no space to tell the tale of Chlothar’s iniquities; it suffices to say that the world was happily rid of him before the death of Justinian, and again the Frankish kingdom was divided between his four sons.

The eldest of the four, Charibert, died after the one creditable member of the Merwing family, his daughter Bertha, had been married to Æthelbert, king of Kent. Two of the others, Sigibert and Chilperic, married the two daughters of the King of the Visigoths, Brunhild and Galswintha. Chilperic murdered his wife and married his mistress Fredegonde; after which for several years the Frankish annals reek with bloodshed caused by Fredegonde and Brunhild.

Guntram of Burgundy, the most respectable of the three surviving brothers, persuaded the others to some sort of reconciliation and union for the purpose of beating off the Lombard invasion. Then Chilperic and Sigibert fell to fighting again. Sigibert got the better of Chilperic, whom he put to flight, and had just been proclaimed sole king of the Franks when Fredegonde effected his assassination.

Thereupon the Western Franks, the Neustrians, rallied to Chilperic; the leaderless Eastern Franks, the Austrasians, dispersed, and Brunhild was captured. Her child Childebert, however, was smuggled out of the way, carried off to the East Franks, and by them crowned king. As he was only four years old, the Franks might acknowledge him as king; but the chiefs took the government upon themselves, such as it was, and the kings never afterwards recovered that absolute supremacy which each had hitherto exercised within his own domain. Brunhild, by the connivance of Chilperic's son, who fell in love with her and married her, escaped to the East Franks, and allied herself with Guntram of Burgundy.

Then Chilperic was assassinated. Fredegonde, who had committed a variety of murders in order to secure the succession to her own children, was left with an infant son. Guntram, however, did not choose to deprive his nephews—the young Chlothar and Brunhild's son Childebert—of their inheritance, though he ruled over the whole of Neustria and Austrasia on their behalf as well as Burgundy for nearly ten years. Then Guntram died; Childebert was his heir, and Brunhild at once attacked Neustria in order to destroy Fredegonde and Chlothar; but the attack failed. Childebert died when he was only twenty-six, and there was another long minority. His two boys were acknowledged respectively as kings of the Austrasians and Burgundians. When they grew up they fell to fighting each other. One of them murdered the other, and immediately afterwards died himself. Brunhild had a great-grandson, Sigbert; but East Franks and Burgundians hated the old queen, and offered the crown to Chlothar of Neustria. Brunhild and Sigbert were taken prisoners, Sigbert was murdered, and the unfortunate Brunhild, who had committed crimes enough and to spare, was tied to the heels of a wild horse and dragged to pieces. She had been very much of a savage, though she was a Goth, not a Frank; nevertheless, she built churches, hospitals, and monasteries, and but for her relentless personal feuds might have had some title to be called a great queen.

Chlothar was now king of all the Franks, but the royal power had fallen to a low ebb. The government in fact passed into the hands of an aristocracy of dukes, counts, and bishops. Austrasia and Burgundy secured for themselves two virtually independent governors bearing the title of Mayor of the Palace, hitherto appropriated to the

king's principal officer, and we shall presently find the Mayors of the Palace dominating the kings themselves.

The Frankish people were more or less held together by the one fact that they were loyal to the house of the Merwings, however much the scions of that house might quarrel among themselves. There was no thought among them of any great noble or warrior deposing a Merwing and seizing the crown for himself. That one source of union was denied to the Goths after the disappearance of the house of the Baltings. On the death of Amalric they elected one of the nobles, Theudis, to be king of the Goths; but from that moment the kingship became purely elective. Moreover, as in Italy, the Goths formed a small proportion of the population, who were vehemently orthodox, while they themselves remained Arian. Hence they could not call in the support of the Church, as the Merwings did to some extent. Thus there were perpetual rivalries among the nobles on the one side, and on the other there was no amalgamation between the Goths and the native population. This sufficiently accounts for the fact that though the Goths in Spain beat off the attacks of the Franks, they made no counter attack upon the Frankish dominion.

When Theudis died a new king was elected on the strength of his prowess in war; but having no other commendable qualities he was assassinated, after which the Goths of Northern and Southern Spain could not agree upon a chief. Agila was elected, but the south rebelled under Athangild. Agila was defeated in battle, whereupon his soldiers put him to death and made Athangild king.

After his death there was another period of division and anarchy, and then Leovigild was accepted as king of the Visigoths. He was a vigorous monarch, who succeeded in establishing a powerful autocracy; and after nearly twenty years of his strong rule he was succeeded by an able son, Reccared. The great work of Reccared, like that of Agilulf among the Lombards, was the conversion of the Goths from Arianism to Orthodoxy, whereby he hoped to destroy the great barrier to the amalgamation of his subjects into one nation. Very shortly after his accession he announced himself a Catholic, and his example carried over many of the nobility and a considerable proportion of the Arian clergy. An insurrection of the determined adherents of the traditional creed of the Goths was suppressed, and after that it was not long before all or nearly all the Visigoths conformed to Orthodoxy. As a consequence Reccared found that he could rely on the active support of the Church; but it also followed that he gave the clergy a very much increased weight in the General Council of magnates which in varying forms was associated with every Teutonic monarchy. The number of bishops was greater than that of the dukes and counts—they were more clever and better

educated than the lay magnates, who were chiefly fighting men; and the general result was that the Church acquired a very powerful influence, and the toleration which had marked the Gothic rulers in their Arian days became a thing of the past.

When Reccared died, no long time elapsed before his son was killed, and his assassin, Count Witterich, was accepted as king of the Goths. But the very method by which he had gained his crown stopped the process by which, during the reigns of Leovigild and Reccared, the king had been raising himself definitely to a plane above the nobility. The Gothic dominion fell back into the decentralized condition which had prevailed before, and to the contests between the nobles was now added a contest for supremacy between the nobles as a body and the clergy a body.

It remains to be noted that with the close of the sixth century the bishopric of Rome attained to a greater importance than it had ever reached before, and from this time every pope of capacity and character was a real political force. Ever since the days of Constantine the Church had been a power; among the bishops, the Pope—the Bishop of Rome—had long held a certain primacy, by courtesy at least. In the fifth century the great Pope, Leo I., who may be said to have saved Rome from Attila, had devoted himself to making the primacy of Rome a universally acknowledged reality. He had not altogether succeeded. The East generally repudiated the supreme papal authority, and emperors with a tendency to Monophysitism were by means disposed to yield to papal claims. Justinian, in spite of his orthodoxy, was as much inclined as most vigorous monarchs have been to assert the subordination of the ecclesiastical organization to the Imperial authority. The Gothic rulers in Italy before him very steadily maintained the claim that their sanction must be obtained to render a papal election valid.

But in 590 the Lombards had overrun Italy, where the Imperial power was a mere shadow. In that year Gregory the Great was made Pope, without any lay sanction whatever; and Gregory, by his great abilities, his virtues, and his boundless belief in his own divine authority, obtained for the Papacy a prestige which it became all but impossible to destroy, and incidentally made the Pope—not the Imperial duke—the supreme authority throughout the city and the dukedom of Rome. And for practical purposes the Pope really superseded the Exarch of Ravenna, who was nominally at the head of the Imperial Government in Italy. It may also be said of him not only that it was he who established the *modus vivendi* between Lombards and Italians in Italy, but that he materially influenced the conversion of the Lombards from Arianism to Christianity, and Reccared's similar conversion of the Goths in Spain; while

to him was also due the missionary expedition which planted Latin Christianity in the British Isles.

VI.—The Teutonic Conquest of England, 450-630

We have described how, by the opening of the seventh century, all Western Europe had fallen under the domination of Teutonic conquerors. To complete the story of the Teutonic conquest, we have still to tell how the larger portion of the island of Britain became Teutonized. Britain had been less Latinized than Gaul or Spain. The effective Roman occupation had covered the country up to Hadrian's Wall between Solway and Tyne, but beyond that line, in spite of occasional campaigns and nominal subjugations, the Romans had never done more than plant military outposts to hold the Celtic peoples of the north in check. South of the Tyne the Britons had acquired a veneer of Roman civilization; their old tribal system had been broken up; they had become Christians, and were even sufficiently keen theologians to produce one of the most remarkable of heretical teachers, Pelagius. But the Latin influence was nevertheless so slight that in contrast with all the other Celtic peoples the Britons never generally adopted the Latin language, but retained their own Celtic speech.

When the legions had gone, and after them the pick of the auxiliary cohorts, there was no authority left to maintain a centralized government. The country broke up into a number of chieftainships or principalities. Here and there some individual of exceptional vigor established an exceptional authority, such as Caradoc or Coroticus in Strathclyde. But no consistent and united resistance was offered to the Picts of Caledonia, the Scots from Ireland who were also establishing themselves in what became the kingdom of Dalriada on the west of Caledonia, the sea-rovers from Friesland, the Saxons who had long been the pest of the North Sea, and the Jutes from Southern Denmark.

Somewhere about the middle of the fifth century a band of Jutes made a permanent settlement in the south-east corner of the island. Tradition says that they came at the invitation of a British prince, Vortigern, who wanted their aid against the Picts; and having come they sent for more of their countrymen and set about conquering the south-east for themselves. At any rate, the Angles and Saxons, who were all of very much the same kin, and were doubtless being harassed by the pressure of other Teutonic tribes on their rear, discovered that Britain offered a field for enterprising pirates who were disposed to establishing themselves permanently. In the second half of the fifth century Jutes and Saxons, having conquered Kent, Sussex, and Hampshire, swept over the country and drove the Britons

out of the south and the midlands behind the line of the Severn. At the end of the century they met with severe reverses at the hands—according to Celtic tradition—of King Arthur, who was probably a real person—not actually a king, but a successful captain; and the tide of invasion was rolled back, leaving a great band of desolate and unoccupied territory between the Britons in the west and the Teutons in the east. In the earlier half of the sixth century the Angles from overseas were fighting for a settlement between the Wash and the Forth. By the middle of the century one chief, Ida, had established his dominion over the coastal districts—at least, between the Forth and the Humber; and probably also by this time the English tribes had occupied the whole of East Anglia, and were pushing their way round the fenland into midlands.

According to the West Saxon tradition, a Saxon chief named Cerdic landed in Hampshire in 495. Cerdic was pretty certainly a mythical person, an imaginary progenitor of the royal house of Wessex. But a very real person was his reputed grandson, Ceawlin, who in 560 was king of the western tribes of Saxons on the Thames and south of the Thames, the creators of the kingdom of Wessex. Ceawlin pushed westward, and in 577, at Deorham, overthrew the forces of the Britons whom the Saxons called *Welsh*—foreigners. The victory of Deorham enabled the West Saxons to push up to the Severn mouth, and thus permanently to sever the Britons of Wales from the Britons of the south-west in Somerset, Devon, and Cornwall. From this time also the Britons were permanently blocked behind the Severn.

In the north the Northumbrian Angles, whose kingdom was periodically split into two divisions—the Northern Bernicia and the Southern Deira—and periodically reunited, were forcing the Britons back into the west. It was not till 613 that Æthelfrith of Northumbria accomplished in the north at the battle of Chester what Ceawlin in the south had accomplished at Deorham—driving up to the coast a wedge, severing the Britons of the north—Strathclyde, between the Mersey and Clydemouth—from the Britons of Wales.

Thus at the beginning of the seventh century we have approximately this division. North of the Clyde and the Forth Scotland was entirely Celtic—at least, if we are to reckon the Picts as Celts. The vale of Clyde and all to the west of it was Celtic. In England, Cubria, or Strathclyde, south of the Solway, including roughly the counties of Cumberland, Westmorland, and Lancashire, was Celtic, the whole of Strathclyde forming more or less a single kingdom. Wales formed another Celtic division, and Damnonia—that is, Cornwall, Devon, and part of Somerset—was Celtic. This country the Saxons called West Wales.

Along the marches lay a considerable extent of debatable terri-

tory; and east of this Angles and Saxons were in full possession from the Tyne to the English Channel. Between Forth and Tyne, in Bernicia, or Northern Northumbria, it would appear that the Celts to a great extent held their own against the Angles, and were neither extirpated nor exterminated, but amalgamated with the invaders.

The English tradition affirms that throughout England, Angle-land—the whole of the country which we have described as having fallen under the dominion of the Angles and Saxons—the British population was exterminated. It has recently been argued that the social conditions point rather to the theory that the Britons remained a conquered and subject population, the serfs of their English masters. Space forbids us to deal in detail with this question, but it may be said that the old theory has not in the main been disproved. It seems incredible that if more than a remnant of the Celtic male population survived, their language should have disappeared entirely and their religion also. Nowhere else did the Teutons impose their own religion on a subject population; when they came in contact with Christianity they were always Christianized. Nowhere else did the Teutonic tongues displace the language of the preceding population; all over the Roman Empire Latin conquered German, and when, at a later date, the Scandinavians colonized Ireland, they became absorbed into the Celts. Only in England do we find the phenomenon of the uncompromising victory of Teutonic language and religion.

There was no "heptarchy" in England, no establishment of seven defined kingdoms. But in the fourth quarter of the sixth century there was in the first place a definitely established Jutish kingdom of Kent, the longest established dominion in the island, one which was in touch with the comparatively advanced civilization of Western Europe, under the enlightened king, Æthelbert. There was another small kingdom, that of Sussex on the south coast, isolated by its geographical position. West of Sussex, Berkshire, the whole of the Thames valley, some districts to the north of it, and all to the south of it, were under the dominion of Ceawlin, of the so-called house of Cerdic. There was apparently an East Anglian kingdom. The Midlands had not yet been consolidated into a single dominion; and beyond the Humber was the kingdom of Northumbria.

Such was the position when Gregory the Great, not yet Pope, was first moved by the desire to carry Christianity to the barbarians in the north, by his admiration for the captive lads whom he saw in the slave market. Some years later, when he became Pope, he was able to carry out his desire, and to dispatch Augustine with a band of monks to preach Christianity at the court of King Æthelbert. Æthelbert had married a Christian princess, Bertha, of the Mero-

vingian house. He received Augustine graciously, permitted him to preach, and presently professed himself a convert to the new doctrines. His subjects followed his example; Kent became Christian; and Christianity also took hold in East Anglia. A few years later Edwin of Northumbria was converted, and the Northumbrian Angles followed suit. The Celts in England and Ireland were already Christians, but the Celtic Church differed on sundry questions from the Church of Rome; and the Welsh bishops, invited to a conference with Augustine, stood their ground. Consequently the Celtic Church in Wales and the Latin Church in England were unreconciled, and their antagonism helped to keep Celts and Saxons apart when their common Christianity ought to have diminished hostility between Angle and Briton. Paganism held its own for some time in the Midlands, where its obstinate adherent, Penda, was consolidating the kingdom of Mercia; but it died with his death at the battle of Winwæd in 655, a date which carries us beyond the limits of the present chapter.

CHAPTER XV

FIRST CENTURY OF ISLAM, 622-722

I.—Mohammed and his first Successors, 622-661

At the moment when Khosru was apparently at the height of his power and when Heraclius was on the point of carrying out his victorious attack, each of these potentates received a missive from Arabia inviting them to recognize a newly arisen prophet of Allah, Mohammed, who was then endeavoring to establish his claim to authority among the Arabs. Heraclius received the message politely, Khosru did not. Neither of them took any great interest in Arabia; neither had heard of the obscure Prophet, whose followers were to shatter the power of one and to wage deadly war with the Roman Empire until its final overthrow after more than eight hundred years had elapsed.

The Arabian desert cut off the Arabian people almost entirely from the rest of the world, though there had in the past been occasional tremendous eruptions. The Arabians had not been a progressive people. They had indeed held intercourse by sea with the West; probably they had sailed to India and to Africa; possibly they are the people whose traces as gold-miners are to be found in the eastern regions of Southern Africa. But it had never been worth while for any one seriously to set about conquering them. They remained under their primitive tribal system chiefly as pastoral nomads, though in some places they were settled agriculturists, and here and there set up commercial centers. Alexander the Great was contemplating the invasion of Arabia when he died; Trajan professed to have brought it under his dominion, though the Roman legions never entered the country; Jewish and Abyssinian adventurers set up petty principalities amongst them; and the Persians claimed some sort of supremacy over them. They had become for the most part worshippers of miscellaneous gods; but garbled editions of Judaism and Christianity had also found their way. In the sixth century A.D. traditions extracted from contact with Jews and Christians were mixed up with the primitive idolatry, the center of which was in the city of Mecca, where was the sacred stone in its shrine called the Kaaba, a general object of worship and the goal of pilgrimages.

The nomad tribes were professional robbers, who raided the occasional caravans which passed through the country, and pursued interminable blood feuds against each other, while the one definite virtue they possessed was loyalty to the tribe.

Mohammed, the child of an old but impoverished family, reached the age of forty before he had done anything to distinguish him from his neighbors. He was a dreamer who failed disastrously in the pursuit of worldly prosperity, until he found favor in the eyes of his employer, the elderly and wealthy widow Kadijah, who married him. The dreamer was moved with strange ideas of a more decent morality and a purer religion than he saw around him. He was not a Jew; he was not a Christian; but he acquired the conception of the one true God, who was the God of Abraham and abominated idols, who spoke to the faithful through prophets, of whom Christ had been the last; and then it was borne in upon him in a vision that he himself was the new Prophet whose revelation was to supersede those of his predecessors, among whom were reckoned Adam and Moses, as well as Christ.

Encouraged by his wife, Mohammed began to assert his prophetic pretensions—to come forward as a reformer of religion and morals. He found very few who would pay any attention to his credentials in Mecca, where his monotheism and his objections to idolatry would, if accepted, destroy the vested interests of the guardians of the Kaaba. In the rival town, which he afterwards called Medina, there grew up a small community of believers. At last, in 622, Mohammed had made himself so obnoxious to the people of Mecca that he took flight from that city. The year of the Hijra, the flight of Mohammed, is the year from which the Moslems date the Mohammedan Era.

In Medina the numbers of the faithful increased. Very few people now doubt that the Prophet's belief in his own mission was absolutely genuine—in fact, what he was offering to the Arabs was something enormously superior to anything known to them at the time. He claimed for himself that as Prophet he was authorized to assume special privileges, exemptions from the general law, and he claimed the Divine authority for all his pronouncements whether in enunciating the general law or in asserting his own privileges. It is easy enough to know that there was no Divine authority in the matter; it is also easy to be scornful of the increasing persistence with which the Divine pronouncements were directed to ends which had more connection with the expedient or the convenient than with morality or religion. But when once a man has come to believe in his own occasional inspiration, he very soon comes to believe that the ideas which he would like to regard as inspired actually were inspired. On the whole it would not be too much to say that Mohammed was probably never a conscious imposter. But his inspirations were

naturally apt to take a form consonant with the ideas of an extremely ignorant sixth century Arab living among people who were all as ignorant as himself. Wherever Mohammed varied from the vulgar superstitions of his race and his day, his variations were an advance; although if promulgated among Christians or even cultivated pagans they would have been retrogressive at best.

As Mohammed's following increased he developed the idea that he was called upon not only to persuade, but also to compel. Also he became readier for these compromises with existing beliefs which would win him an easier hearing. He wanted, primarily, to attach Mecca to himself, and he began the attempt by raiding the caravans and convoys on their way to the sacred city. It was while he was thus stirring up a state of war between Mecca, which had rejected him, and Medina, which supported him, that he addressed his missives to Herclius and Khosru. His followers became filled with a fanatical enthusiasm for the Prophet and his doctrine. In course of time the Meccans were defeated. Mohammed entered the sacred city, but only to retain it as the sacred city of the new religion. The Kaaba was the stone hallowed by Abraham, and its shrine had been sanctified by Adam. Mecca was still to be the sacred spot for all the faithful, as the temple at Jerusalem had been for the Jews.

The Meccans were converted, and Mohammed continued to enforce his doctrines and his supremacy upon the outlying Arab tribes, at the point of the sword. The faith which he taught inculcated a virile if unrefined morality, the worship of a righteous God, as righteousness was understood, a fatalism which fostered reckless courage, and a belief in the rewards and punishments of a life to come, of which the materialism was a help rather than a hindrance to eager acceptance.

In 632, the eleventh year after the Hijra, the Prophet died. The men who had been his comrades from the beginning formed a special supreme group among the faithful, and they nominated as the first "khalif" or successor of the Prophet his earliest friend and convert, Abu Bekr, thus instituting the principle of an elective succession. Another leading group had desired the recognition of Mohammed's son-in-law, Ali, who had married his daughter Fatima; and ultimately the Mohammedan world was split into the two factions of the adherents of the house of Ali, who were called Fatimites or Shiites, and the orthodox Sunnites.

The revelations of Mohammed had been written down by himself or by others, and collected together. These formed the Koran, which may be called the Mohammedan Bible. They were arranged, however, not chronologically, but according to their length; but it is not difficult to rearrange them in something like chronological sequence, which shows the gradual development of the politic or

expedient in their motive. The Koran, and the order that the new faith, Islam, should go forth and conquer the world at the sword's point, were the legacies of Mohammed to mankind.

The succession of Abu Bekr was followed by several revolts against his authority, which was disputed in various quarters. There was a great deal of jealousy between the Meccans, who were of the pastoral tribes, and the Yemenites of Medina, who were agricultural. Mohammed himself was a Meccan, but his earliest active support had been given by the Yemenites. Each claimed a superiority, and the chiefs of innumerable if miscellaneous Arab tribes, which would own no common head, were not too willing to accept the supremacy of any one man, now that the Prophet himself was gone. Abu Bekr, however, was both politic and vigorous. He had the support of the Meccans and of the distinguished warrior Khalid. The revolts were put down, Arabia recognized Abu Bekr, and the khalif set about the extension of Islam into Syria and into Persia, exhausted by its war with what we shall now, for convenience, call the Byzantine or Eastern Empire.

Within one year, Khalid was leading an Arab force into Irak, the old Babylonia, where there was a very considerable Arabic element in the population. Before long a second army was attacking Syria, to the leadership of which Khalid was transferred, when it was found that the forces dispatched by Heraclius were not to be immediately overwhelmed. Khalid's appearance changed the aspect of affairs. The Imperial army was defeated, and when Heraclius, awaking to the reality of the new danger of which no one had ever dreamed, sent a great force to Syria, it was utterly shattered at the battle of Hieromax or Yermak, in the north of Palestine. Then Heraclius, though worn out and suffering from a serious disease, took the field himself, as he had done ten years before against Persia. But he did not meet with the old success. The Moslems won city after city, and the Emperor found himself obliged to retreat to Constantinople, taking with him the True Cross from Jerusalem.

By this time Abu Bekr's brief rule was ended, and he had been succeeded by the great khalif, Omar, another of the Prophet's early companions. Omar himself was present at the capture of Jerusalem, where, with a surprising magnanimity, he allowed the Christians to retain the holy places (637).

While the Moslem armies were overrunning Syria, they had not after the departure of Khalid been at first able to advance in Irak. By 636, however, they had won some victories, and in that year received large reinforcements. A tremendous three days' battle on the Euphrates was decided by the fall of the Persian general, Rustum—the Persian army almost invariably broke up if its captain was killed or took to flight. The victory gave the Moslems complete

command of lower Mesopotamia, and by 641 the Persian king, Yesdigerd, was a fugitive, and the Persian Empire had ceased to exist.

But this was not all. In 640 the Moslems or Saracens, already masters of Syria, flung themselves upon Egypt. The Imperial army was put to rout, and all Egypt, except Alexandria, promptly submitted. In 641 Alexandria itself fell, just after the death of Heraclius. That great warrior had fallen upon evil days in his latter years. His Persian campaigns had proved him to be one of the greatest soldiers the Roman Empire had known; he had saved Christendom from a Persian conquest, but when he died, a power, which no one fifteen years before had dreamed of, had arisen, and had torn from the Empire Egypt and Syria and the Holy Land itself, besides completely overthrowing the only dominion which the Empire had hitherto regarded as in any sense a rival.

The triumph of Islam was due in the first place to its appearance as a militant moral force, the creation of Mohammed; and in the second place, it may be safely said, to the character and abilities of the khalif, Omar. Resigning to others the more splendid opportunities of leading the forces of Islam in the field, he devoted himself to the work of organization, to the business of enforcing justice with an even hand among his people, to maintaining at their highest point the new moral standards which Mohammed had set up. But in 644 the great khalif was slain by an assassin. Once more Ali was put forward, and once more was defeated. The choice of the old "companions of Mohammed" fell upon Othman simply because, among bitter rivals, it was possible to unite only upon the one who excited the least jealousy.

Though Othman himself, elderly, feeble, and incompetent, was quite unable to control the hostilities and rivalries of the various factions among the followers of Mohammed, the expansion of dominion continued during the twelve years of his rule. In the north the armies overran Asia Minor, led by Muaviya, a Meccan warrior of the Ommayad family. In the south, headed by Amrou, they crushed an attempt of the Byzantines to recover Egypt, and they broke across the desert on the west of Egypt, mastering what once had been the Roman province of Africa, Carthage, and the neighboring district. They took up a new rôle and launched fleets upon the Mediterranean, where for centuries none had challenged the Roman navies except the Vandals. But Othman, anxious to quarrel with nobody, displeased everybody. When he issued, on his own authority, a new edition of the Koran, which was to reconcile all parties, he only brought about his own assassination.

Complicated rivalries at once broke out among the leading men and the leading tribes. The khalifate fell at last to Ali; but Ali found his chief supporters among the more effeminate peoples of Irak.

The old rivalries of the other tribes had been more or less superseded, since the expansion, by the rivalry of Irak and Syria. But Ali's first struggle was with another group of the Companions of the Prophet, who were in favor neither with Irak nor with Syria. Ali won, but only to find a new rival in Muaviya, the successful soldier to whom were given the suffrages of the Syrian Saracens. Ali fell by the hand of an assassin (661). His son Hassan was named khalif, but on the defeat of his troops, which had been sent against Muaviya, his claim was dropped, and the khalifate passed to the Ommayyad chief, in whose house it became for a time hereditary.

II.—The Eastern Empire and Islam, 641-718

On the death of Heraclius in 641 there was an interval of acute disturbance, ended after two years by the accession of his youthful grandson Constantine, generally known as Constans II. During his minority Alexandria was for a moment recovered from the Saracens, only to be lost again. Constans, when he grew up, threw himself vigorously into the struggle with the Moslems. Twice, in 652 and 655, he took part in fierce naval battles stubbornly fought, though in both the actual victory fell to the Saracens. But the death of Othman and the contest between Ali and Muaviya checked the Moslem advance, and peace was made between the East and West, though no definite term was set to it. In 660 the Emperor found that in Asia only Asia Minor was still held by the Empire, and in the African continent only Africa west of Carthage; while the Danube provinces and half the interior of the Balkan peninsula had been absorbed by Slavonic tribes or by the Mongolian Bulgars.

As there was a lull in the struggle with the Moslems in the East, Constans turned his attention to reorganization and to schemes for recovering effective supremacy in the West. But when he visited Italy at the head of an army he got little more than a formal submission from the Lombards. When Muaviya obtained the khalifate for himself, while Constans was in Italy, the Saracens renewed their incursions into Asia Minor and their advance into West Africa. In both regions they were beaten back with difficulty. Then Constans was assassinated, and his son Constantine, called Pegonatus, "the Bearded," succeeded to the purple.

Four years later the Moslem attack had been pushed so vigorously that for the second time the siege of Constantinople was attempted. Constantine, however, emulated the achievement of his great-grandfather Heraclius, by inflicting a great defeat on the Moslem fleet and subsequently upon the land forces of the khalif, who were said to have lost 30,000 men in the battle. Again the Sara-

cens retired from Asia Minor, and peace was renewed for an indefinite period.

It was at this time that the Mongolian Bulgars crossed the Danube, attacked the Slavs, and settled themselves, with the assent of Constantine, in the modern Bulgaria, where they were in fact gradually absorbed by the Slavonic population—the Slavonic type survived, and the Mongol type almost entirely disappeared.

The death of Constantine in 685 was disastrous. He was succeeded by his young and energetic but cruel and capricious son, Justinian II. In the first ten years of his rule Justinian proved himself so intolerable a tyrant that in 695 one of his generals, Leontius, fearing for his own life, revolted, deposed him, and deported him to the Crimea. Immediately afterwards, Carthage, which for some time past had been repeatedly captured and recaptured by Saracens and Byzantines, was finally lost. The generals who were responsible hurried to Constantinople, and to secure themselves from punishment captured Leontius, deposed him, and compelled him to turn monk after slitting his nose—a form of mutilation which he had himself applied to Justinian. They set up a new Emperor, another Tiberius. Then Justinian reappeared from his exile, borrowed an army from the Bulgarians, killed both Tiberius and Leontius, and resumed his tyranny, which lasted for another five years. Then there was another military revolt, and he was killed. Three more emperors in succession were raised to the purple. Two of them were murdered, but the third, when attacked by a successful general, Leo the Isaurian, voluntarily abdicated in favor of the rebel. In 717 began the reign of Leo III., the first of the Iconoclast emperors.

It was indeed time for a strong and capable ruler to take control of the Empire, since the most tremendous of the Moslem attacks was now developing.

When Ali had been killed and his son Hassan defeated in 661, the Ommayad Muaviya was made khalif. But the remnant of the Companions of the Prophet, the Yemenite faction, still looked to the house of Ali to overturn the Meccan predominance. Their strength lay in Irak, and their candidate was Ali's second son Husain. There was another group, whom we may call the Puritans, who detested alike the predominance of the Meccan and of a Yemenite clique, holding that the election of the khalif should lie with the whole body of the faithful. Muaviya maintained his supremacy, but the succession of his son Yezid, in 680, was resented by rigid believers on account of his religious laxity. Irak called Husain to the khalifate, but his troops were easily routed by Yezid's cousin and lieutenant Obaidallah, and Husain himself was slain. Thereupon another candidate was put up in Mecca itself, Abdallah, the son of one of the

old "Companions." Then Medina refused to recognize either Yezid or Abdallah; Yezid sent a Syrian army against Medina, which sacked the city and massacred the whole population. Mecca was saved from like fate only by the death of Yezid himself.

The survivors of the party of "the Prophet's Companions" fled from Arabia and joined the advanced troops of the Saracens in Africa. Irak acknowledged Abdallah at Mecca; the Yemenites, henceforth known as the Kelbites, did not. Abdallah refused to come to an agreement with the Syrian army, which, having for the moment no candidate of its own, retired, and then set up another Ommayad, Mervan. The old Meccan group, now called the Kaisites, put up another candidate of their own. Mervan made terms with the Kelbites, and attacked the Kaisites, whom he defeated, and then nominated his son Abdelmelek as his heir. Mervan was murdered, and there came a period of wild confusion. Puritan fanatics were in revolt on their own account. The Persians adopted the Shiite view, that all khalifs were usurpers unless they were of the house of Ali. There was a khalif at Mecca, Abdallah, and another Ommayad khalif, Abdelmelek, the son of Mervan. Abdelmelek made terms with the Kaisites, got the mastery of Irak, and at the end of 692 crushed Abdallah.

For twelve years the Ommayad ruled with a somewhat uncertain tenure of power, which accounts for the failure to take aggressive action against the Empire. In 705 he was succeeded by Velid. During Velid's ten years' rule, the aggressive activities of Islam again came into play. He did not, however, concentrate, as might have been expected, upon an attack on the Empire. In the south and west the Saracen forces dominated Africa and Mauretania, and then flung themselves into Spain, of which the conquest will presently be described. But, while Asia Minor was overrun, the other direction of Moslem expansion during this period was to the east. Persia had been already compelled to recognize the khalif, and now Bokhara and Samarkand were subdued; and for the first time the Arabs penetrated the mountain barrier of India and captured Multan in the Punjab, like Alexander the Great, though they were unable to establish a permanent dominion there.

It was well for Christendom that Velid died in 715. His son and successor was the incompetent Suleiman. Velid had chosen great captains to carry out the work of expansion; Suleiman was afraid of them, recalled one after another, and put them to death or degraded them. Suleiman, however, undertook the enterprise which his father had deferred. Under Velid, the Saracen fleets had captured Sardinia, and the Saracen armies had overrun the greater part of Asia Minor. Suleiman resolved to attack Constantinople itself.

A huge army and a huge fleet were gathered. The army poured into Asia Minor in 716, and besieged Amorium—a fortress which lies in its center, and was at the time commanded by Leo the Isaurian. Leo checked the advance, but he was aware that a single general or provincial governor could not stem the tide. The chaos at Constantinople must cease, and that could only be effected if a strong man could seize the reins. He made a truce with the enemy and sped to Constantinople, proclaiming himself Emperor. The nominal Emperor, Theodosius, took the wise course of abdicating in his favor, and the Senate accepted the new candidate, who was recognized as Emperor in March 717.

The time before him was short. Within six months the Saracen army, commanded by Suleiman's brother Moslemah, advanced almost to the Dardanelles; the Saracen fleet swept through the Sea of Marmora, embarked the army from the Black Sea coast, and landed it in the rear of Constantinople, which was soon blockaded on the land side, though its defenses were too strong to be assaulted. The Golden Horn, the harbor of Byzantium, the Saracen fleet fell back into the Sea of Marmora. The blockade was thus incomplete, since supplies could still be brought into Constantinople by way of the Black Sea.

Leo had made his preparations with energy and thoroughness. Early in the next year his fleet sailed out of the Golden Horn, attacked the Saracens before they had raised anchor, and destroyed or captured the whole of the fleet which was actually engaged in the blockade. Then he dispersed the land force which was encamped on the other side of the Bosphorus. Moslemah's army was now completely cut off from its base; supplies ran short. As the summer came on Leo induced the Bulgarian king to advance against the Saracens. The Bulgarians annihilated a great column which was sent to hold them in check. Moslemah's troops had already been more than decimated by their privations. He raised the siege, and carried his terribly reduced force back by sea to Syria; two-thirds of them in fact had perished. The retiring fleet was caught in a tempest, and was annihilated. Leo's triumph was complete. Centuries were to pass before the Moslem power again attempted to attack Constantinople, the bulwark of Christendom.

III.—The West, 630-720

THE first century of the Mohammedan era (622-722) presents us in the West with what at first sight looks like a mere welter of meaningless struggles for ascendancy between ambitious nobles within each of the three great Teutonic groups—the Lombards in Italy, the Franks in France and Western Germany, and the Visigoths in

Spain. And as in the East we have seen that at the end of it Islam had torn from the Empire all its Asiatic and African possessions with the exception of Asia Minor—that is, of what lay on the west and north of the ranges of the Taurus and anti-Taurus—so in the West, at the end of the period, the Saracens had established their dominion over three-fourths of Spain. In the East, however, their further progress had been decisively stayed by the annihilation of the huge armies launched against Constantinople; in the West they had as yet met only with a temporary check at the hands of Duke Eudo of Aquitaine in 721. The decisive blow which finally penned them into Spain was not struck till eleven years later, when the great Frankish Mayor of the Palace smote them at the battle of Tours, or, more correctly, of Poitiers, in 732.

Yet, anarchical as the story appears, it is not without its interest and value. It illustrates in the most forcible manner the supreme defect of the Teutonic system—the extreme difficulty of adapting it to any strong form of central government. Among the Visigoths its failure led to the complete overthrow of the Visigothic dominion in Spain, when the Saracen power was launched against it. In Italy the Lombard rule still survived, but its ultimate dissolution, the break-up of Italy into a congeries of independent states or small principalities, was already almost assured; while its weakness and disintegration fostered the development of the political power of the Papacy, to which the Greek Empire could not offer such a resistance as it would undoubtedly have done if its energies had not been too much, absorbed by the ceaseless menace from Islam on one side, and from Slavs and Mongols on the other. Only among the Franks was the way being prepared for consolidation under the supremacy of one house, the Austrasian Arnulfings, which gave birth to a series of great men—from its founders, Arnulf, Bishop of Metz, and Pepin the Old, to the great Karl, whom the world will continue to call Charlemagne, the French form of Carolus Magnus, Charles the Great.

Our record of the Lombard kingdom closed with the reign of Agilulf, who died in 615. He was succeeded by a son, but no dynasty was established. The young king's brain gave way, the Duke of Turin was elected to the monarchy, and on his death, in 636, Rothari, Duke of Brescia, was elected. Rothari was a vigorous ruler, who suppressed an attempt on the part of the Exarch at Ravenna to extend the very limited Imperial dominion in Italy, just after the death of the Emperor Heraclius. Rothari's principal title to fame, however, rests on the first promulgation of a written Lombard law, which illustrates the near kinship of Lombard and English institutions. Like the kings of Wessex, the Lombard issued his code "by the counsel and consent of the wise men and the army" (that is, the

royal council—the English Witan—and the assembled freemen). With the Lombards as with the English, the principal penalties for misdoings take the form of fines, *weregeld*, compensation paid to the injured person for injury suffered, and to the crown for breach of the peace. The Lombard “dukes” correspond very much to the English *ealdormen*, while there are king’s officers who again correspond to the shire reeves. As in England, the soil is in the occupation of freemen; but whereas in England the occupiers, though politically free, sharing in the various folc-moots, commonly owe some form of tenant service to a superior, the Lombards have an Italian as well as a Lombard population on their hands, and the Italians are in a state more nearly akin to serfdom than the English peasantry until after the Norman Conquest.

Rothari died in 653. His successor left two sons, who were elected jointly to the Lombard crown in 662. They began quarreling. Thereupon Grimoald, Duke of Benevento, murdered one, and drove the other, Berthari, out of Italy, seizing the crown for himself. Grimoald was a very vigorous person, who successfully resisted the attempt of the Emperor Constans II. to break down the Lombard supremacy in Italy, and beat off both the Franks and the Avars, who invaded Italy from the north-west and the north-east respectively. When he died, Berthari was recalled, and ruled to the satisfaction at least of the monastic chroniclers, who applaud his virtue, his justice, and his piety. The only revolt in his reign was successfully repressed. But in the reign of his son Cunibert, the same rebel whom Berthari had pardoned broke out again; and though after a temporary success he was slain, a series of revolts bore witness to the slender hold of the Lombard king over the turbulent nobility. After Cunibert’s death, in 700, the anarchy increased until the accession in 712 of the vigorous Liutprand, who succeeded in convincing the nobles of the wisdom of submitting to his rule.

Meanwhile the Lombard kings had gradually absorbed most of the duchies ruled by Imperial representatives. The Exarch of Ravenna was theoretically the Emperor’s representative in Italy, his lieutenant-governor, and the *duces*, or dukes, were his subordinates. But in fact, in the Roman duchy the dux had been superseded by the Pope, and the Popes were very far from being obedient subjects—at least of any Emperor who either favored doctrines which they regarded as heretical or pretended to exercise a spiritual authority contravening their own. Pope Martin I. defied the Emperor Constans; with disastrous results for himself, because Constans was the one Emperor who succeeded in making his personal power felt in the West. But Constantine IV. was thoroughly orthodox from the Roman point of view; the Papacy recovered whatever it had lost under Constans, and no later Emperor was able to assert himself in Italy successfully.

The Papacy was rather in the stage of preserving and strengthening its own independence by appealing to the Lombards against unorthodox or aggressive emperors, and to the Imperial authority against Lombards who threatened to acquire secular dominion in the Roman duchy. The triangular duel became acute in the second quarter of the eighth century, when Leo the Isaurian was ruling at Constantinople, Liutprand was King of the Lombards, and Gregory II. was Pope.

Now we return to the Visigoths in Spain. There, after Reccared had led the way in exchanging the Gothic Arianism for orthodox Christianity, the kings were apt to be very much dominated by the ecclesiastics; and it is noteworthy that, while the secular promotion of the Latin population very much increased, there was a corresponding increase in the number of Visigothic dignitaries in the Church.

In 641, however, the nobles, tired of clerical domination, deposed King Tulga and elected Chindaswinth, who was already all but an octogenarian; doubtless reckoning that the old man would exercise very little control. But, in spite of his age, Chindaswinth asserted his supremacy with entire success, crushed rebellion ruthlessly, and then set about assimilating Goths and Latins, by placing all under the same law—Gothic law with Roman modifications. Under his son, however, the clergy recovered their ascendancy. From 672 to 680 there was another strong king, Wamba. And then for thirty years—under kings whose personalities are extremely shadowy—disintegration proceeded apace. The last of them was a certain Roderic, with regard to whom we are in possession of almost no facts, though there were later legends of the iniquities of his past which let an outraged governor turn traitor and to help the Saracens to land in Spain. Variants of the ancient myths—of the abduction of Helen of Troy and the rape of Lucrece—recur everywhere as the popular explanations of great catastrophes. What we do know is that by the end of the first decade of the eighth century the Saracens had mastered all Mauretania, the northern coastland of Africa, and that in 711 a Moslem host led by Tarik landed at Gibraltar (Jebel-Tarik). Roderic gathered all the troops that he could muster, but in a great battle on the Guadalete the Gothic army was annihilated. Within two years the whole peninsula, with the exception of the north-west corner, was in possession of the Saracens, as well as the province of Narbonne beyond the Pyrennes, which the Merwings had failed to snatch from the Gothic dominion. Some years later (in 721) the Saracens broke into Aquitaine, but were temporarily checked by a defeat at the hands of Duke Eudo.

We have seen that the Frankish dominion fell practically into four quarters—the great eastern division of Austrasia which included Champagne, and the three western divisions, roughly equivalent to the rest of modern France with Belgium. Of this the northern

portion, Brittany, Normandy, Picardy, Belgium, and most of the Seine valley made up Neustria, which perhaps meant "the new kingdom," the rest being divided between Burgundy and Aquitaine. In 620 the whole of this great Frankish dominion, of which Austrasia at least was emphatically German, recognized one Merwing king, Chlothar II., but, both in Austrasia and in Burgundy, he was obliged to recognize an irremovable Minister bearing the title of Mayor of the Palace, whose authority was only nominally subordinate to his own.

In 662 Chlothar made his son Dagobert King of Austrasia, where he was guided, if not controlled, by the Mayor of the Palace, called Pepin the Old, to distinguish him from descendants who bore the same name, and by Arnulf, Bishop of Metz. Arnulf, as was not unusual in those days, was a married man though a bishop; his own was wedded to Pepin's daughter, and from them descended the house of the Arnulfings, who in a later generation came to be called the Karlings, Carolingians, or Carovingians, the house of Charles Martel. Arnulf's wisdom and virtue, together with the piety which caused him in his latter years to resign his episcopal office and retire to a hermitage, won his enrollment among the saints of the Church. Pepin was a worthy coadjutor. In 628 Dagobert became King of all the Franks. Practically, he was then King of Neustria and the South, while Pepin ruled in Austrasia.

Dagobert's death, in 638, left the succession to two sons. Pepin's death, in the following year, gave the succession in the mayoralty of Austrasia to his son Grimoald, though at first he had to fight for his authority. Of the two sons of Dagobert, the elder, Sigibert, was King of Austrasia; the younger, Chlodwig, of Neustria and Burgundy. It would seem that another grandson of Chlothar II. had the title of Duke of Aquitaine. In 656 Sigibert of Austrasia died. Sigibert's son Dagobert ought to have become King of Austrasia; then the mayor, Grimoald, kidnapped the child, made him a monk in an Irish monastery, and grasped at the crown. His attempt failed; the Austrasian nobles recognized Chlodwig of Neustria as King of all the Franks, and Grimoald was cruelly put to death. Chlodwig died later in the same year, and was succeeded on the Frankish throne by his young son Chlothar II.

Then the Austrasians resolved to split the kingdom again, and, with their peculiar loyalty to the Merwings, they made Chlothar's younger brother Childeric King of Austrasia. With the two children on the throne, the Neustrian Mayor of the Palace, Ebroin, got the whole government into his hands, and used it with extreme tyranny for a short time. Then came anarchy; Chlothar died, the Neustrians recognized Childeric as King of all the Franks instead of his younger brother Theuderic, whom Ebroin set up, and both Ebroin and Theuderic

were compelled to take monastic vows. Then Childeric was murdered. Ebroin got out of his monastery, the two princes, Dagobert and Theuderic, were extracted from their monasteries by partisans, and in the end Theuderic got the crown, and Ebroin was once more Mayor of Neustria. The other claimant, Dagobert, was killed; but the Austrasians, who objected to the villainous Ebroin, chose for their leader Pepin of Heristal the Younger, grandson of Bishop Arnulf and Pepin the Old. Ebroin had the best of the fighting, but was murdered in 681, and in 687 Pepin at last succeeded in compelling Theuderic to recognize him as Mayor both of Austrasia and of Neustria.

From 688 to 714 Pepin was practically the ruler of the Frankish dominion, not attempting to usurp the crown, for it had become quite obvious that the Franks at large meant the royal title to remain with the Merwings, but reigning in Austrasia, where his nominees were Theuderic's Ministers in the West. The chaos of the last half-century had resulted in the loss of great part of the Eastern Frankish dominions, where the Bavarians, the Thuringians, and the Frisians, who had been in the past compelled to submit to the Frankish sovereignty, had thrown off such allegiance as they had once paid. Even the Swabians on the Upper Rhine had refused submission. In a series of campaigns Pepin now succeeded in restoring the Frankish authority and compelling Frisians and Swabians to acknowledge the sovereignty of King Theuderic and his successors, whose names it is not worth while to enumerate.

But Pepin did more. He was not only a conqueror; he was also energetic in spreading Christianity among the unconverted pagans of the outlying regions. Hitherto none had penetrated among them but the enthusiastic emissaries of the Celtic Church in Ireland. But before the beginning of the eighth century all England had adopted the Latin Christianity of Kent, not the Celtic system, which at one time seemed likely to gain the north at least. It was from England that Pepin procured his missionaries, headed by St. Willibrord, to go forth and preach among their Frisian kinsfolk. An Austrasian bishop carried the Christian doctrine into Bavaria, where the Bishopric of Salzburg was founded; while the Irishman, St. Killian, preached the gospel in Thuringia.

In 716 the great Mayor died, leaving a legitimate grandson and an illegitimate son, Charles. There ensued another period of confusion, for his widow made the preposterous attempt to get her very youthful grandson recognized as Mayor, having, naturally enough, no tenderness toward her husband's illegitimate offspring. But there was no meaning in a Mayor who was not capable of exercising vigorous rule in his own person. The widow shut Charles up in prison, but the Neustrians chose a Neustrian Mayor and attacked

Austrasia, ravaging it in co-operation with the Frisians and the still unconverted Saxons. Charles escaped from prison and took the field. To add to the confusion, Dagobert, the youth who was admittedly king of all the Franks, died. His only child was an infant in arms, so the Neustrians extracted from a monastery another Chilperic, the son of the last Childeric. Chilperic proved energetic, attacked Charles, and defeated him; but Charles soon afterwards turned the tables, routed the Neustrians very thoroughly, and un-earthed another Clothar, who was supposed to be a Merwing, whom he set up as King of Austrasia.

Thenceforth the military successes of Charles Martel, "the Hammer," were unailing. He swept out the Saxons and the Frisians and again routed Chilperic, who was supported by Eudo, Duke of Aquitaine—though the duke had thrown off his allegiance to the monarchy. The puppet, Clothar, died; and Charles, still professing loyalty to the house of Clovis, allowed Chilperic to remain king of all the Franks, but only on condition that he himself should be recognized as Mayor of the Palace both in Austrasia and in Neustria. Chilperic himself died immediately afterwards, and the remaining kings of the Merovingian house were nothing more than figureheads in whose name the Mayor of the Palace chose to act instead of grasping the crown for himself.

Here we may turn aside to glance at England. In that country we saw Christianity introduced in the Kentish kingdom in the last years of the seventh century, just after the King of Wessex had carried his arms to the Bristol Channel, and just before the King of Northumbria drove his way to Chester. The central kingdom of Mercia was consolidated by the heathen Penda; but before the middle of the century Northumbria had become definitely the chief among the English kingdoms. A Northumbrian king finally took upon himself, at the Synod of Whitby, to decide that the Church in England should be attached to the Church of Rome, not to the Celtic Church, though the latter still held sway in Wales. At the end of the century there ruled in Wessex the famous King Ine, who codified the laws of Wessex. England, as we have observed, was progressive enough to supply Pepin with the most vigorous of his missionaries, and to be the home of the Venerable Bede, the very embodiment of "sweetness and light." But the power of Northumbria was waning, and we may here anticipate matters slightly by saying that in the second half of the century the hegemony over the whole island passed into the hands of Offa of Mercia.

We have also to note that the most part of Celtic Scotland was as yet divided between the Pictish kingdom on the north and east and the Scots kingdom of Dalriada, which centered in the modern

Argyleshire. Ireland, though the cradle of saints, never emerged politically from the primitive Celtic clan system; and though there were kingdoms and a chief who claimed to be "High King" of the whole island, there was nothing which could be called organized government. Like the Romans, the Angles made no attempt to conquer the sister island.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CARLOVINGIAN ERA, 720-918

I.—The Iconoclasts, Charles Martel, and Pepin the Short, 720-768

HALF a century passed after Charles Martel won the supremacy over the Franks in the official capacity of Mayor of the Palace, before his grandson, Charles the Great, became King of the Franks and inaugurated a new era.

When this half-century opened, the first era of the growth of Islam and of its mighty expansion was already at an end in the West, save for a single effort which was crushed twelve years later. The Ommayad khalifate was already tottering. Suleiman died before the final dispersal of the army which besieged Constantinople. In 724 his third successor, Hisham, was already khalif. The two factions of Kaisites and Kelbites were perpetually at feud; and though the attacks upon the Byzantine Empire did not immediately cease, they were practically brought to an end by a decisive victory which Leo won at Nicæa in Asia Minor in 727. In fact, most of the many factions regarded Ommayads as usurpers, though there was no general agreement upon legitimate claimants to the khalifate.

The supporters of the house of Ali were seriously hampered by the unfailing incapacity of its members; the family of the Abbassides, the descendants of an uncle of the prophet, were pushing into prominence. Four years after the death of Hisham, in 743, a revolutionary movement was headed in the Far East, in Khorassan, by Abu Muslem, a supporter of the Abbassides. In 750 the Ommayad khalif was completely defeated and lost his life. The Abbasside Abdallah was proclaimed khalif. In a short time he had succeeded in massacring almost the entire Ommayad family, though one, Abderahman, succeeded in escaping and establishing a rival khalifate in Spain. But Abdallah made good his supremacy throughout the East. A new dynasty was inaugurated; on his death he was succeeded by his brother Mansur, who transferred the capital of the khalifate from Damascus to Bagdad on the Tigris, a city which rose to rapid wealth and splendor.

This transfer of the capital signaled in the first place the ascendancy of the Persians over the Arabs who had created the

Mohammedan dominion, and it was accomplished by two very important innovations. The first was the establishment of a great bodyguard of mercenaries, among whom were large numbers of Turks from the extreme borders of the Mohammedan Empire; and the second was the institution of the Wazirate, the appointment of a Minister who existed to carry out the behests of the khalif, from whom the whole of his authority was derived. For some time to come there is a lull in the clash between East and West, except for the isolated contest which continued to be waged in Spain.

Within the Byzantine Empire the whole period since the death of Justinian had been one of degeneration and decay, mitigated only by the personal vigor of Heraclius and his descendants. The barbarian flood which permeated the Balkan Peninsula, unlike that of the Western Teutons, was not only uncivilized, but was lacking even in the barbaric virtues. In the West, at least there was no lack of virility; in the East the barbarians were of a lower type, and the influences of the influx were more degrading. The Hellenic culture was almost lost; literature and art reached their nadir; religion had become resolved into polemical theology among the cultivated, and blind superstition among the masses. Leo the Isaurian came of a comparatively unsophisticated race, the mountaineers of Asia Minor, who had been least touched by intellectual cadence; and, living on the Mohammedan border, had perhaps been forced to recognize the moral worth of the most Hebraic element in Islam, its hatred of idolatry. The Christian world, but more particularly perhaps its Eastern section, had learnt to give itself up to what Leo recognized as idolatry, the actual worship of particular images regarded not as symbols, but as possessing supernatural endowments of their own.

Leo, when the Empire had passed through the tremendous crisis with which his reign opened, was able to turn his attention to the numerous problems of reform which presented themselves; and the attempted reformation by which he is best remembered is his Iconoclasm, his attack upon image worship. In all other respects perfectly orthodox, he perceived that the adoration of images as commonly practised was in fact a degrading idolatry; and in 726 he issued an edict forbidding image worship, and ordering carved images to be removed and paintings to be washed out. Intelligent laymen were apparently disposed to applaud; the mob, on the other hand, was infuriated and alarmed; and unfortunately the clergy, whose influence was necessarily magnified by all appeals to supernaturalism, set themselves vehemently against the Emperor. Throughout the East the edict met with a fair measure of success, so far as the open worshiping of images, or Iconoduly, as it was called, was concerned; but in Italy Pope Gregory II. defied the edict, addressing highly op-

probrious language to Leo, on the subject, and the populace were entirely on his side. His successor, Gregory III., took the same line. Leo, with his hands full in the East, prepared one attempt at coercion; but the fleet which he collected was shattered by a storm. In effect it had become obvious that the Empire was no longer—as indeed it had long really ceased to be—able to assert itself by force in the West. Practically the failure of the great Iconoclast marked the final emancipation of the Papacy from the last semblance of Imperial control.

Leo was succeeded in 740 by his son Constantine, opprobriously styled Copronymus by the Iconodules. Constantine was more fanatical and violent in his Iconoclasm than his father, whose dislike to images was confined to his rational aversion from their being treated as possessing supernatural attributes. The image worshippers, on the other hand, denounced both Leo and Constantine and all their works with the fervor which Hebrew prophets had devoted to denouncing the worshippers of Baal. Constantine, indeed, called a General Council at Constantinople; but the patriarchs of the Churches in Asia, as well as the Pope, refused to attend or to recognize the Council at all. Consequently the Council was attended only by the Emperor's ecclesiastical supporters. Its pronouncements were entirely in accordance with his views, and with its authority behind him he proceeded to enforce those views with a strong hand. Then, as eight hundred years later, the secular reformer of the Church found his most dangerous antagonists in the monasteries, and it was largely against them that he directed his energies. His efforts, however, met with small success, because in the eighth century there was none of that popular hostility to the monastic orders which in the sixteenth century made the overthrow of monasticism possible.

Apart from Iconoclasm, however, Constantine's vigorous reign extended the borders of the Empire in Asia, recovering districts which had been torn away by the khalifate. He succeeded also in strengthening the whole of the government over the Slavonic occupants of Thrace and Macedonia, and in inspiring a wholesome respect in Bulgaria. Finally, when the thirty-five years of his rule were ended, he left the Empire at a height of prosperity such as had not been known for generations; stronger also in the military point of view, and financially in an almost unprecedentedly sound condition.

In the West Charles Martel continued the work of Pepin of Heristal. Bavaria was compelled to renew its allegiance; and a Swabian revolt was completely crushed. The missionary work of Willibrord was continued by another Englishman, Winfried, known in the annals of the Church as St. Boniface, and unofficially as the "Apostle of the German," who thoroughly recognized how much he

owed to the strong arm and the zealous coöperation of the great Frank.

Meanwhile, however, the Saracens in Spain and Narbonne were preparing for further aggression. In 732 a great force entered the south of France by the pass of Roncesvalles, under the Viceroy Abderahman (not he who later founded the Ommayad khalifate in Spain). He put Eudo of Aquitaine to rout, and swept northward towards the Loire. In face of the sudden danger Charles Martel gathered a great Frankish host, and brought the Saracens to battle at Poitiers. There the Saracen army was cut to pieces, a vast booty captured, and the leader slain (732). Only a remnant escaped back into Spain. Eudo was restored to Aquitaine, but very definitely as a vassal of the Frank kingdom. It may be doubted whether a Saracen victory at Poitiers would have decisively given Islam a complete supremacy in the West, as the historians have generally been inclined to assume; the internal discords of the opposing factions, which twenty years afterwards split the khalifate in twain, would at least have given another opportunity for repelling the invaders. But the rout of Poitiers, commonly called the battle of Tours, definitely decided that the Saracen dominion should not extend beyond Spain, although another twenty years were to pass before they were finally ejected from the corner of France which covers the Eastern Pyrenees.

During the remaining nine years of Charles's life he was engaged partly in the repression of the persistent Saracens, partly in emphasizing his supremacy over Frisians, Bavarians, and in some degree Saxons. When he was dying, in 741, he was no more able than his predecessors to shake himself free from the invariable Frankish custom of dividing power between his sons. Bad as the custom was, it is a little absurd to make it a ground of reproach against any individual. It had been since the days of Clovis the unvarying custom as far as the crown was concerned. Charles's own father as Mayor was only prevented from acting upon it by the fact that Charles himself was the only son who survived him. It was only for the same reason that his grandson Charles the Great left his dominion an undivided monarchy. The Franks had not attained to the idea of a unitary succession, much less to that of primogeniture, the only system which in settled monarchical states can be regarded as in any degree an effective protection against divisions and dynastic disputes.

In this particular case no evil results followed. Though Austrasia was assigned to Carloman, and Nelstria with Burgundy to Pepin III., called the Short, the brothers worked in complete harmony until Carloman followed the example of his ancestor Arnulf, and retired from the world to a life of religion. It is curious to observe that although in 743 there was no King of the Franks at all, the last king having

died some years earlier without leaving children, the brothers still abstained from appropriating the Frankish crown, and instead hunted out Childeric, son of the last Chilperic, to be the last of the powerless Merovingian kings.

Neither Charles nor his son was popular with the French ecclesiastics. Like all the great men of their house, they were vigorous promoters of religion, as witnessed by their missionary zeal. But they had no idea of releasing ecclesiastical revenues from paying their full share, or more, of the burdens of the State. Nor did they hesitate in the interest of the State to impose upon the Church dignitaries selected by themselves entirely for political and administrative reasons. Less questionable, but not less unpopular, with the clergy was their zeal for enforcing ecclesiastical discipline, though here they acted not by the secular authority, but through the great Archbishop of Mainz, St. Boniface.

In 747 Carloman abdicated, and Pepin became Mayor of all the Frankish dominions. Four years later he had satisfied himself that the time had come for putting an end to the farce of the Merovingian monarchy. A National Council was held, which emphatically approved his proposal that the puppet child-king should be deposed and the Frankish crown should be set on his own head. By way of securing his position, Pepin procured the papal sanction, a step which was afterwards treated as implying that the papal sanction was necessary and authoritative; although the question put to Pope Zacharias by Pepin's embassy was couched as an abstract proposition. The Pope, who wanted Pepin, naturally gave a quite satisfactory answer. Childeric retired into a monastery, and Pepin became King of the Franks, the first of the Karling kings.

During the seventeen years of his kingship Pepin waged successful wars against the Saxons in the northwest and the Saracens in the south, as well as the insurgent dukes of Bavaria and Aquitaine, who were duly brought to subjection. But next to the leading fact that he definitely established the Carolingian dynasty with the common assent of all the Franks, the outstanding importance of his reign turns upon his relations with the Lombards and the Papacy.

From 712 to 743 Liutprand reigned in Italy, the greatest of the Lombard kings. From the first he exacted successfully from the Lombard dukes an unprecedented obedience to the Crown. He did not at first make any attack upon the Imperial dominion. But in 726 Leo's edict concerning images started a furious quarrel between the Emperor and Pope Gregory II. The Italians sided with the Pope; Imperial dukes, who tried to enforce the edict, were deposed. Thereupon Liutprand took up arms against the viceroy, the Exarch of Ravenna, and the Italians generally opened their gates to him. But the Exarch held Ravenna itself, and two of the southern Lombard dukes revolted

against Liutprand. His policy therefore was modified. He made terms with the Exarch, suppressed the dukes, and then posed as arbitrator between Gregory and the Exarch, the representative of Imperialism. Practically the Exarch was left with Ravenna and nothing else, while Gregory was not to be interfered with. Then Gregory died; but his successor, Gregory III., was equally hostile to Leo. It was at this time that Leo's design of restoring his authority in Italy was wrecked by the destruction of his fleet.

Liutprand was on excellent terms with Charles Martel, but Gregory III. viewed the Lombard's power with serious apprehension. He quarreled with Liutprand, and then appealed for protection to Charles. Charles did not care to intervene, and when both he and Gregory died, in 741, Liutprand dealt gently with the new Pope, Zacharias. He gave the Pope presents instead of attacking him, and only insisted that the Papacy should abstain from countenancing his rebellious dukes.

But the hostility of the Papacy to the Lombard kingdom was not diminished. Liutprand died in 743. For nine years the peace was preserved between the Lombard monarchy and the Papacy; but in 752, the year after Pepin assumed the crown of the Franks, a new Lombard king, Aistolf, attacked and captured Ravenna, and then resolved to bring under his sway the Roman duchy over which a new Pope, Stephen II., was now ruling. Stephen threatened him with ecclesiastical anathemas, but then, as he could get no help from the Iconoclastic Emperor, Constantine, took the more practical step of appealing to King Pepin in 753.

Pepin was naturally zealous for the Papacy, and Aistolf had certainly been guilty of wanton aggression against it. The Assembly of the Franks applauded the king's proposal to intervene in Italy. In 754 Pepin came down into North Italy, routed Aistolf, and shut him up in Pavia. Thereupon Aistolf did homage to Pepin, and promised to restore what he had taken from Rome. Pepin retired in triumph, but by the end of the next year Aistolf was in arms again and besieging Rome. Pepin was very soon on the march. Aistolf could not resist him, and this time Pepin, before retiring, compelled him to hand over actual possession of the whole of the exarchate to the Pope, besides appropriating a quantity of the royal treasure of the Lombards and imposing an annual tribute.

Pepin died in 768, leaving his dominion to be shared between his sons Charles and Carloman. The death of Carloman in 771 came just in time to prevent a contest for supremacy between the brothers, and made Charles sole King of the Franks.

II.—The Deeds of Charles the Great, 771-814

Before entering upon the career of the great monarch who re-created the Imperial idea in the West, we may conveniently take stock of the distribution of the powers in the world as it was known in the eighth century.

First: the dominion of the khalifate extended over Asia from the Taurus range, which formed the boundary of the Byzantine Empire, to the Hindu Kush, the barrier which divides India from Central Asia. It extended also over all Northern Africa, but in Spain itself the Omayyad khalifate of Cordova refused to recognize the khalif at Bagdad, which had now become the actual headquarters of Islam. What had once been the Roman Empire, but now had become the Eastern, Greek, or Byzantine Empire, extended over Asia Minor, over the coasts and some parts of the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, over Sicily and the islands of the Mediterranean, while it had not ceased to claim a supremacy in Italy. The regions, however, on the south of the Lower Danube, and between the Upper Danube and the Adriatic, were now populated by Slavs with a Bulgarian admixture in the Eastern area which called itself Bulgaria. The Western Slavs were in effect under the dominion of the Mongol Empire of the Avars, the main strength of which lay on the north of the Danube, in what is now Hungary. What had once been Pannonia, between the Danube and the Save, was a part of the empire of the Avars. East of the Avars lay only the dimly known hordes of migratory Mongols; between the Avar Empire and the Baltic and in the mountains of Bohemia were other swarms of Slavonic peoples who had penned the Scandinavian Teutons into the Danish Peninsula, Norway and Sweden, and the Baltic islands. Of these Northmen we have heard nothing as yet. The Elbe and the Bohemian mountains form approximately a boundary between Slavs and Teutons.

Following the Eastern Teutonic marches then from north to south, the Danes are at the top; next comes the Saxon group; then Thuringia, and then Bavaria; but the Low Countries on the northwest of the Saxons, between the mouths of the Rhine and the Weser, form Friesland. Denmark, Saxony, and East Friesland are still outside the Frankish dominion, but Thuringia and Bavaria acknowledge the Frank sovereignty. The Frank dominion includes the rest of modern Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and modern France, with the exception of the Narbonne district, which is still in the hands of the Saracens. In the northwest corner of Spain and the Western Pyrenees the Goths and Spaniards are still unconquered; over the rest of the peninsula the Saracens are supreme. In Italy the Papacy is in full temporal possession of the States of the Church, stretching across Italy, and

including the exarchate of Ravenna, with the duchies of Rome and Perugia. The rest of the peninsula is still the Lombard kingdom, though the Lombards in Italy are, as the Visigoths had been in Spain, still only a dominant foreign population. It remains to be observed that the main strength of the Franks lies in Austrasia, where they are thorough-going Germans, not Latinized as in the greater part of Neustria and in Aquitaine and Burgundy. The crown of the Franks has passed to an Austrasian house, uncompromisingly German.

When Charles became sole King of the Franks, he was a young man of twenty-seven, built in heroic mould; nearer seven feet than six feet in height, and proportionately endowed with physical powers. He had inherited the abilities of his race in double measure; he was one of the few individuals of whom it can definitely be said that if he had not lived the history of the world would have been different. His wisdom was unerring; his morals, from a modern or Christian point of view, were defective. His principles and his practice made very light of the sanctity of marriage; he could on occasion be ferociously merciless. But that is only to say that he was not free from the vices of his age and race.

It is evident that Charles was at first determined to settle the eastern marches of his dominion, and to begin with the conquest of Saxony. This was the enterprise which he took in hand in the year following Carloman's death. But on his return from a successful campaign, two embassies from Italy gave his immediate energies a different direction. The Pope had picked a quarrel with Desiderius, the successor of Aistolf, and in consequence the Lombard had invaded papal territory; whereupon Pope Hadrian I. dispatched his embassy to call in the aid of Charles, and the alarmed Desiderius dispatched another to explain that there was no reason for interference. Now, after Pepin's death, when Charles was anticipating quarrels with his own brother, Carloman, he did not wish to quarrel with Lombardy; therefore, in spite of indignant protests from the Pope, he had married the Lombard king's daughter. But his attitude presently changed: he got his marriage annulled, to the natural indignation of his father-in-law, and took a new wife. When there was no more danger from Carloman, Charles was quite ready to make the most of an opportunity for carrying his father's operations in Lombardy to their logical conclusion. When he met the embassies, he peremptorily ordered the Lombards to restore what he had seized. The angry Desiderius defied him, and in 773 Charles invaded Lombardy. He shut Desiderius up in Pavia, went to Rome, where he made the most amicable arrangements with Hadrian, and then went back to Pavia, where Desiderius had to surrender unconditionally. Thereupon Charles himself assumed the Lombard crown, proclaimed himself King of the Lombards, compelled the dukes and counts to acknowledge him, planted Frankish gov-

errors in some of the states, and then retired. Three of the dukes afterwards revolted; and in the long run the dukes of Benevento in the far south managed to acquire a somewhat dubious independence.

In effect the transfer of the Lombard crown to the Franks made very little practical difference in the government of Italy, which accepted the new ruler contentedly enough. He again turned his attention to Saxony. The conquest of the Saxons had proved too troublesome for each and all of Charles's predecessors, and it cost him some thirty years of repeated campaigns before he had completely subdued the land between the Elbe on the east and the Lippe on the southwest. The subjugation of a courageous and vigorous enemy, who had no towns to be sacked or occupied, and who could always retreat before the invader into woods and marshes, was an exceedingly difficult task. Each campaign was followed by some sort of submission and some profession of Christianity, for the Saxons were still complete heathens. But even wholesale baptisms of larger numbers of defeated warriors did not convert them into convinced and peaceable Christians.

In 777, however, the Saxons had been sufficiently terrorized to be apparently submissive, and Charles held the National Assembly of the Franks at Paderborn, in the heart of Saxony itself. Here he received an invitation from certain of the Saracens in Spain, who had refused submission to the Ommayad Abderahman, to accept their allegiance and come to their defense. So in 778 Charles made his first expedition into Spain, where he certainly accomplished nothing of importance. Possibly he met with some serious disaster. At any rate, while the army was retreating through the Pyrenees into Vasconia or Gascony, the rearguard was cut up in the pass of Roncesvalles. One of the chiefs who fell there became famous in after days as the legendary Paladin Roland.

In 779 another subjugation of Saxony by the sword and by baptism became necessary. The country was then divided into counties, and laws were promulgated imposing the death penalty for worshipping Odin and even for obstinate refusal to submit to the authority of the Church. The result was another revolt (782), which Charles penalized by a massacre of some thousands of captives who had been surrendered into his hands. The slaughter only stirred up the whole Saxon people to furious rage, and not till after three years of ceaseless and obstinate fighting was the land once more brought into subjection. The later struggles were never more than partial upheavals, and were all suppressed with comparative ease. The last was in 804; after it at least there was a reality in the Christianization and pacification. Charles seems to have realized that the savagery of 782 had been a mistake, for it was not repeated.

The conquest of Saxony was presently followed by the final deposi-

tion of the turbulent Duke of Bavaria and the distribution of the duchy into counties. This in effect completed the inclusion of all the Germanic peoples of Western Europe, with the exception of the English, in the Frank dominion. The object of Charles's later wars was not so much to extend dominion as to hold down the barbarians beyond the Teutonic border, and to secure the march of Spain against the Saracens or Moors. The Slavonic tribes immediately on the east of the Saxons were induced with little difficulty to make submission. The Czechs in Bohemia were prevailed upon to pay tribute by a couple of campaigns. The Avars brought destruction upon themselves by invading Bavaria and the Lombard march on the northeast of Italy. In a series of campaigns, headed first by Charles himself and then by his second son Pepin, the Avars were brought to subjugation and induced to accept Christianity. These peoples, and like them the Slavs of Pannonia, were not brought within the direct Frankish government, but were reduced to the position of tributary dependencies.

On the side of the Saracens, Charles took steps to curb their power in the Mediterranean by recovering from them Corsica and Sardinia and the Balearic Isles; for in effect these had passed out of the possession of the Eastern Empire into that of the Moors. Neither in these operations nor in Spain did Charles take the field himself. For administrative purposes he had assigned portions of his dominion as sub-kingdoms to his three sons—Pepin in Italy, Charles in Neustria, and Ludwig, whom we may call by his French name Louis, in Aquitaine. Louis conducted the Spanish wars from 785 onwards. The proffered allegiance of the Saracens in the northeast, Catalonia, had been illusory, and the campaign of 778 had very little practical result. Gradually, however, Louis, with the aid of William, Count of Toulouse, mastered the country as far as the Ebro. This district of Catalonia, the Spanish march which was the real nucleus of the later kingdom of Aragon, was afterwards severed from the Frankish dominion, but was one of the two bases from which during the following centuries the Christians pushed forward till the Moors were pressed back gradually into the south.

In Italy the relations of Charles with the Papacy were always of the most friendly character. The Lombards in general accepted the substitution of a Frank for a Lombard king, though Benevento in the south succeeded in maintaining the independence which it had usually enjoyed under the Lombards themselves. If Constantinople resented the new Power, it was not strong enough to do so effectively, though it still retained a foothold in Naples and Calabria as well as in Sicily.

Not to Charles himself but to Pope Leo was due the momentous step which was taken upon Christmas Day in the year 800. In theory, Rome and Italy still recognized the supremacy of the Emperor at

Constantinople, who was, politically speaking, in fact as well as in theory the lineal descendant of the Roman Emperor. But at least since the days of Constans II. the Imperial authority in the West had been of the most shadowy kind. Now a woman, the Empress Irene, had grasped the Imperial authority at Constantinople. The idea of reinstating a separate Empire in the West, as in the fifth century, had doubtless been simmering in the minds of Italians, though the antagonism between the Lombard kings and the Popes had prevented it from taking any active form. In the year 800, the King of the Franks had intervened in favor of Pope Leo, upon whom a violent attack had been made by a hostile faction. At the end of the year Charles, after a formal investigation, reinstated Leo, and inflicted condign punishment upon his enemies. On Christmas Day, when the festival had been celebrated with great pomp in the church of St. Peter, Leo, according to his own account, was inspired to set a diadem upon the head of the king proclaiming him Augustus, the Emperor of the Romans. The assembled multitude took up the words and hailed the King of the Frank as Emperor.

It had been the intention of Charles to follow the unfailing Frankish precedent, and divide his great dominion among his three sons, though the eldest was destined to be Emperor, and to exercise a general supremacy. But in 810 and the year following Pepin and Charles the younger died. The Emperor therefore named his third son, Louis, as successor to an undivided realm, though he appointed Pepin's son Bernard to be sub-king of the Lombards as Louis's vassal.

In 814, at his favorite residence at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), Charles died at the age of seventy, and there he was buried in his own cathedral.

III.—The Empire of Charlemagne

The vast dominion of Charles the Great was not destined to survive for long as a single whole; the theory of partition among sons was too deeply rooted in the traditions of the Franks. The introduction of such an institution as the rule of primogeniture, the only conceivable means of preventing disintegration, would have met with no ready acceptance. The dominion, moreover, was not homogeneous. In the Rhineland and to the east of it the population was thoroughly Teutonic as far as the Slavonic border, practically untinted by Latinity. In the west the Franks had become commingled with a vigorous population, which was not German at all but had been Latinized for centuries. Italy was not merely Latinized but Latin, in spite of the Lombard ascendancy; the German element was hardly less certain to be submerged than in Gaul. In the central region German, Gallic, and Latin influences traverse each other inextricably. The welding of

such a conglomerate into a real unity could have been carried out only by a succession of strong absolute rulers, who made it their prime object. No such succession of rulers came, and Charlemagne's Empire was sundered.

Nevertheless, the coronation ceremony of that eventful Christmas Day did inaugurate a new era. It revived the conception of a united Christendom, a Christendom with one temporal and one spiritual Head; or, at least, of a Latin and Teutonic Christendom, even though separated from a Hellenic and Oriental Christendom not subordinated to the Western Augustus or the Western Pontiff. However slight and however restricted the power of the Emperor might be, however dim and difficult to realize the conception, the conception itself subsisted always, sometimes vaguely, sometimes vigorously, throughout what we call the Middle Ages. The Emperor and the Pope were the official heads, temporal and spiritual, of Western Christendom, though they might strive with each other for supremacy and half Christendom might effectively ignore the authority of either or both. The idea of a Christian Commonwealth was there.

The thing had been done on the initiative of the Pope. It was he who had called upon the King of the Franks to assume the attributes of Cæsar, who had taken upon himself to repudiate the allegiance of the West to the Imperial authority in the East, now wielded, contrary to all precedent, by a woman. By his own authority, though he might attribute it to Divine inspiration, Leo had set his diadem upon the head of Charles, from which in after times was to spring the claim that the Pope had authority to make and unmake emperors. Probably Leo and certainly Charles never contemplated such a consummation. Charles assuredly never dreamed of himself as the subordinate of the man whom he had rescued from his enemies, and who repaid him by calling him to take up the functions of Cæsar.

As Charles conceived the position, the Pope was the spiritual director of Christendom; and the Emperor would probably never have encroached upon the papal exercise of a purely spiritual authority, and would certainly have suffered no one else to do so. But he regarded his own authority as extending over the Church; he had no doubt of his own title to enforce discipline, and to employ the Church in the service of the State as he might think fit. He was the Christian governor of Christendom who bore the responsibility of seeing to it that Christendom should be Christian. He counted his coronation as meaning something much greater than the mere recognition that he was *de facto* Lord of the West and independent of Constantinople. It carried with it the obligation to act as the representative of the King of kings, to conform his own law to the Divine law, and to make it his aim that his subjects should obey the Divine precepts. He would have made short work of any pretensions on the part of the Papacy.

to overrule his dicta, though it was not his business to challenge ecclesiastical pronouncements unless they ran counter to his own authority. He was quite orthodox enough for Popes to have no inclination to raise questions which might lead to quarrels. But the circumstances under which the Imperial crown had been assumed left to the Papacy an opening for asserting its own claims to supremacy over the Emperor whenever a Pope should feel himself strong enough to enter upon a contest with the secular head of Christendom.

Charles's organization of the Empire was a development of the organization of the Frankish kingdom. From the days of Clovis the government had been theoretically an autocracy. Remnants of the old tribal Teutonic system survived in the annual National Assembly and in a council of magnates; but the magnates were the king's nominees, and the Assembly met only to hear the king's will. The country was divided into districts, groups of "hundreds"—*glau* was the Frankish term—forming counties which in the Germanic regions were tribal units at first, and in the Gallic regions corresponded to existing territorial divisions. In each the Count was appointed by the king, and the hundred-ealdors, as they would have been called in England, were not elected but were nominated by the Count, who was in effect the king's civil and military governor of the district. The counties were frequently grouped under *duces*, dukes. When power had passed from the kings to the mayors of the palace, the change meant that the mayor discharged what had been the functions of the king.

Charles, as King of the Franks, gave to the National Assembly a somewhat greater significance. There was indeed no suggestion that the king's will required to be ratified by the voice of the Assembly, but the king taught his followers to feel that he wished habitually to take them into his confidence; not to give them a share in the government, but to let them understand what he was doing and why he did it. His appointment of his sons as sub-kings during his own lifetime was merely a delegation of authority for administrative purposes. His counts and dukes were carefully selected, and he instituted traveling commissioners who were annually dispatched to perambulate and supervise large areas. Pepin, in fact, had employed such commissioners before him; but Charles reduced what had been a casual or occasional arrangement to a definite system. And finally, though Aachen was his favorite residence, he had no permanent headquarters, but moved from point to point, visiting every part of his dominion himself. It should be observed also that large territories were appropriated to the Church, in which bishops and archbishops exercised the authority of counts and dukes, and were no less responsible to the sovereign than were the laymen. It is not improbable that Charles intended the great ecclesiastics to be a counterpoise to the power of the nobles, whose dukeships and countships tended to become hereditary.

Charles recognized no theoretical limit to the sphere of his activities. His edicts, contained in the Capitularies, covered every field of life, of religion and morals, of social and economic order, as well as what we are accustomed to regard as the actual proper sphere of law.

Charles was a great soldier, though his name is associated with no great battles. He was a great administrator, who gave to his realm such peace and order as had not been known since the old days of the *Pax Romana*. He was a conqueror, but he was a builder, not a destroyer. Despite his delinquencies in that particular field of ethics to which we are apt to appropriate the term "morals," he was in almost every sphere of life guided by a very high sense of duty—of the responsibility which lay upon him as the viceregent of the Almighty. But in nothing, perhaps, was he more remarkable than in his perception of the value of education, the cultivation of the mind. In the West as in the East, the seventh and eighth centuries had been a melancholy period of intellectual decay; it was perhaps in England alone that learning was rising from a lower to a higher level; but England was, so to speak, starting from the bottom, whereas the Continent was losing its hold upon what had been a highly advanced culture.

When Charles came to the throne of the Franks learning and art were everywhere at a very low ebb, condemned by the fighting men, who regarded physical prowess as almost the only virtue to be admired or worthy to be pursued. Apart from some hints concerning Pepin the Short, there is no appearance that Charles's predecessors had other respect for learning than is implied in their efforts to convert the heathen by means of missionaries. But Charles the Great, like Alfred in England a hundred years after him, was an enthusiastic educationalist. He hardly learned to write himself—scarcely any one could write who was not a churchman—but he could speak Latin, and even, with less fluency, Greek. He urged the monasteries to multiply copies of the books in their possession; he set scholars to revise Biblical texts and to collect German ballads. In his reign, as in Alfred's, chroniclers were set to compile the national records. The Emperor did not think it beneath him to condemn in strong terms the blundering Latin of his ecclesiastics. He gathered a literary circle round his own person, summoning from England the wise Alcuin, a pupil in that monastery of Jarrow where the great Bede had died at about the time of Alcuin's birth. His own biography, a work of real literary value, was written by his companion, Einhard. Charles and his circle discussed every branch of knowledge, from what passed for logic to what passed for astronomy, though it must be admitted that the "knowledge" was of an exceedingly twilight character.

But, above all, he not only encouraged the multiplication of books

and the pursuit of learning, but was very energetic in the establishment of schools for the training of the youth and the clergy of his dominions. The schools which he created became the parents of other schools, and the work of Charles the Great laid the foundations upon which were afterwards built the universities of Europe.

IV.—The Disruption of the Carolingian Empire, 814-885

The son who succeeded the great Emperor stands in singular contrast to his father. The virtues and vices of Charles were those of a very strong man with very little respect for conventions. The virtues and vices of Louis were those of a weak man who is the complete slave of eminently respectable conventions. His piety was indubitable, but wholly conventional, and placed him completely in the hands of selfish and greedy ecclesiastical advisers very ill-suited to direct the control of a dominion which needed above all things a strong man at its head.

On the news of his father's death, Louis hurried from Aquitaine to Aachen, and set the Imperial crown upon his own head with his own hands. In another man this might have been taken as a sign that he had no more intention than his father of becoming subservient to the Papacy, but within little more than a year a Pope was elected at Rome without any reference to the Emperor, who cheerfully submitted to his demand that the Imperial coronation should be regulated by a fresh coronation at the hands of the Pope. He had already shown how completely he was dominated by the group who had won personal influence over him in Aquitaine, by dismissing the ministers, lay and ecclesiastical, in whom Charles had trusted, retaining his own confidence the extremely unsatisfactory persons who had convinced him of their own piety. His ecclesiastical bias was further illustrated by his releasing all but thirty of the monastic houses from the duty long imposed upon them, as upon lay landholders, of providing soldiers for the royal armies and revenue for the royal treasury. They were allowed to hold their lands in return for their prayers.

Louis was already more than sufficiently prone to confuse duty, not with piety, but with pietism, when an accident exaggerated the morbid tendency into actual disease. The most blameless of men convinced himself that he was the greatest of sinners, who could only atone for his iniquities by perpetual penances in the cloister. Since he was not permitted to resign the crown for his soul's salvation, he did about the worst thing possible for his subjects. He divided his Empire between his three sons, of whom the eldest was seventeen. The second son, Pepin, was to have Aquitaine; the third, Lewis, was to have Bavaria and the Ostmark, the eastern march beyond Bavaria which Charles the Great had subjugated. The Empire and the rest of

the territory was to go to the eldest, Lothair, who was to have the Lombard kingdom to begin with. But Charles the Great had bestowed the Lombard kingdom upon his grandson Bernard, the son of Pepin, a popular young prince, who naturally objected to being arbitrarily deprived of his crown. He revolted, but, relying on his uncle's saintly character, came to a conference with him under safe-conduct. Then Louis committed the one conscious crime of his career. Bernard was brought to trial for treason, in despite of his safe-conduct, and condemned to be blinded, an operation under which he died, to the endless remorse of Louis.

The Emperor's wife died, and he regarded her death as a divine judgment. He sank into such a state of despair that his ministers came to the surprising conclusion that he must marry another wife. He submitted, and the new wife bore him a son, Charles, afterwards nicknamed "The Bald."

Louis might very well have considered that the birth of Charles was "a judgment," for countless evils resulted from it, and from Louis's infatuated affection for this child of his latter years. In 829, when the boy was seven, Louis cut a separate kingdom for him out of the inheritance allotted to Lothair, Allemannia, which might roughly be called the region of the Upper Rhine. A year later Lothair and Pepin were in arms, to resent this new distribution. They captured their father, but were frightened by the Austrasian Franks into submission. The pious Louis pardoned the rebels, who were soon plotting again.

They drew the third brother, Lewis of Bavaria—Lewis "the German"—into the conspiracy, and in 832 he and Pepin of Aquitaine were in arms again. As Lothair had not moved, Louis proclaimed the deposition of Pepin and Lewis, the bestowal of Aquitaine upon the boy Charles, and the rest of the Empire upon Lothair. But Lothair joined his brothers. The three of them, accompanied by Pope Gregory IV., met their father in battle array in the plain of Rothfeld. Louis negotiated, while his son intrigued with his supporters, who gradually deserted him, till he was left literally alone with his wife and child on what was thenceforth known as the *Lügenfeld*, the "Field of Lies."

Then the degradations to which the Emperor submitted, though he refused to abdicate, disgusted the Frank nobles with the conduct of the son who thus maltreated his father. Lothair had to take hasty flight to his Lombard kingdom. Louis was restored, but persisted in his project of providing Charles with a kingdom at the expense of his elder brothers. Attacked once more by Pepin and Lewis, he called Lothair to his aid, promising that Charles should have only Aquitaine and Neustria; Lothair should have all the rest, including Bavaria. This time Lothair joined his father. For the only time in his life—at least since he had become Emperor—the old Louis showed vigor.

He overran Aquitaine, compelled the nobles to do homage to Charles, passed to his son Lewis, between whom and his two brothers the middle kingdom was divided. Lewis the Emperor took Italy, with which his fortunes were almost exclusively associated. Of the rest, the northern half, the old Austrasia, went to Lothair II., from whom it acquired the name of Lotharingia, Lorraine; the southern half, Burgundy, went to the third brother, Charles; so that the great Frankish dominion was divided into five kingdoms. Lewis the Emperor died in 875, Lewis the German in 876, and Charles the Bald in 877. Before that time the two younger brothers of Lewis the Emperor were dead. Of their lands, Lewis the German had annexed Lotharingia, on the east of the Meuse, while its western half fell to Charles the Bald, who also annexed most of Burgundy.

When Lewis the Emperor died, leaving no male issue, Charles the Bald managed to anticipate his brother, Lewis the German, in securing the Imperial crown and the Lombard succession. Then came chaos. Lewis the German died, leaving three sons—Carloman, Lewis the Saxon, and Charles, called "the Fat." In 877 Charles the Bald died, leaving as the heir of France his son, Louis II., "the Stammerer." Louis resigned his claims to the Italian and the Imperial crowns; then he died. The practical outcome was that in 879 young Charles the Fat was acknowledged as King of Italy, while the duchy of Provence or Arles was set up in the Rhone valley by Count Boso, the husband of the daughter of Lewis the Emperor. Death after death followed, increasing the confusion. Louis the Stammerer's promising son, Louis III., was killed by an accident in 881; Lewis the Saxon died in 882. Each had a brother Carloman, but the two Carlomans died respectively in 880 and 884. In each family there was a third brother, Charles. The French prince was a child, afterwards known as Charles the Simple. The German was Charles the Fat, and as in 884 he was the only grown man representing the Carolingian line, the child Charles the Simple was set aside altogether, and Charles the Fat was invited to assume the French or Neustrian crown. As he was already King of the Lombards, and had succeeded to the German dominions of his two brothers, this particularly inefficient prince was now once more king of all the Frankish dominion, with the exception of Boso's kingdom of Arles.

It is only by means of such a summary as we have just given, wearisome and meaningless though it seems, that we can trace our way through the hurly-burly of the second half of the ninth century, a period when two factors were at work of which as yet we have made no mention—the Northmen and the Saracens in the Mediterranean, as distinguished from the Moors in the Spanish Peninsula.

V.—The West and the Northmen, 790-918

At the close of the eighth century, when Charles the Great was giving the world a new ideal of kingship, there came to his court the exile Egbert of Kent, a claimant to the crown of Wessex, who had been pushed aside by a more successful candidate favored by the great King Offa of Mercia, the overlord of all the kings in England south of the Humber—East Anglia and Essex, Kent and Wessex. Probably in 802 Egbert found an opportunity, on his supplanter's death, to return to England and secure the succession. He was a patient man, who did not challenge the wrath of Offa's successors, until one of them without provocation attacked him. Egbert smote the aggressor, and within four years was acknowledged as Bretwalda, general overlord, by the whole country. His sons ruled as sub-kings in Kent and East Anglia. He had a better title to be called King of England than any one before him except Offa, who had had diplomatic intercourse with Charles the Great himself as an equal.

Egbert was succeeded by his pious son, Ethelwulf, a man of the same type as the pious Emperor Louis, an admirable son of the Church, not in other respects a man of mark, who died in 858, leaving four sons, all of whom followed him in succession on the throne of Wessex. The last and incomparably the greatest of them was Alfred, whose reign began in 871 on the death of his brother, Æthelred I. It was, as we may note, during this period, about the middle of the century, that the crowns of the Celtic kingdoms of the north were united by Kenneth McAlpin, who succeeded by Pictish law through his mother to the throne of the Pictish kingdom, and by the elsewhere ordinary rule of male succession to the throne of the Scots. Thenceforth his successors are known to the chroniclers as the Kings of Scots.

The conquest of the Saxons by Charles the Great may have been the cause of the sea-going movement which began among the Scandinavians of Denmark and Norway in the closing years of the eighth century. The Swedes, and the Goths who still remained about the Baltic, found occupation mainly in an easterly direction among the Slavs and the Northern Finns. But Danes and Norsemen—"the Vikings"—took to their ships and began to make venturous raids upon the Frisian and English shores. The Norwegians, who were particularly daring mariners, went still farther afield, passed round the north of Scotland, raided the Isles, and presently began to make Ireland their chief objective. In them reappear the characteristics of the early Teutons. They were bands of free warriors, following an elected war lord, called a jarl or a king, very much according to the extent of his following. And like the first Saxons who visited Britain

when Roman legions were still quartered there, they at first came not as settlers but merely as raiders in search of booty.

Two landings in England, one in Ireland, and one, more venturesome still, so far away as the coast of Aquitaine, made up their record in the last decade of the eighth century. An obstinate rebel against Charles the Great from Saxony, Witikind, more than once took refuge with the Danes of Jutland, and doubtless inspired them with that fear of the great king of the Franks which caused one of their kings, Gottfried, to construct a defensive earthwork right across the peninsula. With this security against attack from Saxon territory completed, he began to make attacks by sea upon his mighty neighbor. When Charles sent armies against the raiders they retreated to their ships. Then Charles began to build fleets on the Channel, and Gottfried's successor made peace with the Franks.

For some years to come quarrels amongst themselves restricted the activity of the Danes. There were only isolated raids. One of their kings, Harald, was well inclined to Christianity, and was baptized. But in 835, after they had been for some time rid of Harald, and had indulged in some casual raids, the struggle between the Emperor Louis and his sons tempted them to a raid on a large scale. They sacked two Frisian cities; next year they burned the recently built Antwerp, and in 837 their ships sailed some way up the Rhine. Incidentally they visited England twice, and met with a sharp repulse at the hands of King Egbert. When Lothair and his brothers were on the eve of the great fight at Fontenoy, the Danes rowed up the Seine as far as Rouen, which they sacked.

From this time the attack was continued with increasing severity. The Norse vikings began not only to raid Ireland, but to settle there; before long they had established fortified quarters at half a dozen points on the Irish coast. Year after year they harried the English coast, though in 851 they suffered a severe defeat at Aclea. Either in that year or in 855 they remained for the first time in winter quarters, in Thanet, or else in Sheppey.

But the Frisian and Neustrian coasts were still attracting their most serious attention. Rurik the Dane got the island of Walcheren ceded to him as a fief by the Emperor Lothair. In 843 a party of Danes wintered in the mouth of the Loire. In 845 they came up the Seine to Paris, and extorted a heavy ransom from Charles the Bald. In 847 they sacked Bordeaux, and a year or two later again entered that city, which they held for several years. In 850 and 851 they came up the Seine again, and harried all Flanders. In 852 Charles the Bold got together a large army, and blockaded them in their camp on the Seine; but even then he bought them off and let them go, and a year later they were harrying the valley on the Loire right up to Orleans. In 857 Charles again succeeded in blockading a great in-

vading force on the Seine, but again let them go in order to fight Lewis the German, who thought the opportunity a good one for depriving his brother of some of his dominions. Before Lewis and Charles had made peace, the Danes laid waste the northeast of France, while one fleet penetrated into the Mediterranean and ravaged Provence. At last, in 864, Charles took the only effective step for a system of defense appropriate to the methods of the Danes, who either advanced up the rivers or moved from point to point on horseback (sweeping in the horses from the countryside) with great rapidity, though they habitually did their actual fighting on foot. Charles ordered his levies to assemble with horses, and he ordered the towns which stood upon rivers to built fortified bridges, which the Danes would have to capture before venturing to attempt a passage up the river.

It was almost immediately after this that the Danes, who for ten years past had left England almost unvisited, appear to have determined no longer to content themselves with raids and spoils, but to conquer and permanently occupy English territory. In 865 a great host wintered in Kent; next year came reinforcements. In 867 they fell upon Northumbria, having wintered in East Anglia. Northumbria had been in a state of anarchy for half a century, and was comparatively an easy prey. From Northumbria they broke into Mercia. Then they turned back upon East Anglia, and in 871, "the year of battles," opened the great invasion of Wessex.

It must be remembered that the Danish host was not the army of a king of Denmark, but a sort of confederation of war lords, to whose standards the free fighting folk of the Danes had gathered. There were two "kings" and five jarls in the army which attacked Wessex. There was a series of great battles, not one of which could be called decisive. But at the end of the year King Æthelred was dead, and his brother Alfred, who had approved himself a great warrior, was king. The Danes retired from Wessex, but remained in full force in East Anglia, Northumbria, and Northern Mercia. The struggle was renewed in 876. It was not till 878 that Alfred won a really decisive victory at Aethendune; and even then he was unable to expel the Danes, but made with them the Treaty of Wedmore, which left them in possession of half the island, the district which became known as the Danelagh. One of the conditions of the peace was the adoption of Christianity by the chief, Guthrum, and a number of his companions.

The reigns in England of Alfred and his only less great son Edward the Elder supply an edifying contrast to the fortunes during the same period of the once mighty Frankish dominion. Alfred reorganized the government of that half of the country over which he exercised direct control, reorganized the military forces, created a fleet which

proved more than a match for the Danes on their own element, and taught his people to fortify strategic points—a lesson he had learned from the Danes, who always had fortified camps to which they retired if defeated in the open. But besides this, Alfred emulated Charles the Great as a lawgiver and educator, and as the inculcator of Christian ideals of conduct, in which he set a far higher example than the great Frank. When the Danes renewed their attacks in his later years, he beat them very soundly. His son, Edward the Elder, went much further, and before the end of his reign in 925 had brought the Danelagh itself completely under his sway. He was, in fact, the first ruler with a full and unquestionable title to be called King of all England. Even the kings of Scots and of Strathclyde acknowledged him as “Father and Lord.”

When Guthrum and Alfred made the Treaty of Wedmore, England was for the time being ruled out of the field of the Vikings' activities. Within two years they were again flinging themselves upon the German or Neustrian-French kingdoms. In 881 they met with a check at the hands of the young king, Louis III., who was killed by an accident almost immediately afterwards. In that winter they ravaged and pillaged the Rhine valley up to Aachen itself. In 882 Charles the Fat had succeeded to the dominions of his brothers. He marched against the Danes; but, after the fashion of Charles the Bald, he did not attack them, but granted their king, Gottfried, a duchy and a substantial ransom in consideration of his accepting baptism. Half the Danes went off to Neustria, where they extracted a still bigger ransom from King Carloman, who died in the next year, 884, with the result, which we have seen, that Charles the Fat became sole king of the Franks.

For the Emperor, who had taken that title in 882 on the death of Lewis the Saxon, the Danes had no sort of respect. In 885 they went up the Seine valley again, intending to capture Paris; but for some twelve months Odo, the Count of Paris, bade them successful defiance—the Danes were not masters of siege operations. What induced them, however, to raise the siege was a bribe from Charles. The only legitimate Carolingian beside Charles was his cousin, the other Charles, who was still a child; but owing to the general disgust with Charles the Fat, an illegitimate nephew Arnulf of Carinthia, rose in open rebellion. Charles promptly abdicated in his favor, and died immediately afterwards.

Arnulf was readily accepted by Germany and Lotharingia. Neustria rejected him, and, ignoring the child Charles, elected as its king the valiant Count Odo, the defender of Paris; while the last survivor of the legitimate “Karlings” was sent to England. Boso's son, Lewis, ruled at Arles, and another count, Rudolph, made a little independent kingdom for himself of Upper Burgundy.

Odo was elected because Neustria wanted a captain capable of coping with the Danes. He beat the Danes, but as in the case of the Visigoths, the nobles thought themselves as good as the king they elected, and to get rid of him they brought back the boy Charles from England to be their figurehead. Odo fought for his crown and kept it; but when he died, in 889, his brother Robert recognized the young Charles as king, and was rewarded by being made "Duke of France"—that is, a territory which included Paris, Orleans, and Tours.

But Charles could not recover the old authority. The conditions of the last fifty years had made countships and dukedoms hereditary, and hereditary counts and dukes were not submissive. Consequently his reign was taken up by the perpetual rebellions of his vassals and perpetual raids of the Northmen—a better term than "Dane," since many of the Vikings were Northmen. In 911 a host of Northmen, led by the Viking Rolf or Rollo, lay upon the Seine. Charles the Simple, with wisdom borrowed from Alfred the Great, had come to the conclusion that since the Danes could not be kept out of the country they had better be settled in it as liege subjects. He offered Rollo territory, and the hand of his own daughter, if he would become his liegeman and a Christian. The terms were accepted at the Treaty of Clair-sur-Epte. Rollo swore allegiance and kept his oath, gave the king his loyal support, drew all the Northmen together within the territory allotted to him, and delivered France from their raids at least until the deposition of Charles relieved him from his obligations. Thus was established the Dukedom of Normandy.

In 920 there was a revolt of the nobles headed by the Duke of France; Robert, brother of Odo, was killed, Charles was taken prisoner, and Rudolph of Burgundy was made King of France, though Louis, the young son of Charles, escaped to England. In 929 the deposed Charles was murdered.

The abdication of Charles the Fat, which gave the crown of Neustria to Odo of Paris in 888, was the work of Charles's illegitimate nephew, Arnulf of Carinthia, who was acknowledged as king by the Eastern Franks and all the Eastern Germans. In 891 Arnulf inflicted a tremendous defeat on a great Danish host at Louvain; after that date their attacks upon Germany were confined to raids in the Low Countries. Soon afterwards Arnulf intervened in Italy between the kings who had been striving for the supremacy since the fall of Charles the Fat. His main object, however, was to obtain the Imperial crown for himself, which he succeeded in doing; after which he returned to Germany, broken in health himself and leaving Italy to its own disorders and troubles. Having no children born in wedlock, he naturally had no scruples in persuading the Germans to accept the nomination of an illegitimate son, Zwentibold, as his heir. Soon afterwards a legitimate son was born to him, who is known as Lewis the Child, the

last of the Karlings who ruled in Germany. The birth of the boy made Zwentibold exceedingly troublesome, and his conduct stirred up violent hostile factions in Lotharingia, where Arnulf had made him a sub-king.

When Arnulf died Lewis was six years old. Zwentibold was killed in a battle with the vassals who were endeavoring to depose him, and Lewis the Child was king over all the Germans, but there was no one with a clear right to exercise the supreme authority in his name. The result was that two great factions were formed amongst the nobility, and Germany was plunged into a prolonged and aimless civil war.

This was the more disastrous, because just at this time a new enemy had appeared on the Eastern marches—the Magyars. This people was probably akin both to the Northern Finns and to the Mongol tribes, who gave their name to Bulgaria—the people from the Volga. The Magyars broke into what had been the dominion of the Avars, pushed westwards by the pressure of Turkish tribes from the East. From the beginning of the tenth century their hordes were raiding in force over the German border into Bavaria, and even farther west into Swabia and north into Saxony. They absorbed the whole of the Ostmark, and routed one German army after another. Lewis the Child died when he was only seventeen; there was no Karling left to succeed him except Charles the Simple in Neustria, and the German nobles, with few exceptions, agreed in raising to the throne one of their number, Conrad of Franconia—the central district of Germany which preserved the Frankish name in the east, as Francia or France preserved it in the west.

But even the imminent danger from Magyars did not suffice to prevent the German nobles from fighting each other and defying the crown. Germany had reached the stage, always so fatal to the German communities, of being obliged to raise to the throne a member of the nobility who possessed no hereditary title to their common allegiance. The whole of Conrad's reign was mainly occupied in the necessary assertion of his own supremacy; but he was wise enough and patriotic enough to urge upon the nobles, when he himself was dying, that they should unite in recognizing as his successor the strongest and most capable of the chiefs, Henry, Duke of Saxony, though Henry had been a personal antagonist of his own. The accession of Henry the Fowler, in 918, opened a new era for Germany.

For the Spanish Peninsula the records during this period are brief enough. In the eighth century the Goths and Spaniards, who took refuge in the northwest corner, Asturias, were able to resist conquest by the Moors, and under their Gothic king Alfonso (Hildefuns) made fierce incursions into Moorish territory. A second Alfonso was reigning here in the time of Charles the Great, to whom he tendered allegiance; but there is no appearance of active coöperation between the

Asturians and the Franks when the latter were engaged in securing the Spanish march. Alfonso II. and Alfonso III., who followed him after an interval of fourteen years, in 866, enlarged the kingdom of Asturias, carrying its borders first as far as the Douro, and then over Old Castile and the north of Portugal. This was to become later the kingdom of Leon and Castile, as the Spanish march on the east was to develop into the kingdom of Aragon. It was in the second half of the ninth century that the minor kingdom of Navarre was created by Count Sancho from Gascony; who won his territory on his own account, and secured it by acknowledging Alfonso as his overlord. By the end of the century the basis of the slow Christian advance against the Moslems was thoroughly established.

VI.—Italy and the East, 770-918

Since the accession of Charles the Great we have said nothing of the khalifate or of the Byzantine Empire, and except during the lifetime of Charles himself, have made only casual mention of Italy. To these we must now turn our attention, and since we shall have comparatively little to say of relations between Italy and Byzantium, and more of the relations of both with the Moslems, we shall begin with the khalifate.

At the time when Charles became sole king of the Franks, the first of the Abbasside khalifs of Bagdad was nearing the end of his reign; while a rival Ommayad khalifate had been established in Spain by Abderahman. Mansur had been too much occupied with revolts in the East to be able either to take up wars of aggression or to suppress his western rival. In the time of his immediate successors, Bagdad became that great city of fairy tales with which every one is familiar. In 786 Harun-al-Raschid "the just" began the famous reign which lasted twenty-three years. That hero of popular legend was a powerful monarch, and Bagdad, the great emporium of the trade with the Far East, the center upon which all the trade routes converged, became enormously wealthy. But the general effect was that the khalif became an exceedingly gorgeous Oriental emperor, rather than the *ex officio* champion of militant Mohammedanism. The attitude of the East to the West had so far changed that Harun sent friendly embassies to Charlemagne; Bagdad was a center of cosmopolitan commerce and culture; intellectually the East was at this time more progressive than the West. Our conception of Mohammedanism as a peculiarly intolerant religion was wholly inapplicable; the khalifate not only permitted the multiplication of unorthodox sects professedly Mohammedan, but tolerated all religions; whatever knowledge existed of natural science was to be found among Persians and Syrians and Moors more than among any Europeans.

Throughout the reign of Theophilus his troops were fighting the troops of the khalifate in a weary war which brought little material success to either side. Towns were captured and lost again, there were mutual ravagings of territory, and sanguinary battles were fought. Theophilus was a rigorous Iconoclast, though his persecution was less merciless than that of Constantine Copronymus had been—although, in fact, the time had arrived when image-worshipping and image-breaking had come to be regarded practically as tests of loyalty to the throne. The Iconodules were persecuted very much as Romanists were persecuted in England under Queen Elizabeth, and Covenanters in Scotland under Charles II. and James II. Apart from this persecution, which made the ecclesiastical chroniclers condemn Theophilus very much as John Knox condemned Mary Queen of Scots, his government of the Empire was firm and just. Its prosperity was demonstrated by the amount of revenue which was raised without any intolerable exactions, and his care of trade rendered Constantinople a city of commercial importance very much greater than any other in Europe.

Theophilus died in 842, the year in which the Saracens in Sicily captured Messina. When Theophilus died, his son, Michael III., was four years old, and the government was controlled by his mother Theodora, who turned out all the Iconoclasts, put Iconodules in their places, and revoked the Iconoclastic edicts. The war with the khalifate went on, but the incompetence of the Imperial commanders were compensated by the dissensions among the Moslems, and still no substantial gains were made on either side.

When Michael III. came of age, he put his mother aside, and presently associated with himself Basil the Macedonian, who had begun his career as one of his grooms. The most important act of Michael was the deposition of the Patriarch Ignatius, who annoyed him by his Puritanism, and the appointment of Photius, which presently induced Pope Nicholas, at Rome, to pronounce, on his own responsibility, that Photius was not Patriarch at all, and to excommunicate him. Whereof the result was that, in 866, the ecclesiastical synod of Constantinople pronounced the Roman Church to be heterodox, for the conclusive reasons that Rome enforced the celibacy of the priesthood, and asserted the procession of the Holy Spirit both from the Father and from the Son. The Greek Church declares that the clergy may marry, and repudiates the Western doctrine of procession. The decree of 866 finally severed the Churches of Eastern and Western Christendom.

In the next year, 867, Michael was murdered by Basil of Macedonia, who received the Imperial crown. Having won it by a particularly ugly crime, he ruled with moderation and vigor. His fleet smote the Saracen Corsairs, his armies ravaged the dominions of the weakening khalifate, and cleared the Saracens out of Southern Italy,

self to the serious business of mastering Italy instead of fighting with his uncles—Lewis the German and Charles the Bald—for dominion north of the Alps. For a long time, however, he was hampered by the conduct of the Dukes of Benevent and Salerno, the divisions into which the duchy had been parted. It was not till 867 that he was able to begin a series of campaigns, in the course of which he gradually cleared the greater part of Southern Italy of the Saracens. His successes induced the Saracens in Africa to send a great force to save their conquests. Lewis routed the invaders on land, and when they fled to their ships the fleet was destroyed in a storm. It was only the death of Lewis in 875 which prevented him from completing the clearing of Southern Italy, and giving the peninsula almost its last chance of becoming one united kingdom.

It was not by a king of Italy that the clearance was effected. Charles the Bald was too busy elsewhere to trouble himself about the deliverance of Italy, even though he called himself Emperor. The Saracens began to renew their advance; but Basil, the Macedonian, was now reigning at Constantinople, and took up the task which the Western Emperor had neglected. His navies swept the Saracen fleets off the seas; his armies drove the Moslems out of the land. The greater part of it remained for a long time attached to the Greek Empire, though some years later a certain Wido (Guido), who had acquired the Italian crown, recovered possession of the city of Benevent itself.

The death of Lewis left Italy with no more effective king than Carloman, the son of Lewis the German. The Saracens again established themselves in Campania, on the west coast of Southern Italy. After Carloman's death, Charles the Fat was crowned, but as we have seen he did nothing for Italy. When he died, Duke Wido of Spoleto and Duke Berengar of Friuli fell to fighting for the crown. Wido won, and then Berengar called upon Arnulf, King of the Germans, to help him—Wido having, in the meantime, induced the Pope to crown him Emperor. Arnulf came, and took the Imperial crown for himself, after which he retired; and when both Wido and his son, Lambert were dead, Berengar was left the acknowledged King of Italy in 900. But his kingship was little more than a name, for he was constantly fighting rebels or pretenders; and even in the intervals neither Popes nor dukes paid any respect to his orders. Only this is to be said, that in 915 the Italians did at last really combine for a moment to eject decisively the Saracens who had planted themselves on the western side of the peninsula.

In the days of the Emperor Lewis his relations with the Papacy were always friendly. The six Popes, from Sergius II. to John VIII., were all men who appreciated the merits of the Emperor as the champion of Christendom against the Saracens. Those Popes were strong

men who were wise enough to coöperate with him. We have seen, however, that in that time the final breach between the Eastern and Western Churches was developed; the Papacy had no inducement to preserve friendly relations with Constantinople. The actual severance took place during the pontificate of Nicholas I., in whose day the claims of the Church to territorial dominion were for the first time based upon the imaginary "Donation of Constantine the Great," upon the evidence of newly "discovered" documents, subsequently known as the Forged Decretals; since the criticism of later years proved beyond all possibility of doubt that they were concocted in the ninth century by the pious imaginations of churchmen, who regarded the perpetuation of a monstrous fraud for the benefit of the Church as a highly commendable act. The same series of Decretals also provided the evidence hitherto lacking for the recognition by all the early Churches of the supremacy of the bishopric of Rome.

The series of strong Popes came to an end with the death of John VIII. in 882. There were fourteen Popes in the next thirty years, and the pontificate went to pieces as completely as the monarchies. The Popes indulged in bitter rivalries, and their elections became partisan appointments. In 896 was seen the surprising spectacle of Pope Stephen VI. denouncing his dead predecessor Formosus as a usurper and an antipope, and dragging his corpse from the tomb to fling it into the Tiber. That degradation of the Papacy had set in which was only to be remedied by the vigorous interposition of the Saxon emperors in the second half of the tenth century.

CHAPTER XVII

FROM HENRY THE FOWLER TO HILDEBRAND, 918-1073

I.—Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great, 918-973

As a preliminary to the story of the new Holy Roman Empire, or German Empire, established by the Saxon kings of the Germans on the foundations of the Empire of Charlemagne, it will be useful to form as clear an idea as possible of what may be called the geographical plan of Western and Central Europe at the time of the election of Henry the Fowler as German king.

The old Middle Kingdom had stretched in a narrow strip from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. It had then been broken into two divisions, Lotharingia being the northern half, and Burgundy or the Arelate being the southern half. Lotharingia includes Friesland and the regions through which flows the Lower Rhine, the Meuse or Maas, and the Moselle. The Arelate to the south includes the whole valley of the Saône and Rhone, with the mountain country on the east. The Arelate has become independent, and is divided into Upper and Lower Burgundy; Rudolph of Upper Burgundy is about to become, for a time, King of France also. The dukedom of Lotharingia, on the other hand, wavers between allegiance to the Karling dynasty, which still nominally rules in France, and its naturally closer affinities with the definitely German kingdom.

The German kingdom is now parted among the four great duchies, three of which form a broad belt between Denmark on the north and the Alps on the south. Of these three the northernmost is Saxony, which touches both the North Sea and the Baltic. In the middle is Franconia, and the third, the southernmost, is Swabia. The fourth duchy, Bavaria, lies on the east of Swabia, though its borders also extend along the eastern border of Franconia. On the immediate north of Bavaria, not forming part of the German dominions proper, is the Slavonic tableland of Bohemia, separated from Franconia by a Bavarian wedge. The Elbe is, roughly speaking, the eastern boundary between Saxony and the Slavonic tribes lying between the Elbe and the Oder, a region which is very shortly to be converted into the mark or marches of the German kingdom itself. On the east of Bavaria the flood of Magyars is still surging, and for nearly half

a century will continue to surge westwards and northwards against the Germans and Slavs.

The ending of the Karling line in Germany with Lewis the Child resulted in the election of Conrad, Duke of Franconia, as German king. On his death, his brother and successor in the dukedom of Franconia proposed, in accordance with Conrad's advice, that not he, but Henry, Duke of the Saxons, should be elected German king. Henry, in fact, owed his election to the readiness with which the Franconian magnates surrendered the traditional claim of the Franks to the premier position among the German tribes, with what may fairly be called a patriotic desire to subordinate their special interests to those of Germany in general—a desire which was deservedly rewarded. The Saxon line preserved Germany from disintegration, and re-created a German, though no longer a Frankish, Empire.

It was not possible, however, for the Duke of Saxony to claim and to receive such an authority as might have been wielded by a great prince of the Karling dynasty. His position had no historic tradition and no strength of public sentiment to support it, such as that which made Lotharingia prefer to attach itself to the Neustrian Karling, Charles the Simple. Franconia, as well as Saxony, was loyal to the new king, but in the eyes of Swabians and Bavarians he was after all nothing more than the premier duke, with a questionable title even to that primacy. He was wise enough to know that he could not claim more without fighting for it, and that there were other foes against whom there was a need of defending Germany much more imperative. He let Lotharingia go, though the duchy reverted to Germany when the Karling was deposed in France. He treated the Dukes of Bavaria and Swabia virtually as independent kings, content to accept from them little more than a formal recognition of his titular supremacy. With cautious insight he abstained from attempting to assert higher claims through an alliance with the Church, and a recognition of ecclesiastical authority which would, in effect, have subordinated the Crown to the Church.

In the earlier years of Henry's reign, the Magyars, checked in the south by the Bavarians, directed their attacks northward; but their invasion was repulsed, and a nine years' truce with them enabled Henry to devote his attention to defense against the Slavs and the Danes. Against both he conducted successful campaigns, and his acquisitions of territory were accompanied by the establishment of towns which were fortified outposts—small German settlements of agricultural colonies, but at the same time garrisons. The payment of a tribute to the Magyars had been one of the conditions of the truce; when the truce came to an end the tribute was stopped, the war was renewed, and repeated successes attended Henry's arms. His victories over the heathen gave him the personal prestige which he

had not derived from his election to the kingdom. An attempt on his own part to enforce his complete supremacy would have been premature; but his cautious and successful policy had placed that supremacy within the reach of his eldest son Otto, who succeeded him in 936, being then twenty years of age.

The young king was prompt to take the risks which Henry the Fowler had declined; but it was some years before he attained the success which was the justification of his audacity or imprudence. The old Duke of Franconia resented the assertion by the young king of a greater authority than his father had claimed. The young Duke of Bavaria refused him homage and was promptly deposed in favor of a younger brother, who became duke, but with curtailed privileges, and with a third brother to look after him who bore the title of Count Palatine, but was, in fact, an officer of Otto. The king had two brothers of his own, each of whom considered that he had a better title to the crown than Otto. The result was a general revolt of the aggrieved dukes and princes, who were joined by the Duke of Lotharingia; while in Saxony itself there was discontent because of Otto's choice of officers. In the course of a prolonged contest, however, one of the brothers died, the dukes were killed, and ultimately there was a reconciliation, resulting in a general redistribution of duchies. Otto set his son Ludolph over Swabia, his son-in-law Conrad over Lotharingia, and his brother Henry Bavaria. But each was watched by a Count Palatine. Before twelve years had passed the dukes had again broken out into civil war, in 953.

These dissensions seemed to give the Magyars their opportunity; but the vigor of Otto's lieutenants in the north overcame the Wends and other aggressive peoples, and carried the German dominion as far as the Oder. The Margraves, counts of the marches, being in the nature of things king's men, brought strength to the crown and served as a counterpoise to the old hereditary nobles; having, moreover, at their backs experienced troops who trusted them as captains. In the new marches arose new fortified towns, monasteries and churches, and Otto took up the policy of Christianizing and civilizing the subjugated Slavs.

In the second civil war the dukes were fighting each other as much as the king; it was brought to an early end, partly by the consciousness that a Magyar onslaught was impending, which would have to be met with a united front. Otto led his army to a triumphant victory against the Magyars at Lechfeld. That battle finally broke the advance of the Magyars; a new "Ostmark" (eastern march), which later acquired the name of Austria, was established; and here, as well as in the north, the system of walled towns, churches, Christianization, and civilization was set to work.

Otto adopted a new attitude towards the churchmen whom his father

had very much distrusted. In face of the laxity of morals and discipline among the clergy, which was the natural accompaniment of the demoralization of the Papacy for more than half a century past, there had been growing up among churchmen a vigorous reforming school, which centered at the monastery of Cluny, in Burgundy. Established in 910, and filled from the first with men full of religious zeal and high ideals, who welcomed for themselves an extremely rigid discipline, Cluny became the mother of many monasteries which, contrary to previous custom, were all offshoots of itself, subject to the jurisdiction of its abbot, ruled by priors who were, in effect, his lieutenants. The Cluniac monasteries formed a single organization throughout which the same high standards were upheld and the same religious discipline was enforced. Cluny had been constituted independent of any episcopal jurisdiction; its abbot had no superior except the Pope. The influence of the Cluniacs spread rapidly—it was soon felt even in far away England, where the movement for reform was led by Dunstan; and in Germany it produced a new ecclesiastical school, at the head of which stood Otto's youngest brother, Bruno.

To this new school Otto turned. Bruno and men like Bruno viewed matters in a very different light from the ordinary bishops, who had the character of great landed proprietors more than of churchmen, of lay nobles rather than of representatives of things spiritual. The new group was educationists and scholars who could bring their intellectual training to bear upon the problems of statesmanship, without discarding their spiritual ideals in the pursuit of secular ambitions and secular pleasures. Upon men of this color Otto bestowed the highest ecclesiastical offices. Bruno was his own right-hand man and his Chancellor. Ecclesiastics of this type, in intimate association with the Crown, would be the strongest possible counterpoise to the arrogant and greedy nobles who were endeavoring to usurp a great deal of the territorial jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical magnates. Otto became the protector and defender of the Church, and whatever was best in the Church was ready to give him zealous support. There was no question of the Crown deriving its authority from the Church; on the contrary, the churchmen owed their elevation to the king.

But Otto's own bishops were not necessarily in accord with all the king's designs. When he proposed to set up a new archbishopric beyond the Elbe he found himself met by an opposition which appealed to the Pope; and the appeal to the Pope showed him that his reforms in Germany could not be completed without a reformation of the Papacy, while a forcible reformation of the Papacy could only be effected by the domination of Italy.

In Italy and in France the business of resisting barbarian invaders, northern Danes and southern Saracens, had brought about a rapid development of feudalism. The military exigencies led in particular

to two innovations: the building by the great landed proprietors of castles which were impregnable to assault, and the formation of their followers into band of mailed horsemen who could move rapidly and could easily disperse much larger numbers of light-armed troops. But the effect was to give every landed proprietor the power of ruling over his own particular territory with a high hand unless a stronger than he should come against him with a bigger band of mailed horsemen, rout him in the field, and shut him up in his castle till he starved. The result was that each of these petty lords sought the alliance and protection of some mightier lord to whom he "commended" himself, doing homage to him, becoming his "man," the two parties exchanging promise of protection on one side and a military service on the other. By the extension of this process the greatest territorial magnates because in effect princes, each having behind him an army of his lieges whom he could call into the field, while each liegeman could if so minded play the tyrant within his own domain.

In Italy, where there was no strong man at all, where, since the death of Emperor Lewis II., no one had been powerful enough to exercise an effective supremacy, perpetual anarchy had prevailed. Claimants to the Lombard crown and claimants to the Imperial crown held and lost them in turn. Toward the middle of the century two rivals were appealing for aid—one to the Duke of Bavaria, Otto's brother Henry; the other to the Duke of Swabia, his son Ludolph. Then one of the rivals died, and his widow appealed to both the dukes, who, instead of uniting, each took the field as her champion. Otto did not wish either his son or his brother to become independent King of Italy. He intervened, marched into Lombardy, married the widow, and proclaimed himself King of the Lombards but found it more convenient to withdraw, leaving the defeated claimant in occupation of the throne as his vassal, while he went home himself to deal with the troubles of the second civil war, and to conduct his triumphant campaign against the Magyars.

Meanwhile the Papacy had reached the nadir of its degradation. The Popes became the mere creatures of a powerful Tuscan House of which, one member or other might occupy the papal throne. At last Pope John XII., a scion of the family, who wished to make it supreme in Italy, found that Berengar, the King of the Lombards, whom Otto had left behind, stood in his way. He appealed to Otto. In 961 Otto crossed the Alps, and in January 962 he was crowned Emperor by Pope John at Rome.

The main object that Otto had in view was to secure the alliance of the Papacy in his projects for the ecclesiastical reorganization of Germany. The German king was once more head of the Empire, but probably Otto himself attached no very great importance to that fact, except so far as it enabled him to reassert the Imperial authority over

the Papacy. He issued an edict making the consecration of future Popes conditional upon their first swearing fealty to the Emperor. Otto then left Rome to deal with Berengar; John made haste to intrigue with his former enemy. Otto came back and deposed him, putting up another Pope, Leo VIII. He had no sooner gone again than John reappeared, and when John died his partisans put up another rival Pope. Again Otto returned, removed the new Pope, and on Leo's death made John XIII. Pope in his room. It had become perfectly clear that the Papacy was quite incapable of offering any effective resistance to the Emperor.

During the remaining ten years of Otto's reign no one again ventured to challenge his power. The Pope was his obedient servant; he was in harmony with the reforming party in the Church, and the antagonistic party could no longer appeal against him to the Holy See. The time was past when dukes could venture to rebel against him; the dukedoms themselves began to be broken up into smaller duchies which could no longer be identified with the five great tribal divisions or nations of the German people. His fame went out over all Europe; every one of its princes paid court to him; some from across his eastern borders paid him voluntary homage. He married his son Otto, who had already been crowned both German King and Emperor, to a princess from Constantinople, Theophano, who brought as her dower the Greek territories in Italy. In 973 he died, the greatest potentate the world had known since Charlemagne, the second founder of the Holy Roman Empire.

II.—Germany and Italy, 973-1073

Otto the Great was a German who had been forced by circumstances, for the sake of his authority in Germany, to impose his authority on Italy and the Papacy as well. Otto II., who succeeded him at the age of eighteen, was only half a German by birth. His mother was a Burgundian; his wife was the daughter of a Greek Emperor. If Germany filled the foreground of his outlook, that was the most that could be said. The opening of his ten years' reign was taken up by the necessity for a vigorous suppression of the tendency of Swabia and Bavaria to combine in an attempt to revolt against his authority. The result was that he transferred the dukedom of Swabia to a staunch adherent of his own, Otto, son of his brother Ludolph, who had died some years earlier, and broke up the Bavarian dukedom by separating from it three margravates. The strong hand of the young Emperor was also felt by the King of France, who made a vain attempt to recover Lotharingia, and saw Otto's armies marching almost up to Paris itself in consequence. But his chief work was to be done in Italy.

In the south the Saracens from Sicily were again threatening the dominions which the Greek Empire had recovered at the close of the ninth century in the time of Basil the Macedonian, and which were nominally the marriage portion of Otto's Empress Theophano. Otto conducted one campaign, which, beginning successfully, ended in disaster—his forces were ambushed and cut to pieces, and he himself narrowly escaped with his life. Energetic efforts were made to prepare for a great united onslaught on the Saracens, when he was cut off by a sudden illness, leaving as his successor a four-year-old son, Otto III., who had already been acknowledged as his successor by the magnates both of Germany and of Italy.

Henry I., Duke of Bavaria, the brother of Otto the Great, had acted in harmony with him during his own latter years. His son, Henry II. of Bavaria, called "the Quarrelsome," had compelled Otto II. to eject him from his dukedom. Henry the Quarrelsome now reappeared on the scene, and tried to deprive the Empress Theophano of the regency. After a long struggle, however, he was so far defeated that he had to give up his claim to the regency, and be content with his restoration in Bavaria. It was only with great difficulty that the revived Empire was saved from dissolution.

Theophano died in 981, and for five years the government was controlled by a Council of Regency, one member of which was Henry III. of Bavaria, whose quarrelsome father had also died. The boy Otto was brought up by prelates of the new school, and imbibed a fervent devotion to the Cluniac ideals of religion, as well as a keen love of learning and letters. At the age of eighteen the youthful idealist assumed the personal rulership of the Empire. The Papacy had fallen back into its old condition, and the death of the Pope enabled Otto to nominate as his successor his own cousin, another Bruno, only a few years older than himself, and like him a fervent idealist. Bruno and Otto set about reforming the world. Then Bruno died, and was succeeded by another equally enthusiastic nominee of Otto's, Gerbert Aurillac, known as Sylvester II. Sylvester was a zealous student of science and mathematics, and acquired in consequence a reputation for practising magic. Also he was not a German, but a Frenchman. Pope and Emperor being in complete concert, full of the idea that it was their duty between them to rule as the leaders not of any particular country but of Christendom at large—really the fundamental conception of the Holy Roman Empire—they went completely counter to the practical German policy of Otto the Great, and especially annoyed the German ecclesiastics by setting up among Slavs and Hungarians independent archbishops instead of bishops dependent upon one or other of the archbishops of Germany.

Otto and Sylvester were not destined to carry out their ideals. The Emperor died when he was only twenty-two, and Sylvester a year

later, in 1003. There was no descendant of Otto the Great to take the Imperial crown, and Henry of Bavaria, the nearest representative of the Saxon line, was made king.

Henry II. was pious, patient, and pedestrian. Having no ideals in particular, but a substantial endowment of common sense, he devoted himself to the work immediately before him of strengthening the German kingdom against the growing power of Slavonic Poland on the east, and of increasing the temporal power of the German bishops and abbots; perhaps with the conscious intention of making them steady adherents of the Crown as against the independence of the hereditary nobles. With the churchmen he obtained such credit that in later years he was reputed a saint. Henry's absorption in German affairs was very beneficial to Germany itself; but by him Italy was entirely neglected. There the nobles were left to go their own way. The control of the papal elections passed practically into the hands of the Counts of Kusculum, with results very similar to those when the Crescenti of Tuscany had held the control in the tenth century.

Henry had no children, and when he died in 1024 Conrad of Swabia, called the Salic, was elected German king. The election was largely the work of that party among the churchmen who resented the Cluniac prepossessions of the Ottos and of Henry II. himself. Conrad was descended from the daughter of Otto the Great and her husband, the Salian Frank Conrad the Red, of Lorraine.

Conrad's position was at first extremely dubious, but was practically secured by the loyalty of his cousins, Conrad of Carinthia, who had at first been put forward as a rival, and the churchman Bruno, who was made Bishop of Toul. The new German king, vigorous and clear-headed, was determined to recover his supremacy in Italy. Thither he went in 1026, received the Lombard crown, compelled the unruly nobles to submission, and in the following year was crowned Emperor at Rome. He held down rebellious dukes and counts, successfully imposed his own overlordship on the Poles, and added to the Empire the kingdom of Lower Burgundy or the Arelate, which was left to him in 1032 by the childless old King Rudolph III.; though Conrad did not make good his claim against a rival candidate without an appeal to arms. Thus the whole of what had at one time been the middle kingdom once more formed a part of the Empire.

It was the definite intention of Conrad to make the kingship and the Empire hereditary, and to this end he secured at an early stage the recognition of his young son Henry as his successor. But he sought to further the principle of heredity by establishing the rule of hereditary succession among the holders of the smaller fiefs. Perhaps the main purpose he had in view was to break up the supreme danger to the power of the Crown involved in the progress of the feudal system. In practice the tendency was for all the lesser men to make

themselves the vassals of one or other of the very small number or the greatest nobles, and to hold themselves bound more rigidly by their allegiance to this overlord than by allegiance to the king. Conrad's intention was to multiply the tenants-in-chief who held directly from the Crown, and to make them independent of the great fiefs into which they were being absorbed. The soundness of the principle was afterwards to be illustrated in England, but in a realm so vast as the Empire it is possible that better results might have been obtained through the vigorous control of a small number of overlords than through the necessarily inefficient control of a king who found it extremely difficult to enforce his authority from a distance.

In Germany Conrad's system did much to extend the royal authority by limiting the power of great nobles, so that they could not set the Crown at defiance. What he did in Germany he sought to do in Italy also, by establishing the principle of hereditary succession to the smaller fiefs. In 1039 the able but unpopular ruler was followed by his much greater son Henry III.

Success attended Henry from the first. No rival was set up to challenge his rights, no rebellions compelled him to assert them by the strong hand. The Kings of Poland, of Bohemia, and of the Magyars in Hungary, were compelled to do him homage by a series of vigorous campaigns between 1039 and 1044. The prestige thus gained by a prince who already bore a high character alike for piety and justice aided him in his efforts to check the private wars among his German subjects which had multiplied with the multiplication of independent baronies. But very soon it became necessary for him to take Italy in hand. In 1045 matters had reached such a pass that there were three rival Popes, each claiming to be the true representative of St. Peter. The ill-doings of young Benedict IX., a member of the Tusculan House, were so scandalous that in 1044 an anti-pope, Sylvester III., was set up. Benedict maintained his title at first, but presently sold his claims to Gregory VI., and having done so tried to reassert his own claims once more. A Roman synod invited the intervention of Henry, who came to Rome, held a series of synods which deposed all the three Popes, and finally procured the election of the German bishop of Bamberg, who became Pope as Clement II. on Christmas Day, 1046. On the same day Clement crowned Henry as Emperor.

The presence of the Emperor in any portion of his dominions soon reduced that particular portion to order. So it now befell in Italy; but his prolonged absence there was attended by disturbances in Lotharingia which now called him away. A few years later Henry again visited Italy, with the result that there was a revolt in Bavaria. Always the revolts were quelled by his return, but always there was the danger that in his absence they would break out. Mighty mon-

arch as Henry was, even he failed to preserve obedience in every quarter of his dominion at once. But he was still only thirty-eight when he died, having achieved a great work, but leaving it still incomplete.

His death was followed by a long minority, for his son, Henry IV., was only six. For some ten years the government of Germany was controlled first by one prelate, Anno of Cologne, then by another, Adalbert of Bremen. Then Henry was declared of age. But still another seven years passed while nobles and prelates quarreled, and sometimes one and sometimes another held the ascendancy until Anno fell into permanent disgrace, and Adalbert died in 1072.

While the third quarter of the century was to some extent a period of decline in Germany, marked by no striking events, the case with Italy was very different.

The appointment of Clement II. as Pope by the Emperor was to all appearance a decisive assertion of the Imperial supremacy over the Papacy. Certainly there could be no question of a Pope posing as the antagonist of Henry III. Clement died within a year; the rule of his successor, Damasus, also an Imperial nominee, was even shorter. In 1048 Henry nominated his cousin, Bishop Bruno of Toul, to the Papacy. Bruno duly became Leo IX, but he insisted first on what may be called his constitutional election by the Roman clergy and the people. Between 1049 and 1054 Leo did much to breathe new life into the Church, zealously supported if not directed by the Archdeacon Hildebrand, the embodiment of the Cluniac conviction that the Church was of higher authority than the State, the Pope than the Emperor. He had indeed refused to recognize the previous Popes nominated by Henry, attaching himself to the deposed Pope, Gregory VI. Now, however, he joined Leo, who devoted himself energetically to the cause of the Reformation, traveling through Western Christendom, and insisting wherever he went upon obedience to the rule of clerical celibacy which was still by no means regularly observed, and denouncing the practise of simony, which meant primarily the sale and purchase of ecclesiastical benefices. Leo compressed into his brief pontificate of five years enough energy to have satisfied an ordinarily active man if spread over twenty years. On his death in 1054 Henry III. nominated the last of his Popes, Victor II., who just outlived the Emperor. Victor's successor, died within the year, and in 1058 the Counts of Tusculum succeeded in procuring the irregular election of their own candidate, who was called Benedict X. But owing to the energetic action of Hildebrand, the election was ignored. Nicholas II. was elected, and the "anti-pope" Benedict was deposed.

At Nicholas's synod in 1059 the Lateran Decrees transferred the election of the Popes from the clergy and people of Rome to the College of Cardinals, the seven cardinal bishops and the cardinal priests

and deacons. They also ordained that in ordinary circumstances the election should be held in Rome, and Roman clerics were to have a preferential title to election. The next election was not long deferred. Nicholas died, and Alexander II. was elected without any reference to the young Emperor, although the Lateran Decree implied that the election ought to be confirmed by him. The indignation of the German bishops led to a revolt on their part, and the election by them of another Pope, Honorius II. Honorius failed to eject Alexander, but throughout his life continued to claim the papal authority and to find some supporters to his title.

From Leo to Alexander, every one of the Popes rested upon the Archdeacon Hildebrand; and when Alexander died in 1073 the inspirer of so many Popes was himself raised to the chair of St. Peter as Gregory VII. With Gregory began the long struggle between the Empire and the Papacy, the era of the great Popes which was the era also of the Crusades.

For another aspect of Italian affairs, however, we must go back to an earlier date than the middle of the eleventh century. The south of Italy had never been brought effectively under the dominion of the German kings. The Greeks had completely driven the Saracens out of what we may call the boot, Apulia and Calabria. The two Beneventine duchies, Salerno the instep and Benevent the ankle, continued to be practically independent; on the west coast the Greeks held Gaeta, Naples, and Amalfi; while another Lombard duchy, that of Capua, was also virtually independent. Sicily was entirely in the hands of the Saracens. We saw that Otto II., having married the Greek princess Theophano, endeavored, but without success, to establish his sway over the Greek provinces. The Lombard dukes fought with the Greeks, and the Italians in the Greek area, being Catholics, were hostile to the "Orthodox" Greek government, which in their eyes was heretical. The leader of an Italian revolt, looking for allies, invited the aid of a band of Norman soldiers who were on a pilgrimage. A century had elapsed since the duchy of Normandy had been established in the north of France, and the valor of Norman warriors had long been celebrated. These Normans, who were simply adventurers, fought with brilliant success for the rebels till they were overwhelmed by superior numbers at Cannæ, where they met with a great defeat. The rebels fled to get aid elsewhere, but the survivors of the Normans entered the service of the dukes of Salerno and Capua. The fame of their doings brought new Norman adventurers to Italy. The Prince of Naples gave one of them some land to settle on, and this settlement, named Aversa, at once became the base from which they set out henceforth to carve out for themselves a dominion in Southern Italy.

In 1038 there appeared among them three of the numerous sons of

Tancred, the lord of Hauteville in Normandy. In 1042 they had made such progress that they were recognized as counts of Apulia by Henry III. Then came a fourth brother, Robert, called Guiscard, who played for his own hand. Lombards and Greeks were uniting to resist the new foe, when Leo IX. joined in the quarrel, siding against the Normans. The Normans, however, won a decisive victory against the combination; but being after their fashion pious, they showed every courtesy to the defeated Pope, and there was a reconciliation, though as yet there was no formal alliance.

Now in 1057 Robert Guiscard succeeded his elder brother Humphrey as Count of Apulia. About the same arrived from Normandy the youngest of the brothers, Roger. It was very shortly after this that Archdeacon Hildebrand realized the use that might be made of the Normans' friendship, and induced Nicholas II. to enter into an alliance with them by which he took upon himself to make Robert Duke of Apulia and Calabria, and of Sicily if he could get it; all of which lands the duke agreed to hold as the Pope's vassal. The Norman alliance was of extreme value to the Papacy, because the Normans themselves were the most vigorous military power in the peninsula. It was hardly of less value to the Normans, who could now claim to be the special champions of Christ against the Saracens and of the Papacy against the heterodox Greeks.

In 1071 Robert Guiscard had completed the business of ejecting the Greeks from Italy, and in a very short time the Lombard duchies were also in Norman hands; although, since they too had theoretically been recovered from the Greeks for the Popes, on whom Henry III. had conferred Benevent in 1052, Robert Guiscard found himself obliged to hand over that city and the neighboring districts to the Pope himself, instead of holding them as the Pope's vassal.

The Norman conquest of Southern Italy—which was going on just when the Duke of Normandy was engaged in making himself King of England—was capped by the Norman conquest of Sicily. We must bear in mind, however, that the Normans in the Mediterranean were adventurers playing for their own hand, not on behalf of the Duke of Normandy. There was no political connection between the duchy in France and the duchies in the south, though the conquests of Duke William and those of the sons of Tancred were phases of the Norman expansion.

Roger FitzTancred had begun operations by conquering and holding half Apulia as his brother Robert's vassal; but he welcomed an invitation from Sicily which gave him the opportunity of securing for himself the independent principality which had been prospectively bestowed upon the Normans by the Pope. The Christians of Messina asked the redoubted warrior to come and deliver them from the Moslem yoke. His first effort was repulsed; but in his second, in 1061,

he was aided both by troops from his brother Robert and by dissensions among the Saracens. Messina and the eastern half of Sicily were conquered or delivered without much difficulty; the Christian population there was large. The conquest of the west offered a much more severe task; Roger could not accomplish it by himself, and had to call in the aid of his brother, the Duke of Apulia. We may transgress the chronological limit set to this chapter by saying that Robert Guiscard, until his death in 1035, was acknowledged by his younger brother as suzerain, and retained some of the most important districts under his own direct control. Roger had to be content with the work of gradually expelling the Saracens from their last stronghold. When Robert died, Roger called himself Count of Sicily, and recognized no overlord except the Pope. Before his own death, in 1101, he was master of the entire island.

III.—*The West, 922-1073*

At the moment when Henry the Fowler became the German king, the Karling Charles the Simple was King of France. Almost immediately afterwards, Count Robert of Paris, the brother of King Odo, headed a revolt, supported by the great Count of Vermandois and Rudolph, Duke of Burgundy. Robert succeeded in making himself king, but was killed in 923, when Rudolph, his son-in-law, succeeded in making himself king, but was killed in 923, when Rudolph, his son-in-law, succeeded in his claims and his crown instead of his son Hugh, who was then too young. We have already related how Rudolph, King of Lower Burgundy, left his kingdom to the Emperor Conrad. The dukedom of Burgundy was the northwestern portion of the Burgundian dominion which had not formed a portion of the Burgundian kingdom, otherwise called the Arelate. Duke Rudolph and King Rudolph were two quite different persons. In coming chapters the name of Burgundy will be reserved for the dukedom which is connected with the French kingdom as distinct from the Arelate which connects with the German Empire.

The deposed King Charles the Simple died in prison. When Rudolph died, in 936, his brother-in-law Hugh, Count of Paris, Robert's son, might have seized the crown for himself; but he preferred to recall from England the representative of the Karlings, the young son of Charles the Simple, who was living under the protection of his uncle, the great King Athelstan. Louis IV., called *D'Outremer*, "the king from over the sea," became king; while Hugh the Great held the real power in his own hands after the fashion of the old Mayors of the Palace, with the title of Duke of the French.

Louis was personally a man of capacity and vigor, but it was a sheer impossibility for him to maintain his authority after the fashion

of the German kings. Henry the Fowler was Duke of Saxony, which was itself almost a quarter, and the strongest quarter, of the whole German dominion. Louis, on the other hand, had only a quite insignificant territory of his own. There were half a dozen dukes and counts who were very much more powerful territorial magnates than the king; and over them towered Hugh the Great, who, besides his own territories, had at his back most of the great feudatories of the north, including the Duke of Normandy, who had voluntarily become his vassals by commendation. Louis engaged in a contest, with the Duke of the French, but found his resources altogether inadequate for the struggle. Hugh, on the other hand, did not wish to overthrow the king whom he himself had set up. The two were reconciled, and lived in amity till the king's death, in 954, when he was succeeded by his son Lothair, a boy of thirteen. It may be remarked that Otto the Great and Hugh the Great, as well as Charles the Simple, all married daughters of the English King Edward the Elder, sisters of Athelstan, though Otto II. was the offspring of his father's later marriage with the Burgundian Adelaide.

Hugh the Great died two years after Louis, and his place was taken by his son Hugh, called Capet. The young Lothair struggled against his domination with no better success than his father had struggled against that of Hugh's father. Moreover, he quarreled with the churchmen, who were traditional supporters of the Crown, and with Germany (whose friendship Louis had carefully fostered), by that futile attempt to recover Lotharingia which brought Otto II.'s avenging armies into the heart of France. Lothair reigned, while Hugh Capet ruled, till 986. His son and successor, Louis V., made friends with Hugh, but died a year after his accession. There was no Karling to follow him, and Hugh was elected King of the French, the first of the Capet dynasty whose descendants reigned, with only one interval of twenty-two years, until the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was not the accession in 987 of Hugh Capet which made France French instead of German. France was already French, and already finally separated from Germany, when Charles the Fat died, a hundred years before. The final disappearance of the Karlings merely emphasizes what had long been the accomplished fact. But now in France, as in Germany, the king was no longer the scion of a royal house with a great tradition behind it; he was merely the most powerful of the nobles, who had been elected to discharge the functions of kingship. A dynasty with a great tradition was in course of time established because the Capets enjoyed the exceptional good fortune of an unbroken succession of male heirs to the throne, the son following the father, or the brother a brother who had left no son, for more than three hundred years; whereas in Germany the male line of

one dynasty after another ran out, and the elective character of the monarchy was repeatedly renewed.

The new dynasty, however, had more difficulty than the German emperors in establishing an effective supremacy during the century which followed the accession of Hugh Capet. The kings had not the prestige of the Imperial Crowns; in the eyes of the great feudatories they were little more than powerful nobles, and not always the most powerful among the nobility themselves. Dukes and counts were quite ready to repudiate their allegiance, and to back each other up in doing so, if the king interfered with their virtual independence. The Capet was after all much stronger than a Karling, because as a territorial magnate he was at any rate on an equality with any one of his feudatories, and that was a more valuable asset than the Karling name. The Crown, in fact, gained more than it lost by the change, but the change did not make it by any means unquestionably supreme. In one respect, however, the Crown enjoyed a great advantage over the feudatories; it had the support of the Church. Bishops and abbots, as well as laymen, were territorial magnates; they needed the support of the Crown in resisting the encroachments of lay magnates; they were themselves to a great extent the nominees of the Crown, whereas the lay nobility held their estates by indefeasible hereditary right. It followed that the tendency was for the Church and the Crown to preserve a close alliance.

Hugh and his successors, his son Robert II. and his grandson Henry I., who died in 1060, were not powerful kings; but they abstained from such attempts to exercise supreme authority as might have endangered their tenure of the Crown. It was not till the reign of the fourth Capet, Philip I., who did not attain his majority till some years after his accession, that something like a definite though very unobtrusive policy of strengthening the Crown was inaugurated.

Of the Spanish Peninsula during the whole of this period not much is to be told. At the opening, Christian Spain was entirely confined to the north, and was in two divisions which were completely separated by a broad Saracen wedge. In the northeastern corner was Barcelona or Catalonia, the Spanish march of the Carolingian Empire. In the northwest the kingdom of Asturias had expanded to the Douro and the district of Estremadura; the enlarged Christian power consisted of the small kingdom of Navarre, the larger kingdom of Leon, and the march country of Castile. The whole of the rest of Spain and Portugal was under the khalifate of Cordova; and during the tenth century the Christians were unable to extend their territory farther in spite of the rivalries and dissensions which were threatening to break up the western khalifate. In the first quarter of the eleventh century, however, the Ommayyads were overthrown.

Meanwhile Sancho the Great, King of Navarre, had been establishing his own supremacy over all Christian Spain except Barcelona, which as yet was a dependency of France. On his death his so-called empire was divided among his sons. One had the northeastern corner, Aragon, which was long afterwards combined with Catalonia, and now began its expansion toward Saragossa, under its King Alfonso I. Leon and Castile became united under Ferdinand, under whom and his successor, Alfonso VI., the period of persistent expansion began. Alfonso of Castile pushed into the heart of Spain, conquered Madrid, and carried his arms victoriously as far as Toledo. In these wars with the Saracens appears another of those valiant warriors about whom wonderful legends afterwards accumulated—Ruy Diaz the Cid Campeador. Later myths transformed him into a champion of Christendom; but in fact he appears to have merely been a very valiant warrior, whose trade was fighting, and who did not particularly care for whom he fought. Such figures have more to do with traditions of the spirit of chivalry, of knightly courage and courtesy, than with actual historical developments.

Across the Channel, in England, Athelstan, and after him his brother Edmund, continued the work of Alfred the Great and Edward the Elder. Under Athelstan the north sought to break free from the supremacy of the house of Wessex. Northumbrian Danes and Norsemen from Ireland joined with Constantine, King of Scots, in a great attack upon the English power. The coalition was crushed at the great battle of Brunanburh, which may perhaps be said to have finally secured the unity of England; though the great rout did not mean that the English acquired any effective lordship in Scotland. A few years later Edmund ceded the really unsubdued Cumbria to another King of Scots, Malcolm I., who probably held it in some sort as his vassal. But, in fact, it was still almost impossible for the kings of Wessex to exercise effective personal control beyond the Humber. Even after Brunanburh Athelstan appointed a sub-king of Northumbria, and Cumbria was probably granted to Malcolm in order that might hold it against the attacks of the Norsemen from Ireland. A little later again the ruler of Northumbria lost the title of king, and bore instead the title of nobility, *eorl*, not hitherto associated with territorial dominions.

For some while after the middle of the century there were no more attempts to subvert the supremacy of the royal house. With the accession of Edgar the Peaceful in 959 and the rule of his minister Dunstan, Archbishop of Canterbury, there came a brief era of peace. Edgar's suzerainty would seem to have been acknowledged by all the other kings in the island, in Wales, in Strathclyde, and in Scotland itself. Dunstan at the same period was engaged in determined efforts

to carry out those ecclesiastical reforms which on the Continent were associated with the school of Cluny.

Edgar's death, at an early age in 975, was the beginning of troubles. Soon afterwards his widow, Ælfthryth (Elfrida), murdered her step-son, Edward the Martyr, who had succeeded to the throne, in order to make her own son Ethelred the Redeless king; and in the days of that vicious and incapable monarch the Danes from overseas again appeared on the scene.

Since the Northmen had won their footing in the Danelagh and in Normandy, their own onslaught in force upon England and Western Europe had ceased. Towards the close of the ninth century the free vikings of Norway had become involved in a struggle with Harold the Fair-haired, who succeeded in establishing his own supremacy over the petty kings and jarls; whereby not a few of the vikings, including probably that Rolf who won Normandy, were driven to go cruising on their own account; so that some of them established themselves in the Hebrides, and one band of emigrants occupied the remote and hitherto unpeopled island of Iceland. Harold's son Haakon was an ally of Athelstan of England, and was the first prince who attempted to introduce Christianity in Norway.

It was also in the middle of the tenth century that the Danish king, Harald Blue-tooth, became a Christian, and made Christianity general, though not universal, among the Danes. In fact, his son Sweyn Forkbeard became the leader of those who resented Harald's religious zeal. Though Sweyn was actually baptized, he only made profession of Christianity when it suited him. Sweyn Forkbeard, heir to the kingdom of Denmark, and the Norseman Olaf Tryggvesson became famous vikings, raiders, and pirates. They began again the harrying of England, which was laid open to attack by the wretched incompetence of Ethelred. Before the end of the century Olaf was converted to Christianity, gave up his harryings, and went off to Norway, where he made himself king. Sweyn established himself securely on the Danish throne. Then the witless Ethelred arranged a massacre of the Danes in Wessex on St. Brice's Day, 1002. After that, Sweyn's Danes fell upon the unhappy land and inflicted upon it a series of merciless and devastating raids, till at last Sweyn resolved to conquer the country and annex it. He succeeded with little difficulty in ejecting Ethelred, but died immediately afterwards, when his son Knut, or Canute, very shortly succeeded in securing the kingdom for himself, as well as that of Denmark, upon the death of a brother to whom the Danish crown had at first passed.

For twenty years the crowns of England and Denmark were united. During part of the time Canute reigned over Norway as well, having succeeded in dispossessing Saint Olaf "the Thick," the valiant warrior

who had completed the work, practically begun by Olaf Tryggvesson, of Christianizing his subjects. England enjoyed a period of just and vigorous government; but Canute introduced the system which threatened to develop in England a state of things corresponding to the feudal monarchies of the Continent. Under the old system the country had been divided into shires, each with an ealdorman at the head of the local administration. Since the old kingdoms had disappeared, it could not be said that there were any nobles who could make head against the central government. Canute divided the country into four great earldoms or provinces; and but for the great catastrophe in the course of English history, the Norman Conquest, the great earls would assuredly have developed into semi-independent feudatories. The system, however, so long as it meant that the earls were not magnates with a hereditary title, but in effect lieutenants appointed to act for the Crown under a very strong king, was admirably adapted for the restoration of order and firm government. There was one event of importance which should be mentioned: the King of Scots, Malcolm II., compelled the Northumbrian earl to cede to him the Lothians, the eastern half of the Lowlands from Forth to Tweed. Virtually this cession of the Lothians settled what territory was to be thereafter regarded as an integral part of the Scottish kingdom.

After Canute's death and that of his two sons, Harald Harefoot and Harthacnut, England and Denmark were finally separated. Norway also for a time was separated from Denmark; in 1066 the great adventurer Harald Hardrada, who was of the kin of old King Olaf, had succeeded in winning the crown of Norway for himself. But he fell at the battle of Stamford Bridge, having thought fit to invade England, and the crown of Norway as well as of Denmark was secured by Canute's nephew, Sweyn Estrithsen.

On the death of the sons of Canute the English summoned to the throne Edward the Confessor, son of Ethelred the Redeless, who had hitherto lived in Normandy. On Edward's death, in 1066, the English Witan passed over the boy, Edgar the Atheling, Edward's great-nephew, who was the only male representative of the house of Wessex, and elected as their king the great earl, Harold, who had for some time been the effective governor of the country. But William, Duke of Normandy, founding his claim on promises made or said to have been made by Edward and Harold, invaded England to take possession of the crown. Harold was slain and his forces routed at the battle of Senlac, or Hastings, and on Christmas Day William the Norman was crowned King of England. A series of revolts in the west and north were ruthlessly crushed in the course of the next six years, and when Archdeacon Hildebrand became Gregory VII. the Norman conquest of England was a completed fact.

IV.—The East, 920-1072

The long reign of Constantine porphyrogenitus at Constantinople was as placid and uneventful as that of his predecessor, Leo the Wise. The Empire—now quite distinctively the Greek Empire—consisted in effect of the whole of Asia Minor, the islands of the Ægean, the European coastline from a point about half-way between the mouth of the Danube and Constantinople round to Venice, and the foot of Italy. It is true that all of what we generally think of as Greece was included under the Emperor's actual sway, but otherwise almost the whole interior of the Balkan Peninsula on the south of the Danube was occupied by independent kingdoms of Bulgarians and Slavs. Within the Empire the government worked almost automatically. Neither Saracens on the east nor Bulgarians on the north were flinging themselves upon it; trade was prospering; and the court and the leisured classes occupied themselves with art and literature to an almost unprecedented extent.

Perhaps it was as well that there should have been such a long period of repose. But when Constantine died in 959, his son Romanus felt that the time had come to take advantage of the disintegration of the khalifate to recover something of all that Islam had torn from Christendom. The first step was to expel the Saracens from Crete, whence their pirate fleets had inflicted much loss on the commerce of the Empire. The next was to recapture Cilicia, the coastal province on the south-east of the Taurus range. The work was rapidly accomplished by the general, Nicephorus Phocas. Romanus died, leaving two children, who were made emperors jointly; but Nicephorus married the Empress-mother, and conducted the government in their name. His vigorous campaigns recovered a great part of Northern Syria for the Empire. But after ten years he was murdered by one of his captains, a popular soldier, John Zimisces. The Empire acquiesced with a curious equanimity when John was proclaimed Emperor in association with the two boys Basil and Constantine. As in other cases which we have observed, John Zimisces, having attained to the purple by a particularly ugly crime, atoned for it by proving himself a strong and capable ruler. He himself married one of the sisters of the boy emperors, and arranged the marriage of the other, Theophano, with Otto II.

In the main, however, John was occupied with wars during the seven years of his reign. Beyond the Danube a Russian state had come into existence—that is to say, Scandinavian adventurers, pressing south and east while the Danes and Norsemen were sweeping the Western seas and coasts, had established an ascendancy among the Slavonic tribes. Although to us the name Russian is essentially

connected not with Teutons but with Slavs, it belonged in the first instance to the Goths or Swedes, who were ultimately absorbed by the Slavs among whom they established their domination, as the Bulgars were absorbed by the Slavs on the south of the Danube. During the period with which we are now dealing, however, the Russians must be regarded as Scandinavians of the same type as the western vikings. Already the Russians had been Christianized, but only to an extent so limited that on the accession of the king, Sviatoslav, he reverted to paganism.

In the last years of Nicephorus the Russians had overrun Bulgaria; in the first year of John they were attacking the Empire itself. In 971 John marched against them, and defeated them in two great battles, the victories being won, like that of Hastings, by the combination of archery and heavy cavalry against solid masses of axe-wielding infantry. The Northmen, however, secured an honorable treaty, on their engaging to make no further attacks upon the Empire. John proceeded to the subjugation of Bulgaria and to the recovery of debatable districts from the Saracens in Syria, when his unexpected death made room for Basil, the elder of the young emperors who had nominally been reigning since the death of Romanus II., in 963.

Basil was now only twenty, and he ruled for all but fifty years. For nearly forty of them he was engaged in a long struggle with the Bulgarians, whose subjugation by John had been incomplete. Under their king, Samuel, they waged continual war with the Empire, which remained on the defensive until after the opening of the eleventh century. Basil then found himself able to assume the offensive, recovering ground slowly till, in 1014, he won a decisive victory; and in another four years the Bulgarian resistance was completely crushed. Basil's triumph won for him the title *Bulgaroctonus*, the "Slayer of the Bulgarians."

Being already past sixty, Basil successfully but unwisely attacked the Armenians, who lay on the north-eastern side of the Empire in Asia Minor—unwisely, because the Armenians were Christians who, if troublesome themselves, were nevertheless a useful buffer between the Empire and the khalifate. But their power of resistance was broken by the attack of Basil; while Armenia was not reorganized as a military frontier of the Empire.

Basil died in 1025, leaving his brother and hitherto nominal colleague, Constantine VIII., sole Emperor. Constantine survived his brother only three years, leaving his daughter Zoe to succeed him. She, with three of her husbands in succession, ruled very badly for another twenty-six years, at the end of which her sister Theodora was extracted from a convent to prolong the rule of the Macedonian dynasty for three years more. This was the only moment during

which the Eastern Empire enjoyed decent government between the death of Basil II. and the elevation to the Imperial dignity of the crafty soldier, Alexius Comnenus, in 1081. The half-dozen emperors who intervened were the nominees of factions; not one of them displayed any competence in the contest with the power of Islam, which was now reviving under the leadership of the Seljuk Turks.

About the end of the ninth century the khalifs at Bagdad were recovering a little of the control over their wide dominions which had been slipping from their grasp. But the recovery was only temporary. One family, the Hamdanides, established a hereditary governorship in Mesopotamia and Northern Syria. The Abbassides had become definitely orthodox Sunnites, the school of doctrine to which the Turkish converts in the East adhered; while the Persians were Shiites holding at once the belief in the hereditary title of the descendants of Ali to the khalifate, and a mystical or allegorical interpretation of the Koran as opposed to the literalism of the Sunnites. In Africa the Aglabite governors were displaced by Obeidullah, a descendant of Ali, who there established what is called the Fatimide dynasty, which in the second half of the century secured also the supremacy of Egypt. Meanwhile, a family of Persian governors, the Buides, who though they were Shiites did not recognize the claims of the African Fatimides, established an ascendancy at Bagdad, where they ruled as protectors of the Abbasside khalif without being able to get rid of the Turkish mercenary troops, who, being Sunnites, were at perpetual feud with the Shiites.

It was under these conditions that a mighty, if brief, independent monarchy was set up in the East. At Ghazni, in the modern Afghanistan, towards the close of the tenth century, the governor of the province himself, a Turkish warrior, Sabuktigin, renewed the attacks of Islam upon the Punjab. In 998 he was succeeded by his mighty son, Mahmud of Ghazni. Mahmud conducted a series of sanguinary campaigns into the Punjab. His armies swept eastward as far as the Jumna, and southward into Gujrat; whence he carried off the great gates of the temple of Somnath, which were only restored after more than eight hundred years had passed. He gathered immense spoils, and acquired credit by the destruction of innumerable idols. But, like so many of the conquerors who descended through the mountains from Afghanistan, he came not to organize empire, but to gather spoil. Beyond the mountains, on the other hand, he made himself master of all the Farther East. Persia owned his sway, though he himself owned the supremacy of the khalif as the spiritual head of Mohammedanism, whose claim to temporal authority might be quietly ignored. War was the constant employment of the great Mahmud; but though he was much more of a conqueror than a statesman, he occupied a foremost position among the powerful

princes who have fostered learning and culture. The Turks as a people have done a good deal to impede the progress of the world, but individuals of Turkish race have been brilliant exceptions. Such was Mahmud, whose court became a center where every devotee of art and literature was welcomed. Not only were the literary activities of his subjects encouraged by lavish rewards, but it was under his protection that Firdusi took in hand the great task of recasting the national epics and legends of Persia in the great work called the *Shah Nameh*, the "Book of Kings."

Yet Mahmud's is the only great name in the Ghaznavid dynasty. After his death in 1030 the dominion which he had built up went to pieces. He had held back the flood of nomad tribes from Turkestan, who now began to pour into Bokhara and Persia. Led by the chiefs of the house of Seljuk, the Turkish tribes to whom that name was given first shattered the power of the son of Mahmud, then mastered Persia; and in 1055 their chief, Toghrul, overturned the Buide protectors of the khalif in Bagdad, and assumed their functions himself. The Seljuk became the Great Sultan, though the Abbasside was still the spiritual head of the Moslem world and its nominal lord.

Toghrul's great successor, Alp Arslan, turned his arms first not upon Syria but upon Armenia, and burst through Armenia into Asia Minor. The Emperor of the moment, Romanus Diogenes, had proved himself a good soldier as a subordinate, but was a hopelessly incompetent general. He advanced to drive back the Turk, who enticed him into the Armenian mountains, overwhelmed his forces, and took the Emperor himself prisoner, at the battle of Manzikert in 1071. The Turks overran Asia Minor, and swept up to the Dardanelles. Romanus had been released, but perished immediately afterwards; the new Emperor, Michael, was forced to buy off the Turk by ceding to him as much of Asia Minor as was already in his occupation. The Seljuk general, Suleiman, who had now taken the place of Alp Arslan, set up an independent Seljuk kingdom, that of Roum (that is, Rome) or Iconium, while Melek Shad, the son of Alp Arslan, held the general Seljuk sultanate, and brought Syria and Palestine under his direct dominion.

The Turkish ascendancy was of evil omen for the world. When the Arabs dominated Islam, the contest between East and West had, indeed, become a contest between Christianity and Islam, between Oriental and Occidental ideas of progress. The ascendancy of the Turk brought the East under the control of a race which was not progressive at all. Under the Arabian ascendancy the advance of science and of philosophy compared favorably with that in Europe. But the Turk was a soldier, and nothing more. He could fight, and his qualities as a fighter were intensified by his fanatical adherence to

the creed of Mohammedanism. But fighting was the only thing he could do well. The contest ceased to be one between differing ideals of progress, and became rather one between civilization, however crude, and forces which tended to barbarism.

V.—Slavs and Magyars

On the marches of the Greek and German world lay the Slavonic and Mongolian peoples, to whose development down to the closing years of the eleventh century we must now give brief attention—brief, because of the very limited amount of information at our disposal. The brevity of our references hitherto, however, makes it necessary to carry our connected account of them somewhat farther back than the chronological limits of this chapter.

When the Teutons broke into the Roman Empire, Slavonic peoples who were behind them spread over Central and Eastern Europe. In the Danube basin and between the Danube and the Adriatic the stay of the Teutons was brief; before the end of the fifth century they had all moved off to the West. The flood of the Mongol Huns poured across Europe and rolled back again after the death of Attila, to be followed by other Mongol hordes. The pressure of the Mongols drove the Slavs into flight southward and northward as the wedge was pushed through them. They surged up to the Baltic and down over the Danube. They submerged the interior of the Balkan Peninsula, and spread up the Danube till they occupied the regions between that river and the Adriatic. They closed up round the western confines of the Avar dominion, till Slavonic peoples covered the whole Teutonic march between the Baltic and the Adriatic. They were in great part subjected to the Avars, till that Power was broken up by Charles the Great.

Meanwhile the Bulgars, kinsmen, doubtless, of the Avars, crossed the Lower Danube, and made themselves masters of the Slavs in Moesia, though only to become ultimately absorbed by them. The Avars disappeared, but the Magyars came to take their place in Hungary, urged westward by other Tartar tribes. The Slavs offered no serious check to the Magyars, who pushed westward through them till they were rolled back first by Henry the Fowler, and finally by Otto the Great; and the Magyar kingdom, having accepted Christianity, was content to confine itself approximately to what we call Hungary.

Of the Huns and Avars we have nothing to add to what has already been recorded. They came, they conquered, they vanished, partly perhaps absorbed by the East Germans. The Slavs and the Magyars did not vanish. Both, on the contrary, created powerful

kingdoms, though Bulgaria, lying within the confines of the old Roman Empire, was not destined permanently to preserve its independence.

The Slavs, like the Celts, appear to have suffered from a general incapacity for forming solid centralized political combinations. Except when they found leaders of another race, whether Mongols like the Bulgars, or Scandinavians like the Russians, they were seldom a serious menace to the Teutons, though they might be very much of a nuisance. But they did form states sufficiently consolidated to be dealt with as units when they came into collision with the Western Powers.

The Bulgarian kingdom had come very definitely into existence before the end of the seventh century. The Bulgars drove back the attack of the Greeks when Justinian II. was Emperor, and afterwards it was a Bulgarian army which reinstated him on the throne from which he had been deposed. It was a Bulgarian army which came to the assistance of Leo the Isaurian in 718, and inflicted on the Saracens the decisive blow which caused them forthwith to raise the siege of Constantinople. We have already noted various collisions between the Bulgarians and one or another of the Byzantine Emperors. Their Christianization was mainly the work of their khan Boris—who still retained the old title of Tartar monarchs—in the second half of the ninth century. Bulgaria attained to its highest power under his son Symeon, who took the new title of Tsar, a spelling which is to be preferred to "Czar," which perpetuates the probably erroneous belief that it stands for Cæsar. Symeon had lived for a long time at Constantinople, while Leo the Wise, scholar, or pedant, was ruling there. He was himself a man of no little culture, whereby his people benefited considerably. He was also a warrior of no small repute, who extended his dominion over the Western Slavs, the Serbs, or Serbians.

After him, however, the kingdom broke up again. In 968 it was overrun by the Russian Sviatoslav; when John Zimisce drove the Russian out, it was only to bring Bulgaria within the Empire; and its subjugation was completed in the long struggle with Basil the Bulgar-slayer.

The south-western Slavs need not detain us. Serbia and Croatia did not attain to organized government, but were generally more or less subject to one of the neighboring Powers, the Avars, Bulgaria, or the German rulers of the West. Germans were wedged in between them and their northern kinsfolk, who occupied Moravia and Bohemia. It is only after the smiting of the Avars by Charles the Great that we become aware of the Czech principality on the Bavarian march. On this principality Lewis the German made

numerous attacks, though it can scarcely be said that he subjugated it. Before Lewis was dead, however, internal dissensions virtually brought Moravia to a state of submission. Then came the worst moment of the Carolingian disintegration; the Czechs recovered their independence, and presently we find their duke or prince Svato-pluk supporting the vigorous German king Arnulf. But at the beginning of the tenth century, owing to the dynastic struggles which regularly attended the death of a strong ruler, Moravia fell a prey to the Magyars. The Czechs in Bohemia, on the west of Moravia, preserved independence. The peoples had been Christianized before the end of the ninth century, and the "good king Wenceslaus" of the familiar Christmas carol was ruling in Bohemia when Henry the Fowler was German king. His successor, Boleslav, sent his troops to the support of Otto the Great in the fight of Lechfeld, which finally stopped the Magyar advance.

Soon after followed a period of fierce collisions between the Premyslid dynasty of Bohemia and the rising Slavonic power of the Poles on the north-east.

It is in the time of Otto the Great that the Polish group of the Slavs begin to attract attention. Their prince Miska married the Bohemian princess Dubrava, in consequence of which the German and Bohemian Christianity made its way into Poland. Miska may be looked upon as the founder of the Polish dominion. He found it necessary to acknowledge the overlordship of the Ottos. At the end of the tenth century his son Boleslav I. secured a general supremacy, and obtained from Otto III. something like a recognition of his independence, while his arms had already greatly extended the sphere of Polish ascendancy. The growth of the Polish Power brought it into collision with the Emperor Henry II., to whom the half-subjected Bohemia naturally attached itself. Nevertheless, so vigorous was Boleslav that before he died in 1025 he called himself no longer duke but king, and in actual fact dominated the Slavs from the Baltic to the borders of the Magyar or Hungarian kingdom.

On his death followed the break-up. The Bohemian Bretislav shook himself free and recovered Moravia. Magyars on the south, Danes on the north—Canute was now King of Denmark—and Russians on the east tore away portions of the Polish territory, and the Polish duke was once more obliged to surrender his independence to the German king and his own claim to the royal title.

Farther to the east the warrior Swedes were, in the middle of the ninth century, establishing their supremacy among other Slavonic tribes; and before the end of the century had created a Russian state which was to have two centers, Novgorod in the north and Kiev on the Dnieper in the south, Kiev being the more prominent of

the two. At the beginning of the tenth century, when Leo VI. was at Constantinople, the Russians came down the Dnieper, crossed the Black Sea, and attacked Constantinople itself. Leo made a treaty with them which averted serious hostilities for a long time. A new attack was made, however, in the days of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, when the treaty was renewed and a few Russians were baptized. Christianity was encouraged by the queen Olga, who ruled the Russians while her son Sviatoslav was a child; when he came of age he repudiated Christianity, and made that alarming onslaught on the Empire which was checked by the victories of John Zimisces, and was once more followed by a renewal of the treaty.

Although the Scandinavian dynasty gave the Russians their rulers for some centuries, the Northmen, who were never more than a small dominant group, were already losing their ascendancy among the Slavs; and from this time numbers of them passed out of the Slav territory and took service with the Emperors at Constantinople, where they formed the famous Varanger Guard, supplemented in later days not only by miscellaneous Norse and Danish rovers, but by a good many of the English, who preferred the foreign service to remaining in England under the Normans. Kiev or Russia was becoming a definitely Slavonic instead of a semi-Scandinavian Power. Sviatoslav was followed, after a sharp struggle for ascendancy between several brothers, by Vladimir, who strengthened and extended his kingdom, allied himself with Basil the Bulgar-slayer, and ultimately became an unusually genuine convert to Christianity. He imposed the Christian faith (derived from the Greek Church) upon his subjects, and actually modified the barbarism of his methods to a great extent in accordance with the milder doctrines of Christianity. The reign of Vladimir was a distinct epoch in the civilization of the Russians. His work was actively carried on by his successor Jaroslav; who before his death laid down what was to be the guiding principle of the Russian constitution, the division of the dominion among the sons, while the eldest, as Grand Duke of Kiev, retained the general supremacy. As a natural consequence it proved exceedingly difficult for the Grand duke to enforce the supremacy which was nominally his; the reality of his superior authority was never adequately recognized.

A few words must suffice for the story of the Magyars. At the end of the ninth century, under the great khan Arpad, they forced their way easily enough into Hungary and Pannonia. At the beginning of the tenth century they were overrunning Moravia; and for nearly fifty years after Arpad's death they were flinging themselves upon the German marches until they met with their great rout at the hands of Otto I. In the last quarter of the century they adopted Christianity,

and thereafter in many respects assimilated Western characteristics as no other Mongolian race has ever done. The genius and virtues of Stefan I. transformed the Magyars from a horde of barbarians into a Christian kingdom which advanced rapidly in the arts of government and civilization, and successfully preserved its independence of the Holy Roman Empire.

CHAPTER XVIII

FROM THE ACCESSION OF GREGORY VII. TO THE ACCESSION OF
INNOCENT III., 1073-1198

I.—Gregory VII. and Urban II., 1073-1099

IN 1073, on the death of Alexander II., Hildebrand was elected Pope by popular acclamation without the forms laid down by Nicholas II. But the cardinals did not challenge the election, and Hildebrand was ready to defer his consecration until its confirmation by the Emperor. When the ceremony took place he took the name of Gregory VII.

The young Emperor, Henry IV., confirmed the election. He was no longer under tutelage, and was beginning his active sovereignty by alarming and irritating half his subjects. The Saxons were convinced that he intended to subordinate them to the Swabians. In 1073 the Saxons revolted, and though he got the better of them in the struggle for the time it was not till they had almost succeeded in procuring his deposition. And then came the thunderbolt from Rome, which was not the cause but the gage of battle between Empire and Papacy.

Gregory believed utterly in the Divine authority of the Church and the Papacy. He was possessed with the conception of Christendom as a theocracy, the government of God's people by His minister the Pope, the successor of St. Peter, whose pronouncements were the Word of the Lord. Emperors and kings were the instruments for enforcing the will of God as declared by the Church. Control of the spiritual by the temporal power was in the nature of blasphemy. The Church was supreme; the churchmen, the clergy, God's ministers, were a people apart, who must keep themselves apart under austere discipline that they might be worthy of their office. These were the doctrines of the Cluniacs in their extremest form, the views of the relations between the temporal and the spiritual which the prophets of Israel had enunciated and upon which they had acted.

The most effective means to the severance between clergy and laity was to be found in the rigid observance of the rule of clerical celibacy, applied not only to the members of the monastic orders, the "regulars," in whose case a breach of the rule was a breach also of the most solemn vows, but also to the "secular" clergy, who were not living under any monastic rule, *regula*. The principle of spiritual suprem-

acy was most flagrantly disregarded by the practice which allowed lay nobles or princes to make ecclesiastical appointments at their pleasure, and above all by simoniacal appointments made in consideration of payment. It is perhaps needless to remark that while to prevent enthusiasts the conceptions of Gregory presented a holy and glorious ideal, there were vast numbers of the clergy to whom they were extremely unattractive, while they were wholly incompatible with the plenary powers of rule claimed by the lay lords of the world. Ecclesiastical magnates held large territories and much wealth, which were perpetually increased by the piety which regarded the endowment of the Church as a passport to Paradise. Princes could not afford to have within their dominions great territorial magnates wholly independent of their control. Gregory's ideal was in fact quite irreconcilable with any conception of the kingly office which did not account the king a more servitor, in matters temporal as well as spiritual, of the spiritual autocrat at Rome.

Gregory issued a decree absolutely forbidding any of the clergy to receive a bishopric or an abbacy at the hands of any layman. Any such appointment was to be invalid; any layman who sought to confer such an appointment was to be excommunicated. The spiritual powers, symbolized by investiture with the ring and the crosier, could not possibly be conferred by a layman.

The Emperor, Henry IV., had just crushed the Saxon revolt. He reckoned on the support of numbers of the German clergy who had no liking for Gregory's views on discipline. He took up the challenge, and invested a new Archbishop of Milan. He called a General Council at Worms, and with the support of most of the German bishops summoned Gregory to leave the papal throne which he had "usurped." Gregory answered by pronouncing on his own authority that Henry was no longer Emperor and that his subjects were free from their allegiance to him. Then Henry discovered that he could count upon the support neither of clergy nor of nobles, who feared the extension of the Imperial much more than of the Papal authority. He was told in effect that unless he promptly made his peace with the Pope he would be deposed.

Despairing of support Henry in the winter betook himself to Italy, resolved to entreat the Pope's pardon. Gregory was at Canossa. Thither went Henry. For three days he remained at the Pope's approach gate in the snow, barefooted, in the garb of a penitent. Then Gregory admitted him to pardon. The German nobles, full of contempt for the humiliated Henry, elected Rudolph of Swabia king in his place. On the other hand, some were ready to give him the support which they had refused when he was under excommunication. There was a long struggle between Henry and Rudolph. At last Gregory declared in favor of Rudolph, but the reaction triumphed among the

German bishops; and Henry assembled a synod which declared Gregory deposed and elected an anti-pope. Rudolph of Swabia was killed in battle; victory inclined more and more to Henry. At last Gregory, shut up in the castle of St. Angelo, persuaded Robert Guiscard to come to his aid. The Normans came, raised the siege, sacked Rome and released Gregory, who accompanied them to the south, where he died very shortly afterwards in 1085. Two years later the cardinals who had never recognized the anti-pope, elected Urban II.

Urban was as resolute as Gregory, but less uncompromising in his methods. The struggle between Papalists and Imperialists in Italy continued. Henry's arms were, on the whole, successful till public opinion was turned against him by the generally true stories which were spread abroad concerning his evil treatment to his wife. And at this critical stage Urban was provided with a new instrument for developing the prestige of the Papacy—a new means to establishing it as the true head of Christendom.

When Syria and Palestine were torn from the Eastern Empire by the Mohammedans, the Christians of the East had been permitted, according to Mohammedan custom, to practice their religion, and even to retain in their own keeping the Holy Places in Palestine. Thither streams of pilgrims had continued to wend their way, not without difficulties and dangers, but generally without being subjected to direct persecution. But within the last quarter of the century the Seljuk Turks had become the dominant force among the Moslems in the East. Their conquest of half Asia Minor had blocked one of the pilgrim routes to Palestine; they had taken possession of Syria, and finally of Palestine itself. They treated the Christian population with a new brutality; and pilgrims returning from the Holy Land brought back hideous stories of their cruelties and blasphemies. Even at the beginning of his pontificate Gregory VII. had heard enough to be stirred to the first conception of a Holy War which should free the Holy Places from the domination of the Infidel, though his struggle with the Emperor precluded him from any attempt to give shape to the project. And still the tales of wrong multiplied.

But this was not all. Alexius Comnenus saw the Seljuk Suleiman established in Asia Minor, with his kingdom of Roum extending almost up to the waters which divided Europe from Asia. Byzantium was menaced as it had not been menaced since the days of Leo the Isaurian. Alexius knew that by himself he had not the force to roll back the tide. Moreover, the ambitious Robert Guiscard had already taught him that the Normans in Italy were a foe who might threaten him from the West as well as the East. He conceived the idea that by appealing to Western Christendom he might bring the forces of the West to bear, not against his own dominion, but against the menacing Turk. The Normans themselves might be turned to account

to win back the lost provinces of the Empire, and to enlarge his own dominions by forcing the Crescent to retreat before the Cross.

Now, in 1095, the omens were all in favor of Urban in his struggle with Henry IV. It is probable that in any case religious enthusiasm alone would have sufficed to make him take up the idea of Gregory and call upon Christendom to advance against the Turk as soon as the pressure of the struggle with the Empire had passed. But in the course of the last twenty years the case for a crusade had become enormously strengthened. Peter the Hermit had appeared on the scene with his passionate denunciations of Turkish iniquity. The ambassadors of Alexius had come to him adding their arguments of policy to Peter's more emotional appeal. Urban was astute as well as enthusiastic, and he saw that his own position would be enormously strengthened if he brought the Papacy forward conspicuously as the champion of Christendom, the leader and organizer of the armies of Christ against the Infidel. By taking up that position he could teach Christendom to look to him as its true head, relegating to an altogether inferior place an Emperor who was clearly not thinking about Christendom at all and who had moreover notoriously forfeited the respect of all men. In fact, the wisdom of the serpent gave precisely the same counsel as the fervor of religious enthusiasm; though a less keen-witted politician than Urban might have failed to see how favorable the moment was, and a more single-minded enthusiast might have failed to turn the situation to political account.

There was to be no conciliatory abatement of the highest papal pretensions. In the spring Urban held at Piacenza an ecclesiastical Council whence there resounded once more the papal thunders against Henry's iniquities, against simony, against married clerics. But along with them sounded the note of appeal from the envoys of Alexius. Then Urban passed out of Italy into France, and in the winter, at Clermont, he held the famous Council at which, while he upheld the moral authority of the Papacy against the kings of the earth by excommunicating Philip of France for persistence in open sin, he called upon the assembled magnates and multitudes of minor folk to unite together for the redemption of the Holy Places, and proclaimed the First Crusade.

The appeal went home. The multitudes were stirred to a passionate enthusiasm. It was of small account to Urban that the kings themselves were deaf, or even that the greater of the lesser princes were not to be stirred. The masses were won; not only the common folk, but crowds of the knights and the lesser nobility, and with them sundry powerful dukes and counts: Robert of Normandy, Godfrey of Lorraine and Boulogne (commonly but erroneously called of Bouillon), Raimond of Toulouse, and some few more; besides such famous war-

riors as Bohemund, the son of Robert Guiscard, and his nephew Tancred.

The work of Urban II. was effectively accomplished by the Council of Clermont. Indirectly, but none the less decisively, the triumph of the Papacy was assured when Urban died on July 29, 1099, a fortnight after the crusading army had recaptured Jerusalem by storm.

II.—The First Crusaders and the East 1096-1188

The frenzy of religious excitement created by the preaching of Peter the Hermit produced the fantastically tragic episode of the Peasants' Crusade before the great lords were ready to start on their expedition to the East. A few knights and great swarms of peasants gathered under the leadership of Walter the Penniless and Peter the Hermit; tramped in a great unorganized herd through Hungary, where they had to help themselves to food and were treated as marauders by the enraged Magyars; tramped on through Bulgaria, where they met with a like treatment; and were hastily transported across the Dardanelles by Alexius, who only wished to be rid of them. Once in Asia Minor they were for the most part cut to pieces by the Turks.

Not in quite such reckless fashion the counts and dukes who had taken the Cross gathered their forces and poured in successive bands across the Adriatic into the Greek Empire. Alexius had got a great deal more than he had bargained for; he had wanted an army to come and help him, not a great host who seemed as likely as not to fall to a partition of his dominions. His diplomatic skill, however, was equal to the task of inducing the leaders to swear allegiance to him; it is to be presumed that he arrived at an understanding with the chiefs to the effect that territories recovered west of the Taurus were to be accounted as part of his dominion, and that beyond that range the Crusaders were to hold any conquests which they might make as independent of the Empire. During 1097 the Crusaders secured Asia Minor. Then they crossed the Taurus and laid siege to Antioch, which fell in the summer of 1098. There Bohemund remained in possession, while the main host moved on towards Palestine. Raimond of Toulouse would have followed Bohemund's example and have settled himself in Northern Phœnicia or Tripolis, if the renewed zeal of his followers had not compelled him to continue the southward march against his will.

Meanwhile, the Fatimide khalif of Egypt, who had always regarded Palestine as an Egyptian dependency, succeeded in expelling the Seljuks from Jerusalem and occupying it with his own forces. Consequently the struggle of the Holy Land was not after all a struggle with the Seljuks, who looked on from their sultanate across the Euphrates and left the Egyptian and Syrian Saracens to fight it out.

with the Christians. About a year after the capture of Antioch, on July, 15, 1099, the Crusaders stormed Jerusalem and captured it after a hideous massacre. The victorious Christians first offered the crown of Jerusalem to Raimond of Toulouse and Robert of Normandy, who both refused it. Then they elected Godfrey of Boulogne, the brave and simple soldier who had taken the Cross with less afterthought of his own possible glory and advancement than any of the greater nobles. Godfrey, though he accepted the kingdom, refused to wear a crown in the city where Christ had worn the Crown of Thorns; he would style himself only Baron of the Holy Sepulchre. His much cleverer brother Baldwin was taking example by Bohemund, and held the north-eastern outpost of the Christians, at Edessa beyond the Upper Euphrates. Raimond got his own wish and established himself as Count of Tripolis. When Godfrey died a year later, his brother Baldwin I. became king of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, which, under his able rule, was extended from the Holy City and its immediate environments over the whole of Palestine and Southern Phœnicia. We must here remark that the Seljuk conquest of Armenia had caused a great migration of the Christian Armenians into the regions of the Taurus, where they created for themselves the Christian kingdom of Lesser Armenia which extended over the ancient Cilicia.

The general result, then, of the First Crusade was that the Seljuk kingdom of Roum, or Iconium, was virtually isolated on the north-west of the Taurus, but retained its grip on rather more than half of Asia Minor. The whole eastern coastland of the Mediterranean, Cilicia, and the strip extending from the Cilician corner down to Ascalon on the south, was in the hands of the Christians, as also was the county of Edessa, thrusting northwards between Roum and the Mesopotamian dominions of the Seljuk sultanate. The Armenian kingdom was independent of the Latin kingdom, which embraced four main divisions: the kingdom of Jerusalem proper, or Palestine; the county of Tripolis; the principality of Antioch; and the county of Edessa. The rulers of the three latter acknowledged the suzerainty of the King of Jerusalem, but were virtually independent princes.

The system established was that of the purest feudalism, unqualified by the local peculiarities which differentiated the feudalism of the divisions of Europe. It was, in fact, not a natural growth, but an artificial adaption, as a single system, of what was common to the feudalist systems of the West. It was ultimately embodied in the Assize of Jerusalem, which must be regarded as representing the ideal aimed at rather than the actual facts. The kingdom of Jerusalem was divided into a dozen great fiefs, whose lords held them from the king, while numerous minor lordships were held under them. The overlords of the other three states held theoretically from the kingdom of Jerusalem, but the dominion of each was divided into great fiefs,

whose lords held from them, not from the king. In all cases the tenure was by military service.

The name of Franks, once that of a great division of the German race, became in Eastern lands the permanent designation of the Western Christians. It survives to this day in the name *Feringhi*, which the Indian Mohammedans attached to the English. France provided the great bulk of the baronage, but the bulk of the population consisted of the native Syrians, while Italians, chiefly from Venice and Genoa, formed a commercial community which developed trade and enjoyed a large measure of self-government. The Franks were an effective garrison, of which there was no more than a small permanent nucleus, perpetually reinforced by the streams of Crusaders, who went to the East to learn the art of war in a great military school, and then streamed back again to practice what they had learnt in their own countries, carrying with them fragments of the Eastern lore which they had incidentally picked up.

Periodically there were renewed attempts to gather the masses of Christendom in fresh Crusades. The separate Crusades are variously numbered, as the size and importance of the different expeditions vary so much that the question which of them are entitled to be dignified by the name of "Crusade" is one upon which opinions differ. But we would here observe that the great majority of barons and knights who took the Cross did so not as participators in one of the great Crusades, but as fighting pilgrims who attached themselves temporarily to the permanent garrison in the East.

The peculiar conditions of this new battle between East and West, in which the West had again become the aggressor, gave birth to the two famous orders of military monks—the Knights of the Temple and the Knights of St. John—which were presently to find their imitators in the military orders of Spain and the Order of Teutonic Knights, who fought against the heathen not in the Holy Land, but, after the outset, on the borders of the Baltic. The monks of the West took the threefold vow of chastity, poverty, and obedience, that they might the better devote their lives to prayer, meditation, and peaceful service of God. The monks of the military orders took upon them, in addition to these vows, the further duties, first of protecting and ministering to pilgrims in a land where protection could be given only by force of arms, and then generally of fighting against the infidels. They became organizations at once military and ecclesiastical; they acquired in the course of time immense estates and vast wealth. They were societies wholly independent of nationality, but nevertheless capable of exercising powerful political influence; though this was a development which by no means fell within the scope of the intentions of their original founders, who were religious enthusiasts.

During the forty years which followed the First Crusade it seemed that the Latin kingdom would grow steadily stronger. Baldwin I. and his successor and nephew, Baldwin II., consolidated their position in their own kingdom, planted impregnable fortresses commanding the trade routes as out posts in the south and west, and proved themselves shrewd statesmen and soldiers. After them, the the son-in-law of Baldwin II., Fulk, Count of Anjou, was elected to the crown, while he left the management of his great country in France to his son Geoffrey, the father of our King Henry II. He also ruled with vigor and success, though there was no marked extension of territory. The Baldwins had secured the southern frontier against Egypt, while the divisions of Islam made Southern Syria a protection against the more aggressive Eastern Mohammedans rather than a danger to the Christians.

But during the reign of Fulk of Anjou a Turkish governor in Northern Syria, Imad ed-Din Zangi, made himself master of Mesopotamia and Northern Syria. When Fulk of Anjou died the kingdom passed to his children by his second wife, the daughter of Baldwin II. They were young boys, and the fact of itself weakened the position of the kingdom. A year after Fulk's death Imad ed-Din flung himself upon Edessa and captured it. The fall of Edessa was the occasion of the Second Crusade.

At this moment the most influential individual in Western Christendom was Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, to whose unofficial judgment Popes and kings were alike wont to submit themselves. Bernard preached a new Crusade, in which he persuaded not merely nobles and knights to take part, but also the King of France, Louis VII., and the German Emperor, Conrad III.

The King of England, Stephen, was too busily engaged in fighting for his own crown, his claim to which was challenged by the daughter of his predecessor and uncle, Henry I., who is known as the Empress Maud, her first husband having been the Emperor Henry V. of Germany. Christian kings in Spain had enough Moslems to fight in their own peninsula without going to Palestine.

The Second Crusade was a failure. Conrad started without waiting for Louis, and tried to march straight through the kingdom of Iconium, where most of his forces were cut up. The expedition of Louis, avoiding the route followed by Conrad, made its hardly less difficult way to the southern coast of Asia Minor, and there could only find ships enough to carry nobles and knights, leaving the rest of the army to struggle round by land as best it might. The inefficient force attacked Damascus, thereby driving it to unite with Nour ed-Din, the successor of Imad ed-Din. The attack failed, and first Conrad, who had joined the French force, and then Louis himself and his Frenchmen, went home.

Fulks' widow, Millicent, ruled in the name of her son, Baldwin III., for some years. No more pressing attacks were made on the Latin kingdom; but though she and Baldwin himself, and his brother Amalric, who succeeded him, were reasonably efficient rulers, nothing material was accomplished. And in the meanwhile Nour ed-Din's power was growing. Nor was this all. Egypt was divided by factions which ought to have been turned to account. But the actual outcome was that the factions called in to their aid first one of Nour ed-Din's generals, named Shirku, and then the Latin kingdom. Amalric mismanaged the situation. Shirku got himself established as the Wazir of the Fatimide khalif, and when Shirku died he was succeeded in that position by his exceedingly able nephew, Salah ed-Din Yusuf, whom the Western world called Saladin. Amalric and Nour ed-Din both died in 1174; and Saladin, already practically master of Egypt, secured for himself the succession to Nour ed-Din.

Ill fortune fell upon the Latin kingdom. The boy who succeeded Amalric, Baldwin IV., showed brilliant promise; he, or his generals, fought successfully against Saladin himself. But the seeds of the terrible disease of leprosy developed in him. He was doomed to a brief life, and the nobles fell to quarreling over the succession. Wisdom pointed to Raimond of Tripolis as the right man to succeed, but Guy of Lusignan had married Baldwin's sister. When Baldwin himself and an infant, Baldwin V., died in successive years, Guy managed to secure his own election. Within three years before the end of 1187, Saladin had inflicted a tremendous defeat on the Christian forces at the battle of Tiberias, had captured one after another most of the coast towns, except Acre, from Sidon to Ascalon, and finally recaptured Jerusalem itself.

The history of Spain during this century belongs also to that of the contest between Mohammedanism and Christianity. As the eleventh century neared its close the advance of the Christian Powers received a check. The Arabs in Spain sent a call for help to Africa, where a fanatical branch of the Berbers—native Africans, not Arabs—known as the Almoravides, had recently won an ascendancy. The Almoravides came, put the Christian forces to rout, and then established their own ascendancy over Arabs and Christians alike within the Moorish dominion. Then another group of Berbers, the Almohades, rivals of the Almoravides, appeared on the scene, and struggled with them for supremacy. The dissensions of the Moslems gave Alfonso I. of Aragon his opportunity. He captured Saragossa, which became the capital of Aragon, and carried his arms successfully into Andalusia. In the west, the Count of Portugal recovered Lisbon and called his county a kingdom. Crusaders on the way to Palestine stopped to fight the Moors in Spain instead of proceeding on their journey. As in Palestine, so in Spain, monastic orders of knights were instituted.

But, again, the progress was stopped when the Almohades, on the one hand, won decisive supremacy among the Moors, and on the other, the feuds which broke out between the Christian magnates prevented them from opposing a united front to the Saracens. There had been no such disaster as that which befell the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, but when Saladin captured the Holy City, the Moslems rather than the Christians were advancing in Spain.

The rule of the Comneni at Constantinople came to an end in 1185. The First Crusade relieved Alexius of all danger from the Moslem attack. The astute Byzantine was able not only to defeat an onslaught on the part of Bohemund of Antioch, who returned to Italy with high hopes of fulfilling the old ambitions of his house by assailing the Greek Empire, but even to compel the defeated Crusader to acknowledge his own sovereignty. The Empire wore an appearance of peace and prosperity; but, in fact, the progress of the maritime cities of Italy was depriving Constantinople of its position as the great emporium of trade. John, the son and successor of Alexius continued to rule with ability, and held the frontiers of the Empire successfully, both on the line of the Danube and in Asia Minor, until his death, in 1143. John was followed by Manuel Comnenus, who was in some sort a prototype of Richard Cœur de Lion, a knight-errant who revelled in adventurous feats of arms. But though he went himself on the Second Crusade, and afterwards plunged into various wars more from the love of fighting than with serious political motive, his activities did little to promote the strength of the Empire and a good deal to exhaust its resources. Three years after his death, his young son, Alexius II., was murdered by his cousin Andronicus, whose brilliant talents and power of fascination have caused him to be likened to Alsibiades; but his entire unscrupulousness made his tyranny so detestable that he was murdered by the mob of Constantinople. So ended the house of the Comneni, and when the Third Crusade was organized in the West the throne of Constantinople was occupied by the elected Emperor, Isaac Angelus, whose grandmother was one of the Comneni. With his reign set in the rapid decay of the Greek Empire.

The power of the nobles had been considerably developed at the expense of the Crown by the recent troubles, and Henry V. found campaigns in Bohemia and Hungary the safest immediate outlet for his energies. But he meant to renew the fight with the Papacy. The Norman King of England, Henry I., had already arrived at a satisfactory settlement of the particular question of investiture with Archbishop Anselm, by an agreement that the bishops and abbots were to do homage to the king for their temporalities, but were not to be invested by him with the insignia of office; freedom of election was granted, while it was virtually the fact that the king could enforce the election of his own nominees. This was the compromise which was in effect ultimately to be adopted by Emperor and Pope.

But when, in 1111, Henry V. appeared in Italy at the head of an army, and the Pope called in vain for the Normans to come to his aid, Paschal proposed a different compromise. He would not surrender freedom of election, nor would he permit lay investiture; but the Church should surrender to the Emperor all its secular estates. In effect, he would agree to disendowment as the price of complete spiritual independence, if we may apply a modern formula. The clergy for obvious reasons were furious. The ceremony of crowning Henry Emperor was at first prevented by a wild riot; but Henry kept the Pope prisoner, extracted from him the additional permission to appoint and invest bishops on his own responsibility, and finally procured his coronation by Paschal, though with very scanty ceremonial. The victorious Emperor then departed to Germany.

But he had won too much. The clergy refused to be bound by the Pope's decree; the nobles could not view with equanimity the enormous increase of the power of the Crown which would follow upon the resumption by it of the Church lands. Paschal discovered that he was not bound by promises which had been extorted by force. The air grew thick with plots and rumors of plots. Paschal died, and after a brief interval the papal throne was occupied by Calixtus II., a stronger and more astute person than Paschal, who had the skill to bring about the Council at Worms; at which his Legate, Lambert of Austria, carried through the Concordat of Worms, which settled the actual investiture dispute virtually on the lines laid down by Henry I. and Anselm in England.

The plain fact was that no one disputed the abstract theory that emperors and kings ought to control things temporal, the Pope and the Church things spiritual; but it was in practice impossible to draw any boundary line. Each power was bound to enroach upon what the other regarded as within its own sphere. The battle over investitures had not brought the real fundamental problems in dispute any nearer to a solution. But the settlement had increased the prestige of the Papacy because, in the eyes of the public, it looked like a papal victory;

though in fact, the Emperor had carried the vital point that the lands of the Church were held from him, no less than the lands of the lay nobility.

In 1125 Henry V. died, leaving no son, but two nephews, Frederick, Duke of Swabia, and Conrad, Duke of Franconia, the sons of his sister, who had been married to Frederick of Hohenstaufen and Weiblingen, Duke of Swabia. Hohenstaufen had been the most consistent and loyal supporter of Henry IV. in the struggle with the Papacy. Henry V. intended his nephew Frederick to succeed him as German king.

In traditional rivalry with the dukes of Swabia were the Weif dukes of Bavaria (from Welf and Weiblingen come the later titles of Gueif and Ghibelline), who had, as a matter of course, identified themselves with the papalist party in Germany. In the north, Lothair, Duke of Saxony, represented the unsubdued spirit of Saxon nationalism; Saxony, which had given to Germany its great line of the Ottos, had no inclination for subordination to the great houses of the south. An attempt was made to heal the feud between Bavaria and Swabia by the marriage of Frederick to the daughter of the Bavarian duke, but the duke's son and successor, Henry the Proud, married the daughter of the Saxon Lothair. Consequently, the attraction of Bavaria to Saxony more than counteracted the attraction to Swabia. Moreover, Saxony and Bavaria were both papalist, at least in their antagonism to the Salin dynasty which ended with Henry V. An Emperor had to be elected; waverers were won over by insistence on the point that the election of Frederick would almost ensure that the German kingship would become definitely hereditary; Frederick was rejected, and Lothair of Saxony became Emperor.

A struggle soon began; but though Frederick was personally strong and capable, so also was Lothair, who was in the much more favorable position for a contest. The Hohenstaufen gave way, and Lothair conciliated them by taking no undue advantage of his victory. He wanted peace and concord in Germany. He impressed his power upon Danes and Poles and Bohemians; he was energetic in fostering religion in Saxony and spreading it among the still heathen Slavs and wilder non-Aryan peoples of the Baltic shore. Germany, in fact, prospered greatly in his reign, though rigorous anti-clericalism reproaches him for a conciliatory attitude to the arrogant claims of churchmen.

Italy, however, as well as Germany demanded his care. It will be remembered that most of Southern Italy had gone to Robert Guiscard as Duke of Apulia, while his younger brother, Roger, had conquered Sicily and there made himself Count. In course of time the failure of heirs in the house of Robert enabled Roger's son, Roger II., to procure from the Normans in Apulia his own recognition as Duke of

Apulia, with the practical result that, after the suppression of sundry minor rivals, he was lord of the whole dominion which in later times became known as the Two Sicilies. Now it befell that in 1130 Pope Honorius II. died, and Anacletus II. was elected by the cardinals. His election was procured, in part at least, by extensive bribery, and he was in other respects extremely objectionable. Therefore certain of the cardinals considered themselves warranted in ignoring the election and raising Innocent II. to the Papacy. But Anacletus secured for himself the support of Roger of Sicily, with the Normans of the south, by conferring upon him the title of king. Innocent had to take flight.

The case against Anacletus was so strong that the religious dictator of the West, Bernard of Clairvaux, pronounced unreservedly for Innocent, whom all the kings of the West—France and England, Castile and Aragon—acknowledged. Lothair constituted himself Innocent's champion. He marched into the south, conquered a great part of Roger's dominions, and agreed with Innocent to depose Roger and set up another duke in his place. But Pope and Emperor quarrelled again, because each claimed the right of investing the new duke with his new dignity. Lothair withdrew in wrath; and but for his death—he was over seventy—he would probably have entered on a fresh struggle with the Papacy.

On the death of Lothair, Conrad of Franconia, the younger of the two Hohenstaufen dukes, was elected German king. The nobles were now too much afraid of the power of the Welf, Henry the Proud, who was not only Duke of Bavaria, but had received the duchy of Saxony from his father-in-law Lothair as well as a great inheritance in Tuscany. The dukedoms were not in theory hereditary—that is, the Emperor claimed the right of removing one duke and substituting another. The election of Conrad of Franconia renewed the contest between Hohenstaufen and Welf, since Conrad deprived Henry of his dukedoms, giving Bavaria to Leopold of Austria, and Saxony to Albert the Bear, Margrave of the northern march. After the death of Henry the Proud a pacification was reached under which his young son Henry, afterwards called the Lion, became Duke of Saxony, while Bavaria went to his stepfather, the brother of Leopold of Austria, and thus continued to be attached to the Welf connection. Albert the Bear on the northern march, excluded from Saxony itself, extended his dominions in the East by the acquisition of Brandenburg, the margravate which was ultimately to develop after some centuries into the kingdom of Prussia.

Conrad was moved to leave Germany in order to go on the Second Crusade. When he came back he found that young Henry the Lion's position in Saxony had become very strong, and that he was preparing to assert a claim to the Bavarian duchy. But before open war

broke out Conrad died. Conrad's nephew, Frederick, had succeeded his father, the former candidate for the Empire, as Duke of Swabia. He had gone with his uncle on the Crusade, where he had shown distinguished courage and capacity. He was the senior representative of the Hohenstaufen, while his mother was a Welf. Not only did his ability and his character mark him out as the fittest successor to the German kingdom, but it was also possible to anticipate that his accession would terminate the feuds of Hohenstaufen and Welf. Frederick I. (Barbarosa) was elected German king in February 1152.

In 1139 the Anti-pope Anacletus was dead, and the whole Church acknowledged Innocent II. The contest between Empire and Papacy was in abeyance; but the Pope, deserted by the Emperor since the quarrel with Lothair, was quite unable to impose obedience upon Roger of Sicily, who quickly recovered his mastery of Southern Italy. Innocent took the field against him in person, but was himself taken prisoner. Roger treated him with every respect, but insisted on the acknowledgment of his own claims. The result was that Innocent recognized him as King of Sicily and Southern Italy, where he ruled with a strong hand, crushed all attempts at rebellion, and established a despotism which, while absolutely relentless in the face of resistance, was marked by real statesmanship. Roger dealt out equal justice to Greeks and Italians, Saracens and Normans, the heterogeneous population of his dominion, to which he added the strategically important acquisition of Malta, while he compelled the Saracens of North Africa to own his suzerainty. When he died, in 1154, his kingdom was probably the best ordered in Europe.

In Northern Italy this half-century witnessed a great development of the cities, especially in Lombardy. Each city of importance had a bishop of its own; the contest between Emperor and Pope had its counterpart in the antagonism between the lay nobles and the magnates of the Church. The townsfolk found it entirely in their interest to support the ecclesiastics, as the churchmen found it in their interest to support the townsfolk in resisting the tyrannical ascendancy of the nobles; but then the townsfolk in their turn were able to assert their own independence as against the churchmen, and each city became a self-governing municipality, subject neither to count nor bishop, but ruling itself through a chief magistrate or consul, a council in which dwelt the main authority, and an occasional General Assembly. There were, of course, fiercely opposed factions within each city, and every city was intensely jealous of rival cities; but as with the Greeks in classical times, the system developed a vigor of political and intellectual life which could hardly be paralleled elsewhere. And, as in Ancient Greece, special prominence attached to the maritime cities, such of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice, the greatest of all being Venice, which it must be remembered still stood outside the Holy

Roman Empire, professing allegiance to the Emperor at Constantinople.

When in 1061 Philip I. succeeded to the throne of France, the dominion over which he was nominal suzerain was virtually a collection of independent states. Normandy, Brittany, and Flanders on the north, each had strong racial characteristics of its own. The counties of Blois and Chartres pressed upon the royal domain on the three sides where it did not march with Normandy. Champagne on the east was soon to be united, though only for a time, with Blois. Anjou was growing powerful under the house which was afterwards to bear the name of Plantagenet. Of Upper Burgundy, nearly half had passed to the Empire, where it became the county of Burgundy or Franche Comté; the other half was the French duchy of Burgundy. The south-western quarter of France formed the duchy of Aquitaine, which included Poitou, Guienne, and Gascony, and sundry other counties as well. Of the other potentates of the south of France the greatest was the Count of Toulouse, virtually the lord of all Languedoc. Provence and the Arrelate lay outside the borders of the French kingdom. Before Philip had been six years on the throne, his great feudatory, Duke William of Normandy, had appropriated to himself the kingdom of England in independent sovereignty.

Philip was the first of the Capet kings who realized that it was the business of the Crown to add fragment by fragment to the royal domain, until the king should himself be a more powerful noble than any of his feudatories. But he could only show the way. His son, Louis VI., who succeeded him in 1108, was able to go a good deal further. Louis was much more successful than his father in his policy of weakening the great feudatories by encouraging their vassals in rebellion. Moreover, he was exceedingly careful to conciliate the churchmen, and to organize the royal domain so as to make it a solid support to the Crown. Also he perceived the advantage to the Crown to be derived from encouraging the growth of communes—the development of cities into independent municipalities upon whose support the Crown could count in its contests with an arrogant and overbearing nobility.

When Louis VI. died in 1137 the Crown was very much stronger and the nobles a good deal weaker, comparatively speaking, than at the time of his accession. Almost his last stroke of policy was the marriage of his heir to Eleanor, the heiress of Aquitaine. When the young Louis VII. became king a year later, the royal domain included in consequence about one-third of France, although it was true that the feudatories of Aquitaine were by no means too ready to show obedience to their overlord. It has always to be remembered that the south of France differed in a marked degree from the north and center. Aquitaine and Languedoc, though hostile to each other, were still

more hostile to the northerners. There was something between them of the same sort of antagonism as that which developed between the Lowland Scots and the English neighbors to whom they were after all more nearly akin in race and language than to the Celts of the north. The language of the south, the *langue d'oc*, differed as much from the French of the north as both differed from the languages of Spain and of Italy, though all alike were founded upon Latin.

Louis VII. was a man of far less ability than his father. His efforts to enforce his supremacy over the feudatories in his newly-acquired Aquitainian dominion met with a very limited success, and he committed a very serious blunder as a politician in going off on the Second Crusade. By so doing he lost grip at home, while the failure of the crusade did not add to his prestige. Then he committed a still more serious blunder. He and his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, were an extremely ill-assorted couple; and he sought to escape from his matrimonial troubles by procuring the annulment of the marriage on the ground that he and she stood within the forbidden degrees. He succeeded; but by so doing, he lost Aquitaine altogether, since it was in fact not his but hers. Very shortly afterwards the shrewd but exceedingly self-willed lady married again, taking for her husband the young Count of Anjou, Henry, whose county had already been joined to the duchy of Normandy, and who was, moreover, on the point of becoming King Henry II. of England. Consequently Aquitaine was added not to the royal domain of the French king, but to the possessions of the House of Anjou, the whole constituting ~~about~~ half of France, apart from the strength which Louis's feudatory derived from the independent possession of England.

In England itself the course of events may be very briefly summarized. When William the Norman conquered England he had before him the opportunity of establishing the royal power on a stronger basis than was known anywhere else in Europe. In England the feudal theory of land tenure by military service had hardly come into existence; troops were still raised by the old system of shire levies not as the followers of a territorial magnate. All the circumstances were favorable to the Crown. Canute had begun the system of great earldoms; but the Conquest enabled William to forfeit vast estates by degrees, distributing them among his followers, so that, without any special effort on his part, none of them held a dangerously extensive tract of land in one region. The theory of feudal tenure was at once enforced. Every landholder big or little, new or old, was compelled to do homage to the king for his estate. What Conrad II had tried to do in Germany William did in England. There were crowds of small men holding their lands direct from the king, owing service to him and to no intermediate power; and the Crown was able to enforce the principle that the feudal obligation to the king overruled any obli-

gation to an intermediate overlord. Also, after it was manifest that the Normans could not be turned out, the English population were generally ready to answer the royal call to arms against rebellious barons, because in their eyes the barons were much worse oppressors than the king.

The Conqueror himself was succeeded by two sons who were both strong men, more than a match for every baronial combination which was formed against them. The shrewd King Henry I. arrived at a concordat with the Church, which did not detract from the royal power while it gained the support of the churchmen for the crown. When on the death of Henry I. his incompetent nephew Stephen, brother of the Count of Blois, secured the crown, there ensued an appalling period of anarchy; from which, however, both the barons and the people at large learnt that anarchy carried to extremes was intolerable, and the bulk of them became ready to welcome a strong hand at the helm of the State. Geoffrey of Anjou in right of his wife Maud, the daughter of Henry I., devoted himself to the acquisition of Normandy, while she was striving unsuccessfully to eject her cousin from the English throne. Their son Henry, however, while still a boy in years succeeded in coming to terms with Stephen, and securing the reversion of the English throne on the king's death. In 1154 Henry, Count of Anjou and Duke of Normandy, and in right of his wife Duke of Aquitaine, became King of England—and perhaps the greatest potentate in Europe save the German Emperor, not excepting the King of France.

IV.—The Empire, the Papacy, and the West, 1152–1188

No man, perhaps, ever ascended a throne with a grander or nobler conception of his sovereign and boundless responsibilities than Frederick Barbarossa. Few, if any, have been better fitted to carry out a splendid task. But, though the ideal was grand and the man was great, the man could not realize the ideal because it took insufficient account of other ideals and of hard material facts. In his two great struggles, with the Papacy and with the Lombard cities, the great Emperor was definitely beaten. An infinitely smaller man than he was to wreck the pretension of the Pope more than a hundred years after his death. Philip the Fair was victorious, because in his day the contest had ceased to be one between ideals. Frederick was beaten by the Lombards, because he was endeavoring to prevent the natural development of particularism in his pursuit of an unnatural unification. But even in his failure his greatness is manifested; and in his treatment of Germany, where his idealism was practicable, he achieved as much success as was possible to one man.

The personal character of an emperor was of first-rate importance

as a factor in producing harmony or discord between himself and the great princes of the Empire. Frederick's tact and diplomacy quenched the immediate spirit of antagonism. The succession to the duchy of Bavaria secured the loyalty of Henry the Lion, and Frederick was able to give his almost immediate attention to the problem of Italy.

There the city of Rome, under the guidance of Arnold of Brescia, had set up a commune of its own in defiance of the temporal authority of the Papacy. The free cities of Lombardy were by no means inclined to recognize any authority save that of their own respective governors. When Frederick entered Italy in 1155, Adrian IV., the only Englishman in the long line of Popes, had been elevated to the Papacy. Even at their first meeting a quarrel between Pope and Emperor was hardly averted; but Frederick, thinking that he had sufficiently overawed the Lombard cities, reinstated Adrian in Rome, where he himself was crowned Emperor, and then withdrew to complete the interrupted task of pacifying Germany.

Austria was constituted a separate hereditary duchy with special privileges; and in Central Germany the palatinate of the Rhine was created for Frederick's half-brother Conrad, to whose own estates were added the lands of a disorderly and rebellious count. Frederick himself acquired the county of Burgundy by marrying its heiress. But a quarrel with the Papacy was precipitated by Adrian, who was imbued with the Hildebrandine conception of the papal authority and considered, not without reason, that he had deserted by the Emperor. Adrian's diplomacy frightened William of Sicily, the successor of Roger, into seeking a reconciliation by accepting investiture with his kingdom as the Pope's vassal. The Pope also secured himself in Rome by a compromise with the commune, which Frederick had not suppressed. When Frederick held a diet of the Empire at Besançon, in 1157, the Pope addressed him in terms which were taken to imply that the Emperor held the Empire from the Pope. All Germany was aflame with indignation, and Adrian sought to explain away the obnoxious phrases, but the ill-feeling remained.

Meanwhile, one of the two leagues of Lombard cities, which was headed by Milan, was persistently defiant. In 1158 Frederick again entered Lombardy with a strong force. The second League of Lombards, headed by Pavia, in its hostility to Milan gave its support to the Emperor, and the Milanese League was soon reduced to submission. Supported by the lawyers, the Emperor resumed the royal rights of the Lombard kingdom which had of old been delegated to counts and bishops, and from them had passed to the municipalities. In each town Frederick established a supreme official of his own, who had no personal connection with the place, having the title of Podestà. Immediately the cities broke out in revolt again, and only after a pro-

longed struggle were once more brought into subjection, when Milan itself was dismantled of its fortifications.

Pope Adrian was preparing to support the Lombards in the struggle when he died. The majority of the cardinals elected an even more determined upholder of Hildebrandine ideals, Alexander III. A minority of the cardinals elected another Pope, who took the name of Victor IV. Frederick convoked a synod at Pavia to decide between the rival Popes. Alexander refused flatly to acknowledge its jurisdiction. The Synod pronounced in favor of Victor; France and England adhered to Alexander, who was shut out of Rome, and, in 1162, when Milan had fallen, took refuge in France. The German bishops maintained the line of the Antipopes, but even they were divided, and nearly all the rest of Christendom supported Alexander. Frederick having returned to Germany, the Lombard cities again began to prepare for revolt; in 1164 a new league was formed, and in 1165 Alexander returned to Italy, was received in Rome itself, and pronounced sentence of excommunication against Frederick.

In 1167 Frederick reappeared and marched upon Rome, whence Alexander took flight to the Normans in the south. But a pestilence fell upon Frederick's army, among whom it wrought such havoc that the Lombard League, which had at first been overawed, set to work to organize itself vigorously. It was with difficulty that Frederick succeeded in effecting a retreat from Italy. City after city joined the new league, resolved to maintain their freedom. Neither France nor England could be detached from Alexander. Henry II.'s own domestic struggle with Archbishop Becket had ended with his decisive defeat—the result of Becket's murder—and the King of England could not afford to defy the Pope, who was universally acknowledged by his own feudatories.

It was not till 1175 that Frederick once more entered Italy, determined to crush the Lombards. And on this occasion he had not the full force of Germany at his back. Henry the Lion of Saxony, though not openly disloyal, refused to move in his support. In 1176 Frederick met the forces of the league at the great battle of Legnano, where his force was shattered. His own followers declared that they would no longer support him unless he reconciled himself with Alexander; and the Pope was not to be detached from either the league or the Normans in the south. Frederick saw that he was beaten, and submitted, throwing himself at the feet of the Pope and asking for pardon. It was a triumph for the Papacy much greater than that of Canossa, though the Pope was too wise to make it equally ignominious for the Emperor. Nor was the Emperor's submission a piece of poltroonery; it was the frank recognition by a great man that the cause for which he had been fighting must be definitely abandoned.

The Emperor's submission to the Pope brought peace; the final

settlement which was to make that peace permanent was only arrived at after prolonged negotiations. By the Treaty of Constance in 1183 the cities of the Lombard League recovered all the royal rights they had ever enjoyed; in other words, each city became practically an independent state. Frederick's podestas ceased to be Imperial governors and became only judges, called in from outside by the states themselves—since it was all but impossible, where party spirit ran so high, that a member of the community itself could be free bias or the imputation of bias. Though the Emperor wore the Lombard crown, his rights as Lombard king or as emperor practically ceased to exist.

Frederick's defeat in Italy and his submission to Alexander brought with them no degradation, as they would have done had he been a smaller man. But his preoccupation in the south had enabled Henry of Saxony, who was also Duke of Bavaria, to consolidate a power too great for any vassal. Frederick had been unable to afford to quarrel with him, and in fact he had been doing very valuable work in the extension of German colonies among the Slavs on the east, and the actual establishment of German dominion over them. But when the Emperor had accepted the situation in Italy, he could turn his attention to Saxony. In fact, however, Germany in general was on the side of the Emperor, fearing the extension of the Saxon power more than the domination of the legal head of the State. Frederick found himself called upon to adjudicate upon quarrels between Henry and other magnates. Henry refused to submit himself to Frederick's judgment, and at last, when the refusals had been persistently repeated, the Emperor pronounced sentence of forfeiture and banishment upon him. Henry's hopes of assistance from foreign allies proved vain. When Frederick appeared against him in arms, he was forced to submit. Though his personal estates were restored to him, he was deprived of his duchies, and the sentence of banishment was carried out. One part of the Saxon duchy was made into the new duchy of Westphalia; another part with the Saxon name was transferred to the house of Albert the Bear. The duchy of Bavaria was bestowed upon the house of Wittelsbach, which has held it ever since.

A feature of Frederick's rule in Germany was the development of the Free Cities: superficially, in contrast to the policy which he pursued in Lombardy. But the Free City in Germany meant one free from any superior jurisdiction save that of the Emperor, a city not under the control of a great territorial magnate. It was equally in the interest of the Emperor and of the commercial communities that they should develop unchecked, and the policy attached them to the Imperial side in contests with the magnates. In Lombardy the Free City was anti-Imperial; the aim of the struggle with the league was not to restore the jurisdiction of magnates, but but to recover Imperial control.

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Frederick compensated himself for the practical loss of North Italy by marrying his son to the heiress of the King of Sicily, daughter of the great Roger. Even in Northern Italy the feuds of the two divisions of the Lombard League seemed to be preparing the way for a restoration of the Imperial power. Alexander III. was dead, and his successors had neither his strenuousness nor his ability, though fresh ruptures took place which might possibly have resulted in the tables being turned on the Papacy, if Saladin's capture of Jerusalem had not induced a new Pope, Clement III., to postpone other quarrels to his anxiety for a new crusade. The Emperor himself took up the cause with enthusiasm, and was on the way to the Holy Land when he met his death in 1190.

After 1154 affairs in France centered upon what was practically the rivalry of the king and his great feudatory, Henry of Anjou. Henry was able to establish the traditional claim of Normandy to suzerainty over Brittany, where his third son, Geoffrey, was married to the Breton heiress. In the south of France he asserted his wife's claim to the overlordship of Toulouse, and succeeded in the main in bringing the counties which she claimed under his suzerainty. Theoretically Henry was not making war against Louis; the French king, however, sought to weaken the position of his great feudatory by the support which he gave to the Archbishop Becket, and, when Becket was dead, by encouraging the rebellions of Henry's son.

Louis died in 1180, and was succeeded by the crafty and able prince, as yet only a boy, who became known as Philip Augustus. Philip was troubled by the might not only of Henry of Anjou in England, but also of the Counts of Blois and Flanders. He adopted his father's policy of encouraging the English princes to rebel against their father, especially after the Count of Flanders had been compelled to come to satisfactory terms partly by the intervention of the King of England. Henry the Younger, the eldest of the rebellious princes, was dead; but Richard, who had been made Duke of Aquitaine, and Geoffrey, who was Duke of Brittany in right of his wife, composed their quarrels in order to fight against their father. Then Geoffrey died, and the news of the fall of Jerusalem seemed for a time likely to force all the potentates of the West to a general reconciliation in order that Christendom might unite.

Not only Barbarossa, but Henry and Philip and Richard took the Cross, though the old King of England did not intend personally to go on the crusade. Dissensions, however, again broke out between father and son. Philip sided with the son, and a great combination was formed against Henry. Henry broke down completely. His boundless energy and unfailing resourcefulness suddenly forsook him. He surrendered, conceding everything that was asked of him; but he was already on his deathbed. In July 1189 Richard became King of

England Richard and Philip were nominally at least friends; with Richard the crusading idea was a genuine passion; and ostensibly the preparations for the Third Crusade absorbed the attention of the allies.

Both Ireland and Scotland were brought under the English suzerainty during the reign of Henry II.—the former permanently, the latter temporarily. Hitherto Ireland had been entirely independent; none of the conquerors of England—Romans, Saxons, Danes, or Normans—had attempted to extend their rule over her. She had remained under her Celtic tribal organization, never shaped into a state; though various clan chiefs took the title of kings of one portion or another of the island, and there was generally one who was supposed to exercise a supremacy over the rest. Christianity had developed on the Celtic lines, and the Celtic Church was regarded by Rome as schismatic. The vikings had made settlements, but not any organized attempt to establish a general dominion; their greatest effort had been overthrown by Brian Boromhe at the battle of Clontarf early in the eleventh century. William the Conqueror and Rufus are both supposed to have contemplated expeditions to Ireland, but neither of them undertook one. Henry II. obtained from Adrian IV. an authority to take possession of Ireland, as a schismatical region which ought to be brought within the pale of the Church; but he took no further steps to set about a conquest. A quarrel, however, between Dermot, the King of Leinster, and some of his neighbors induced Dermot to ask the King of England for aid. Henry allowed some barons, chief of whom was Richard, called Strongbow, to join Dermot; but when they had established their ally on his throne, Henry himself took the opportunity of intervening. The Normans readily acknowledged his sovereignty; the clergy preferred the prospects of a strong government to a rigid adherence to their schismatic principles; the chiefs in general were persuaded without much difficulty to recognize him; and thus Henry II. became lord of Ireland, which itself became a field in which Norman adventurers sought personal advancement, territory, and larger liberty than the Plantagenet government permitted them in England.

Scottish kings, on the other hand, had from time to time paid some sort of fealty to English kings, though it has always been contended in the north that such fealty was paid only in respect of dominions held south of the Tweed. The Scottish royal line was virtually established by Malcolm Canmore, who married the sister of Edgar Atheling. A series of his sons reigned successively in Scotland, and his daughter married Henry I. of England. With the sole exception of Stephen, all the subsequent monarchs, both of England and of Scotland, were descended either from Malcolm's son David, or from his daughter Edith, the Queen of England. Southern Scotland was largely anglicized in the reign of Malcolm through the

influence of his queen; in the reign of his son David it was Normanized—that is, large grants of territory were made to Normans from England—so that in the Lowlands Norman feudalism was thoroughly established, while Celtic tribalism remained with little modification in the Highlands. An incursion of the Scots king, William the Lion, into England, led to his capture; and Henry took the opportunity to exact from him the homage which his predecessors had claimed, but in a more definite form. The treaty of Falaise, however, was abrogated in the next reign by Richard I., so that the claims of England stood precisely where they had been before the capture of William the Lion—that is to say, in the eyes of the Scots they applied only in respect of baronies held in England by the King of Scots.

V.—The Third Crusade, and the close of the Twelfth Century.

The Third Crusade began in 1189. Neither Philip of France nor Richard of England was ready to start at once. Miscellaneous troops of Crusaders, however, went off to join Guy of Lusignan, the nominal King of Jerusalem, and Barbarossa marched at the head of a vast German host through Hungary, which was friendly, to follow the route through Asia Minor. He and his forces were delayed by the fears and the trickery of Isaac Angelus. In the spring of 1190 they were in Asia Minor, where they were again delayed by the trickeries of the Seljuk Sultan of Roum, who did not venture to profess open hostility. At midsummer they were crossing the mountains into Cilicia, when the worst possible disaster befell the army. Frederick was in some way killed in attempting to swim across a river. The command of the expedition devolved upon his younger son Frederick, as the eldest, Henry, had remained in Germany. But the army went completely to pieces as soon as its great chief was gone; young Frederick proved quite unable to hold it together. Only scattered contingents ever joined the main crusading force.

Immediately after this disaster Philip and Richard started. Then there were further delays, which caused both of them to pass the winter in Sicily. The crown of Sicily should have devolved upon Frederick's son, Henry VI., the German king, in right of his wife; but the dominant party in the kingdom, objecting to foreign ruler, elected Tancred, an illegitimate grandson of the great king, Roger II. Richard had a quarrel with Tancred, though antagonism to the Hohenstaufen led him to recognize Tancred as king, whereby he incurred the strong ill-will of Henry. In the spring of 1191 Philip and Richard patched up a quarrel between themselves—the result of Richard's refusal to marry the French king's sister. Philip was the first to leave for Palestine, and Richard stopped on the way to take possession of Cyprus, which was under the rule of Isaac,

one of the Comneni, who called himself "emperor," but was more than suspected of being in league with Saladin. Richard's seizure of Cyprus was of importance, because he ultimately bestowed it upon the Lusignans, when it became the real base of what remained of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, the outpost of Western Christianity in the East.

The Christians were beseiging Acre, and Saladin was beseiging the beseigers. The arrival of the new host compelled Saladin to withdraw. Acre fell, and then Philip of France went home to plot against his dangerous adversary, Richard. The Christians were violently divided into factions by the rival claims of Guy of Lusignan and Conrad of Montferrat to the title of King of Jerusalem. Richard supported Guy. The quarrel was patched up, and it was agreed that Guy should hold the crown, and should be succeeded by Conrad. Then Conrad was murdered by emissaries of the "old man of the mountain," the powerful chief of the sect called the Assassins, from whom the term assassin is derived. It was then that the Crusaders agreed in conferring the crown of Jerusalem upon Henry of Champagne, and Richard gave Cyprus to Guy of Lusignan as compensation.

Nevertheless, the dissensions of the great host, fomented by the personal antagonism which Richard had a natural genius for arousing, ruined the chances of the ably conceived operations which Richard had designed as the acknowledged military chief of the army. In spite of prodigious feats of valor, he found himself obliged to give up the idea of capturing Jerusalem. Saladin was ready to make terms, and in 1192 a truce was made which gave the ports for the most part into the hands of the Christians, and kept Jerusalem in the hands of Saladin. Christendom never made another such effort as that of the Third Crusade.

When Richard was on his way home, he fell into the hands of Leopold of Austria, another of the magnates with whom he had quarrelled before Acre. Leopold handed him over to Henry VI., who kept him a prisoner until an enormous ransom was paid, Richard, King of England, did homage to the Emperor as his vassal. There is, however, some doubt whether this homage was in respect of the kingdom of England or of the kingdom of the Arelate, which was given to Richard, though it did not pass to his brother on his death. In effect, nothing more was heard of kings of England paying homage to the Emperor.

A year after the truce Saladin died. He had put an end to the prospect of any farther advance of the Christian arms in the East; but in fact his triumphs over the Latin kingdom had only formed a part of his design of consolidating a great sultanate over Western Asia. Actually, however, he had accomplished little more than the overthrow of the Shiites and the establishment of Sunnite supremacy

throughout Egypt and Syria. There was no subsequent expansion, because Saladin's Empire was broken up, mainly by struggles for supremacy among his sons. And though the "Ayubite" family, as it was called, preserved some sort of ascendancy for fifty years, the dominion was never really consolidated.

In Europe Barbarossa's son, Henry VI., was determined to establish his claims in Sicily, and to renovate his power in North Italy. He dreamed, too, not only of making the Empire definitely hereditary in his house, but of establishing his supremacy at Constantinople also, and obliterating the division between the Churches of Eastern and Western Christendom: an ideal which had been dear to every Pope. The reappearance of Henry the Lion in Saxony necessitated, first, a composition with that turbulent prince. The king made no attack upon the Lombard leagues, since it was his object to concentrate upon the overthrow of Tancred: he sought instead the friendship of both leagues, and procured the active support of that which was headed by Pisa. He practically compelled the reluctant Pope Celestine to crown him Emperor at Rome. Then he marched on the south, but his first successes were checked by the stubborn resistance of Naples and the fierce antagonism of Southern Italy to German rule. He was obliged to retire, fresh disturbances having been set on foot by Henry the Lion. The capture of Richard of England enabled him to compel that monarch to use his good offices in pacifying the great Welf, who was his brother-in-law; but the practical result was to establish the Welf family in a still very powerful position.

Henry was now in a position to renew his attack upon Tancred. Then the death of the King of Sicily insured the victory to Henry. The most determined leaders of the anti-Germans were flung into prison, the family of Tancred withdrew their claims, and Henry was able to establish his wife Constance as regent of Sicily. Almost immediately afterwards she bore him the son who was to become famous as Frederick II., the "wonder of the world."

Henry's position was now extremely strong. If the Welfs were powerful, the Lion himself was dead, and his sons seemed likely to be loyal. An attempt of the Sicilians to revolt against their German rulers was crushed with ruthless cruelty. A very large number among the German nobility had declared in favor of making the Empire hereditary, though as yet the Emperor did not consider it safe to go beyond procuring the election of the infant Frederick as German king. His next step was to set on foot a tremendous crusade; but even while he was organizing it, a sudden illness wrecked his plans, and he died in his thirty-third year in 1197.

Within a few months of his death, the death of Celestine III. raised to the chair of St. Peter the mightiest of all the Popes, Inno-

cent III. In spite of the previous election of the child Frederick of Sicily, Germany had no mind to accept an infant king. Philip of Swabia, the younger brother of the late Emperor, endeavored to maintain his nephew's claim, but soon found that by doing so he would merely ensure the election of one of the sons of Henry the Lion, Henry or Otto, of whom the elder was away on crusade. He became a candidate himself, and a diet of the Empire held at Mühlhausen elected him. But the Welf party abstained from attending the diet, ignored the election, and held another diet at which they elected Otto in June 1198. The struggle between Guelf and Hohenstaufen Weiblingen or Ghibelline was fairly opened.

CHAPTER XIX

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, 1198-1306

I.—The Era of Innocent III., 1198-1216

THE new Pope was a Roman of high descent, of the noble house of the Conti. Though a comparatively young man—he was only thirty-seven—he had already acquired the highest reputation for his intellectual gifts and the vigor and firmness of his character. He was intensely imbued with the highest Hildebrandine conception of the papal authority. For him there was no question of the “two swords”; St. Peter was supreme, and the kings of the earth were his ministers. The Pope was lord of the world, princes were princes only of particular regions; the Emperor was a prince like the rest, not the head of Christendom, but the lord of Germany, and of such other dominions as might happen to fall under his sway. All that had ever been claimed for the Papacy Innocent was determined to claim; and not only to claim, but to make good. Had he come into collision with a man of the calibre of Henry VI., astute, far-seeing, unscrupulous, and no less ambitious of world-dominion than himself, the issue might have been doubtful. But he became Pope at a moment when the strength of the Empire was shaken by the death of a strong Emperor, who had left no one to take his place. For every other king Innocent proved himself more than a match, and Germany had no king to match herself against the Pope.

Constance, the mother of the young Frederick, was herself a Sicilian. Having lost her German husband, she had no mind to make her own Sicily a prey to German rulers. She called upon the Pope to support her, and when she died, made him the guardian of her little son. She had secured him by the readiness with which she conceded the old recognition of his suzerainty over Sicily. Yet it was not till ten years had passed that Innocent succeeded in finally clearing the Germans out of the two Sicillies and establishing them as a kingdom free from German lords. Much more easily and swiftly he established his personal authority both over the Roman commune and over the official who had hitherto represented the Emperor; and swept the Germans out of Central Italy, while he attached to himself the cities of Tuscany and Lombardy, always resentful of the German control.

Matters were simplified for him by the state of Germany, which divided its allegiance between the rivals, Philip of Swabia and the Guef, Otto of Brunswick. Both appealed to the arbitration of Innocent, since neither could feel himself convincingly the stronger, and neither could rely for assistance on the foreign allies whom each could call to his aid. Philip of Swabia turned to Philip of France, Otto to his mother's brother, Richard of England, and on Richard's death to his other uncle, King John. But the hostilities of the English and French kings put it out of the power of either to interfere effectively in Germany.

Innocent pronounced his award, not as a judicial arbitrator, but as the Authority having power to appoint the king. The House of Hohenstaufen traditionally represented the claim of anti-papal imperialism; the House of Guef, since the days of the Emperor Henry IV., had been papalist, primarily because it was anti-imperial. The Pope gave his award in favor of the Guef, to whom he promised the imperial crown. Otto responded by recognizing the right of the Papacy to all its temporal possessions, including such as had been in dispute between previous emperors and previous popes. Nevertheless, Philip and his supporters repudiated the award, since they had never admitted the assumption of authority on which it was based. In appealing to the Pope's arbitration, there had been no intention of recognizing him as anything more than an arbitrator. To accept the award as given would be to acknowledge his right to dispose of the imperial crown as he thought fit. And Philip was rapidly proving himself the stronger, when he fell the victim to act of private vengeance. There was no one for the other party to set up in opposition to Otto, who married the daughter of his dead rival, and was confirmed in his position by a fresh election. Otto also secured the continued friendship of the Pope by making further concessions, and was duly crowned at Rome.

But when Otto was undisputed Emperor his attitude changed. It was one thing to make every concession the Papacy demanded in order that he might displace a rival; it was quite another as Emperor to carry out his obligation and assume a subserviency which none of his predecessors had admitted. Otto revived the claim to Sicily as an integral portion of the Empire which Henry VI. had endeavored to make it; and he renewed the claims to estates in Tuscany which he had before cheerfully conceded to the Pope. Innocent repudiated his sometime *protégé*, excommunicated him, and released his subjects from their fealty (1210).

In the twelve years during which he had been Pope, Innocent had not confined his vigorous assertion of authority to his relations with Germany and the kingdom of his youthful ward, Frederick of Sicily. As the guardian of public morals he had not hesitated at the very

outset of his career to attack Philip of France, although French kings had in the past been conspicuously loyal to the Papacy, and the French alliance was, from the political point of view, of very great value. Philip, in the days of Celestine III., had repudiated the Danish princess, Ingebord, whom he had married. Celestine bade him take her back, but he refused, and, shortly before Celestine's death, married another wife, Agnes of Meran. Innocent was no sooner Pope than he intervened on behalf of Ingebord, threatening an interdict and the excommunication of the king. The interdict was pronounced, and Philip so far gave way as to procure its removal by promising to take back Ingebord, though he was not, in fact, fully reconciled to her till a much later date, when a close alliance with the Papacy had become of vital importance to him.

Innocent, on the whole, had been victorious in the contest, because public opinion endorsed his condemnation of Philip's action, and Philip's vassals were not ready to back the king up. A much more decisive victory was won in England, although between Innocent and John the question at stake was not one of morals, but of the authority of king and Pope respectively. Innocent set aside both the royal and the clerical claimants to the vacant see of Canterbury, to which he appointed Stephen Langton. If John had been a popular king he would probably have defied the Pope with success; even as it was he almost did so. As in Philip's case, the country was laid under an interdict; after two years and a half, sentence excommunication was pronounced. Still John held out, till at last Innocent threatened a formal bull of deposition, and invited Philip of France, who had by this time entered into close alliance with him, to enforce the bull. Then John was seized with a panic, realized that two-thirds of the country was ready to eject him on any excuse, and made humble submission; going so far as to surrender his crown to the Pope, and to receive it again as a vassal of the Holy See. Innocent, however, owed his victory in England, not to a public opinion favorable to Rome in a particular case, but to the general detestation in which King John was held.

The subjection of John was only the most striking example among many of royal submissions to papal suzerainty. A century back Roger's kingdom of Sicily had, under peculiar circumstances, come into existence as a papal fief. A little later, a king of Portugal had sought to strengthen his position by acknowledging the suzerainty of the Pope. Both Sicily and Portugal acknowledged the suzerainty of Innocent, and Peter of Aragon had, voluntarily, in 1204, become the Pope's man. Poland, too, followed suit. Innocent was, in fact, steadily pushing towards the position which should give color to his doctrine that the Pope was the disposer of crowns. The event proved ultimately that the Papacy, by its resolute assertion of tem-

poral authority, was compelled to a perpetual intervention in secular politics which, in the public estimation, lowered it to the position of a merely secular power; so that its loss of spiritual prestige led the way to its downfall. The aggressive attitude of the Papacy in politics created towards it a new hostility in England, afterwards in France, and in Aragon, where the nobility repudiated the submission of their king; but hostility in France was not as yet aroused, because there the papal intervention had been definitely within the sphere of morals, and therefore had been endorsed by public opinion.

Now, in 1210, Innocent had just excommunicated King John. At the end of the year Otto was attacking Sicily. Philip and Innocent were mutually disposed to alliance. Though Otto had been accepted as German king and Emperor, he was by no means popular with the German nobles, who suspected him of intending to strengthen the central authority at their expense, as the crown had been strengthened in England by Henry II. The Emperor's absence in Italy gave the disaffected lords their opportunity, as the Pope's excommunication of the Emperor gave them their warrant. An assembly of the magnates announced that they intended to elect the young Frederick of Sicily German king. Innocent accepted the situation, and at the end of 1212 Frederick was elected and crowned.

Fear of the strong combination of the Papacy, France, and the Hohenstaufen convinced John of the necessity for making his peace with the Pope; and when he was no longer in fear of papal censure, he was also hopeful of carrying the hostile barons with him in developing an attack on Philip in conjunction with Otto—his own object being to recover the northern Angevin dominions in France, which had been lost to England a few years before. If John's own plan of campaign had been properly carried out, Philip would have been crushed by a concerted attack from Poitou on one side and from Flanders on the other. But while an English contingent joined Otto's army, John was still unable to get sufficient support to carry out his own operations in the west, and Otto failed to co-operate from the east. Philip was unable to leave a force to contain John in Poitou while he advanced against Otto; and the army of Otto and his allies was shattered at the battle of Bouvines (July 27, 1214). The battle ruined all Otto's chances, and all the magnates not irrevocably bound to his cause went over to Frederick, whose complete triumph was assured, though not absolutely confirmed until Otto's death, in 1218. The one unsatisfactory feature in the arrangements from Innocent's point of view was that the crown of Sicily and the crown of the Empire were joined again; still, Frederick had duly done homage for the Sicilian crown as a papal fief, so that the connection between Sicily and the Empire was in theory only accidental, not fundamental. It did not follow that a new Emperor

would also be King of Sicily. To all appearance, the accession of a faithful son of the Church, Innocent's own ward, who palpably owed the retention of Sicily to the Pope, seemed to have secured for the Papacy the final predominance over the crowned heads of Europe. Innocent had indubitably made himself the first potentate in Christendom.

Mighty as he was, however, it is to be remarked that, even when John had actually become his vassal, the Pope could not prevent the King of England from acting in alliance with the excommunicate Otto. That alliance was very rapidly brought to an end by the battle of Bouvines. John was ready to show himself the most obedient child of the Church when he needed the Pope's alliance; and yet the Pope's support availed him little enough in his contest with the barons. A year after Bouvines John was compelled to ratify Magna Charta; and though the Pope denounced that instrument, his thunders were only so far effectual as to check the activity of the Archbishop of Canterbury in his opposition to the Crown. Even Philip of France declined to prevent his son, the future Louis VIII., from accepting the invitation of the English barons to take the crown, of which they were seeking to deprive King John. In short, so far as England was concerned, the new influence of the Papacy reached only King John himself and his successor, Henry III.; as concerned the baronage, the common folk, and the clergy, the hold of Rome appears to have been rather weakened than strengthened, and the attitude of Philip of France showed clearly enough that in that country the Crown was only papalist when policy happened to demand alliance with the Pope. When John died, just three months after Innocent, his heir did not renew the homage to Innocent's successor.

The political advance of the Papacy has overshadowed the other achievements and failures of this mightiest of the Popes. It would probably be untrue to say that Innocent's energies in this field were responsible for moral deterioration among churchmen. The voice of lay criticism undoubtedly became at this time particularly articulate in denouncing the iniquities of clerics of all sorts. Among the clergy the religious fervor which had inspired the Cluniacs, and had reinvigorated monasticism in the earlier part of the twelfth century, had died down before its close; in some degree perhaps in consequence of the zeal with which Popes and clergy insisted upon their temporal rights. The moment had come for another reforming movement, which took shape in the rise of the Mendicant Orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic—a very potent movement, which exercised a great influence during the thirteenth century. But though it was encouraged by Innocent, and though the great Pope was

honestly zealous to foster the reformation of morals, he set about that part of his work in the spirit of a legislature and dictator rather than that of an apostle. Almost the last act of his life is concerned with the Lateral Council of 1215, which enunciated a series of canons directed against abuses in the conduct both of clergy and of laity. Its denunciation of trial by ordeal and of the worship of dubious relics was the sign of a general revolt against gross and vulgar superstitions.

Less commendable is Innocent's appearance as the first of the Popes who preached a literal crusade against heresy. Protestant sympathies have been in some degree wasted upon the Albigenses of Southern France. Religious reformers are liable to be labelled as anarchists, and the tenets of the Albigensian heretics are too obscure to enable us to pass judgment with certainty on evidence derived from hostile witnesses; nevertheless, it seems tolerably clear that they were in their nature productive of social and moral anarchy. They were forerunners of Protestantism only in the sense that they denounced the authority of the Church and held up clericalism to contempt. The anti-clerical creed had taken a firm hold in Southern France, where the nobles derived from it much encouragement to robbery of the Church. The Church fought for herself with the weapons of the Spirit, and with very little success, until the murder of a papal legate induced Innocent in 1208 to preach a crusade against the patron and abettor of the Albigenses, Raimond of Toulouse. The result was a long bloody war, which became, at least in part, a struggle between Southern and Northern France, signalized by merciless butcheries, and ending in the subjection of the south—with the important political result that the county of Toulouse became an appanage of the French Crown itself.

The Albigensian crusade carried with it nothing which was creditable to any of the parties concerned. The suppression by massacre even of an offensive heresy can hardly be called an advance of Christianity. On one side, however, militant Christianity did make a very material advance. At the end of the twelfth century the Almohades in Spain had not only overthrown the Almoravides, but had definitely won back territory from the Christians. The mutual hostilities of the Christian kingdoms of Castile and Leon, Navarre and Aragon, had effectually prevented the progress of the Christians. It was largely due to the exhortations of Innocent that the kings of Navarre and Aragon joined forces with Castile, and were also joined by bands of crusaders from the rest of Europe. In July 1212 was fought the great battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, when the Saracens met with a tremendous defeat, which prepared the way for forcing them back into the southern kingdom of Granada, where

they were to maintain their hold until the end of the fifteenth century.

If credit is due to Innocent for persuading the kings of Spain to compose their quarrels and unite in smiting the Infidel, he failed completely in effecting his grand desire to recover the ground lost to Christianity in the East.

In 1195 the capable Emperor Isaac was deposed and shut up in a monastery by his equally incapable brother, Alexius III.; though his son escaped and joined Philip of Swabia, who had married the sister of his father and uncle. The German Emperor, Henry VI., was preparing a great crusade, under color of which he intended to take possession of half the Greek Empire, if not the whole of it, when he died. The whole scheme of the crusade was dropped. Innocent III. took it up again; but the real crusading spirit was a sort of recurring wave—there had been no time since the Third Crusade for a fourth wave to accumulate. In Germany, Otto and Philip of Swabia were fighting for the crown. Philip of France was engaged in that contest, partly military and partly diplomatic, which was just about to make him lord of Normandy and Anjou, at the expense of King John. The Spanish kings were still quarreling with each other, besides having infidels enough in their own peninsula without going farther afield. In short, the princes of Europe all had other things to think of than going on crusades to Palestine.

As in the case of the First Crusade, however, the great nobles proved more responsive. The Count of Champagne gathered a goodly company to fight for the kingdom of Jerusalem, whose crown his brother had worn for a brief period. Baldwin of Flanders came with his brothers, and Boniface of Montferrat, the brother of the murdered Conrad. Venice was invited to provide ships for the expedition, for which her doge, Dandolo, took care that she should receive adequate remuneration—a large sum of money, half the anticipated conquests, and half the booty. A suggestion was becoming current that on the way to the East the usurper Alexius at Constantinople might very well be deposed and his brother restored, or his brother's son, the young Alexius. But the crusaders could not raise the money for Dandolo, who suggested that as an equivalent they should capture and hand over to Venice the town of Zara on the Adriatic coast. The Franks, as the crusaders were collectively called, adopted the proposal, in spite of the indignant protests of some of their number and of the Pope himself. Zara was taken, and while the Franks were waiting for the spring of 1203 to proceed to the East, the young Alexius succeeded in persuading them to deal with Constantinople first. They were not difficult to persuade. The Greek Empire had lost its old care for naval security; Constantinople was virtually open on the sea side. When the Franks appeared be-

fore it Alexius III. fled, and the garrison proclaimed Isaac and his son Alexius IV. joint Emperors. The Franks had no excuse for occupying and looting the city; but they remained in the neighborhood to extract compensation for their services. Their violence and the extortions of the joint Emperors led to a revolution. Isaac died, and Alexius IV. was killed; while a soldier, Alexius Ducas, was proclaimed as Alexius V., and forthwith set about strengthening the defences of the city. So the Franks stormed Constantinople, and sacked it as thoroughly as Alaric and Geiserich had sacked Rome in an earlier age. Alexius V. was killed, and then the Franks elected Baldwin of Flanders emperor, while the Venetians appointed a Patriarch for the Church. Innocent, disgusted though he was at the misdirection of the crusade, was mollified by the prospect of bringing back the Eastern Church to the Roman fold.

The Greek Empire in Europe was divided into great fiefs—the Imperial domain, a kingdom of Thessalonica for Boniface of Montferrat, most of the islands and coastal districts for Venice, and half a dozen other dukedoms, principalities, and counties, the possession of which the appointees were left to secure for themselves. Those who had fiefs allotted in Asia never succeeded in taking possession at all. Even in Epirus and some parts of Greece the Franks or “Latins” were unable to establish themselves; while in Asia two of the family of the Comneni proclaimed themselves Emperors of Trebizond, and a soldier of the Greek army, Theodore Lascaris, ruled also as Emperor at Nicæa. Throughout the Latin Empire, Catholics seized all the ecclesiastical appointments; while the Greeks, whom they called schismatics while claiming themselves to be the “Orthodox” Church, were united by the fervor of the religious contest.

The Latin Empire was destined to meet the fate which it thoroughly deserved. Morally, it had been created by sheer robbery, while its political structure presented all that was worst in feudalism in its most exaggerated form. In such a parody of an organization there could be no unity. At the outset Boniface of Thessalonica declared himself independent; and though he was suppressed, a Bulgarian invasion resulted in the rout of the Latins and the death of half of the chief nobles, including the Emperor Baldwin. Baldwin's brother Henry was made Emperor in his place, and the eleven years of his rule gave promise of better things. He endeavored to deal justly with Greeks and the Greek churchmen, for which pandering to schismatics he was duly denounced by the Pope; and he even succeeded in compelling his vassals, including the Venetians, to acknowledge the reality of his supremacy. But with his death, in 1216, vanished the last prospect of the creation of a stable Latin Power in the place of the Greek Empire.

The reign of Philip Augustus in France was a period of vital importance in the development of the French State, and in that of the English State as well. France was under the rule of an unprincipled but astute statesman, bent on consolidating a great power, unscrupulous as to the means he employed for concentrating strength in his own hands, but conscious also that the most effective instrument of despotism is the fearless administration of justice within the State. Consequently, when Philip died, the French Crown was infinitely more powerful than it had been at any previous period. England, for the greater part of the time, was ruled by two princes, Richard and John, each of them endowed with quite exceptional military genius, which in both was made ineffective by defects of character.

The Crown in England had already, under Henry II., achieved that supremacy which Philip was endeavoring to secure in France. But the first Plantaganet left the whole English people imbued with a spirit of law and order. Though Richard was king for ten years, out of which he spent only six months within his kingdom, the kingdom itself was during nearly the whole of the time under sound and progressive administration conducted by successive justiciars. When John came to the throne, law and order did not require a strong monarch for their enforcement; it had become instead the business of the nation to compel the Crown to observe the law. A triumph of Philip's feudatories over Philip would have meant the disintegration of the French kingdom; the triumph of the barons over King John at Runnymede meant the permanent establishment of the principle that the law in England was supreme, and was to be overridden neither by king nor by barons.

But of no less importance to both countries was the change in their relations which took place during the period. When Henry II. was reigning in England and Louis VII. in France, the Angevin king was suzerain of a full half of France, although he was nominally the vassal of the French king. The lord of Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine was a continental potentate, apart from his English kingdom, the equal in power of his nominal suzerain. From what may be called the international point of view, the kingdom of England was an appendage of the Angevin inheritance. If Henry had thrown off his allegiance to the King of France and declared his own independence, England would have become only one of the provinces of his dominion. Richard, in his own eyes and in those of the world, was a continental rather than an insular prince. But when John died, only Gascony and Guinne and a portion of Poitou were left of the continental possessions of the Angevins. The king of England held some fiefs of the King of France, but they were

merely appendages of his kingdom of England; he himself had ceased to be a continental potentate. Hitherto many of the greater English barons had also been barons of Normandy; after John's death it may be said that, broadly speaking, his successor had vassals in England and vassals in France, but none who were his vassals both in England and in France. The barons of England became definitely Englishmen whose personal interests were wholly concentrated in England itself. In order to play a leading part in English history, the Frenchman Simon de Montfort had to become an Englishman. On the other hand, the separation of one-third of France from the Angevin dominion, whereby it ceased to be Angevin at all, meant for France not merely the substitution of one dangerously powerful feudatory for another, but the attachment of the greater part of what had been the Angevin dominion to the Crown of France itself. Before the accession of Philip the royal dominion was not only smaller, very much smaller, than that of the greatest of the feudatories; it was hardly superior to that of half a dozen others. When Philip died the royal domain comprised some half of the whole French kingdom.

Of the story of this transfer of power we can give only a very brief summary. When Richard was killed while making an attack upon one of his own recalcitrant vassals, he had been endeavoring to organize a confederation of French feudatories for the destruction of his personal enemy, the King of France. Philip could not prevent the succession of John to his brother's dominions. John's mother Eleanor was still living, so that in respect of Aquitaine there could be no dispute. But it was an open question whether Arthur, the son of the intermediate brother Geoffrey, had not the better title to the Angevin and Norman inheritance. John's refusal to attend a summons to the court of his suzerain, to answer charges preferred against him by his own French vassals, gave Philip the opportunity of pronouncing that his titles were forfeited, and taking up the cause of Arthur. John took Arthur prisoner, and, as the whole world believed, murdered him. John had already made himself thoroughly detested; after the murder, the barons of England refused to uphold his cause in France, and the barons in Normandy offered no serious opposition to Philip, who claimed the fiefs for himself as forfeited under feudal law by John's defiance of his jurisdiction as suzerain. The technical plea could not be applied even after Eleanor's death in respect of Guinne and Gascony, which remained loyal to the House of Plantaganet; but in respect of the rest of the Aquitanian dominion it could be applied—consequently, it was in effect only the coastal districts south of the Loire, which remained attached to what had been the House of Anjou.

II.—The Fall of the Hohenstaufen, 1217-1273

In his own day the Emperor Frederick II. was known as the "wonder of the world." In spite of his ancestry there was little about him either of the German or of the Norman. The population of Sicily was sufficiently mixed—ethnologically it could hardly be classified; but of Frederick it can only be said that he was a Sicilian, a southern European, with even Oriental elements in him which are in no way to be accounted for by his ancestry. He was a sceptic and a mystic, a lover of philosophic disputation, a master of many languages, a voracious reader, a dabbler at least in natural science of most kinds, and a devotee of the pseudo-science of astrology. But with talents the most brilliant and the most versatile were combined a certain shallowness and an instability of character which rendered chimerical and illusory great designs which might have solidified in the hands of a man of less brilliancy, whose imagination did not outrun his practical capacity.

It was Sicily, not Germany, that occupied the young Emperor's attention. After Otto's death there was no rival to challenge him in the German kingdom, which for several years was controlled or guided mainly by the wisdom of Engelbert, Archbishop of Cologne, till his death, in 1225. The more to relieve himself of his German responsibilities, Frederick, as early as 1220, had secured the election of his eight-year-old son Henry as German king; in whose name the government was carried on after his coronation by Engelbert and the other ecclesiastical magnates, upon whom the Emperor himself had conferred enlarged authority and privileges. Disorder ensued upon the death of Engelbert, since there was no one of like capacity to take his place. The young Henry was incompetent and ill-conditioned as well. Frederick was too much occupied elsewhere to take matters in hand himself, and in 1232 a royal and imperial decree was issued which fell little short of pronouncing that each of the great territorial magnates was an absolute sovereign within his own realms. In 1234 the young king crowned his follies by stirring up a revolt among the great towns and the lesser nobles, who were offering an obstinate resistance to the encroachments of the great magnates, fortified by the decree of 1232. The rebellion was easily suppressed, and Henry disappeared permanently from public view. A few years later he died by his own act.

Very different was the policy pursued by Frederick in the Sicilian kingdom. For some time he was engaged in crushing the persistent defiance of his Arab subjects in the island itself. When at last he had fully succeeded, he won their devoted loyalty for the future by planting a Saracen colony in Italy at Lucera, which rapidly rose to

commercial eminence; while the Arabs, who were fighting men as well as merchants, provided him with entirely trustworthy troops for the suppression of rebellious barons and rebellious towns. Largely by their aid he established a powerful despotism, crushing the feudal lords, and absorbing their jurisdiction into the hands of Crown officials, who were also given the chief authority in the municipalities. In the two Sicilies Frederick's rôle was that of the enlightened despot. He was the first monarch to establish (at Naples) a university by royal charter. He himself wrote poetry in the Sicilian tongue, and the royal example gave a great impulse to the vernacular as a literary language.

Frederick's more serious troubles began with the death of Pope Honorius, the mild and not unwise successor of Innocent. The patience even of Honorius was sorely tried. While Innocent was still living Frederick had pledged himself to a crusade on which the heart of Honorius was also set. But Frederick continued to find excuses for procrastination. Then he broke his promise to keep the kingdom of Sicily separate from the Empire by procuring the election of his son and heir as German king, though he professed to the Pope that the thing had been done without his consent. Still he soothed Honorius by promises and handsome concessions to the clergy in the Sicilies, and by apparently sincere professions concerning his intended crusade. He married the heiress of John of Brienne, the titular King of Jerusalem. But still there was no crusade, and Frederick went on not only to withdraw promised privileges from the clergy, but to reassert his claims over Lombardy.

At this juncture Honorius died, early in 1227, and was succeeded by the octogenarian Gregory IX., who was endowed with all the fiery zeal and energy which might have been looked for in a man of half his age. Six months later Frederick had actually collected a crusading force and set sail, but only to put back into port on the quite truthful plea that the plague had broken out among the Crusaders. The enraged Gregory forthwith excommunicated him; a vehement propaganda was disseminated against him by the Franciscan and Dominican friars, enthusiastic adherents of a Pope who was their warm patron. The gage had been flung down, and battle was once more joined between Pope and Emperor.

The Emperor defied the Pope, who was driven from Rome by the Roman mob, while his denunciations failed to stir up any revolts against Frederick either in Italy or in Germany. In 1228 Frederick again sailed for the East, still under the ban of the Pope, who forbade any one to aid him. Nevertheless, he found numerous supporters, and without fighting a battle, obtained from the Ayubite Sultan of Egypt the cession of Jerusalem, of which he crowned

himself king with his own hands, in right of the wife who had just died in giving birth to a son.

Frederick came back to find papal forces overrunning Apulia. A proposal for mediation brought about the reconciliation, and the continuation of the quarrel, or at least of open hostilities, was suspended.

The process of completing Frederick's despotism in Sicily was now varied by those disturbances in Germany to which we have already referred. In 1235 Frederick had to suppress his son Henry's revolt. But still his heart was in the south, and he held to his policy of strengthening the power of the great German magnates—a system wholly incompatible with the strengthening of the power of the Emperor himself. In Frederick's scheme, the personal loyalty of the magnates was to be secured by large and liberal concessions, and they were to be left to govern the country themselves. This magnification of a few princes at the expense of the rest brought about the establishment of seven princes as Electors, in whom became vested the right of choosing the Emperor. Before departing to Italy, Frederick, having already deposed his son Henry, procured the election as German king of his son Conrad, who had been born at the moment of his own former departure from Italy on his crusade.

Meanwhile, the Lombard cities had again been forming leagues to resist the revived Imperial claims. Frederick sought to counteract them by encouraging the feudal barons to establish their own lordship over the cities. On his reappearance in Italy in 1237, after the election of Conrad (who bore the title of "King of the Romans," henceforth appropriated to the designated heir of the Empire), the army of the new Lombard League was shattered. Yet there remained a group of papalist or anti-imperialist cities, who refused submission. Thenceforth the imperialist and papalist parties respectively bear the name of Ghibellines and Guefts, though the House of Guelf itself had ceased to have any connection with the struggle.

Again the old Pope took alarm at the progress of Frederick, and denounced the actions of an Emperor who had won his victories, partly at least, by the aid of his Saracen troops from Lucera. Another attempt at mediation failed; the Pope excommunicated Frederick, absolved his subjects of their fealty, and tried hard to procure the deposition of Conrad in favor of a papal nominee. Pope and Emperor flung at each other's heads denunciations of the most virulent kind, while public opinion was disposed to condemn both alike. Frederick was on the point of capturing Rome and Gregory himself when the old Pope died, in 1241.

Frederick was master of the situation. A new and colorless Pope was elected, but died almost immediately. For eighteen months

there was no Pope. Then Innocent IV. was elected—a man hitherto known as an ecclesiastical lawyer with imperialist tendencies. Like Becket in England, his election to the papal chair turned him into an uncompromising supporter of ecclesiastical claims. A year later he had to take flight from Italy and to seek refuge at Lyons, where, though the Arelate was nominally in the Imperial dominions, Frederick could not venture to pursue him. From Lyons Innocent announced the deposition of the Emperor, against whom he proclaimed a sort of crusade, with the result that a new German king, William of Holland, was elected; and for some years to come Conrad and William were fighting for an ascendancy which neither of them could decisively secure.

Frederick replied by practically declaring war upon the Church, and asserting the entire supremacy of the Emperor as the sole head of Church and State alike. A furious partisan struggle raged all over Italy between Guelfs and Ghibellines. For five years it continued, and the unhappy land was deluged with blood. Then just as it seemed that the Emperor in Italy and his son in Germany were on the verge of victory, Frederick himself died in December 1250.

Frederick's death left his son Conrad heir of the Empire and of Sicily, and also of the hostility of the Pope. For the moment Conrad's illegitimate brother Manfred acted as his lieutenant in Sicily, till Conrad himself found it advisable to leave the struggle in Germany to his partisans there, and hurry to the south. His own younger brother and his elder brother's son both died in rapid succession. Innocent, claiming Sicily as a papal fief, offered the crown to Edmund, the younger son of King Henry III. of England, by whom it was accepted. Disagreements between Conrad and Manfred favored the papal cause in Italy, and enabled Innocent to return to Rome. Almost immediately afterwards Conrad died, leaving the inheritance of his claims to his infant son Conradin. His nomination not of Manfred but of a German to the Sicilian regency produced a violent outbreak of hostilities between Germans and Italians. The regent resigned in favor of Manfred, but turned to seek the favor of the Pope. Manfred found himself obliged to come to terms, under the impression that either Conradin or he himself would be recognized as King of Sicily. When it became apparent that the Pope intended to acknowledge Edmund of England, Manfred prepared to take up arms. When Innocent died he was succeeded by Alexander IV.

King Henry of England was a devoted son of the Church. The Pope intended to use him as a cat's-paw; to make him fight what was, after all, a papal battle, pay for the privilege of doing so, and get as his reward the crown of Sicily for his younger son, to be held by him as the Pope's obedient servant. Neither the laity nor

the clergy in England were in the least inclined to play the part assigned to them. Clergy as well as laity intensely resented the papal exactions and the papal practice which had developed under Henry of bestowing English benefices upon absentee Italian priests. In short, England refused to fight or to pay in order to win the Sicilian crown for King Henry's younger son.

Whilst Alexander's scheme for using England was proving ineffective, Manfred's popularity and influence in the south were growing apace. All Ghibelline Italy began to look to him as its leader. In 1258 he took for himself the crown of Sicily, on the strength of a false report of Conradin's death. The actual death of the opposition German king, William of Holland, compelled the papalists to seek a new Emperor; but their suffrages were divided between Richard of Cornwall, brother of the King of England, and Alfonso, called the Wise, King of Castile. Neither of them could by any possibility have been anything more than a mere figurehead, since neither possessed the means to enforce his authority. Alfonso's efforts to secure his own recognition were exclusively diplomatic; and though Richard did present himself in Germany and pose as King of the Romans, he exercised no real power. Manfred also gained ground through the fall of the leader of his own party in North Italy, the evil and bloodthirsty but able tyrant Eccelin da Romano, whose iniquities in fact united Guelfs and Ghibellines against him, so that before his death Manfred had repudiated all association with him. In 1260 the Ghibellines had the upper hand all over Tuscany and Lombardy—a position secured for them by the rout of the Guelfic Florentines at Montaperto.

Greater energy was infused into the papal cause when Alexander died and was succeeded by the fiery Urban IV., a Frenchman, who dropped the futile candidature of the English Edmund for the throne of Sicily, and offered the crown to Charles of Anjou and Provence, the able and ambitious younger brother of the King of France. Charles accepted the offer, somewhat against his brother's will. Urban died, and was succeeded by another Frenchman, Clement IV., who threw himself into the struggle with no less zeal than his predecessor. In January 1266 Charles of Anjou was crowned at Rome King of Sicily. From this time the House of Anjou means this younger branch of the French royal house, not the House of Plantagenet, since Anjou had passed to the French Crown when the English King John was driven out of the Angevin possessions.

The issue between Charles and Manfred was promptly joined. Charles invaded Southern Italy, and in February 1267 completely defeated the forces of Manfred at the battle of Grandella, where Manfred himself was slain. The victory made Charles master of

Southern Italy, and also enabled the Florentines in Tuscany to overturn the Ghibelline government.

The very completeness of Charles' triumph, and his own merciless harshness towards his vanquished opponents, created a reaction. Young Conradin, the sole representative of the Hohenstaufen, entered the north of Italy, where the change of feeling had again put the Ghibellines in the ascendant. But in August 1268 Charles annihilated Conradin's forces at Tagliacozzo. The last of the Hohenstaufen—he was only sixteen—was betrayed into the hands of his enemies and executed. The rule of German kings in Italy was decisively at an end.

From 1257 to 1272, when he died, Richard of Cornwall was titular King of the Romans, though his title was disputed. For practical purposes there was in fact, no German king. For three years after the death of Clement, in 1268, there was no Pope. In 1271 Gregory X., who embodied all the highest and best traditions of the Papacy, was elected. It was his primary desire to heal the feuds which had torn Western Christendom for half a century. Germany was weary of anarchy, and six of the Electors—the Archbishops of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the Count Palatine—were persuaded to agree upon the election of a minor noble, Rudolph, Count of Hapsburg, the first of that line to wear the Imperial crown, which later became practically hereditary in his house.

III.—France and England, 1217-1272.

The German policy of the Salian and earlier Hohenstaufen Emperors had aimed at diminishing the authority of the greatest magnates, and multiplying the minor territorial lords in independence of any save the German king. Frederick Barbarossa had dealt with the cities on the same principle, fostering the multiplication of free towns which were independent of a feudal overlord. The policy was sound, on the hypothesis that it was possible to establish a single consolidated German kingdom. Frederick II., on the other hand, had reversed this policy. Since his personal interests centered not in Germany but in Italy, and, so long as this was the case, it was impossible for him to develop his personal supremacy in Germany, he adopted the plan of strengthening the greatest magnates, and forming Germany into a congeries of states, in each of which a hereditary or an ecclesiastical prince was supreme ruler. For Germany this was perhaps the more natural course of development, as the whole dominion was too heterogeneous to be welded into a unity. Failing the possibility of a single strong central government, a collection of

separate states each having a strong central government offered the best prospect of systematic and orderly rule.

In France and England political development was on the opposite line. In neither was the territory so large as to render the attainment of a single strong central government impossible. In England the process was assisted by geographical isolation. Even in despite of its connection, first with Normandy and then with the Angevin dominion in France, the consolidation of England had progressed under the Norman kings, and still more emphatically under the first Plantagenet, since Henry II. treated the English kingdom definitely as a unit. The danger that this development would be arrested by the stronger interest of Angevin kings in their French dominions was finally removed when they were deprived of two-thirds of those dominions by the King of France. The result was that England was the first country to emerge as a unified national state, in which it was possible to advance steadily from pure monarchism to constitutional government, restricting the absolute power of the Crown without weakening the central government; since England was protected from the worst dangers of feudalism by the fact that only a consensus among a large number of the greatest feudatories could produce efficient resistance to the Crown.

In France, on the other hand, this was very far from being the case. In the twelfth century there were half a dozen great feudatories, none of whom the Crown could effectively coerce without the goodwill of the rest. The normal effective supremacy of the central authority, always maintained in England except under Stephen, required to be created in France; while the great feudatories were almost independent princes, their defiance of the Crown was directed to the retention and extension of the privileges of their order, not to the championship of public law.

The process which relieved England of the Angevin incubus at the same time helped France towards unification. It made the French king himself very much the greatest territorial magnate within his own kingdom. The craft of Philip Augustus made the King of France for the first time master of France; the lofty character of his grandson, Louis IX., gave to the Crown, in addition to its superior material strength, a moral prestige which raised the French king to the position of the most powerful prince in Europe.

The position which Philip had won was maintained during the brief rule of his son, Louis VIII.; but it was endangered when that prince died, leaving only young children, and his widow, Blanche of Castile, to safeguard their interests, in 1226. Almost at once there was a general combination of the principal feudatories in antagonism to the regency of the Spanish queen mother. But Blanche was a woman of abnormal capacity and vigor. She sought the sup-

port of the clergy and the commonalty; she appealed to Pope Honorius; and she won the aid of Theobald of Champagne. The Crown in any strife with the feudal baronage generally had this one advantage, that the barons would rarely accept the control and direction of a single leader. Blanche held her own. More than that, she secured the succession to Toulouse for the second of the royal princes by marrying to him the daughter of the count. The work of the Albigensian Crusade was completed when all that had been left of the great county became an appanage of the royal family.

In 1235, when he was twenty-one years of age, Louis IX. took over the direct control of the government from his mother. St. Louis stands beside Alfred the Great as the type of a Christian king, a lasting proof of the compatibility of an almost perfect Christian character with the qualities of a convincingly powerful and successful ruler. He had none of the intellectual brilliancy of Frederick II., none of his own grandfather's craft. He was not so clever as his younger brother, Charles of Anjou. No military achievements stand to his credit, though no man surpassed him in personal courage. But he held in the Europe of his own day position so unique that no disputant confident in the justice of his own cause feared to refer it for arbitration to Louis of France, because all men knew that he would pursue justice absolutely without regard to any personal ends. Perhaps it was well for him that he was not clever enough to be tempted into scepticism like that of the Emperor; the reality of his piety was so manifest that he could afford to run counter to churchmen without incurring clerical censure. Excess of piety was indeed the one defect which could lead his clear-eyed judgment astray, made him something of a persecutor, and induced him to go crusading when he could ill be spared from the control of secular affairs. But the man was absolutely virile and strong, without any touch of the hysteria, the self-absorption, or the utter impracticality which were apt to characterize the saintly laymen of the Middle Ages.

In accordance with his father's will, large portions of the royal domain were transferred to the king's younger brother—Poitou to Alphonse, who was already secure of Toulouse by his marriage; Anjou and Maine to Charles. The custom of largely endowing the king's younger sons tended as time went on to revive the dangers of the old feudalism in a new form; but as yet it appeared rather to be a strengthening of the royal family by giving each of the princes a secure state of his own.

Before long there was a recrudescence of feudal opposition; but when the king was forced to take the field, his arms were everywhere triumphant. After the suppression of the revolts in 1243 they were not again repeated. Even in the hour of victory Louis never claimed more than was warranted by the strictest justice; he was

one of those men who could make concessions without incurring a suspicion of weakness. Alphonse, in Toulouse, exercised the same supervision, and ruled with the same justice and care as Louis himself within the royal domain. The younger brother, Charles, followed the same line in Anjou, and presently found an opportunity to apply French methods in Provence through his marriage with the heiress of that county.

The whole of the Arelate was outside the French dominion and within the theoretical boundaries of the German Empire. The crown of the Arelate, like the crown of Lombardy, belonged to the German king, but he seldom troubled himself about it. Savoy and Franche Comté, like Provence itself, were virtually independent states though small, and Provence underwent an assimilation to France very much as the rest of Languedoc was being assimilated to Northern France. At a later stage, as we have seen, Charles went farther afield, and transplanted his main energies to the kingdom of Sicily.

The reign of Louis in France was practically contemporary with that of Henry III. in England. Louis's personal reign began in 1235; and though Henry was a few years the older, it was not till 1232 that he freed himself from the domination of the justiciar, Hubert de Burgh. Louis died in 1270, and Henry in 1273. At the moment of John's death and Henry's accession, Philip Augustus was still reigning in France, and his son, soon to become Louis VIII., was endeavoring to obtain the crown of England for himself. Louis would probably have failed in any case. Half the barons of England, it is true, had been willing to substitute a French prince for an Angevin as King of England; but a reaction was already setting in, and John was also rousing himself to display the strategical talents which he possessed in far greater measure than any of his opponents. But John's death was decisive. The rebellion of the barons had been the outcome of hatred for the man, not for the House. Within twelve months the security of Henry III.'s crown was ensured and Louis withdrew.

There followed a brief period of capable rule by the justiciars, William Marshall and Hubert de Burgh; but in 1232 Hubert de Burgh was dismissed, and Henry, pious and obstinate, foolish, self-confident, and at the same time the tool of his own favorites, resolved to rule for himself. Twenty years passed before the irritation of the baronage reached a stage at which they practically demanded that the control of the government should be taken out of the hands of the incompetent king and vested in a baronial committee. The opposition to the king was divided, one faction having before it feudalistic ideals, while the other, headed by Simon de Montfort, aimed at protecting the rights of the commons no less than the privileges of the barons. Montfort, resting on popular support, for the first time

summoned representatives of the towns, as well as of the lesser barons or landholders, to attend the Great Council which was beginning to be generally called by the name Parliament. After a brief success Montfort was defeated and killed at the battle of Evesham; but the heir to the throne, who was presently to become Edward I., had learned from him the principle that the strongest of governments would rest upon the assent of the people at large. It was to be his great achievement that he associated the power of the Crown with Parliament, and thereby laid the foundations upon which was gradually built up in the course of centuries the supremacy of Parliament itself.

IV.—The East, 1217-1272

The story of the Latin Empire of Constantinople is a mere tale of disintegration after the death of Henry of Flanders. Peter of Courtenay and his two sons, Robert and Baldwin, were nominally "emperors" for forty-five years; but Theodore Angelus got possession of the kingdom of Thessalonica, where he called himself Emperor, and there was another Emperor at Nicæa, and another at Trebizond. Then John of Nicæa possessed himself of Thessalonica as well. Probably he would finally have ejected the Latins from Constantinople but for his death in 1254, which enabled Michael Palæologus to secure first the regency and then the crown of Nicæa. In 1261 Michael surprised Constantinople, and once more a Greek dynasty reigned at Byzantium. The Latin Empire was at an end, though Latin Powers were not wholly ousted from their acquisitions. Venice kept her hold upon the Ionian Islands, upon Crete, and to some extent in the Ægean; and Latin princes remained for some little time at Athens and in the Peloponnese. But in fact the Fourth Crusade had done the worst possible service to Christendom by so breaking up the foundations of the Greek Empire that it could never again recover stability. We are astonished, not that it was ultimately swept away by the Turk, but at the vitality which enabled it to hold the Turk in check for still another two hundred years.

The misdirection of the Fourth Crusade had been a bitter disappointment to Innocent III., modified only by a hope that it might terminate the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches. The great Pope and his successors were all extremely anxious to rouse the princes of the West to a fresh enterprise. Innocent got promises from King John of England, Frederick of Sicily, and Andrew of Hungary. But John was quarrelling with his barons, and Frederick was careless. Andrew did head a Crusade in 1217, but it effected nothing. At this time John of Brienne was titular King

of Jerusalem in right of his wife, while a Lusignan was King of Cyprus.

In spite of Andrew of Hungary's failure a sufficient number of Crusaders gathered to enable John of Brienne to seize Damietta on the east of the Nile Delta, which he regarded as the real key to the Holy Land. But the disastrous results of an expedition into Egypt forced John to surrender it again. It was this blow which compelled Frederick II. to give more serious attention to his long-standing promise. Frederick, a curiously modern statesman, relied upon diplomacy, backed by an army, in preference to hard fighting; and in despite of the excommunicatory thunders of Gregory IX., he did what the soldiers had failed to do, and recovered Jerusalem. But no steps were taken to organize the government; and Frederick, after crowning himself, returned to the West. In 1240, Richard of Cornwall led what was called the English Crusade to Palestine, but nothing was really done towards an effective extension of the Latin power, which was torn by factions and by the rivalries between the Knights of the Temple and the Knights of St. John.

Destruction was for the time averted by the quarrels among the Ayubites, the descendants of Saladin. But at this time the hordes of Mongols, or Tartars, had started on their series of devastating conquests under the leadership of Temujin, or Genghis Khan. Although they had not embraced Islam, the Ayubite ruler of Damascus called in some of them to aid him against both the Christians and his Moslem rivals. They came, recaptured Jerusalem, slaughtered all the inhabitants, and overwhelmed an army of Crusaders. This was practically the end of the Latin kingdom, though the Tartars did not remain in Palestine.

It was this disaster which impelled Louis IX. to head the Sixth Crusade in 1248. Damietta was again made the objective of the expedition. It was captured, and again the invading army attacked Egypt. As in 1218 disaster followed. The army was compelled to fall back on Damietta; in the course of the retreat Louis, who took the post of danger in command of the rearguard, was made prisoner. The army surrendered; most of it was cut to pieces, while the king and the great nobles were held to ransom. Louis on his release went to Palestine and then returned to France.

In 1269 the death of the last of the Hohenstaufen, who had been titular kings of Jerusalem for thirty years, passed on the crown to the Lusignan, Hugh of Cyprus. But all semblance of unity had departed. Templars and Hospitallers, Venetians and Genoese, were all fighting each other, each playing for their own hand. The Christians suffered from an illusory hope that the Tartar enemies of Islam might be converted to Christianity and help them in destroying the Mohammedan power. But Egypt had acquired a new vigor. Her

defense against the crusading invaders had been inspired by the captains of the Mamelukes, a slave soldiery recruited from various subject populations. In 1254 the Mamelukes finally ejected the Ayubite sultans, and thenceforth for some centuries Egypt was ruled by Mameluke chiefs set up by the Mameluke soldiery. In 1260 their sultan, Kutuz, shattered the Tartar forces at Ain Talut, a victory which finally checked the Tartar advance towards Syria and Egypt.

Kutuz was murdered by Bibars, who succeeded him as Sultan of Egypt and turned his arms against the Christians. In 1268 he conquered Jaffa in the south and Antioch in the north. Only three or four coast towns remained in possession of the Christians.

Once more Louis took the Cross. Edward, the heir to the English throne, was the only prince of importance who decided to join him, but his departure was delayed. Charles of Anjou for his own ends persuaded his brother of France to make his first descent, not upon Egypt but upon Tunis, which Charles wanted for himself. Pestilence broke out in the camp; the army was practically blockaded, Louis died, and his son Philip III. was compelled by the nobles to give up the expedition and return to France, having procured nothing but the promise of the payment of tribute by Tunis to the King of Sicily—a tribute which dated from the days of Roger II. of Sicily and had only been withheld since the fall of the Hohenstaufen. Edward appeared on the scene too late to do anything in Tunis. He proceeded with a small force to Acre; but the Franks were too dispirited to maintain the struggle, and accepted a truce with Bibars. In 1272 Edward left Palestine to take up the task of governing England. Twenty years later all that remained to the Latins was the kingdom of Cyprus and the island of Rhodes, which was held by the Knights of St. John.

The thirteenth century witnessed the enormous expansion of the destructive power of the Mongols, or Tartars, of Central Asia. In the middle of the twelfth century a chief named Yesukai had united under his leadership a number of the nomad tribes outside the sphere of the Mohammedan dominion. In the last quarter of that century his son Temujin, better known as Zenghis Khan or Genghis Khan, after a long struggle with various rivals, secured and extended his supremacy among the Tartars. Genghis Khan in the earlier part of the thirteenth century carried his arms both to the East and to the West, conquered Northern China, subjected the greater part of Persia, pushed through Afghanistan into the Punjab, but turned off from further conquests in India. In 1227 he died, and the chiefs selected as his successor one of his sons, Ogdai.

Within a few years the conquest of Northern China was completed, and the Mongol hordes poured into Europe under the leadership of the Khan Batu. They swept through Eastern Russia, destroyed

Kiev in 1240, and next year annihilated a force of Poles and Germans from the marches of the Empire at Liegnitz. Then they turned southwards upon Hungary and began a career of extermination, which was fortunately and suddenly stopped by the news of the death of Ogdai. For no other apparent reason, the horde rolled back again from Hungary across Southern Russia, over which for nearly three centuries the Tartars maintained their supremacy, having successfully destroyed the development of the Slavonic power, without any reconstruction of their own.

Ogdai was succeeded as Great Khan by his son Kuyuk Khan; but on Kuyuk's death, another grandson of Genhis, Mangu, became Great Khan. Mangu occupied himself with the conquest of Tibet, while he made one brother, Kublai Khan, Viceroy of Northern China, and another, Hulagu, was entrusted with the advance against the khalfate. Kublai established a great and splendid dominion with Peking as his capital. On his brother's death he became Great Khan, and the vast Mongol Empire was virtually divided between him and Hulagu. Kublai became to all intents and purposes a Chinese; Hulagu continued his attack upon Western Asia. For one thing only the world has cause to be grateful to the Mongols: they completely destroyed the abominable sect of the Assassins, whom they rooted out utterly. The refusal of the khalif at Bagdad to assist in this operation was Hulagu's excuse for a direct attack upon the khalfate itself. In 1258 Bagdad was captured, its inhabitants massacred, its literary treasures destroyed, and the khalif put to death. So perished for ever the Abbaside dynasty. Hulagu swept into Syria and captured Aleppo, but his advance was stopped when his army met with its great defeat at the hands of Kutuz. From that time the power of the Mongols in Western Asia was on the wane.

V.—The Close of the Thirteenth Century, 1273-1306

With the election of Rudolf of Hapsburg as German king in 1273, the attempts of the emperors to exercise in Italy came practically to an end. Thenceforth it was as much as any Emperor could do to secure his own precedence in Germany. The principle of election had triumphed over the principle of hereditary succession, and for a long time the electors made a point of not permitting the son to succeed the father. The desired also to keep the Imperial office from falling into the hands of any magnate whose own possessions were sufficiently large to give him an emphatic preponderance over other magnates; in fact, they wished to avoid what had taken place in France, the establishment of the crown in such strength as definitely to control the magnates. Every Emperor, on the other hand, made

it his primary object to enlarge his personal dominions with a view to establishing his own dynasty.

Rudolf, the lord only of a county in Swabia, was very well aware that as Emperor he would be practically powerless unless he could extend his own domain. The House of Guelf held Brunswick and Hanover, that of Albert the Bear ruled Brandenburg and Saxony. The Wittelsbachs held the Rhenish Palatinate and Upper and Lower Bavaria. During the last century the Proemyslids in Bohemia had extended their power, and Ottocar, King of Bohemia, had also acquired the German lands on the southeast—Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. Territorial magnates on an equality with these were the great archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, while others were little inferior to them. The strength of the Emperor lay in the possibility of combination with the ecclesiastical magnates and in the now large number of minor barons who had no suzerain but the Emperor, and the wealthy free cities who also had no other overlord.

Rudolf, looking for something more than his county to rest upon, and wanting a free hand in Germany, at once came to terms with Gregory X., whom he confirmed in all the papal temporal possessions, while he recognized Charles of Anjou as King of the Two Sicilies and dropped his claims upon Lombardy. He could not afford to quarrel with the German magnates, and Ottocar of Bohemia was the only prince whose possessions he saw his way to attacking. The German provinces held by Ottocar were ready enough to throw off allegiance to a Slav ruler. Ottocar refused to acknowledge Rudolf on the ground that he personally had not taken part in the election; the result was that Rudolf procured a sufficient number of supporters to enable him to overthrow and kill Ottocar at the battle of Marchfeld. The four German provinces were annexed by Rudolf, and were henceforth the property of the Hapsburg or Austrian family. He did not succeed in procuring the succession to himself for his son Albert, but he had raised the House of Hapsburg to a leading position among the German princes.

Though Albert of Austria was rejected on his father's death in 1291 in favor of Adolf of Nassau, on very much the same grounds which had induced the electors to choose Rudolf himself, Adolf alienated the nobles by pushing the policy of alliance with the lesser barons and the towns. Consequently, after five years, Albert succeeded in overthrowing Adolf and procuring his own election. Being Emperor, he was able to exercise his authority effectively, as Adolf with only Nassau to rest upon had been unable to do. He was thus able to continue the policy of fostering the free towns, abolishing the tolls which the magnates, lay and ecclesiastical, had been able to exact during the last fifty years. The vigorous Albert would probably

have succeeded in largely extending the Hapsburg power if his career had not been cut short by his assassination in 1308.

The fall of the Hohenstaufen apparently secured the dominion of the Two Sicilies to Charles of Anjou. His progress in Lombardy, however, was checked by the policy of the Popes, who were not inclined to encourage the development of an Italian kingdom which might very easily dominate the Papacy. But the new kingdom was fated to disruption from another cause. Peter III. of Aragon had married the daughter of Manfred. In the ordinary course of events he would not have challenged Charles's dominion in Sicily, but the Sicilians acted for themselves. They had resented German domination in the past, now they resented French domination with no less bitterness. The conduct of Charles's French soldiery filled them with savage resentment; in March 1282 there was a sudden rising in Palermo, where four thousand of the French were massacred in the "Sicilian Vespers." The whole Sicilian population answered the call to revolt, and offered the Sicilian crown to Peter of Aragon. Charles, who was in Italy, was preparing to cross over to the island and take condign vengeance, when Peter arrived with a fleet which completely commanded the sea. In 1285 both Charles and Peter died. The contest was continued between their sons. Though James of Aragon retired from the contest, the Sicilians offered the crown to his younger brother Frederick. The island of Sicily remained in possession of the House of Aragon, while the other half of the double kingdom, the South of Italy, or Kingdom of Naples, remained with the Angevin House, which had also in the meantime acquired the succession to the Hungarian throne.

In the north of Italy the final disappearance of the Hohenstaufen, the withdrawal of Rudolf of Hapsburg, and the check offered to Charles of Anjou by the Papacy, cleared the way for the development of the great city-states, whether as commercial communes or under local despots. Milan was losing its importance, and Genoa, geographically isolated, played very little part in the general history of Italy, though it developed a great maritime power of its own. The Venetian republic had already played a very active part as a maritime and commercial Power; its fleets were already the most powerful in the Eastern waters. Its constitution was that of a close oligarchy, wherein it stands in marked contrast to the Tuscan city of Florence, which was now rising to the intellectual leadership at least of Italy. About the end of the thirteenth century Florence attained the form of constitution which ranges it among the democratic republics. The nobles were entirely excluded from office. The executive government was in the hands of the Signory—six magistrates who were required to be members of one of the seven great guilds. But the power of making constitutional changes lay only with

the General Assembly, or mass meeting of citizens, so that it was with this body that the ultimate sovereignty rested. Before the first quarter of the fourteenth century was ended this Florentine constitution had taken a shape at once much more elaborate and much more democratic.

In France the death of Louis IX. placed on the throne his well-meaning but somewhat stupid son, Phillip III., called the Rash. Not through any particular wisdom of the King, the Crown in his reign was strengthened by the reversion to it of the appanage bestowed upon Alphonse, the brother of Louis IX.—Poitou and Toulouse, as well as the marquisate of Upper Provence. Lower Provence, the county, belonged to Charles of Anjou, and was not connected with the French kingdom. An accident enabled the King to take possession of Champagne and of Navarre, though the latter was still an independent kingdom. Its heiress was betrothed to the prince who afterwards became Philip IV. The result was that there were now only four great duchies or counties, each of them isolated, to represent the old power of a practically independent nobility—Flanders, Brittany, Burgundy, and Aquitaine, a province of the King of England. Anjou also belonged to the House of Naples. Some two thirds of France was under direct control of the Crown.

Philip III. was succeeded in 1284 by Philip IV., called *Le Bel*, a much cleverer man than his father, with more of the qualities of Philip Augustus. Of his reign the three prominent features were: the elaboration of the system of centralized administration, which perhaps did more than anything else to counteract the disintegrating forces which were at work during the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth centuries; the devices by which Philip endeavored to add to his domain at the expense of his feudatories; and the quarrel with the Papacy which led to the overthrow and death of Boniface VIII., and to what was known as the "Babylonish Captivity" at Avignon.

Philip endeavored to get possession both of Aquitaine and of Flanders, but somewhat overreached himself in the attempt. In order the better to execute his designs against Flanders he came to terms with Edward of England. This enabled him to get the better of Guy of Flanders; but the burghers of the Flemish cities found the French rule more objectionable than that of their own count, and the contest which followed is made memorable by the battle of Courtrai in 1302, when, for the first time on the Continent the charge of mail-clad knights, which had hitherto swept all before it, was successfully resisted and shattered by the massed phalanx of pikemen on foot. In England the lesson had already been learned in the Scots war, but it had been coupled with the discovery that the decisive arm was the archery, which could destroy the phalanx and

give the victory to cavalry. It was soon to be proved that the archery properly employed were no less decisive against cavalry; and ultimately the mail-clad horseman became rather an adjunct than the real strength of a fighting army. Philip failed to get possession either of Aquitaine or Flanders.

The old struggle between Empire and Papacy had been played out. With the fall of the Hohenstaufen the Emperor had sunk to the position of head of the German states. But if the Papacy had been apparently victorious in that duel, nevertheless it had not preserved the dominant position which it held in the time of Innocent III. Its strength depended upon its moral ascendancy; and after the death of Gregory X. there was a succession of elderly and short-lived Popes who were undistinguished and unimpressive. At the close of the century Boniface VIII. was raised to the Papacy. He set the papal pretensions as high as any of his predecessors, but he found himself involved thereby, not in a duel with the Emperor but in a contest with the now powerful kings of France and England, who in the old days had almost invariably been allies of the Pope. With the laudable object of preventing ecclesiastical revenues from being employed in un-Christian quarrels between Christian princes, as well as with the political aim of compelling Christian princes to submit to the papal authority, Boniface issued the bull *Clericis Laicos*, forbidding the clergy to pay taxes to the secular authority. Since both Edward and Philip had wars on hand, Edward responded by outlawing the clergy, who pleaded the papal behest as a reason for refusing to pay taxes; and Philip forbade the export of money from France, so that no French coin could reach the papal coffers. Boniface was obliged to explain away the papal bull. Again he attempted to assert his authority by claiming that Scotland was a papal fief, and forbidding Edward to interfere with that country. Edward's Parliament replied in round terms by denying the papal jurisdiction in secular affairs. Philip of France procured a corresponding declaration from the Assembly of French Estates, and his soldiers took the Pope himself prisoner. Boniface died, partly in consequence of the violence to which he had been subjected; and after a brief interval the Archbishop of Bordeaux became Pope as Clement V., and practically found himself in the hands of the French king. Clement took up his residence not at Rome but at Avignon, in the county of Provence, where he was not actually in French territory but was practically under French control. The seventy years' residence of the Popes at Avignon made them, in the eyes of Germans and English at least, little better than puppets of the French crown; and in that position it was quite impossible for them to recover the old moral ascendancy.

The reign of England I. in England (1272 to 1307) was the great

period of the consolidation of the English State, in which Parliament took its permanent shape and acquired definitely the right to refuse new taxes. Thenceforth, the royal revenue being of itself insufficient for the needs of national expenditure, the parliamentary control of additional supplies gradually gave to that body the power of veto on the royal policy, which was ultimately to become an effective control over it. Also the establishment of the law of entail prevented the noble families from forming a caste, because the younger sons passed out of the ranks of the nobility. Further, it was Edward's purpose to bring the whole island of Great Britain within the compass of a single state. As concerned Wales, which had hitherto acknowledged only a vague suzerainty, he was successful. With Scotland Edward was involved in a long struggle by attempting to assert as a practical fact the suzerainty which English kings had been in the habit of claiming in theory. Scotland was in a state of perpetual revolt, and entered into an alliance with France which lasted for two centuries and a half. One revolt after another was crushed only to be renewed; at the moment of Edward's death he was advancing into Scotland at the head of an army which was intended to bring the northern kingdom into subjection once for all, since Robert Bruce had assumed the Scottish crown. Edward's project was doomed to failure; Scotland was not to be coerced, and in the reign of his son the independence of Scotland was permanently secured by the victory of Bannockburn.

CHAPTER XX

THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, 1307-1380

I.—Political Movements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries

THE thirteenth century is commonly reckoned as the era when the mediæval system reached its best development and produced its greatest characters. It was the most inspiring era of the age of chivalry. When the fourteenth century opened, the decadence of the mediæval ideals was setting in. The great Hildebrandine conception of the Papacy had broken down. The Imperial conception of Frederick Barbarossa had broken down. The fervor of the spiritual movement initiated by Francis of Assisi was almost dead. The finer ideals of chivalry were fading; its great twin traditions of prowess and courtesy remained, but they had lost the note of self-sacrifice by which they had at least been touched in the thirteenth century; an Edward I. was still a possibility, but scarcely a Louis IX. Slowly, very slowly, new ideals were to shape themselves—the political conception of the State displacing that of the universal Empire of Christendom, the conception of personal responsibility displacing that of obedience to authority in religion and morals. But for the time being it is difficult to recognize the presence or the clashing of such guiding principles as those of the Hildebrandine Papacy and the Empire. The history of Europe seems to be dissolved into a number of isolated and disconnected stories of dynastic struggles, leading nowhere.

The Hildebrandine conception of the Papacy was killed when the Pope became virtually the nominee of France and the city of Rome ceased to be the spiritual center of Christendom. The conception of the Empire collapsed when the election of the Emperor was vested in seven German princes, lay or ecclesiastical, whose primary object was to provide a merely titular sovereign not sufficiently endowed with territories to be able to enforce a supreme authority. After a long interval Rome was to be restored to the Papacy, and the Imperial crown was to become the permanent possession of one family, the descendants of Rudolf of Hapsburg; but these two restorations came too late to renovate the mediæval conception either of the Papacy or of the Empire.

Geographical conditions naturally tend to divide the European

continent into two great sections, with the Rhine and the Danube as the dividing line between them. One of these sections was embraced in the old Roman Empire, to which was added the group of the British Isles. Geographical conditions again—the mountain ranges of the Pyrenees and the Alps, and the Adriatic Sea—divide this area, into five portions, the British Isles, France, and the three great Mediterranean peninsulas. Racial rather than geographical conditions—though these, too, are not to be neglected—tend to divide the rest of Europe into three sections, the Scandinavian, the German, and the Slavonic on the east of the German. But into a portion of the Slavonic area accident interpolated a race akin to none of these, the Magyars of Hungary.

The isolating geographical factors did approximately during the Middle Ages effect the quintuple partition of the Roman Empire in Europe into groups, though not by the evolution of five separate states. That was a later development only attained in the nineteenth century. In the thirteenth century France was the only one of the five which was actually assuming the character of a single state, though Edward I. was trying his hardest to unify the insular group.

The partition of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western, and the inclusion of Germany in the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne, in effect substituted for the old division of Roman and barbarian Europe a division into Eastern and Western Europe, parted by an irregular line drawn from the south of the Baltic to the north of the Adriatic, Scandinavia and the British Isles remaining distinct. One Emperor after another strove in vain to overcome the geographical and racial influences and to make a united dominion of Germany and Italy—the three western divisions had all broken away before the age of the Karlings was ended. But the result of the efforts of the German emperors was that Germany and Italy were brought no nearer to each other; each became increasingly a mere congeries of petty states, and even in Germany the Emperor's own authority was of the smallest.

Two hundred years later the same description applied to the condition of Germany and Italy. England, France, and Spain had become thoroughly consolidated kingdoms, although Scotland was still a state separate from England, and Portugal a state separate from Spain. The nations of the West were leading the way to a reconstruction of Europe on nationalist lines, their nationalism being simply the outcome of the combined action of geographical and racial conditions. And nationalism as a theoretical basis of state construction had not even then been recognized. But in actual fact the process of national consolidation was well on the way to completion among the nations of the West.

Not elsewhere. Movements in that direction among the Scandi-

navians were abortive. In the Balkan Peninsula they were ruined by the advance of the conquering Ottomans, who wiped out the last remnants of the Greek Empire when they captured Constantinople in 1453. The system of elective monarchy in Hungary, in Bohemia, and in the growing Slavonic power of Poland, combined with other causes to prevent any of these from attaining to anything like the political development of the West. Behind them Russia was only just beginning to emerge from barbarism, to free herself from the desolating overlordship of the Mongols.

In the two central areas, the German and the Italian, unifying movements were doomed to failure. The Italian might be hostile to the German foreigner, as in ancient days the Greek had been hostile to the Persian barbarians, but the Italian cities were no more disposed to surrender their own rivalries than Athens, Sparta and Thebes. Italy was in its way a reproduction of the ancient Hellas, with its city-states dominating over each other, each state ruled by its own dominant oligarchy or in some more democratic fashion, or by a duke or count or self-established despot, who was more like a *Tyrannus*, a tyrant in the Greek sense, than a legitimate king. But between city and city there was no tradition of cohesion, of common action in a common cause, of loyalty to a common system or to a single prince. And north of the Papal territory the nearest approach to unity of any kind was found in the voluntary leagues which only held together when some palpably common danger was imminent and menacing.

On the other hand this particularism, concentrating a vigorous political life in every considerable city, intensified intellectual activities, as it had done in Hellas. In sheer intellectuality Italy left the rest of the world far behind, though the very conditions which produced her intellectual superiority also made impossible her political cohesion, and her ascendancy in any sphere but that of the intellect. But so it was that while England and France were laying broad and deep the foundations of national states in an eminently practical fashion, unaccompanied by any obvious display of intellectual initiative, Italy remained politically divided beyond hope of consolidation, but gave to the world masterpieces of literature and art unmatched since the downfall of Athens, or at best matched only in part in the Augustan Age of Rome. Great art had almost passed away with Virgil; it was reborn with Giotto and Dante at the close of the thirteenth century.

In Italy, always with the exception of the southern half, the kingdom of Naples, the city-state was politically predominant. In Germany it was not predominant, but it did undergo effective development. The Imperial system always tended to foster the multiplication of tenants-in-chief holding their land from no overlord but the Emperor. The great towns lost no opportunity of obtaining release from subjection to feudal overlords and acquiring the position of free cities inde-

pendent of other than Imperial control. But the conditions in Germany were not those of Italy, where political vitality, commercial energy, and intellectual activity all advanced together. In the German Free Cities the commercial energy was altogether predominant; the political vitality directed its efforts to commercial expansion, and the intellectual activity had no corresponding development. But this was the era in which grew up the Hansa, the Hanseatic League of commercial cities: a species of confederation of the very loosest kind, which did nevertheless effectively direct the course of commerce to a very great extent. The towns which were associated with the Hansa did not form a military or even a naval union; their political influence in the Empire and outside it was exercised through the channels of finance, and the influence of finance always works behind the scenes while the blare of trumpets and the flashing of armor conspicuously occupy the stage. The Free Cities, however, were merely one element in the very loose organization of which the Emperor was the head; they were very far indeed from being even the prepondering element, whereas in North Italy the city-state was altogether predominant.

II.—France and the British Isles, 1307–1338

From the time when Philip IV. was reigning in France and Edward I. in England, almost down to the accession of Edward IV. in England and of Louis XI. in France, the histories of England, France, and Scotland are very intimately associated and stand almost entirely apart from the history of the rest of Europe.

At the close of the thirteenth century King Edward of England had established English supremacy in Wales as well as in Ireland, and was actually *de facto* King of Scotland as well. Also he was lord of considerable territories in France as a feudatory of the French Crown, although a good deal more than half of the old Angevin dominion had been lost by his grand-father and his father. While Edward had been by no means so successful as he imagined in securing his supremacy in Scotland, Philip IV. was endeavoring, whether by legitimate means or by force or by fraud, to destroy the independence of the great feudatories and to establish an irresistible central control in the hands of the Crown. For the establishment of a great state, homogeneous and united, the creation of a central authority supreme in fact as well as in name was the first essential. Germany and Italy failed to establish such an authority; England and France and Spain succeeded, but succeeded on different lines. For in France and Spain it was vested in the Crown, producing an absolute monarchy. In England the authority was shared between the Crown and the Estates of the Realm, producing not an absolute monarchy, but monarchy by

consent of Parliament, a monarchy which could not make itself independent of popular goodwill.

It was primarily the effort of the French kings to destroy the disintegrating power of the great feudatories which brought about the long struggle between France and England, known as the Hundred Years' War; because one of the most powerful of the feudatories happened to have the resources of England behind him to help him in the maintenance of those feudal rights of which it was the French king's object to deprive him, and of which it was necessary that he should be deprived, if France was to be organized into a great homogeneous state. There was one apparent alternative, namely, that the Duke of Aquitaine should himself become King of France; and, as it befell, a technical plea, though a weak one, did present itself, on the strength of which the King of England was able to formulate a claim to the French crown. We may affirm with certainty that a union of the crowns of England and France, even if it had been voluntarily accepted by the French people, would not have solved the problem; but no mediæval statesman, hardly a modern statesman before the nineteenth century, realized the importance of nationality as a factor in questions of union or unification. The acquisition of France by the King of England could only have been disastrous to both nations in the long run. The final victory of France in the struggle gave France and England their individual positions as powers in the development of the modern European system.

England failed to conquer France, and failed also to conquer Scotland. Union between England and Scotland, and union between England and France, were objects of statesmanship fundamentally different in character. Carried out peacefully by mutual consent of the two states, a British union in 1300 would have simply anticipated the union which took place 400 years later. Racially the Lowland Scots, the people who fought against the Edwards for national independence, were no more remote from the Englishmen of North England than the North Englishmen were remote from the Englishmen of Wessex. The same elements, though in different proportions, were to be found in all three—Saxon, Scandinavian, Celtic, and Norman. Over the greater part of the whole area, dialects of the language which we can only call English were spoken. The fundamental problem ought to have been not the assimilation of England and Scotland from Perth to Bristol and Exeter, but the assimilation of the chain of Celtic-speaking populations on the west to the population of the English-speaking area. And one great obstacle to that was removed by the isolation of the three Celtic-speaking groups in Cornwall, Wales, and the Highlands of Scotland, an isolation which precluded the formation of a Celtic state.

This ought to have been the problem, but in actual fact it was the

minor problem, the problem of uniting the Scottish Lowlands with England, which Edward I. mismanaged. From the days of Edward to the days of Queen Anne there were statesmen in both countries who were conscious of the mutual advantages to be derived from a union on equal terms. But Scotland was always ready to resist to the last gasp any union which did not guarantee equal terms. She paid the penalty by centuries of disorder, compared with which the disorders in England were insignificant; she had her reward in the maintenance of her indomitable spirit of independence. The price was heavy, but it was worth paying.

In both the struggles, with France and with Scotland, the English kings rested their claims upon a dubious technical title. That of Edward I. in Scotland was the very indefinite form of homage which had from time to time been paid to various kings of England by various kings of Scotland; certainly in respect of territories held in England, such as the earldom of Huntingdon, and possibly, but by no means certainly, in respect of the Scottish crown. The validity of Edward's claim has always been denied by Scottish historians and maintained by the English. The technical title of Edward's great antagonist who won Scottish independence would certainly not bear close investigation; but his moral title was conclusive. He was the one man among those of royal descent who finally did definitely stand forth as the champion of national independence. Against that claim, merely technical pleas, whether valid or invalid in feudal law, were of no avail. The Scottish nation repudiated any ruler who would not identify himself with the national cause.

It is probable that Edward I. was perfectly satisfied that his own technical plea was actually valid in law, and for him that which was legal was also just, at least if the law was on his own side. When the opportunity offered for enforcing his technical claim he asserted it uncompromisingly. The same could not be said of his grandson's claim to the throne of France, still less of that claim when it was renewed by Henry V.; yet it was not so utterly futile as is generally represented. Edward III. used it, not because he wanted the crown of France or believed that he had an indisputable title to that crown by law, but for the double purpose of securing military support from Flanders and of using it as a means to bargaining with the French, in order to achieve two other objects—to free his fiefs in France from the suzerainty of the French king, and to free commercial intercourse between England and Flanders.

The claim itself is of interest as illustrating the diversities of feudal law. Philip IV. died, leaving three sons and one daughter. The three sons reigned in succession. None left a son, but one left a daughter. Who, then, was the next heir? It was never claimed at all that a woman could in her own person succeed to the French throne; there-

fore Philip's daughter Isabella and his son's daughter Jeanne could neither of them succeed. But according to one feudal custom, succession to the crown lay always in the direct male line. This would give the succession to the crown of France to Philip of Valois, son of Charles of Valois, the brother of Philip IV. According to another custom, a daughter would succeed her father. This would have made Jeanne queen, but in the case of the French crown it was admittedly barred. A third custom, while forbidding the succession to the woman in person, admitted the title of her son. Thus we may observe that in England Henry II. succeeded to the throne, although his mother Maud, through whom he claimed the succession, was still alive; and in 1485 Henry VII. was recognized as King of England, although his mother, Margaret Beaufort, through whom he claimed the throne, was still alive.

When Charles IV., the last son of Philip IV., died, Jeanne had no child. But Isabella, the sister of Charles IV., and daughter of Philip IV., had a son, Edward III. of England. According to this custom, therefore, Edward III., the grandson of Philip IV., had a better claim than Philip of Valois, the nephew of Philip IV. Edward's claim, therefore, when formally put forward on the death of Charles IV., was not an absurd one, although it was rejected at the time by the French lawyers in favor of that of Philip of Valois. Edward for the time was content to enter his claim formally, and to accept the decision of the French lawyers so far as to pay homage to Philip, but without making any formal renunciation of his own title. Therefore, when at a later stage he quarrelled with Philip VI. over his feudal obligations, he was not wholly without warrant in reviving this claim.

At the same time, although there was no conclusive proof that what was called the Salic law was the law of succession in France, since no occasion had ever before arisen for raising or setting aside claims through a female, there was still less reason for asserting that the custom under which Edward claimed was the law of France.

Robert Bruce, the new champion of Scottish independence, was fortunate in the death of the great Edward when on his way to chastise the rebellious country. Edward II. was not the man to carry out any great schemes, political or military. His reign was a doleful record of obstinate incompetence on the part of the king and selfish incompetence on the part of the barons. For six years there were incessant feuds between the king and the great earls, whose own mutual jealousies prevented them from adopting any systematic policy of their own, while they made government by the king impossible, and virtually substituted baronial assemblies for the national Parliament, which had taken shape under Edward I.

At the end of the six years, England awoke to the fact that the English authority in Scotland was practically at an end—that only

three or four castles remained in its hands, the rest having been captured and generally dismantled by Bruce and his steadily growing band of adherents. The fall of Roxburgh and Edinburgh Castles left Stirling the only stronghold in English hands, and Stirling was pledged to surrender unless relieved by Midsummer Day following. At last for very shame the king and the barons of England effected a formal reconciliation, and prepared a great armament for the subjugation of Scotland; though even then the greatest of magnates, Thomas, Earl of Lancaster and of four other earldoms, stood sullenly on one side.

In the summer of 1314 Edward marched into Scotland. Of the magnificence and costliness of his array there is no manner of doubt. By contemporary computations, his army numbered not less than 100,000 men. The best modern authorities place it approximately at 60,000. Until six hundred years had passed no English army of such a size was ever assembled upon foreign soil under one commander. The Scots army numbered not more than one-third of the English, but at Bannockburn they won an absolutely overwhelming victory, entirely decisive; a final proof that in hand-to-hand fighting infantry skillfully handled were impenetrable to the shock of a frontal attack by mail-clad cavalry. Happily for King Robert, the English had not yet grasped the principle which had given Edward I. the victory over the Scottish foot at Falkirk when they were commanded by William Wallace—the principle of preparing the way for the cavalry by an overwhelming archery attack. The archers were, indeed, thrown forward at Bannockburn; but, being unsupported by heavy-armed troops, they were promptly cut to pieces by the handful of cavalry which, with that precise purpose in view, had been reserved by King Robert for mounted service.

Never before or since, except at Hastings, has a disaster so overwhelming fallen upon a great British army. The English were swept clean out of Scotland; and for fourteen years to come the Scots harried the north of England almost at their pleasure. When Edward II. died, and Robert was soon to be lying on his own deathbed, England at the Treaty of Northampton recognized the independence of Scotland (1328).

While Edward I. was striving to subjugate Scotland, he had also been engaged in a somewhat inconclusive contest with Philip the Fair, with whom he had come to terms. Philip had been quite distinctly the aggressor, and got nothing by his aggression. But when Edward II. was King of England, Philip and the three sons who reigned after him, Louis X., Philip V., and Charles IV., persistently took advantage of the English king's incompetence to weaken his authority and absorb his dominions in Aquitaine. The wretched misgovernment in England, the absence of any effective control, the dependence of the king upon favorites who were regarded by the English

nobility as upstarts, made it a comparatively easy matter for his queen, Isabella of France, to depose him in 1327, procure the recognition of their young son as King Edward III. of England, murder the deposed king, and secure the control of the government for herself and her paramour, Mortimer, Earl of March.

To the intense disgust of the English, the Regency in 1328 negotiated the Treaty of Northampton, which recognized the independence of Scotland. In the same year Charles IV. of France died, and was succeeded by Philip VI., of Valois, in spite of the formal claim to the French crown entered by Isabella on behalf of her son Edward III. At the time any attempt to assert the claim by force of arms would have been impracticable, and Edward did homage to Philip for Aquitaine, though, as we have remarked, without making any formal renunciation of his legal pretension to the throne. For ten years, however, that pretension remained in abeyance.

The government of the Regency in England was no improvement upon the government of Edward II. When Edward was eighteen, a party of the nobles, in conjunction with the young king, effected a *coup d'état*, put Mortimer to death, relegated Isabella to a comfortable but powerless obscurity, and gave the reins of government into Edward's own hands.

In 1329, a year before Edward's *coup d'état*, King Robert of Scotland died, leaving the throne to the three-year-old boy David, who had been born to him by his second wife. Marjory, his daughter by his first wife, was married to Walter Fitzalan, High Steward of Scotland, whose son Robert ultimately succeeded David, and became the first king of the Stewart dynasty.

It was the peculiar fate of Scotland that the majority of her monarchs succeeded to the throne while they were still in their childhood. Between Robert Bruce and Charles I.—that is, for three hundred years—the two first Stewarts were the only exceptions to this almost unfailing rule. The effect on Scottish history was disastrous. The reigns of eight out of ten kings or queens began with a period of regency, in most of which baronial factions were striving with each other for the custody of the youthful sovereign and the control of the State. Under such conditions the development of a vigorous central government, whether autocratic or parliamentary, was practically out of the question.

The trouble began almost immediately on the death of King Robert. Just at the outset the Regency was conferred upon the extremely capable soldier and competent statesman, Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray. But when Randolph himself died, there was none fit to take his place. Scotland was again plunged into civil broils because Edward Balliol, the son of King John Balliol, whom Edward I. had first set up and then deposed, asserted his claim to the crown, which, as a

simple matter of descent from the old kings of Scotland, was a better claim than that of the Bruces. Balliol was backed up by the disinherited lords, the nobles who had been ejected for their antagonism to Robert Bruce. Edward III. was barred by the Treaty of Northampton from asserting his grandfather's old claim; but Edward Balliol went to Scotland with the practical understanding that if he succeeded in establishing himself on the throne he would acknowledge the English suzerainty, and thereby give Edward a warrant for intervention.

Balliol obtained a short-lived success; he defeated the army of the Regency at Dupplin Moor, got himself crowned king, and acknowledged Edward III. as his overlord; while the Scots dispatched young King David to France for safety. In spite of their lack of leadership, however, and of a disastrous defeat by Edward III. in a pitched battle at Halidon Hill, the Scottish patriots succeeded in again ejecting Edward Balliol, though some Scottish castles were still garrisoned by English soldiery. Edward's mind was concentrating upon his French schemes, from which he could not divert the energy necessary to achieve anything like an effective conquest of the northern kingdom. Young David returned to Scotland, and from that time forward no Scottish Government ever again acknowledged, and no English Government ever succeeded in enforcing, the overlordship of an English king. Hostilities between the two countries, with intervals of ill-observed truces, characterized the whole period, which lasted into the sixteenth century.

In England Edward I. had organized the political system on the lines which were destined ultimately to concentrate the predominant political power in the hands of the Commons, through the recognition of the fact that it lay with them to concede or to withhold supplies exceeding an amount which was considered sufficient for the normal purposes of the Government. The Commons included the mercantile class, but also the vast number of minor landowners who had no overlord except the king. Even the greatest of the great earls were by no means in the position of such great feudatories of France as the Duke of Aquitaine or the Count of Flanders, who commanded the allegiance of almost all the landowners within the area of their duchies and counties. In effect, the principle already established was that of government by the Crown with the assent of the Estates; it was not practicable for individual feudatories to set the Crown at defiance. A common system of law applied from one end of the realm to the other, which system it was always in the interests of the great majority to maintain against encroachment either of the Crown or of powerful magnates. The central government was bound to be strong, provided that it was in reasonable accord with the interests of the majority and did not seek to override the law. Its strength through all fluctuations always depended upon the recognition of the

two fundamentals: that its administration must be in accordance with law, and that the law could not be altered except by assent. And the sanction of these fundamentals was found in the power of the Commons to limit or withhold supplies. The disintegrating force of feudalism was reduced to a minimum.

In France also it was the aim of the Crown to reduce the disintegrating force of feudalism; but that aim was still a long way from accomplishment. When Philip Augustus began his reign at the end of the twelfth century, there were half a dozen feudatories, each of whom individually was almost as powerful as the king. When Philip IV. began to reign a hundred years later, he was more powerful than any individual feudatory; but it was still the policy of the Crown to achieve a direct supremacy for itself by increasing its own domains at the expense of the feudatories. Edward I. solved his problem in part by recognition of the legal rights of the Commons; but in France there was nothing corresponding to Edward's recognition of Parliament, Philip summoned the States General, an assembly of all the Estates of the realm; but he did so only because it suited him on occasion to confirm his own policy by popular assent—notably in his quarrel with Boniface VIII.—not as in any sense an admission that the Estates had a right to be consulted.

A certain confusion is apt to be created in British minds by references to the development of the Parliament of Paris. The confusion is due to the word Parliament—*Parlement*—for the *Parlement* was not in any sense a National Assembly. It was, in fact, one of the three divisions of the king's court which was the French parallel, not to the Great Council which developed into the English Parliament, but to the Curia Regis of Henry II.; the three divisions being the King's Council, corresponding roughly to the Privy Council; a court corresponding to the Court of Exchequer; and the Parlement, which corresponded, though much less accurately, to the English Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas. Its business was mainly judicial, though it was also a registry of public acts. The organization of this body was one of the methods by which the king drew into his own hands the administrative control which had hitherto been largely vested in the great feudatories, the members of the Parlement being selected as legal experts, not as territorial magnates.

The reigns which followed that of Philip IV. were notable chiefly for the establishment of what was called the Salic Law of Succession. When Louis X. died, leaving only a daughter living, but also the prospect of a son being born by his surviving widow, the actual question of succession depended on the birth of the posthumous child. The claim of Jeanne was, therefore, postponed, and Philip V., the next brother of Louis, became Regent. In course of time a boy was actually born, but lived for only a week. Philip, having been in

effect king for five months, was now by no means inclined to withdraw his own claim to the French throne in favor of his niece. A compromise was arrived at, since it was impossible to affirm any indisputable law of succession. Jeanne was to have certain territories, but Philip was to be king. Philip died without children, and the third brother Charles succeeded. When Charles died without a son, Philip of Valois was declared heir, on the hypothesis that succession must be through males only. Be it observed, however, that there was absolutely no precedent providing an answer to the question which was presented. It was established by law and custom that the son succeeded the father, and that brother succeeded brother in default of children. That was all. The questions of succession by a female or through a female had never been presented at all, and no laws had been formulated to provide for such a contingency. Since legal minds demanded a law and a precedent, French lawyers choose to invent that the law of France, but that was merely an afterthought. In actual a more or less mythical law of the Salian Franks, the Salic law, was fact, in the absence of a definite law, the French acted upon practical political grounds. The succession of a girl was inconvenient; the succession of a foreign king was inconvenient; the succession of Philip of Valois secured a king whose interests were exclusively French, while his legal title was as defensible as any other that could be produced.

Now the policy of Philip VI. towards Edward would have been effective if the King of England had been a feeble prince. He continued the old practices of seeking to tighten his own grip on territories which Edward claimed as part of Aquitaine, he supported the Scots in their resistance to Edward Balliol. But, what was much more injudicious, he interfered with the trade between Flanders and England. Unlike most English kings, Philip had no disposition to foster commerce. On the other hand, it seemed to him politic to support the Count of Flanders in his quarrels with the extremely independent commercial cities. In supporting Count Louis, he harried the Flemings mercilessly, and he stirred the Count himself to take oppressive action against Englishmen in Flanders. Edward, viewing the quarrel as one between himself and the Count, retaliated by stopping the export of English wool to Flanders and the import of Flemish woollen goods into England—action which was doubtless bad for England trade, but to the Flemings was positively ruinous. At the same time, the Count's Flemish subjects were invited to transfer themselves and their allegiance to England, and to manufacture cloth there instead of in Flanders.

Edward hardly wanted more than an adequate pretext for throwing down a direct challenge to Philip. Neither the encroachments in Aquitaine nor the French support of the Scots were altogether

adequate. But the Flemish burghers demanded peace and trade with England, which they were not likely to have while Philip was King of France and Louis was Count of Flanders. They suggested to Edward that if he asserted his claim to the French crown they would acknowledge his suzerainty, and support him as their lawful overlord. A war with France would then excite the imaginative enthusiasm of the English as a war for a kingdom, and their practical approval as a war for commerce, in which they would have the powerful support of Flemish money and the Flemish soldiers, who had set almost the earliest example of routing the mail-clad chivalry of France with their pikemen at the battle of Courtrai. It would be of little moment that Edward personally attached more importance to projects to Aquitaine than to the crown of France or to improved relations with Flanders. Edward easily secured the support of Parliament, and set about forming alliances with the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria, with Hainault, and with other German states. The alliance with the Emperor in 1338 may be regarded as the opening of the Hundred Years' War.

III.—France and the British Isles, 1338–1380

Edward's alliance with Lewis was in effect a declaration of war. The campaigning began next year with an expedition to Picardy, which was entirely unproductive. The alliance with Lewis brought England no practical aid. But the next year, 1340, saw the first great engagement of the war, the memorable sea fight of Sluys, which virtually established the English supremacy in the narrow seas. There had been a ceaseless and acute rivalry between Normandy sailors and the seamen of the English south coast. The two notable features of the fight were: first, that it was fought on the principle of making a battle by sea approximate as nearly as possible to a battle on land; and second, that the English owed their victory to their use of archery. The English long-bow, which was to play to mighty a part in the wars of the next hundred years, was a weapon which appears to have been brought into effective use only in the reign of Edward I. The archery heretofore in use consisted of the short-bow, an instrument of no great power, and the cross-bow, which was powerful but slow in operation. The English long-bow, the handling of which was never mastered by any other people, was not much less powerful than the cross-bow, was handled with extraordinary precision by the English archers, and permitted the discharge of several arrows in the time required for the discharge of one bolt by the cross-bow. At Sluys, there was no maneuvering of the ships; the tactical conception of a sea fight was that the ships should grapple each other and decide the issue by hand-to-hand fighting. The English, however, opened

with archery, working dire havoc among the enemy crews before the ships grappled, and the result was an overwhelming victory for the English. After the battle of Sluys, the Channel was a highway for English ships where French ships hardly dared to make an appearance.

There were no other immediate results. The land campaigning resolved itself into a number of desultory and ineffective sieges, while Philip refused the English king's invitation either to settle their quarrel by single combat or to bring their armies together to fight the matter out in a sort of glorified tournament. Towards the end of the year, a truce was brought about through the good offices of the Papacy. Edward's allies deserted him, including the Flemings, from whom he had borrowed great sums which he was unable to repay.

Although the war was suspended, opportunities for renewed fighting between French and English soon arose in Brittany, where there was a disputed succession to the duchy, the respective claimants being John de Montfort, the younger of the last duke's brothers, and Jeanne, the daughter of a dead elder brother, who was married to Charles, Count of Blois. The French courts, the Paris Parliament decided in favor of Jeanne, whereupon Montfort appealed to Edward III. as his suzerain. The rival factions fought in Brittany, and English soldiers helped the Montfort faction, while French troops supported the Blois faction. The pretence of a truce between England and France could not in such circumstances be long maintained. In 1345 it was definitely repudiated, and direct hostilities were resumed.

Since Flanders was not now available as a military base for the attack upon north-eastern France, it appeared that Gascony would be the main theater of war. Notable successes were there achieved by the Earl of Lancaster, and in 1346 Edward sailed on an expedition which was probably intended to land in the southern province. Edward, however, instead of sailing down channel suddenly directed his attack upon Normandy, which was practically undefended. He marched through Normandy and almost to the gates of Paris. His advance caused Philip hastily to concentrate another great army, and Edward began to retreat upon Flanders, where he expected again to receive the support of the Flemings. Philip's army tried to cut off his line of retirement by blocking the passages of the Somme. Edward, however, succeeded in effecting his crossing by a precarious ford called Blanchetaque. To escape a pitched battle, however, was now impracticable; still Edward could choose his own ground, and awaited the approach of the great French army on the slope of Crécy, where he, with his very much smaller army, could hold a narrow front without risk of having his flank turned.

The battle of Crécy was a practical application under new conditions of the lessons of Falkirk, Courtrai, and Bannockburn. The fundamental ideas of the new tactics were that heavy-armed infantry in

solid formation could hold their ground against a cavalry charge better than a counter cavalry charge with inferior numbers; that shock tactics would be absolutely ruined by the effective employment of archery; and that the archers must not themselves be exposed to the onslaught of heavy cavalry, which had paralyzed them at Bannockburn. The English men-at-arms were for the most part dismounted, and ranged in two solid masses flanked by large masses of archers, with a few mounted men in reserve, as well as a third battalion of foot. The English victory at Crécy implied a complete revolution in the still prevailing practice of assuming that the mail-clad horsemen were the decisive fighting arm. In the late afternoon of the day following that on which the English had taken post, the French began to arrive on the scene after a fatiguing march. But so convinced were the chivalry of France that the English lay at their mercy that they insisted upon joining battle. A body of Genoese cross-bow men was thrown forward to open the combat, but the sun was in their faces, the cords of their cross-bows had been exposed to a shower of rain, and their first discharge of bolts fell short. It was answered by a hail of accurately aimed clothyard shafts. The Genoese were thrown into disorder, the impatient horsemen refused to wait, galloped forward in dense columns riding them down, and thundered on against the English line while men and horses went down in scores and hundreds under the storm of English arrows. In spite of reported charges, it was only at one point that the French came to close quarters. When night fell the French army was scattered in flight, and thousands of their dead were left upon the field; while great numbers were prisoners in the hands of the English, whose losses were insignificant.

Almost at the same time a diversion attempted in England by a Scottish invasion, led by King David, was disastrously foiled. At the battle of Neville's Cross the Scots army was ruinously defeated, while David himself was taken prisoner and borne off to the Tower of London.

Crécy did not pave the way for conquest, though it added enormously to the military prestige of the English. Edwards army was not large enough for conquest, and though he had proved himself a master of the art of handling troops in the field, he was no strategist. The effective fruit of the Crécy campaign was the capture of Calais after a prolonged siege, which ended ten months after the victory of Crécy. Then came another period of suspended hostilities. A truce was arranged through the meditation of the Pope. England, as well as France, was suffering from the financial strain, and in 1348 and 1349 nearly all Europe was paralyzed by the frightful visitation of the Plague, known as the Black Death. Still for eight years informal warfare was carried on in Picardy, Brittany, and on the Gascon border. This period witnessed the development of the bands of free

companies, mercenaries fighting under independent captains, with booty as their primary object, which devastated France.

The nominal truce again collapsed in 1355. Meanwhile Philip VI. died, and was succeeded by his chivalrous son John the Good. In 1356, the Black Prince, raiding from Gascony into the heart of France, found himself entrapped and forced to fight against immensely superior force at Poitiers. The Gascons followed the banners of their immediate suzerain, the Duke of Aquitaine, that is to say, the King of England—not those of the duke's suzerain. In spite of the enormous odds, the Black Prince won a victory which astonished his contemporaries even more than the battle of Crécy. The French army was utterly routed, and King John himself was taken prisoner. For four years prolonged negotiations and perpetual miscellaneous fighting went on, but it was not till 1360 that peace was effectively concluded by the Treaty of Bretigny; when it was agreed that the King of England should withdraw his claim to the French crown, and the King of France should cede Aquitaine in free sovereignty to the King of England, as well as Calais. These undertakings, however remained without formal ratification.

Nine years passed before there was a renewal of hostilities. During this interval the Duchy of Burgundy lapsed to the French Crown through failure of heirs, and John bestowed it on his youngest son Philip. The importance of this event was not immediately obvious, though it was actually fraught with great consequences. For Philip's marriage brought to him great possessions in the Netherlands and on the Rhine, partly within the French kingdom, partly within the German Empire. Thus the Dukes of Burgundy, of the French House of Valois, became powerful potentates, who a hundred years later very nearly succeeded in reviving the old middle kingdom between Germany and France, stretching from the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Rhone.

A year after the acquisition of Burgundy King John died, and was succeeded by Charles V., called the Wise. Charles had been the first of the crown princes of France to bear the title of Dauphin, which after this time was appropriated to them, as the title of Prince of Wales was appropriated to the Crown Prince of England. Dauphiné, Provence, and Savoy were the three largest surviving divisions of the old kingdom of Arles, the Arelate, roughly speaking the territory watered by the Rhone. None of it lay within the French kingdom until the last prince of the old line of Dauphiné transferred his province to the French crown in the last year of the life of Philip VI. Provence still belonged to the House of Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX., whose descendants were seated upon the thrones of Naples and Hungary.

During the interval of peace between France and England Charles

was reorganizing the French government. Edward constituted his son, the Black Prince, Prince of Aquitaine. The Black Prince enjoyed an immense reputation as a soldier and as an ideal knight according to the standards of fourteenth-century chivalry. In an evil hour for himself he intervened in a quarrel with which he had no concern, the fight for the crown of Castile between Pedro the Cruel and his illegitimate brother Henry of Trastamare. The Black Prince sustained his military reputation by winning a great victory on Pedro's behalf in Spain at the battle of Najaro or Navarrete. But his own health was ruined in the course of the campaign, for which he had drained all the resources of Aquitaine. Pedro neglected to repay him, and, to meet his debts, the prince found himself obliged to impose heavy taxation on his Aquitanian subjects.

The nobles thereupon appealed to the King of France. Charles claimed that since Edward of England had never formally withdrawn his own claim to the French throne, the sovereignty of the French crown in Aquitaine still held good. He summoned the Black Prince to make answer to the appeal lodged by his feudatories with the suzerain. The demand was answered by defiance and a renewal of Edward's claim to the French crown.

So the struggle was renewed, but this time the tide of war flowed entirely against the English. King Edward in England, though not yet sixty years of age, had sunk almost into a state of dotage. Disease had all but prostrated the Black Prince himself. The French had learned the military policy of avoiding pitched battles; and most of Aquitaine, which had been loyal to its duke in the earlier stages of the war, was now in revolt. By 1375, half of Aquitaine had been lost; what remained to the King of England was less than the domain where his rights had been undisputed when the Hundred Years' War began.

So closed the first phase, with a truce which was subsequently extended over a period which lasted for forty years. In the reigns of Richard II. and Henry IV., England was not in a position to renew a great contest outside her own borders, and France herself was plunged into civil strife under the imbecile successor of Charles V., who died in 1380.

The reign of Edward III. (1327-1377), although it was in the long run a failure as far as concerned the struggle with France, was nevertheless an era of much constitutional and industrial progress in England. The follies of Edward II. and the jealous rivalries of the barons had saved the country from two dangers. Another Edward I. might very possibly have succeeded in establishing the despotic supremacy of the Crown. Under the incompetent Edward II. the great earls, acting vigorously together, might have established a permanent oligarchy of the great families. But the truth was revealed that an oligarchy of the great families would have meant anarchy. On the accession of Ed-

ward III. neither the Crown nor the great nobles were strong enough to establish a tyranny, an arbitrary government, even if they had wished to do so. The costliness of King Edward's policy forced him to depend upon the goodwill of the Estates, and especially of the Commons, whose control of supplies became thoroughly established.

The constant wars upon foreign soil compelled him to rely upon troops serving for pay instead of upon feudal levies, whose legal obligation to service extended over only forty days, or upon the shire levies, whose obligation to service was restricted to the defence of the kingdom. And in the course of the wars the English yeomanry, from whose ranks the archers had sprung, acquired a military reputation of their own, which intensified their traditional self-respect and provided a permanent guarantee for the preservation of their liberties. Those liberties were being rapidly extended in the early years of Edward's reign to the rest of the agricultural community, the semi-servile villeins and laborers. The economic superiority of free labor for wages and a rent-paying tenantry over forced labor and a tenantry giving services instead of rent, was becoming generally recognized.

Villeinage might have practically disappeared, but for the set-back which the movement suffered from the visitation of the Black Death. The Plague devastated the agricultural districts. The fields were left waste, and famine followed upon pestilence. The demand for labor altogether outran the supply, and the laborers demanded very high wages—not without reason—because of the greatly enhanced cost of the necessities of life. The Government intervened with the Statute of Laborers, attempting to impose the standard both of wages and prices prevalent before the visitation; but it was practically impossible to enforce the regulations, however severe the penalties for breaches of them might be. The landlords fell back upon their legal right to compel the villeins to render agricultural service in place of the rent for which those services had recently been to a large extent commuted. Laborers and villeins bitterly resented the recurrence to servile conditions from which they supposed themselves to have been legally set free. Finding the lawyers against them, their hatred for lawyers and law was soon quite as strong as their hatred of oppressive landlords, and a new class hostility was born.

The climax was reached with the Peasant Revolt in 1382, a revolt in which it is apparent that, while the bulk of the peasants were thinking of purely practical and immediate grievances, not a few of their leaders were aiming at a social revolution, democratic on its political and communistic on its economic side.

The revolt collapsed; the propertied classes were completely triumphant. But in the natural course, normal economic conditions were restored with the equalization of the demand and supply of labor, which had been thrown out of gear by the catastrophe of the Black

Death. The restoration of normal economic conditions caused a return to the interrupted course of normal development. Free labor and rents took the place of forced services, and by the middle of the fifteenth century villeinage had practically vanished.

Rural prosperity suffered a check from the Black Death, but commerce advanced greatly. Edward III., like Edward I., realized that by developing the wealth of his subjects he would get more money into the treasury than by heavy exactions. His grandfather had done much to create in the trading community the consciousness of common national interests of greater importance than local rivalries. Edward III., as Duke of Aquitaine, sought to extend in England the market for the products of Aquitaine, and as King of England to extend in Flanders the market for English wool. The methods of strict regulation and supervision which he adopted, though they do not appeal to the modern economist, were in accordance with the ideas of the time and were indubitably accompanied by a great expansion of trade while they greatly simplified the business of collecting dues. Edward also went farther than any of his predecessors in his efforts to encourage experts in cloth-making and other industries to settle in England, with the result that Englishmen learned the arts of the foreign manufacturers, and were very soon competing with them and even surpassing them in the cloth-working trades.

There was no corresponding progress in France. The French kings and the French nobles were more disposed to regard the commercial classes of the towns as accumulators of wealth of which they might justly be deprived than as producers of wealth whose prosperity the whole community benefited. There was no class corresponding to the English yeomanry, and the peasantry, whose condition was more servile than that of any of the English peasantry, suffered horribly from the wars and still more horribly from the Black Death. Both in the form of services and in the direct form of taxation they were ground down after a fashion unknown in England; it was sheer misery and want that drove them into the desperate insurrection called the Jacquerie, which was stamped out with utter ruthlessness and only served to prove their helplessness.

When King John was a prisoner in the hands of the English, the regency was vested in the Dauphin, who had not yet learned the wisdom of his later years. The fortunes of France were at their lowest ebb, and the States General was summoned with a view to the provision of money. The commons, led by Stephen Marcel, endeavored to use the financial lever as a means to getting control of the government into their own hands, in a mismanaged effort to achieve a position such as that which they conceived to be position of the Parliament in England. For a moment they seemed to have succeeded, but they had neither the experience nor the machinery for conducting a gov-

ernment to which the Crown and the nobility were alike hostile. Marcel's strength was among the Paris bourgeoisie; there was a royalist reaction in the provinces; the outbreak of the Jacquerie made matters worse—Marcel was overthrown and killed. The attempt of the commons to assert themselves failed hopelessly, and was not renewed till four hundred years had passed. The developing of a strong central government in France was to be upon despotic, not upon constitutional, lines.

On these lines considerable progress was made in the reign of Charles V. The failure of Marcel made it easier for the king to exercise the arbitrary power of taxation, but this was accompanied by an unwonted degree of justice and firmness in the administration which brought general relief and made the king's absolution popular. And his success was clinched by the intelligent statecraft which turned the tide of victory against the apparently irresistible English.

In Scotland there was little enough that could legitimately be called political development. The Scotland which came in contact with England was the English-speaking Scotland whose kings were, in blood, more Norman than anything else, and whose most powerful nobles were as likely to be Norman as anything else. The Bruces were Normans, as were the Balliols and the Comyns and the Fitzalans who were the progenitors of the House of Stewart. If the bulk of the population were of mixed Celtic, Saxon, and Scandinavian race, their laws and institutions, since the days of Malcolm Canmore and David I. had departed entirely from the old Celtic system and were much more akin to the laws and customs, Saxon, Danish, or Norman, prevalent south of the Tweed. Their language differed little from that of the north of England, and the effective division between highlanders and lowlanders is marked by the fact that even to this day the lowlanders are to the still Gaelic-speaking population *Sassenachs*, Saxons. These are the people who, in the literary point of view, were the Scots, though the kingdom which gave its name to Scotland and from which the reigning dynasty originally sprang was Celtic.

In the Celtic highlands and islands, in spite of a very strong Norse admixture in the west, the Celtic customs and the Celtic clan system persisted. It was only to a very limited extent that the royal authority could make itself beyond the highland border. It was the failure of the clan system in Ireland as in Scotland to adapt itself to any sort of monarchical control, which prevented Ireland in the days of Edward II. from establishing her own independence with the Scots king's brother, Edward Bruce, as king, and which made hopeless the attempts—not infrequent—of any chiefs, however powerful, to combine the clans and form a separate or even a predominant Celtic state.

When feudal Scotland under Robert Bruce maintained its independence of England, the victory was due to political organization but

to military leadership and indomitable sentiment. Scotland's political organization was considerably less advanced than that of England, and the very spirit of individual independence which had done so much for Scotland in the struggle against England stood in the way of that systematic subordination of personal ambitions to a superior control, in the public interest, which was the mainspring of the development of constitutional principles in England from the days of Magna Carta onwards. Independent feudal jurisdictions, which made many of the barons practically the sole arbiters of law within their own territory, prevented the operation of a system of law common to the whole country, and unless under very exceptional circumstances it was only powerful barons who attempted to claim a share in the actual government.

Some sort of a National Assembly did exist in Scotland, which had the name of a Parliament, but its composition was less definite than that of the English Parliament in the reign of Henry III. After the War of Independence it emerges a little more clearly than in the earlier period; at the end of the reign of Robert Bruce burgesses were summoned to attend it as well as the barons, a term which in Scotland continued to cover all the tenants-in-chief and was not restricted to the greater nobles. Formally it would seem to have been consulted chiefly when specially heavy taxation, exceptional grants of money, were required. But it did not derive from this function an importance comparable to that of the English Parliament, because such demands were in Scotland quite exceptional and were necessitated chiefly by such occasion as the raising of a ransom for the liberation of the captive David II.

On occasion also the Assembly might constitute itself the mouth-piece of a very strong national sentiment. Thus, when the degenerate David proposed to make terms with England which would have recognized some kind of English suzerainty, the rejection of his proposals by the Parliament was decisive. But again the need for such action was altogether exceptional. Ordinarily the Parliament was concerned merely with financial routine; its work was extremely uninteresting, and attendance was very inconvenient. Consequently it adopted a practice of delegating its work to a committee called the Lords of the Articles, who were in effect selected by the magnates. And when factions were rife, that meant the particular faction of magnates who happened to have the largest available armed force at the moment.

IV.—Europe during the Avignon Papacy, 1307–1380

Although Rudolph of Hapsburg had immensely strengthened his own comparatively unimportant family by the acquisition of the Austrian provinces, he did not as yet establish in his house any title to the Imperial succession. After his death his son Albert had to wait

six years before becoming German king and in effect Emperor; Albert's rule lasted for ten years, and was ended by his assassination in 1308. He in turn failed to secure the succession of his son, and the choice of the Electors fell upon Henry of Luxemburg, the lord of a minor principality. Henry VII. ruled for only a short time, and most of that time was passed in Italy, where he perhaps hoped not only to revive the Imperial authority but to reinstate the center of government. These Imperial dreams, insubstantial at the best, vanished with his early death in 1313. He had secured the crown of Bohemia for his son John, but not the Imperial crown. Lewis of Bavaria and Frederick of Hapsburg were each of them chosen German king by different groups of the Electors. For eight years there was a contest between the two candidates, which was brought to an end when Lewis made his rival prisoner at the battle of Mühldorf.

There followed a renewal of the old strife between the Empire and the Papacy, though it was on a much lower plane than in the former days. John XXII., the second of the Avignon Popes, pretended to the old authority. He claimed that the papal sanction was necessary to an Imperial election; and when Lewis ignored the claim the Pope immediately excommunicated him. If the authority of a Pope at Rome had been disputable, that of a Pope at Avignon was much more difficult to sustain. The quarrel was complicated by the intervention of the two great orders of friars, the Franciscans taking the Imperial and the Dominicans the papal side, as a natural outcome of the antagonism between the Franciscan doctrine of clerical poverty and the practices sanctioned by the papal Curia.

In Germany the case for the Empire was very much strengthened by the peculiar antipathy attaching to the Avignon Papacy as being wholly subservient to French influences. The opinion of Germany was shared by England at least until a Bishop of Bordeaux in Aquitaine was raised to the papal throne as Clement VI. This sentiment was partly responsible for the alliance of King Lewis and Edward III. in 1338; but the more significant result of the ill-feeling was the declaration of the German Electors at Rense that election by the Electors conferred the full Imperial authority without further confirmation.

Lewis, however, had now the chance to achieve success where Barbarossa had failed. His position was in many respects so advantageous and insured so much German support that with a wise use of his opportunities he might have applied them to the consolidation of the Imperial power in Germany. He failed partly because he was secretly afraid of the Pope, whoever the Pope might be, partly because he alienated the Germans by his persistent efforts to snatch for his own family the succession to great German fiefs. The result was that Clement VI. was able to combine in Germany a party hostile to

Lewis, and procured a majority of the Electors who elected Charles of Luxemburg, the son of King John of Bohemia and grandson of Henry VII., as Roman king. Whether Charles could make head against Lewis was more than doubtful, but in the year following the election Lewis died suddenly.

The Bavarian party were not at all disposed to acknowledge an election which had been engineered by the Pope, or an Emperor who was practically committed to acknowledging the papal pretensions. But they were at a loss for a rival candidate. They offered the crown to Edward III., but Edward was too much occupied with the French quarrel to fight for the German crown. Lewis of Brandenburg, the son of the late Emperor, was similarly disqualified by a struggle with a pretender to Brandenburg. A minor noble, Gunther of Schwartzburg, was adopted as their candidate, but died immediately afterwards. Charles, essentially a diplomatist, secured Hapsburg support by giving his daughter in marriage to Rudolph, the son of Albert of Austria. A declaration against Waldemar, the Brandenburg pretender, pacified Lewis of Brandenburg. The free cities which had been partisans of Lewis were mollified by concessions, and in 1350 Charles of Luxemburg and Bohemia was acknowledged as Charles IV. by all Germany.

The reign of Charles IV. marks the effective renunciation by the German kings of the attempt to exercise anything more than a nominal sovereignty in Italy. The Emperor's visit to Italy in order to receive the Imperial crown and the crown of Lombardy was merely formal, and conspicuously emphasized his determination to leave the Italians to settle their own quarrels. The German king would have enough to do in organizing Germany. Charles had been elected to the Empire as the nominee and apparently the creature of the Pope at Avignon; and so far as he met his obligations to the Pope it was by the practical desertion of the Ghibelline factions in Italy, who had been Imperialists for the most part because they were anti-papal. But in Germany he went on to ignore the papal claim to supremacy. The act most conspicuously associated with his name is the publication of the edict known as the Golden Bull. The most conspicuous feature of the Bull was that it definitely and finally vested the right of election in seven magnates, the King of Bohemia, the three Archbishops of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, and three lay Electors, the Elector Palatine, the Elector of Saxony, and the Elector of Brandenburg. Hitherto there had nominally been seven Electors, but there were rival claimants to the electoral office. The Bull definitely excluded the two powerful Houses of Austria and Bavaria, in the latter case giving priority to the Wittelsbachs of the Palatinate over the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria. The House of Luxemburg, on the other hand, secured a vote to itself by its possession of the Bohemian crown, to which John

of Bohemia, the father of Charles, had been elected by the Bohemians in the reign of the first Luxemburg Emperor Henry VII. The exclusion of Bavarian and Austria left the King of Bohemia the most powerful member of the electoral group. Ostensibly, since the election was to go by a majority vote, the intention was to make disputed successions impossible. Actually Charles intended it to insure not only the immediate but the future succession to his own dynasty. The Bull totally ignored the papal claim, treating the election as a matter which concerned Germany alone. The point of view was emphasized by the privileges attaching to the free cities of Frankfurt, Aachen, and Nürnberg; the election was to take place at the first, the coronation at the second, and the first diet of the reign at the third.

The position of the Electors was further strengthened by the provision that electoral territories should not be divided according to the common German custom; that the succession should follow the law of primogeniture; and that while an Elector was a minor the electoral function should be discharged by the nearest male relation on the father's side. The Electors were to take precedence in rank over all other princes, and were to enjoy other privileges which almost amounted to independent sovereignty.

The Bull placed the two most powerful territorial magnates of the Empire in a position subordinate to the Electors. In the course of his reign Charles acquired a second electorate—that of Brandenburg. The covert intention of his policy would seem to have been that the House of Luxemburg, predominating among the Electors and systematically expanding its own territorial possessions, should be able not only to retain for itself the Imperial authority, but to enforce it effectively against the unprivileged territorial magnates and the privileged princes whose territories were smaller and whose wealth was less. But the success of such a plan required a corresponding capacity in the Emperor's successors and the consolidation of their territorial dominions. As it fell out, the sons of Charles IV. were not equal to the task; the Luxemburg dominion passed to them divided instead of consolidated, and ultimately it was the House of Austria which occupied the position destined by Charles for the House of Luxemburg.

Charles during his own lifetime obtained the election of his son Wenzel as his successor. To him went the kingdom of Bohemia; Brandenburg went to the younger brother Sigismund, who by his marriage acquired the kingdom of Hungary, his wife being the elder daughter of King Lewis, called the Great. The year of Charles's death, 1378, was also the year which initiated the Great Schism. An unsuccessful attempt had already been made to put an end to the Avignon Papacy—the "Babylonish captivity"—by re-establishing

the papal residence in Rome. But Pope Gregory XI. visited Rome, and was there taken ill and died, with the result that the papal election was again held in Rome, where Italian influence predominated. The new Pope, Urban, was intolerable to the French, and the French cardinals, repudiating the Roman election, elected a new Pope of their own. The result was that for some thirty-five years Europe suffered from the scandal of having two rival Popes, if not more, while the various potentates gave their adherence to one Pope or the other on strictly political grounds.

Italian history during the fourteenth century is eminently picturesque but incredibly confusing—devoid of any central connecting principles. Italy was in effect a congeries of an immense number of small city states, so far as concerned the northern half, without unity and without any common conception of nationalism. Italy, in short, is a geographical expression meaning not a state but the peninsula with its appendage, the island of Sicily. That island had become a separate kingdom under the Aragonese dynasty, which, after the Sicilian Vespers, had liberated it from Charles of Anjou. The Angevin dynasty remained in possession of the southern half of Italy, otherwise called the kingdom of Naples. A branch of the same dynasty at the beginning of the century acquired the crown of Hungary; but this was entirely separate from the kingdom of Naples and brought no development of an Angevin Power. The King of Naples was unable to establish any ascendancy outside his own kingdom.

North of Naples lay the group of papal states; but with the Papacy fixed at Avignon the Pope's authority therein was of the smallest, and was not effectively secured by the appointment of King Robert of Naples as the papal vicar.

In the north of Italy five cities held pre-eminent positions: Venice, a close oligarchical republic, scarcely in Italy at all, but established at the head of the Adriatic as the possessor of the most powerful of the fleets with access to the Mediterranean; Genoa, on the opposite side of the peninsula, the rival of Venice herself on the seas; the democratic republic of Florence, dominant in Tuscany; and in Lombardy, Milan and Verona, with their despots of the Houses of Visconti and Scala.

Every city had its rival factions, still bearing the names of Guelph and Ghibelline, though the names virtually ceased to stand for any kind of political principle after the death of the Emperor Henry VII., the last prince who embodied the Imperial idea. When Guelphs predominated, Ghibellines were driven into exile, always with a hope of returning, and *vice versa*; but the so-called Guelph in one city did not unite with those in other cities.

We must be content, then, here to take note of a small number of episodes, either on account of their notoriety or because of their sub-

sequent bearing upon the claims put forward by various pretenders to Italian dominions.

To this latter category belong disputes regarding the succession to Naples. King Robert of Naples, grandson of Charles of Anjou, succeeded to the crown in 1309, despite the somewhat better claim of his elder brother's son, Charles Robert, or Carobert, who had already succeeded to the crown of Hungary. Robert was succeeded by his daughter Joanna. The Hungarian branch asserted its title, but realizing the impossibility of uniting the crowns of Hungary and Naples, ultimately withdrew its claim. Joanna was actually succeeded in 1382 by her cousin, Charles III., who was also the husband of her niece, Joanna herself having no children. She, however, being personally offended with him, endeavored to prevent his succession, and nominated as her heir Louis of Anjou, the brother of Charles V. of France, a very distant cousin. Louis was defeated in his attempt to claim his inheritance, but secured one fragment of it—Provence. Hence a hundred years later Provence itself was absorbed in the French kingdom; and not long afterwards Charles VIII., King of France, asserted on his own account a claim to the kingdom of Naples, on the hypothesis that he had himself become the representative of the House of Anjou.

In the absence of the Popes at Avignon, Rome witnessed the singular episode of the rise and fall of Rienzi. Rome itself and all the other cities of the papal domain were victimized by powerful baronial families or dominated by despots. Rienzi, in Rome, succeeded in raising a victorious popular insurrection, which placed him at the head of the State with the title of Tribune. His first measures were directed to the establishment of liberty and security; but his success seemed to have unbalanced his brain. He asserted absurd claims to supremacy. But his original qualifications for leadership lay in a somewhat dangerous gift of eloquence and an enthusiasm for literary ideals of liberty; and when these were mastered by personal ambitions, which he was quite unfitted to achieve—ambitions attainable only through the possession of military qualities, in which he was entirely lacking—his whole scheme collapsed. Six months after the Revolution he found himself without the support even of the mob, fled from Rome, and vanished. Some years later he reappeared for a short time, but only to fail again and perish.

The most important of the Italian struggles was that between Venice and Genoa, whose maritime rivalry brought about a war in the middle of the century, in which the third naval Power of the Mediterranean, the kingdom of Aragon, took part against the Genoese. Victory, however, fell to Genoa when her admiral, Dorea, destroyed the Venetian fleet at the battle of Sapienza. More than twenty years elapsed be-

fore Venice ventured to renew the war, with the result that in 1379 her position became so critical that the Government actually contemplated the abandonment of Venice itself, and the removal of the headquarters of the maritime state to Crete. The Venetians, however, succeeded in blockading the Genoese fleet at Chioggia, where, at midsummer, 1380, it was compelled to capitulate. The disaster was so complete that Genoa sought safety from utter destruction by placing herself under the protection of France and voluntarily submitting herself to French suzerainty.

The history of Spain demands only cursory attention. By the fourteenth century it had shaped itself into four dominions—the Moorish kingdom of Granada on the south; the Portuguese kingdom on the west; the kingdom of Aragon, comprising the provinces of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia on the northeast and east; and the kingdom of Castile and Leon, comprising the rest of the peninsula, and completely separating the other three states.

To these four must be added the small kingdom of Navarre, at the western end of the Pyrenees, which might be regarded as a corner either of France or of Spain.

During the fourteenth century renewed aggression on the part of the Moors was defeated by Alfonso XI., King of Castile. Alfonso XI. was succeeded by his legitimate son, Pedro the Cruel, whose crimes led to the revolt of his illegitimate brother, Henry of Trastamare, who claimed the crown for himself. Pedro was victorious in the struggle, largely owing to the intervention of the Black Prince, which indirectly led to the loss of half Aquitaine by the prince. Pedro's triumph was short-lived, for after the withdrawal of the English troops he was defeated by Henry with the assistance of French troops, and at a subsequent interview between Henry and Pedro the latter was killed by the former, who secured the crown of Castile and established his own dynasty.

With regard to Aragon, the leading interest lies in its connection with Sicily. At the end of the thirteenth century, after the Sicilian Vespers, the Sicilians ejected Charles of Anjou and offered their crown to the King of Aragon. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, however, the Sicilian crown was transferred to Frederick, the younger brother of King James of Aragon. The two crowns were reunited at the beginning of the fifteenth century by the marriage of the heir of Aragon to the heiress of Sicily. Incidentally, we may note that the island of Sardinia was acquired by Aragon from the Genoese in the first half of the fourteenth century, and remained attached to Spain for nearly four hundred years.

During the period which we are here studying the Swiss confederacy developed in one corner of the Empire. The mountain regions

about the lake of Lucerne originally formed a part of the duchy of Swabia. The duchy was dissolved, and the more powerful nobles endeavored to extend their own overlordship over minor barons and minor communities who, by the dissolution of the duchy, were left with no overlord except the German king himself. The original Hapsburg territories were in Swabia; and Rudolf of Hapsburg, who afterwards in 1273 became King of the Romans, was vigorous in his efforts to reconstitute a Swabia under Hapsburg dominion. He sought to assert his authority over the forest cantons, the communities of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. When Rudolf became German king, the cantons could not dispute his sovereignty in that capacity, though they repudiated it in his capacity as Rudolf of Hapsburg. On his death they formed a League to maintain their independence of Hapsburg rule, as well as for the mutual maintenance of order within the cantons. The story of William Tell belongs to the time of Rudolf's son Albert, who subsequently, though not immediately, succeeded to the Imperial position. The Swiss are as reluctant to surrender that splendid legend as Scotland would be to surrender William Wallace; but Wallace is vouched for by contemporary records, whereas the contemporary records, in the eyes of historians who are not Swiss, absolutely preclude the possibility of the truth of the William Tell legend as we know it, and provide no confirmation of anything approximating to it. Moreover, active resistance to Albert's officials when he was actually Emperor, and therefore admittedly sovereign, would have been out of the question.

We come, however, into clear ground after Albert's death, when Henry of Luxemburg was the first Emperor of his House. From him the League received full recognition of its independence of any suzerainty other than that of the Emperor himself. When, upon Henry's death in 1313, there was a contest for the Imperial crown between Lewis of Bavaria and Frederick of Austria, the son of Albert, the cantons naturally supported the Bavarian; the Austrians attempted to suppress them, and were heavily defeated at the battle of Morgarten. Lewis had the better in the contest with Frederick, and the Hapsburg surrendered all claims to suzerainty over the cantons.

Some years later, in 1330, Lucerne, which was actually under Hapsburg suzerainty, joined the League, and in 1351 the city of Zurich followed suit. By 1353 Zug, Glarus, and Bern, had been added. But each of the cantons, now eight in number, had its own government, oligarchical or democratic, and some of them still recognized allegiance to Austria, though in different degrees.

In 1365 the Hapsburg dominions were parted between two brothers, both young men, Albert and Leopold. The Swabian lands formed part of Leopold's share; and Leopold found himself confronted by two

leagues, the Swabian League of Towns, and the League of the Cantons. In 1386 Leopold marched against the Switzers, but was ruinously defeated and killed at the famous battle of Sempach. Another Swiss victory at Näfels was decisive, and a treaty in 1389 recognized the complete independence of all the members of the League of the Cantons, so far as the Hapsburgs were concerned, though the Swiss confederacy still remained a portion of the Empire

CHAPTER XXI

THE PASSING OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 1380-1485

I.—The Papacy and the Empire, 1380-1453

THE Great Schism began in the year 1378 with the election of the French Antipope, Clement VII., in opposition to the newly-elected Italian Pope, Urban VI. The former was recognized by France and by the Spanish kingdoms, the latter by the rest of Western Christendom, with the exception of Scotland, which habitually ranged itself on the French side—not so much from affection for France as from hostility to England. Immediately after the second papal election, Charles IV. died, and was succeeded as German king by his son Wenzel. This succession he had secured during his own lifetime by procuring Wenzel's election as King of the Romans. The Imperial dignity was presumed to follow as a matter of course, though the Imperial title was not assumed until the coronation of the King of the Romans at Rome.

Charles had weakened the Imperial position for his heir by dividing the Luxemburg inheritance. Wenzel was King of Bohemia, but the Brandenburg electorate went to the younger brother, Sigismund; a cousin, Jobst, was in possession of Moravia, on the borders of Bohemia.

The Schism offered a problem which would have been difficult enough of solution even by such a clear-sighted and capable diplomatist as Charles IV. Wenzel was a coarse, pleasure-loving drunkard, utterly unfitted to discharge the duties of his position, and quite incapable of dealing with problems demanding tact and insight. The rival Popes continued to denounce each other and each other's supporters, and as each Pope died a new Pope was chosen by his own faction. Urban was succeeded in 1389 by Boniface IX., followed in 1404 by Innocent VII., and in 1405 by Gregory XII. Clement, dying in 1394, was followed by Benedict XIII., a Spaniard, whose election somewhat weakened the French support. In the enumeration of later Popes—after the termination of the Schism—the Roman Popes are counted, but the Antipopes are not.

For twenty years Wenzel reigned but did not govern. The antagonisms between the territorial magnates and the towns came to a head,

producing a war between the League of Magnates and the League of Towns with no very decisive results, except as concerned the final defeat of Hapsburg pretensions in Switzerland at the battle of Sempach—an affair in which the Swiss peasant received no help from their Swabian allies. The towns could successfully defy attacks upon their walls by the feudal forces, but could not hold their own against them in the field. The war was brought to an end by a treaty under which arrangements were made for the settlement by arbitration of future disputes between the towns and the nobles. But the contest emphasized the entire absence of control and direction on the part of Wenzel who, in effect, left matters to take their course. The same inefficiency marked his rule in Bohemia, which had progressed greatly under Charles, so that even in his own kingdom his authority was set at naught.

Meanwhile, Wenzel's brother Sigismund was occupied in affairs of his own outside of Germany. King Lewis, called the Great, the last king of the Angevin line in Hungary, had withdrawn his pretensions to the kingdom of Naples, but was elected to the crown of Poland as well as to that of Hungary. Sigismund was betrothed to Maria, the elder of his two daughters. On the death of Lewis in 1380, the Hungarians acknowledged the succession of Maria. The Poles, on the other hand, were dissatisfied with the last experiment in the union of the two crowns, and elected the young sister, Hedwig; but they also required her marriage to the powerful and independent Duke Jagellon of Lithuania, of which the population, like that of Poland, was Slavonic. Lithuania was still heathen; but the duke's adoption of Christianity was made a condition of his marriage with Hedwig. The conversion of Jagellon, who was baptized under the name of Ladislas, brought the last heathen area of Europe into the community of Christendom, and the union of Poland with Lithuania established on the east of Germany a powerful Slavonic kingdom.

Sigismund had expected his future wife to succeed to both her father's kingdoms. Poland was definitely lost, and it was not without considerable difficulty that he secured the hand of his bride and her Hungarian kingdom. But Hungary was entirely outside the German area, and was more and more assuming the character of a barrier state between Western Christendom and the threatening advance of the Turks. Its acquisition therefore did not serve to strengthen the position of Sigismund as a German prince; and incidentally he had further weakened that position by mortgaging Brandenburg to his cousin, Jobst of Moravia, in order to obtain the means of asserting his position in Hungary. The Turkish pressure was alarmingly exemplified when Sigismund marched against the Sultan, Bajazet I., and suffered at his hands an overwhelming defeat at the battle of

Nicopolis, from which he himself barely escaped. The salvation of Europe came from another quarter. The vicissitudes of the Turks in Asia and Europe are to be dealt with elsewhere.

As the fourteenth century drew to its close the solution of the papal question was presenting itself in France. The way of escape from rival Popes must be by procuring the retirement of both, and the election of a new Pope whose authority would be recognized by every one. The scheme was discussed between the drunken Wenzel and the crazy King Charles VI. of France. Germany was weary of Wenzel; an excuse for repudiating his authority was provided by his proposal to withdraw his support from the Roman Pope, Benedict. The Elector Palatine, Rupert, and the three ecclesiastical Electors, the four forming a majority of the Electoral College, met together and declared that Wenzel was deposed, and elected Rupert of the Palatinate King of the Romans. So that there were not only two Popes, but two claimants of the Imperial crown. After a time Wenzel and Rupert tacitly left each other in peace, and contented themselves, one with the nominal rule in the East and the other in the West.

The papal Schism encouraged the doctrine, which was now making way, that there is in the Catholic Church an authority higher than that of the Pope—namely, the General Council. The abdication of the two Popes, and an appeal to a General Council of the Church which should restore ecclesiastical order, seemed to be the most promising course. Gregory XII. was elected on the definite understanding that he would abdicate if his rival did the same. The pressure was growing so strong that Benedict and Gregory opened negotiations. Nothing came of them. France was uncertain in its allegiance; since the Orleanists, or Armagnacs, supported Benedict, it followed that the Burgundians supported Gregory. The cardinals took matters into their own hands, deserted the respective Popes whom they had elected, and summoned a General Council at Pisa in 1409.

The Council, resting its action upon personal charges against the two popes, proceeded to depose both of them by its own authority and to elect a new Pope, Alexander V. In theory the Council had met partly to put an end to the Schism, partly for the reform of other abuses. Reform was postponed, and the Council dissolved. Then Alexander died, and a new Pope, who called himself John XXIII., was elected. His career had been eminently disreputable, but he had a certain military reputation, which was the only thing that could be said in his favor. The other two Popes had refused to abdicate, and of all the three there was not one who commanded any serious respect.

Almost simultaneously, the death of Rupert revived the question of the German king. The Electors who had deposed Wenzel were not in-

clined to treat his deposition as invalid. Neither the new Count Palatine nor any one else outside the House of Luxemburg could be regarded as a sufficiently strong candidate. The House of Luxemburg provided three possible princes—Wenzel himself; his brother, Sigismund of Hungary; and their cousin, Jobst of Moravia, with whatever title to Brandenburg he had derived from Sigismund beyond the fact that he was actually ruler.

By dint of skilful management, Sigismund was elected by the three voters of Trier, the Palatine, and Brandenburg, which was claimed as Sigismund's. But the actual majority, setting aside the dispute whether Sigismund or Jobst was entitled to the electoral vote for Brandenburg, was against Sigismund, and a new election was held, when four votes were cast for Jobst besides his own Brandenburg vote, he having made a bargain with Wenzel, according to which the latter was to be recognized as Emperor, and Jobst was to be King of the Romans, and his successor. War would have resulted but for the fortunate death of Jobst. It was comparatively easy for Sigismund to come to terms with his brother. Brandenburg reverted to him, while Jobst's territory of Moravia was annexed to Wenzel's kingdom of Bohemia. Sigismund was unanimously elected King of the Romans, Wenzel reserving a prior right to the actual Imperial crown. For all practical purposes, Sigismund was German king, and Wenzel was nothing more than King of Bohemia. Sigismund, with ambitious projects of reviving in his own person the old dignity of the Emperor, as the secular head of Christendom and the patron rather than the coadjutor of the Papacy, found opportunity for bringing such pressure to bear on Pope John that a General Council was summoned to meet at Constance in 1414.

It has been remarked that the Council of Pisa had met with two objects in view—the termination of the Schism, and the reformation of other abuses in the Church. What the reforming party had in their minds was a constitutional reconstruction which should make impossible the renewal of such a scandal as the Schism, and should renew an ecclesiastical authority less liable to be called in question than that of individual Popes. But when the Council of Constance met, it was obvious that larger problems of reform would require to be dealt with. The leader of thought at the great Bohemian university at Prague, John Huss, had committed himself to approval of the doctrines propounded in England by John Wiclif. The Bohemians had become his ardent disciples. The rival doctrines had taken on something of the character of a national question at the Prague university, the large number of German students holding to the orthodox views; and the hostility had risen to such a pitch that the university was in effect evacuated by the Germans. At the same time, the Wiclifite doctrines attacked not merely the

papal authority, which would not have been acceptable to the constitutional reformers, but the whole basis of ecclesiastical authority, mainly by referring to the text of Scripture as the guide, and specifically by views regarding the Sacrament incompatible with the orthodox conception of priesthood.

Huss was more than ready to maintain his views before the General Council. Sigismund, who might almost be called the convener of the Council, conceived that Huss's appearance might lead to a reconciliation between Germans and Bohemians—a desirable consummation from his point of view as prospective successor to his brother on the Bohemian throne. Sigismund invited Huss to attend the Council, giving him his own personal safe-conduct.

Huss arrived at Constance before Sigismund. He was promptly imprisoned by the party of the cardinals. Pope John hoped thereby to create dissension between Sigismund and the cardinals, which would break up the Council. He very nearly succeeded; but Sigismund was over persuaded that he ought not to forego a unique opportunity for the settlement of Christendom, for the sake of a promise made to a heretic. It is rather curious to observe that the convincing advocate of this theory of moral obligations was Frederick of Hohenzollern, soon to be installed as Elector of Brandenburg, the progenitor of the famous line which gave kings to Prussia and ultimately Emperors to Germany. On the advice of Frederick of Hohenzollern, Sigismund ignored his "scrap of paper" and deserted Huss.

The Council was not broken up. Assuming that Benedict and Gregory had both already been deposed by the Council of Pisa, it proceeded to depose Pope John also. The Council, therefore, was the only authority. It went on to the trial of Huss for heresy. Huss, following Wiclif, maintained that a priest who committed mortal sin, *ipso facto* lost his priesthood. The argument led logically to the conclusion that lay princes also forfeited their claim to divine authority by the commission of mortal sin. Doctrine so dangerous ensured condemnation by lay princes as well as priests. In spite of Sigismund's safe conduct, John Huss was burned.

For eighteen months the business of the Council was in part suspended, while Sigismund was occupied with diplomatic missions. The Council had been divided into four nations—Germany, Italy, France, and England. When Sigismund returned, a fifth nation, Spain, was added. Sigismund wished to emphasize and render permanent the supremacy of the Council by completing the constitutional reform of the Church before proceeding to a papal election. He had the Germans and English with him, but France, out of opposition to England, was now on the other side. The opposition won, and a new Pope was elected—Martin V., a member of the powerful

Roman House of Colonna. Pope John and Pope Gregory both died; Benedict had no adherents; and Martin was strong enough to assert the papal authority in his own person, and to deny the right of appeal to a Council against a Pope. He dissolved the Council, while all that had been conceded to the reformers was a decree, preceding the election, that further councils should be assembled after intervals of five, seven, and ten years.

The Council of Constance ended the Schism—in effect by the decisive victory of papalism over the constitutional reformers, and of ecclesiastical conservatism over the advanced reformers. It had set the tiara on the head of an efficient Pope, and it had failed to strengthen the authority of the Emperor who had brought discredit on himself by his surrender of the man for whose safety he had pledged his honor. Yet it had not restored to the Papacy the prestige which had attached to it in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and incidentally its methods, the division of the Council into nations, fostered the conception of national Churches much as political developments were fostering the conception of a national state, both running counter to the old mediæval conception of Christendom united in its secular aspect under one head, the Emperor, and in its spiritual aspect under one head, the Pope.

Two years after the dissolution of the Council, Wenzel died. Sigismund became Emperor, having before him as a primary object the establishment of his own authority in Bohemia as Wenzel's successor. But Bohemia was in no haste to submit itself again to a German king, especially to the man who had betrayed its hero, John Huss. Bohemia was united in maintaining Hussite doctrines; though, as usual, there were two parties—the moderates and the advanced reformers, known as the Calixtines and the Taborites, the latter combining their religious doctrines with demands for democratic reform, political and social.

Frederick of Hohenzollern, now Elector of Brandenburg, was a capable soldier and an astute politician. For political ends he had advised the desertion of John Huss; for political ends he advised the conciliation of the Hussites, as tending to union with the Empire. But the Pope was zealous for the suppression of heresy, and Sigismund was more anxious to conciliate the Pope than the Hussites. Martin proclaimed a crusade against the Hussites. A crusade against the Hussites was virtually a war between Germans and Bohemians. German armies invaded Bohemia. But the Hussites had a brilliant leader in John Ziska, who routed the Germans repeatedly, so that in one campaign after another they fled before him. Crusade followed crusade, always with the same results. When Ziska himself died he was succeeded by Prokop, a commander who was hardly his inferior. The attempt to crush the Bohemians by force of

arms was a disastrous and ignominious failure—a demonstration of the utter lack of organization in the existing German system, a proof of the Emperor's incapacity, and of a disintegration too deep-seated to be remedied by paper leagues or councils of magnates.

The first of the General Councils arranged for at Constance had met at Pavia in 1423, but proved abortive. The second met at Basel in 1431, the year of the final collapse of the last anti-Hussite crusade. Pope Martin died a few days before it had assembled, and there was a new Pope, Eugenius IV. The Council at once resolved to negotiate with the Hussites. Eugenius would have no tampering with heresy, and issued a bull dissolving the Council. The Council resolved that it could not be dissolved without its own consent. The quarrel lasted till the end of 1433, when Eugenius was obliged to give way and to recognize the validity of the Council, which had continued its sessions. Terms were arranged with the Hussite leaders, which were confirmed by the Bohemian diet at Prague. In the main the claims which had been put forward by the Calixtines were conceded, but the compromise was rejected by the Taborites. Taborites and Calixtines turned their arms against each other. The Taborites were defeated, Prokop was killed, and the victorious party, anxious to put an end to strife, recognized Sigismund, in effect, on condition that the compromise should be recognized. So ended the Hussite war.

The Council of Basel, which had succeeded in compelling the Pope to recognize its authority, now turned to the question of constitutional reforms in the Church, which Martin V. had succeeded in scotching. The object of the reformers was to curtail the absolutism of the Papacy. Decrees of the Council, in which the order of procedure had considerably diminished the influence of the greater dignitaries as compared with that of the mass of the clergy, aimed at precluding all papal control over appointments to benefices and bishoprics, and prohibited the payment to the papal treasury of the annates or "first fruits" on appointment to a bishopric or benefice, which constituted a very substantial portion of the papal revenue.

Conservatism took alarm at the apparently gathering momentum of reform. A new papalist party grew up within the Council. An abortive attempt at a reconciliation with the Greek Church intensified the antagonisms. The quarrel between the Council and the Pope became acute. Eugenius again dissolved the Council, and summoned another to meet at Ferrara, which was joined by most of the Conservatives from Basel, where, however, the reformers continued to sit as before.

The Council of Ferrara of Florence imposed upon the Greek delegates acceptance of the Roman view of the question which divided the Churches. But no union was affected, because the action of the

delegates was repudiated in the Greek Empire. On the other hand, the Basel Council went so far as to declare Eugenius deposed, and to elect as the new Pope the Duke of Savoy, who took the name of Felix V. This, however, only brought discredit on the Council. Eugenius developed a diplomatic ability, in which he had hitherto been lacking, and gradually won over his Italian opponents, the French, and finally the Germans, while England and Spain stood aloof from the quarrel.

In 1437 Sigismund died, and with him ended the house of Luxemburg. Under an old compact made between Charles IV. and Rudolph of Tyrol, who was at the time the head of the Hapsburg House, if either line became extinct the other was to inherit its possessions. Thus the Hapsburgs in 1437 inherited the Luxemburg dominions. Moreover, Albert of Austria, of the senior branch of the Hapsburgs, had married Sigismund's daughter. Yet neither the agreement nor the marriage gave Albert an indefeasible title to the German kingdom, the crown of Bohemia, or the crown of Hungary.

Nevertheless, the choice of the German electors fell upon Albert. Most of them preferred a German king who had plenty to occupy him outside of Germany to the only other candidate, Frederick of Brandenburg, who had always aimed at the consolidation of Germany under a strong central government, and who would most certainly endeavor to strengthen the central government if he became king. From the election of Albert II. onwards, the head of the Holy Roman Empire down to its dissolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century was always a Hapsburg, except in the interval following the death of Charles VI. in 1740—at least if the husband and descendants of Maria Theresa are to be counted as Hapsburgs.

Albert was accepted as King of Hungary, and also by the orthodox party in Bohemia. The Hussites, however, had a candidate of their own in the person of Kasimir, the brother of the King of Poland. Before he had accomplished anything Albert died. His only son was not born till four months afterwards, and was known as Ladislas Posthumus. Although after an interval the child was recognized as king both in Hungary and in Bohemia, the practical result was that the rule of these two countries passed into the hands of two great leaders—John Hunyadi in Hungary, and George Podiebrad in Bohemia.

Germany required another king. The head of the House of Hapsburg was a new-born babe. Next to him was his guardian, Frederick of Styria, the grandson of that Leopold of Hapsburg who had been killed at Sempach. As previously noted, while Austria had gone to the senior branch of the Hapsburgs, the rest had been allotted to this junior branch. The German electors, still convinced

that they wanted not a king but a figurehead, chose Frederick III. to succeed Albert IX.

The winning over of Germany to the side of the Papacy, as against the Council, was principally the work of the diplomatist and scholar Æneas Sylvius, who at a later stage assumed a new character when he was raised to the Pontificate as Pius II. He had belonged to the reforming party; now he applied his talents on the other side. Officially Germany stood aloof from the quarrel, but Æneas Sylvius negotiated a private bargain between the new Emperor and the Pope. Suspicions were aroused. As a consequence, some of the electors definitely ranged themselves on the side of the Council. Eugenius issued anathemas against two of the clerical electors; the rest were only roused to a more hostile attitude than before. Nevertheless, the ingenuity of Æneas Sylvius affected a vague agreement for the time being. Immediately afterwards the Pope died. His successor, Nicholas V., had no personal quarrel with the German electors like his predecessors. Thus it was comparatively easy to arrange terms, and the terms were favorable to the Pope. The decrees against annates and the exercise of papal patronage were in effect revoked, although the Pope was required to acknowledge generally the supreme authority of councils. The once energetic Council of Basil was once more dissolved but in fact it perished of inanition.

II.—The British Isles and France, to the end of the Hundred Years' War, 1380-1453

The forty years which followed the truce made between France and England in the last years of Edward III. were unproductive in these countries and in Scotland.

In England King Edward was succeeded by his young grandson, Richard II., son of the Black Prince. The year 1382 saw the Peasant Revolt, when the boy king distinguished himself by his presence of mind and audacity. Superficially the reign was marked by various intrigues on the part of the king's uncles with others of the great nobles, and of the king himself, to keep the government of the country in their own hands. After twenty years Richard imagined that he had freed himself from the most dangerous of his kinsmen and of the great nobles, and he procured a subservient Parliament, which delegated its own authority to a council selected by the king himself. An absolute monarchy was actually created, but was immediately brought low by the king's own folly. On the death of his uncle, John of Gaunt, he seized the estates to which John's exiled son, now become Henry of Lancaster, was lawfully entitled. While the king was in Ireland, Henry returned to England,

professedly only to claim his own. But Richard, coming back to England, found that he himself had no active supporters. He fell into his cousin's hands, and was carried prisoner to London. There Parliament was summoned; Richard himself was compelled to abdicate, and the Parliament declared that Henry was lawful king.

Something of the same kind had occurred when Edward II. was deposed and Edward III. declared king. But in the present case there was the important difference that Henry's title to be the successor of Richard, even if the abdication of the latter was valid, was by no means strong. Reckoning by male descent only, he was Richard's heir; but in view of the principles upon which his grandfather claimed the French throne, it was not easy to proclaim that the Salic law held good in England. The accession of Henry IV. was, therefore, significant, because quite obviously his title really rested simply on the fact that Parliament chose to acknowledge him as king. The event tended to a great increase in the strength of Parliament as compared with the Crown, though that assembly was not yet at all competent to control government directly.

The new king had in effect secured his crown by armed rebellion, and by the favor of two bodies by no means over friendly to each other—the Church and the Commons. The favor of the Church had to be retained by the initiation of a persecution of heresy which had no precedent in England; while the Commons had to be kept in a good temper by an almost pusillanimous attitude towards their persistent grumbling. And even so the king held his sceptre by an extremely precarious tenure, as was evidenced by several insurrections.

Of much more importance to the world at large than the diversion of the succession to the House of Lancaster was the birth in England of the religious movement which, developing in Europe, prepared the way for the Reformation. The discredit of the Papacy, consequent upon its transfer to Avignon, intensified by the scandal of the Great Schism, went far to destroy the old reverence for the authority of the Pope. The wealth of the monasteries, the luxury and the worldliness of many of the higher clergy, were resented by the laity, and condemned by not a few of the clergy themselves. John Wiclif propounded novel doctrines, derived from his study of the Scriptures, which cut at the root of papal authority; and before he died he was beginning to call into question established dogmas of the Church—notably that of Transubstantiation. His condemnation for heresy did not take place till after his death. The seeds of his teaching were already sown in England. King Richard had taken to wife the princess Anne of Bohemia; Bohemian visitors to Oxford carried back with them to the university at Prague the Wiclifite doctrines to which John Huss was converted, and the Wiclifite heresy took root.

In Scotland, David II. had been succeeded by Robert II., his nephew, the first of the Stewart dynasty. He and his son, Robert III., after him, were both somewhat advanced in years when they came to the throne. Both were well intentioned but feeble monarchs, who entirely failed to control the turbulent Scottish nobility. Early in the reign of Henry IV. of England, James, the young Crown Prince of Scotland, was captured at sea on his way to France by English ships. For many years he was detained as a captive in England, although nominally the two countries were at peace. His capture was followed immediately by the death of the old king, whose brother, Robert of Albany, became Regent. Albany had in effect been governing in his brother's name for some time past, and no marked change took place. But the general effect was to perpetuate and increase the unhappy weakness of the central government.

Albany's regency, however, was marked by one event of which the importance is very variously estimated. The rising of Donald, the Lord of the Isles, is sometimes regarded as an adventure intended to establish a Celtic kingdom. The Lords of the Isles, like many of the other islanders, were of mixed Scandinavian and Celtic descent. The control exercised over them by the Scottish Crown was exceedingly small; they were the greatest of the magnates classed as Celtic, and it may very well have seemed that the establishment of a Celtic kingdom under their dominion was at least worth attempting. Nominally, however, it was to make good a claim of his own to the earldom of Ross that Donald assembled his clansmen and allies. His dream, whatever it may have been, was shattered by the Earl of Mar at the battle popularly known as the Red Harlaw.

In France, Charles V. was succeeded by his son, Charles VI., a boy of eleven. Edward III. in England and the Valois kings of France alike sought independently to strengthen the Crown by the bestowal of great fiefs upon the royal princes. The theory worked out very unsatisfactorily in practice, because it created a small but very powerful nobility of the royal family, whereof each member sought to obtain the predominant position for himself instead of for the Crown. Of the king's uncles, the eldest, Louis of Anjou, had presently become absorbed in his attempt to secure the kingdom of Naples. The leading position passed to Philip, Duke of Burgundy, whose marriage to the daughter of the Count of Flanders presently made him lord also of Flanders and Artois, whose suzerain was the king of France, and of the county of Burgundy, or Franche Comté, which was in the Empire. Another marriage gave to his son John additional Imperial provinces in the Netherlands.

The young king developed partial insanity; but since he had comparatively lucid periods, he could not actually be set on one side. His younger brother, Louis of Orleans, wished to get into his own

hands the effective control which had been secured by Philip of Burgundy. In 1404 Philip was succeeded by his son, John the Fearless, to whom nearly the whole of his possessions passed. The struggle for ascendancy between Orleans and Burgundy continued. In 1407 Orleans was assassinated at Burgundy's instigation, and the Orleans faction was headed by Bernard of Armagnac, whose daughter was wife of the new Duke Charles of Orleans. From this time the two great parties or factions were known as the Burgundians and Armagnacs. The Orleans faction comprised most of the old nobility. Burgundy, on the other hand, since the duke's dominions now comprised the greater part of the Low Countries, was naturally disposed to friendly relations with England on commercial grounds, and the sympathies of Paris were Burgundian. Roughly speaking, the division of parties set most of Northern France on the Burgundian side, and most of Southern France on the Armagnac side, especially since Brittany was somewhat closely connected with England, owing to the support given by England to the reigning House of Montfort, and the marriage of the English king, Henry IV., to Joan of Navarre, the Dowager-Duchess of Brittany.

John of Burgundy appeared to have established his ascendancy in France through the marriage of his daughter to the Dauphin, the eldest son of the imbecile king. But virtually the rest of the royal princes, uncles, cousins, or nephews of the king, along with the Constable of Bourbon, were united in hostility to Burgundy. Both sides craved the assistance of England, which was given first to the Burgundians and then to the Armagnacs, a change of front for which diverse reasons are assigned. But it is noteworthy that the Prince of Wales and the Beauforts were predominant in the Council of Henry IV. in the first instance, but were afterwards displaced by the Arundel party and the king's second son, Thomas of Clarence. The Dauphin joined the Armagnacs, Henry V. succeeded his father on the throne of England, and John of Burgundy reopened negotiations with the new king, who had previously left his support to the Burgundian party. A prospect of conquest opened itself before the eyes of the monarch, whose father had won his crown by a flagrant act of usurpation, who was lured onward by the consciousness of his own military genius and the sense that his own dynasty would be firmly established by martial achievements, who was confident that a French war would be popular, and who was possessed with that peculiar form of fanaticism which makes some men regard themselves as instruments appointed by the Almighty for the chastisement and regeneration of their sinful neighbors—the sinful neighbors in this case being the French.

Some technicality, however flimsy, was all that Henry required to salve his conscience in undertaking a perfectly inexcusable war

of wanton aggression. He found it in the argument that Edward III. had been the rightful heir to the French throne, that he was the rightful heir of Edward III., and that therefore he was also the rightful heir of the French throne. Neither of the premises was true, and the conclusion did not follow from them, since the very principle on which Edward rested his claim would have made Henry's cousin, the Earl of March, heir to the French throne instead of himself; but Henry managed to persuade himself of the justice of his claim, though the mental process by which he did so is extremely difficult to understand, and in 1415 Henry renewed the Hundred Years' War by invading Normandy.

In 1415, when the Council of Constance was engaged in burning John Huss, the King of England, Henry VI., launched his expedition against a divided France. A flimsier claim in law was never propounded; but it satisfied Henry's English subjects, and Henry had somehow persuaded himself that right was on his side. Harfleur, in Normandy, which Henry chose as his objective, offered a stubborn resistance, but was ultimately carried by assault without any active move on the part of the French Government for its relief. Burgundy was holding aloof. The Armagnacs and the Dauphin were as confident as the nobles in the days of Philip VI. that they could overwhelm the English, though their military ideas were elementary. And it appeared that after his initial success the King of England proposed to deliver himself into their hands.

The expedition had not been on a scale such as conquest demanded; presumably it had been designed mainly to secure for a foothold in France some better strategic base than Calais. Henry's obvious course was simply to secure Harfleur, which provided such a base. He had with him at the most 8,000 men, who could be withdrawn from the garrison at Harfleur. Yet instead of returning with them to England, he chose to take the risk of making an amazingly audacious demonstration by marching through Normandy from Harfleur to Calais. If the French Government failed to interfere it would suffer unspeakable discredit. If it did interfere, faction might still paralyze it. At the worst, with the precedents of Crécy and Poitiers in his mind, Henry probably reckoned that he would be able to cut his way through. And at the best matters might turn out as in fact they did turn out. The story of Crécy was very nearly repeated. The great French army brought the small English army to bay at Agincourt. The French did not attempt the old plan of sweeping the English away by a charge of horse. They advanced on foot, but their ranks were shattered, as before, by the English archers, and Agincourt was a victory not less overwhelming than either Crécy or Poitiers. There was a terrific slaughter of the nobility and knighthood of France. Henry continued his triumphant

march to Calais, and was received with enthusiastic acclamation in England. After Agincourt, Henry had nothing to fear from possibilities of insurrection.

During the next two years the Dauphin, Louis, and his next brother both died. The third Dauphin, Charles, was completely in the hands of the Armagnacs. After Agincourt, Burgundy might without difficulty have snatched the power from the discredited factions. He failed to do so, and the Armagnacs maintained their ascendancy by a rule which, in Paris especially, was intolerably brutal. But the French queen, Isabella, was driven to seek John of Burgundy's alliance; again faction developed into civil war. Henry was only awaiting his opportunity to set himself to the serious business of conquest, a business which he understood very much better than Edward III. and the Black Prince. In 1417 Henry was back in Normandy.

For a year he continued methodically to reduce the fortresses of Normandy, maintaining a rigid discipline among his soldiers, and guaranteeing the preservation of their liberties to the Normans, who received no aid from the French Government. In the autumn (1418) he sat down before Rouen. Meanwhile Paris had revolted against the Armagnacs, killed the Count, and driven the Dauphin and his partisans out of the city. Burgundy and Queen Isabella had King Charles in their hands, and, acting in his name, could claim to be a legitimate government. Henry tightened his grip on Rouen. But no effective attempt was made to relieve it, and in January 1419 it was starved into surrender. Negotiations went on, but while Henry pretended to be willing to compromise his claim to the French crown, he demanded in the alternative not only the hand of the French princess, Catherine, but territorial concessions which he knew to be out of the question. Burgundy sought by preference a reconciliation with the Armagnacs. A meeting was arranged with the Dauphin at which John the Fearless was treacherously murdered. The effect was to make a reconciliation impossible, and to drive the young Duke Philip of Burgundy into the arms of the English. In 1420, by the Treaty of Troyes, it was arranged that Charles VI. was to remain king for the rest of his life, while Henry was to act as regent, marry his daughter, and succeed to the throne on the king's death. The treaty repudiated the Dauphin altogether; but as a matter of course he and the Armagnacs remained in arms in Touraine.

Henry was master of Normandy and of Paris; Brittany was neutral; the north-east of France was dominated by Burgundy, but the rest of France adhered to the Dauphin. For two years Henry continued the systematic extension of the territory in which he was master. Then he was carried off by dysentery, leaving his crown to an infant, the government of England to a Council, and the French regency to his brother, Duke John of Bedford. King Charles died a few weeks

after his son-in-law; the infant Henry VI. was proclaimed King of France by the English and Burgundians, while the larger half of France acknowledged the Dauphin as Charles VII. In Southern France the English king was acknowledged only in so much of Guienne and Gascony as still remained attached to the English crown out of the old duchy of Aquitaine.

John of Bedford was a statesman and a soldier hardly inferior to his brother, but he was not King of England. His skill and tact preserved the Burgundian alliance, but only with extreme difficulty, owing to the recklessly self-seeking conduct of his brother, Humphrey of Gloucester. Very slowly the English arms continued to progress, until the town of Orleans was laid under siege. But the ultimate success of the conquest of France only seemed to be possible because the sentiment of nationalism in France had been apparently destroyed by long years of faction. That sentiment was revived by the appearance on the scene of Jeanne d' Arc. Possessed with an entire conviction of her own divine mission as the savior of France, the country girl presented herself at the court of Charles VII., claiming that she was sent to lead the French armies to victory. She was allowed to lead a small French force to the relief of Orleans. Her followers believed that she was inspired by God, the English that she was inspired by the devil. French and English alike were convinced that her supernatural powers, whether derived from above or from beneath, were irresistible. She raised the siege of Orleans. She led Charles VII. triumphantly through hostile territory to be crowned at Rheims. When her work of inspiration was already done, she fell, probably by treachery, into the hands of the Burgundians, who sold her to the English. By a court of French ecclesiastics she was condemned to death as a heretic and a witch, and was handed over to the secular arm—that is, to the English—to be burned in the market-place at Rouen; while the king, who owed his crown to her, stirred no finger to save her.

She died that France might live. It would still have been possible for England to obtain substantial cessions of French territory in full sovereignty. But the English would yield none of the pretensions, though they were unable to enforce them. Burgundy was passing from a lukewarm friendship to positive hostility. When Bedford died, the last chance of retaining Burgundian support disappeared. In England, the obstinate war party was strong enough to prevent peace, but the peace party was strong enough to paralyze war. The tide of success, turned by the Maid of Orleans, set steadily in favor of the French, though there was little enough appearance of organized campaigns. The English were driven out of Paris; at the end of 1450 they were driven out of Normandy. Then they were attacked in Guienne; and in 1453 their only remaining foothold in

France was Calais. The surrender of Bordeaux in that year was the end of the Hundred Years' War and of English pretension to dominion in France. For the contest of factions in England itself was now to culminate in the War of the Roses.

In Scotland the regency was terminated by the release of James I. from his captivity in England, shortly after the death of Henry V. Officially, Scotland had not declared war upon England; unofficially, numbers of Scots were taking part in the French war on the French side. Henry carried James with him into France, with the object of maintaining the fiction that the Scots fighting for the French were in rebellion against their king, and were to be treated not as legitimate belligerents, but as rebels. Nevertheless it was to the Scots that the French owed the one serious reverse inflicted upon the English before Henry's death, at Baugé, where the English, under the command of Thomas of Clarence, Henry's brother, were cut to pieces, and Clarence himself was killed.

James, on his return to Scotland, found the country in great disorder, owing to the independence of the nobles. His brief reign was marked by vigorous efforts to curb the nobles and establish a strong government by methods too drastic to be altogether just, and on lines which had been suggested to James by his residence as a captive in England. The rigor of his rule led to his assassination in 1437, when he was succeeded by a six-year-old son, and the great nobles, notably the Douglasses, recovered their independence, until the young king came of age in 1449; after which time the struggle between crown and baronage became a personal struggle between King James and the House of Douglas.

III.—Italy and the Spanish Peninsula, 1380-1453

In Italy the instruments with which the various states fought out their rivalries were the condottieri—captains of bands of mercenary soldiers who began to come into general employment in the latter half of the fourteenth century. During the closing years of that century Milan achieved supremacy in Lombardy under Gian Galeazzo Visconti. Like others of his House, he was a coward in respect of personal danger, but made up for his cowardice by unscrupulous craft. Before his death he was virtually master of all Lombardy, and it was only his death which saved Florence and Tuscany from sharing Lombardy's fate and being subjugated by Milan. He had obtained from King Wenzel formal recognition as a duke, and incidentally he married his daughter Valentina to Louis of Orleans, the brother of Charles VI., whose grandson ultimately succeeded to the throne of France as Louis XII., and in virtue of his descent from Valentina, asserted a claim to Milan, of which we shall hear more hereafter.

The dominion which Gian Galeazzo was building up fell to pieces on his death in 1402. The condottieri, who had served him well as an excellent paymaster, established independent despotisms in several of the cities of Lombardy. Venice took the opportunity to extend her own supremacy in Eastern Lombardy. But before many years had passed Filippo Maria Visconti succeeded his elder brother as Lord of Milan, and proved himself a person hardly less formidable than his father, being endowed with the same unscrupulous craftiness and a similar capacity in the selection of condottieri to carry out his designs.

The Florentine republic had fallen effectively under the sway of an oligarchy which after the death of Gian Galeazzo considerably extended the power of Florence. When Filippo Maria had again established the Visconti ascendancy in Lombardy, Florence and Tuscany became the next objective of his ambitions. Venice was becoming aware that she must either be content to be as she had been in the past, a sea Power, surrendering her recent acquisitions of land, or else devote herself energetically to securing dominion on land. Florence, threatened by Milan, appealed to Venice. Venice, guided by Francesco Foscari, decided that she must be a land Power as well as a sea Power, and joined with Florence. Carmagnola, the captain who had recovered Lombardy for Filippo Maria, quarrelled with his master and transferred his services to Venice, to the great advantage of Venice. But the Visconti found a new captain, Francesco Sforza. Carmagnola apparently became careless of Venetian success. Sforza won victories for Milan; and the Venetian oligarchy executed Carmagnola. If Sforza had devoted himself simply to the interests of his paymaster, Venice would have been crushed, though the difficulty of the task increased by the alliance between Venice and Florence. Sforza, however, was playing for his own hand, fought for Filippo Maria or against him as seemed best for his own immediate advantage, and forced him to give him his natural daughter Bianca in marriage; whereby, on Filippo Maria's death, he was able to assert a sort of claim to succession to the dukedom. Milan, however, declared itself a republic. Sforza acquiesced; but Venice unwisely considered the opportunity a good one for attacking Milan. Sforza offered his sword to Milan, first inflicted two great defeats upon the Venetians, and then turned upon the Milanese themselves and compelled them to acknowledge him as their duke in 1450. After that it was not long before the great captain compelled Venice to surrender whatever she had won during the last twenty years. Sforza's success was in no small part due to the financial aid which he received from Florence, which had expelled the oligarchy and reverted to its democratic form of government, although, as in other democracies, this was compatible with the complete ascendancy of one family or one man, Cosimo de

Medici. For to Cosimo it appeared that the domination in Lombardy of Sforza was less dangerous than the dominion of Venice.

In the kingdom of Naples we have observed that the queen, Joanna, who died in 1382, left her crown to Louis of Anjou, brother of Charles V. of France, hoping to exclude Charles of Durazzo, the husband of her niece and the legitimate representative of the Angevin line in Italy. On this complicated question of genealogy, however, some further explanation may be advisable. The crown of Naples and Sicily had been secured by Charles of Anjou and Provence, brother of Louis IX. of France. Charles had lost Sicily after the Sicilian Vespers, but was succeeded at Naples by his son, Charles II., whose wife was the daughter of the King of Hungary. Charles II. had three sons and one daughter. The crown of Hungary went to the son of his eldest son, Carobert. The second son, Robert, became King of Naples and was the grandfather of Joanna. The third son, John of Durazzo, was the grandfather of Charles of Durazzo. The daughter, Margaret, with whom went Anjou, married Charles of Valois, the father of Philip VI. of France, who was the grandfather of the Louis of Anjou whom Joanna of Naples chose to regard as her heir.

Charles of Durazzo made good his position against Louis at Naples, though Louis succeeded in securing Provence, which remained in his family. Charles also attempted to assert a claim to the throne of Hungary on the death of Louis the Great in 1382, against Maria, the daughter of Louis, and her husband, Sigismund. This claim collapsed on his own death in 1386; but in Naples he was succeeded by his son Ladislas. The contest for the Neapolitan crown was renewed between Ladislas and Louis II. of Anjou and Provence, and ended decisively in favor of Ladislas—a vigorous prince, who, before the Great Schism was ended, seemed likely to carry out a project of annexing to the kingdom of Naples the papal states of Central Italy.

His death in 1414 put an end to the scheme, and left the throne of Naples to his sister, Joanna II., with whose death the line ended in 1435. By this time René of Provence and Anjou had a clearly recognizable title to the succession; but it was claimed also by Alfonso V., King of Aragon and Sicily, whom Joanna had at one time chosen to adopt as her heir. The title was obviously inadequate, but there was a strong party in Naples which favored the union with Sicily as against the accession of the René of Provence. In the war which followed Alfonso was successful, and in 1442 he was recognized as King of Aragon, Sicily, and Naples. But we may here note that on Alfonso's death he was succeeded in Aragon and Sicily, which he had inherited, by his brother John; but in Naples, which

he had acquired, by his illegitimate son Ferrante, or Ferdinand, so that the Two Sicilies were again separated.

In Central Italy when the Great Schism was closed by the election of Martin V., the Pope, a member of the powerful Roman House of Colonna, was firmly convinced that the spiritual authority of the Papacy could only be maintained if accompanied by the secular authority of a temporal prince. It became a primary aim of the Popes to create a secular papal dominion in Italy. Martin himself did much to recover that ascendancy over the papal states which had been lost in the seventy years of the Avignon Papacy and the forty years of the Great Schism. But no great advance was made under his immediate successors, Eugenius IV. and Nicholas V. In the latter part of the century, however, the pursuit of temporal power by the Papacy was not the least of the causes which undermined its spiritual authority.

In the Spanish peninsula the dynasty of Henry of Trastamare was firmly established on the throne of Castile. Its history does not demand our immediate attention between 1370 and 1454. For Aragon, the separation of her crown from that of Sicily ended with the ending of the Sicilian branch in 1409, when the Sicilian crown reverted to Martin of Aragon. On his death there was a disputed succession, which was decided in favor of Ferdinand, one of the princes of Castile, who was recognized as King of Aragon and Sicily in 1412. We have already related how his son, Alfonso V., acquired also the kingdom of Naples. It is to be observed that Louis III. of Provence, who was for seventeen years claimant to the throne of Naples against Alfonso of Aragon, also had, through his mother, a technically stronger claim to the crown of Aragon itself than Alfonso and his father, Ferdinand, on whom the choice of Aragon had fallen after the death of Martin in 1410.

Of greater importance to the world ultimately was the progress of Portugal. That little kingdom had a sharp struggle to resist absorption by Castile during the reign of John I. of Castile, the son of Henry of Trastamare. Portuguese independence was secured at the great Battle of Aljubarotta in 1385. Portugal enjoyed the wise rule of her own King John I. for nearly fifty years after Aljubarotta. During the latter part of his reign one of his grandsons, Prince Henry, called the Navigator, began to devote himself to the equipment of a series of maritime explorations. Outside the strait of Gibraltar, the African coast and the Atlantic Ocean had hitherto been all but unknown. The merchandise of the East reached Europe from the Levant, the eastern Mediterranean, where from the close of the crusading era Turkish fleets were predominant, and the merchant navies of Venice and Genoa monopolized the European rivalry. Trade with the East was carried on only by grace of the

Mohammedan dominion. At the best, the gateways were held only slightly ajar and might at any time be closed. Prince Henry conceived the possibility of a new highway, an ocean route, which would turn the flank of the Mohammedan barrier and open direct communication with the Further East. Year after year his expeditions put to sea, crept slowly southward along the African coast, and stretched slowly westward into the Atlantic. Between 1418 and 1448 Madeira was discovered, then the Canaries, and then the Azores. The doubling of Cape Verd in 1446 revealed the beginnings of the eastward trend of the African coast; and before Henry's death in 1460 his captains had travelled as far as Sierra Leone.

IV.—The East to the Fall of Constantinople, 1307-1453.

In the last as well as in the present chapter our attention has been confined to the West; so that here a brief review of affairs in the east of Europe and in Asia must be carried back to the thirteenth century.

Although on the Danube, in Bohemia, in Poland, and in Pomerania, the Slavonic populations were Christian, and also in Muscovy, the Slavs on the east and southeast of the Baltic were still heathens in the thirteenth and part of the fourteenth century. Hence in the thirteenth century the task of dealing with the heathen was entrusted to the third great order of ecclesiastical soliders, the Teutonic Knights, who established their dominion in Slavonic Prussia. At the end of the century, when the last Crusade to the Holy Land had broken down, the Order of the Temple was wiped out by Philip the Fair of France, the Knights of St. John occupied Rhodes as the Christian outpost in the Mediterranean, and the Teutonic Knights remained in Prussia, virtually as a German outpost. Prussia was Christianized, but Lithuania remained a heathen Power until its conversion under a Jagellon, the duke who united Lithuania with Poland when he married Hedwig, daughter of Lewis the Great of Hungary and Poland, and became Ladislas, King of Poland and Lithuania.

The conversion of Lithuania destroyed the specific function of the Teutonic Knights as the champions of Christendom against heathen neighbors, since Prussia no longer had heathen neighbors. The struggle which continued to engage them was no longer between Christian and heathen, but between Teuton and Slav. The rule of the knights in Prussia was that of a foreign corporation recruited mainly from South Germany, not of a native hereditary nobility, over a population formed by a combination of the Slavonic stock with North German settlers, among whom a hereditary nobility developed. The result was the formation of a Prussian League hostile to the government by the Teutonic Knights, with the ulti-

mate consequence that West Prussia was ceded to Poland in the second half of the fifteenth century, and the Knights only retained East Prussia as a Polish fief.

The old Greek or Roman Empire of the East, with its headquarters at Byzantium or Constantinople, had been brought to ruin by the Fourth Crusade and the establishment of the Latin Empire, which, after half a century, had perished as it deserved. The restoration which replaced the Palæologi at Constantinople did not reconstruct the Empire. All that was under the sway of Byzantium was a fragment of territory in Europe and a portion of Asia Minor. The Balkan peninsula was broken up into a number of petty states, among which Serbia and Bulgaria were very much the largest. The Mohammedan invasion of Europe was delayed only by the onslaught of the Mongols from the East upon the dominions of the Seljuk Turks, and the disruption of the Seljuk Empire.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the greatest among the Moslem Powers was that of the Ottoman Turks, who took their name from their commander Othman, whose father had rendered good service against the Mongols. Othman established a principality in Asia Minor, and in 1330 his son Orchan captured Nicæa, the Asiatic capital of what must still be called the Greek Empire. By 1340 the Greek Emperor, Andronicus II., retained only two or three fragments of territory on the east of the Bosphorus. Orchan extended the Ottoman dominion; but he is chiefly memorable for the application of a novel principle in his treatment of conquered Christians. The rule of Islam was to offer conquered peoples three alternatives—conversion, tribute, or death. Orchan exacted a tribute of children instead of money, and the children were trained for drafting either into a sort of civil service of educated administrators or into the troops which came to be known to the Western world as janissaries. These professional administrators and professional soldiers for centuries provided the sultans with civil and military service of quite exceptional efficiency.

Meanwhile, the greatest of the Serbian kings, Stephen Dusan, extended his sway over the Balkan peninsula, appropriating tracts nominally subject to the Greek Empire till it spread from sea to sea; though his dominion broke up again after his death in 1355.

A year earlier Orchan had for the first time established a permanent foothold for the Ottomans on European soil at Gallipoli. His successor, Amurath or Murad, captured Adrianople and waged successful wars against the Danube states, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia, which were compelled to render tribute. The Emperor, John V., found himself isolated, and vainly endeavored to entice Western Europe into a crusade against the advancing Crescent. Having

failed in the attempt, he was reduced to making a treaty with Amurath by which Constantinople became tributary to the Turkish Sultan in 1381. Serbia and Bosnia joined in a desperate struggle to resist the Ottoman. A Turkish victory at Kossava was followed by the assassination of Amurath and the accession of his son, Bajazet I. Serbia submitted; Bulgaria was conquered and annexed. Hungary was now threatened. Her king, Sigismund (afterwards Emperor), sought to stem the tide by gathering to his banners the chivalry of Western Europe; the Christian forces were disastrously routed at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396.

Manuel, the son and successor of John V., was fain to seize the opportunity of Sigismund's crusade in order to break free from the yolk imposed by the Ottoman upon the Greek Empire. Bajazet, therefore, presently turned his arms against Constantinople itself, laying siege to it, and would probably have captured it if he had not been called away by a more pressing danger. Once more there had arisen in Central Asia a mighty warrior, Timur of Turkestan, commonly called Tamerlaine, *Timur-i-leng*, Timur the Lamé, who swept through Asia at the head of devastating hordes, a pestilence with no mission but destruction. Lord at first of only a small district in Turkestan, Timur gradually raised himself to a supremacy which won for him recognition as the Great Khan. He flung himself upon Persia, swept into India as far as Delhi, swept back again, and then burst upon the Ottomans in the west. Bajazet marched against him, but was utterly overthrown and taken prisoner at the battle of Angora. Caprice turned the conqueror eastward, and he was on his way to fall upon China, instead of upon Europe, when death ended his career. But his onslaught had paralyzed for the time the Ottoman Power. In Asia it seemed to have been broken up altogether.

Yet, in Europe, the Christians entirely failed to seize their opportunity for combining, and ejecting the Ottomans. Twenty years after the battle of Angora, Amurath II. was again besieging Constantinople. Again the siege was raised by the Sultan, who was called away to suppress a revolt in Asia Minor; yet Manuel was so convinced of the uselessness of resistance that he returned to his old submission and increased his tribute.

Amurath left Manuel's successor, John VI., in peace, himself finding sufficient occupation elsewhere. For Serbia again headed a league against the Turks which was joined by Bosnia and ultimately by Hungary. The re-entry of Hungary checked the tide of Amurath's successes against the Slavonic states; for Hungary was reinforced by Poland, since, on the death of the Hapsburg king, Albert, the Magyar kingdom offered its crown to the Jagellon King of Poland.

instead of accepting the baby Ladislas Posthumus. The Hungarian armies were led by the great captain, John Hunyadi, who not only drove back the advancing Turks, but compelled Amurath to surrender his claims on Serbia and Bosnia by the Treaty of Szegedin. Unhappily this success of the Christians inspired the Pope, Eugenius IV., with the belief that the moment had come for expelling the Turks from Europe, in spite of the treaty. A fresh army was flung into Bulgaria, which met with a not undeserved overthrow at Varna, where Ladislas was slain; with the result that the Slav states again passed under the Ottoman dominion.

In one quarter, however, the Turks found their match. George Castriot, the son of an Albanian noble, had been carried off when a boy and had been bred as a Mohammadan. At the time of Hunyadi's victory he effected his escape, and soon proved himself a brilliant leader who thoroughly understood the business of mountain fighting, and maintained indomitably a successful war of independence. The name by which he is more familiarly known is Skanderbeg, a corruption of Iskander Bey—the Oriental form of Alexander—the name which had been given him as a Moslem.

Amurath II. died in 1451 and was succeeded by his son Mohammedan II., commonly called Mohammedan the Conqueror. Three years earlier the feeble Emperor John had been succeeded by his vigorous brother Constantine. The Emperor realized that the death struggle was at hand; he resolved that, if the Empire must die, it should at least die fighting. A last effort was made to gain the support of the West, even by the submission of the Greek to the Latin Church. Constantine confirmed the terms arrived at by the Council of Ferrara of Florence, which the Greeks had repudiated. By so doing he failed to win the support of the West and succeeded in alienating his own subjects. None but the sea-powers Venice, Genoa, and Aragon would render any aid; for them the fall of Constantinople would mean loss of trade. In 1453, Mohammedan began to besiege Constantinople. The force within the walls was wholly insufficient for holding the ramparts. Constantine had only some 7,000 men; the Turks were at least twenty times as numerous. Some six weeks after the investment began, great breaches had already been made in the walls, and Mohammed delivered the final tremendous assault. Those of the garrison who fought at all, fought to the last and died like heroes, and among them Constantine himself. The last of the Emperors won imperishable renown if he lost all else. But the Crescent hung over the last home of the Cæsars, the city of that Cæsar who had made Christianity the religion of the Roman world.

V.—The Closing Phase, 1453-1485

The Hundred Years' War was hardly over when England was plunged into that great struggle of factions called the War of the Roses. Primarily it was not a war of succession but a contest for political ascendancy, with the queen, the Beauforts, and the De la Poles on one side, and on the other the party headed by Richard of York, who had been heir-presumptive to the throne until the birth of the Prince of Wales. The country was very ill satisfied with the Beaufort ascendancy, which was held responsible for the loss of the English conquests in France. In 1460, however, Richard startled his own supporters by putting forward his own claim to the throne, as being descended from the second son of Edward III., for the Lancastrian kings who had deposed Richard II. were descended from the third brother. A compromise which would have given the Crown to Richard instead of to the Prince of Wales on the death of Henry VI. was rejected by the queen. Richard was killed at the Battle of Wakefield; his son Edward claimed the Crown for himself at once, and shattered the Lancastrian forces at Towton three months after Wakefield.

During the next ten years Edward, reigning as King of England, quarrelled with his cousin Warwick, the "Kingmaker," who had done no more than any one else to win the throne for him. Warwick was driven to the Lancastrian side, and succeeded in expelling Edward from the country and restoring Henry VI. Edward, however, was able in the next year to land in Yorkshire, defeat and kill Warwick at Barnet, and three weeks later to inflict a final and crushing defeat upon the Lancastrians at Tewesbury, where the Prince of Wales was also killed. The presumed murder of the unlucky Henry VI. left the Lancastrian family with no stronger representative than the young Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond, whose mother was a Beaufort—that family having been the illegitimate offspring of John of Gaunt, the father of Henry IV. Edward reigned with his authority undisputed for twelve years. On his death, the Crown was usurped by his brother Richard III., whose sanguinary rule was ended in 1485 at the battle of Bosworth. The victor, Henry of Richmond, was accepted as the legitimate King of England, and by marrying Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of Edward IV., ensured for his children an indisputable title by legitimate descent, as well as by the parliamentary title which was his own strongest claim to the throne in the legal point of view.

The establishment of the Tudor dynasty on the one hand confirmed the theoretical authority of Parliament to control supplies, along with the principles that the king could not override the law,

or alter the law except with the consent of Parliament. On the other hand, the War of the Roses had almost wiped out the powerful families whose accumulations of vast estates during the last century had become a menace to the effectiveness of any central government. Their place was taken by a new nobility whose members were largely dependent upon the king's favor for the preservation of their wealth and prosperity, and were deprived of the privileges which had latterly been usurped by the greater barons. The political menace of latter-day feudalism was dead, though the power of the Commons had not yet manifested itself. Ostensibly, therefore, the Crown was supreme, although its supremacy in fact depended upon its general harmony with popular feeling.

A different course of events produced a different development of regal power in France. When Charles VII. succeeded Charles VI. and the infant King of England was proclaimed King of France, the old French monarchy was at its nadir. The restoration of a central authority at any price was the first necessity. The only possible remedy for the utter disorganization was a concentration of power. This was effected, in the first instance, by a reorganization of the military system which involved a vital departure in taxation. The right of the nobles to levy in their own domains the tax or *taille* for the maintenance of troops was transferred to the Crown; whereby it became possible to constitute a standing army in the pay of the Crown, into which the innumerable free companies were absorbed. To this reorganization was largely due the rapidity with which the expulsion of the English was ultimately effected.

The development of the royal power was a menace to the independence of the great nobles. Philip of Burgundy when he was reconciled with Charles VII. made his own terms, which in effect freed him from his feudal obligations during his own lifetime. Practically he withdrew from active participation in French affairs and devoted himself to the consolidation and extension of his own heterogeneous and virtually independent dominion. Even before the expulsion of the English, however, the rest of the great nobles formed a league for the protection of their own interests in which they were joined by the dauphin Louis. The league was broken up, but the reconciliation between the king and the dauphin was only temporary, and the quarrel ultimately resulted in the flight of Louis from France to the Court of Burgundy. Hence when King Charles died, in 1461, the new king, Louis XI., was apparently committed, not to the establishment of the royal supremacy, but to the restoration of the privileges of the great nobles with whom he had been in alliance.

The nobles were doomed to disappointment; Louis had sought to increase his own power at the expense of the Crown. Now that he

was king he was determined to increase his own power at the expense of the nobles. And especially he was anxious to weaken Burgundy, the most powerful of them all. For many years of Louis's reign the leading interest attaches to his duel with Charles of Burgundy, the son of Duke Philip.

Charles, who is known as the Bold or the Rash, did not actually succeed to the dukedom of Burgundy till 1467, but before that time his political activity had become much greater than Philip's. Louis, conscious of the danger to himself from a powerful state on the borders of France, whose lord was only in part a French feudatory, consistently intrigued against the Burgundian power. To Charles, on the other hand, it appeared eminently desirable that the strength of France should be dissipated between half a dozen great nobles of whom he himself was one. The nobles—Bourbon, Charles of Berry the king's younger brother, Brittany, and Burgundy—before long were joined in what was called the League of the Public Weal. Louis at first found that the combination was too strong to be resisted. Consequently, while he made what looked like a somewhat abject submission at the Treaty of Conflans, he set himself to separate the dukes by creating dissensions among them and appealing separately to the greed of each; while he encouraged the hostility of the Flemish towns to their Burgundian ruler, and notably the defiant spirit of Liège, which was subject to a bishop who, though nominally a vassal of the Empire, was virtually a dependent of the Duke of Burgundy.

Louis very nearly ruined himself by putting himself into Charles's hands at Peronne, at the precise moment when Liège was bursting into insurrection. Being in peril of his life he was obliged to accept a bargain dictated by Charles which would have given the county of Champagne to the Duke of Berry. Champagne divided Charles's dominion in the Netherlands from Burgundy proper; in the hands of an ally, it would render the territory under his control continuous. Louis evaded the bargain by offering his brother the choice between Champagne and the more attractive Guienne, which was of no particular use to Charles. But the best stroke of fortune which befell Louis was the death not long afterwards of his brother, by which Guienne reverted to the Crown, and the somewhat dubious alliance between Burgundy and Brittany was rendered much less formidable.

Charles now turned his attention to the strengthening of his own power outside France rather than to thwarting Louis within his kingdom. His great object was to acquire a continuous territory over which he should be recognized as an independent king. He aimed at the acquisition of Lorraine and Alsace, the latter of which had been mortgaged to him by its ruler Sigismund, of a junior

branch of the House of Hapsburg. This brought the Swiss Confederation into the field on the side of Sigismund, as a less dangerous neighbor than Burgundy. And in the coalition against him, Charles saw the hand and brain of Louis XI.

Now Charles had married for his second wife Margaret, the sister of Edward IV. of England. Edward saw advantages to himself in at least threatening Louis with a renewal of the great war, in alliance with Burgundy. He carried a great armament over to France, but Charles neglected to hasten to his assistance. Edward was a highly accomplished soldier, but was much more disposed to accept a profitable bargain than to emulate Henry V. Charles's delay gave him his excuse; Louis was very ready to buy him off, and Edward went back to England without having struck a blow, but having secured a handsome pension which he was pleased to call a tribute. Charles was furious at what he called desertion, while Louis was very well satisfied to have deprived him of an undoubtedly formidable ally on such easy terms.

Meanwhile, however, Charles had made himself master of Lorraine which gave him continuous territory from the Netherlands to Burgundy; and he had got the promise of the reversion of Provence from the old king, René. To secure Alsace he had to deal with the Swiss Confederation, which he proceeded to attack in 1476, the year after the treaty of Pecquigny between Edward and Louis. His forces, however, met with a disastrous rout at Granson, which caused René to change his mind and make Louis his heir instead of Charles. The duke was only roused to anger, and renewed his attack upon the Switzers. Again, after a hard-fought battle, the Confederation won a complete victory at Morat. On the top of this came news that Lorraine was in revolt, led by René the younger, the disinherited grandson of René of Provence. Charles collected an army and attacked Nancy. René appealed to the Swiss for help; they gave it, and in the neighborhood of Nancy the army of Charles was annihilated and he himself was slain.

The heiress of Burgundy was Mary, a girl of twenty-one. Louis of France found no difficulty in claiming and securing from her the duchy of Burgundy. But of Artois and Franche Comté he could only obtain provisional possession, and all further acquisitions were prevented by the marriage of Mary to Maximilian, the son of the Emperor Frederick. The Netherlands and Franche Comté passed to the House of Hapsburg, not to Maximilian himself, but to the son, born shortly afterwards, who is commonly known as the Archduke Philip. But in due course Provence passed to the French Crown upon René's death. Lorraine remained an independent dukedom within the Empire, but Claud, the younger son of Duke René, became the progenitor of the great French House of Guise.

Thus in 1483, the year of his death, Louis had greatly extended the Crown territories of France, having absorbed so much of the Burgundian dominion as lay within the French boundary. The only feudatory in France who still enjoyed any sovereign rights was the Duke of Brittany. Louis's successor was a boy, Charles VIII., and the government of France was for a time vested in the regency of his elder daughter Anne of Beaujeu.

While Louis XI. was establishing the supremacy of the Crown in France, the foundations of the mighty power of Spain in the next century were being laid, through the union of the crowns of the two major kingdoms, Castile and Aragon. John II. reigned in Castile through the first half of the fourteenth century. Dying, he left three children. He was succeeded by the eldest, Henry IV. When Henry's queen bore a daughter, the world had sufficient reason to believe that the child Joanna was illegitimate. The king was regarded with universal contempt; the crown was offered to his younger brother Alfonso, on whose behalf the standard of rebellion was raised. Alfonso died; his sister Isabella refused to act as a rebel against the king, but demanded her own recognition as his heir, on the ground of the illegitimacy of his so-called daughter. On the death of Henry in 1474, an attempt was made to place Joanna on the throne; but Isabella successfully maintained her position. Five years earlier, when she had been recognized as Henry's successor, she had married Ferdinand, the Crown Prince of Aragon. In 1479, Ferdinand succeeded his father, who had inherited the crowns of Aragon and Sicily from his brother Alfonso V., while Naples had gone to Alfonso's illegitimate son Ferrante.

The crowns were united, but the constitutions and governments of the two kingdoms remained separate. The wedded monarchs, however, ruled in complete harmony, without any subordination of the one to the other. The Queen of Castile could call upon her subjects in Aragon to help the Crown in gaining an unprecedented control over her turbulent Castilian nobles. The king of Aragon could when it became necessary apply the resources of Castile if Aragon became troublesome, because the peoples of the two kingdoms retained a traditional antagonism to each other, and the unruly elements in each were without sympathy for the unruly elements in the other. And thus in both the Crown became supreme, the more since both king and queen were masters of statecraft, and had moreover grasped the fundamental principle of developing the material prosperity of their subjects as a means to the provision of revenue infinitely more effective than heavy taxation.

The close of the reign of Louis XI. in France, the accession of the Tudor dynasty in England, and the union of the crowns of

Castile and Aragon definitely mark the decisive emergence of three great Powers, each Power a nation, in the west of Europe.

The election of the Hapsburg, Frederick of Styria, as German king in succession to the Hapsburg, Albert of Austria, appeared to serve the primary purpose of the Electors; for Frederick had one guiding principle—to do nothing that he could avoid doing. He was nominal guardian of his predecessor's infant son, Ladislas Posthumus. The child was duly recognized as King of Bohemia, where the reins of government were grasped by the very efficient George Podiebrad. Hungary, on the other hand, at first rejected the infant and gave her crown to Ladislas of Poland; but when he was killed in 1444, fighting against the Turks at the battle of Varna, Hungary also returned to the Hapsburg allegiance and accepted Ladislas Posthumus, during whose minority John Hunyadi became acting governor.

Constantinople fell in 1453. In 1456, Mohammed the Conqueror was besieging Belgrade, which was then regarded as the key to the Austrian and Hungarian dominions. The advance of the Conqueror was stayed by the brilliantly effected relief of Belgrade by John Hunyadi. Three weeks later, Hunyadi was dead, having been seized with mortal illness while with the army. After another fifteen months, young Ladislas himself died suddenly of the plague. He was not yet married and the Austrian territories passed to the Emperor Frederick as head of the House of Hapsburg.

Neither Hungary nor Bohemia recognized any obligatory rule of succession; both claimed that their crowns were elective; each rejected a German dynasty. Bohemia gave her crown to George Podiebrad, and Hungary gave hers to Matthias Hunyadi, commonly called Matthias Corvinus, the son of John Hunyadi.

Matthias married Podiebrad's daughter, but unhappily the two kings became alienated. George was a Hussite, Matthias was orthodox. An orthodox Catholic rebellion was stirred up in Bohemia; Matthias gave it his support, hoping to be made King of Bohemia himself, and, by gratifying both the Pope Pius II. (formerly known as Æneas Sylvius) and the Emperor, to obtain active support from Germany against the Turks. Podiebrad, however, mastered the rebellion, with the result that a Polish prince, Ladislas, was nominated as his successor instead of Matthias. Hence, in 1471, the Jagellon Ladislas became King of Bohemia.

When Mohammed II. captured Constantinople, he did not use his victory for destruction. He extended his protection to the Greek Church, and encouraged a revival of trade so energetically that the city soon attained greater prosperity than it had known for a hundred years. His repulse by Hunyadi before Belgrade in 1456 prevented the threatened advance against Austria and Hungary,

out was not followed up by any counter-attack. During the next few years he was enabled to complete the subjugation, first of Serbia, and then of Bosnia on the west, and of Wallachia on the northeast. Albania, led by the heroic Skanderbeg, successfully held him at bay; but the Morea was annexed, and all the islands of the Ægean were brought under the Ottoman sway with the exception of Rhodes, where the Knights of St. John held their own. After the death of Skanderbeg, Mohammeded wrested Albania from the Venetians, who sought to defend it. His last enterprise was the capture of Otranto, which he intended to use as a base for the conquest of Italy; but his death in the following year, 1481, set the term to his ambitions. The Turks evacuated Otranto, and for a time their progress in Europe was suspended.

After the relief of Belgrade, Venice was the only one of the states of Western Europe which was engaged in active warfare against the Turks. The sea was necessarily the field of her activities. The strain was too great for her single-handed; and after sixteen years, the war, which began ten years after the fall of Constantinople, was concluded by a peace which left her deprived of what she had previously held in Greece and in the Ægean Sea, but granted her trading privileges in the East in return for an annual tribute. Incidentally, however, the republic acquired the possession of the island of Cyprus on the death of the last of the Lusignan line, who had married a Venetian wife.

In Milan, Francesco Sforza established his family securely in the dukedom, and procured from Louis XI. the transfer of the allegiance of Genoa from France to Milan. But in 1480 the succession passed to a grandson, who was a minor; consequently the effective rule fell into the hands of Francesco Sforza's second son Ludovico, called II. Moro, whose personal ambitions prepared the way for later troubles.

In Florence, with its democratic government, Cosimo de Medici had acquired a complete ascendancy. The friendly relations with Milan were maintained, and both these states gave their support to the establishment of the Aragonese dynasty at Naples. After Cosimo's death, there was an attempt to overthrow the Medici ascendancy. It failed, and on the death of Cosimo's son Piero, the young Lorenzo de Medici, commonly called the Magnificent, became the recognized head of the state.

The immediate successor of Eugenius IV. in the Papacy was Nicholas V., who failed to procure any active intervention in the West on behalf of the Greek Empeire, so Constantinople fell while he was still Pope. He was followed by the Spaniard, Alfonso Borgia, Calixtus III., whose sister's children, of an Italian father,

kept the Spanish name. Some years later, one nephew, Rodrigo Borgia, became Pope as Alexander VI. Calixtus set an unfortunate example by the zeal with which he promoted his own relations without respect to their qualifications.

On the death of Calixtus in 1458, Æneas Sylvius, distinguished hitherto as a scholar and diplomatist, was raised to the Papacy as Pius II. In his new character he endeavored to play a part worthy of his position. He exerted himself to the utmost in efforts to unite Christendom against the Turk, but without effect. He died in 1464, a disappointed man.

Seven years later the fatal degradation of the Papacy was initiated by the election of Sixtus IV.

In the fifty years following the Council of Constance the Popes had been politicians, anxious to increase the strength of the Papacy by the development of their own power as secular princes; but they had not been unmindful at least while in occupation of the Papal throne, of their spiritual responsibilities. They had not been saints, but they had not been conspicuously sinners, either before or after their elevation. Pius II., an unscrupulous politician when he was known as Æneas Sylvius, devoted himself fervently as Pope, though with little enough success, to the grand object of uniting Christendom against the Turk. All the Popes, though they maintained the traditional attitude of the Papacy towards heresy, were patrons of learning, scholarship, and art. But the attitude of Sixtus IV. and of his successors was that of a secular Italian prince, with the ethical standards of a Visconti or a Sforza, whose ecclesiastical position provided him with an additional instrument to be used with entire absence of scruple for the furtherance of his own ends. Sixtus outraged public morality with a perfect shamelessness, which would have stamped him still more conspicuously with eternal infamy if his misdeeds had not been thrown completely into the shade by comparison with the effulgent wickedness of Alexander VI. But the nepotism of Calixtus III. paled beside that of Sixtus IV., who promoted his own relatives with no pretence of any regard for other objects than the advancement of his own family; while he notoriously lent himself to political plots in which the assassination of hostile politicians, such as the Medici at Florence, was a conspicuous feature.

From Italy we turn to a brief sketch of the course of events in the Scandinavian kingdoms, which for some centuries had ceased to play any active part in European politics. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the crowns of Sweden and Norway were united, but were separate from the crown of Denmark, which included Skaania, the southern providence of the Swedish Peninsula. The

Baltic trade was, in effect, in possession of German towns, from Wisby in the Swedish island of Gothland, to Lübeck at the south-western corner. The rivalry of these towns induced Lübeck, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, to appeal for aid to Eric of Denmark. Eric used his opportunity to establish an ascendancy over a number of the other towns, but at the cost of concessions to the Danish nobility which practically destroyed the power of the Danish Crown; with the result that after his death his successor, Christopher, was expelled from the country. Christopher's son, Waldemar III., about the middle of the century, re-established himself in Denmark, and sought to recover his ascendancy in the Baltic by seizing Wisby. By so doing he brought about an alliance between the German Baltic towns, Magnus King of Sweden, and Hakon, the son of Magnus, to whom the crown of Norway had been transferred. The Swedes, however, deposed the incompetent Magnus, and elected his nephew, Albert of Mecklenburg, as their king. This in turn led to the alliance of Waldemar with Hakon of Norway against Albert of Sweden. In the pursuance of a very tortuous policy, Waldemar made an agreement with the German towns; but his object in attacking Sweden was to secure Gothland, not to restore Magnus. Having procured the cession of Gothland, he deserted Magnus and broke his agreement with the German towns. The Swedes in their turn repudiated the recent treaty; and the outcome of the new war was the Treaty of Stralsund, conceding rights to the League of the Hansa, which transformed it in some sort into a political as well as a commercial federation. Peace was restored.

Waldemar had no sons. His younger daughter, Margaret, was married to Hakon of Norway; and on Waldemar's death, their child Olaf was recognized as King of Denmark, the regency being placed in the hands of his mother, Margaret. Shortly afterwards Hakon died, so that Olaf became king both of Denmark and Norway; while the effective government of both countries was in the extremely competent hands of his mother. Then Olaf died, and Margaret was rewarded by being made queen in succession to her son. The Swedish nobles, irritated by the favor shown by Albert to his German friends, deposed him, and offered the Swedish crown also to Margaret. By the formal treaty called the Union of Kalmar, the three crowns were united, and the succession was conveyed to Margaret's adopted heir, her great-nephew, Eric of Pomerania, and his descendants. Further than this the union did not go.

During Margaret's time Schleswig and Holstein became attached to Denmark. Although Margaret's successor, Eric, was deposed in 1349, the three kingdoms again belonged to one monarch—Eric's nephew, Christopher of Bavaria. He too died without issue; where-

upon the Swedes elected a powerful noble, Karl Knudson, while Denmark chose Christian of Oldenburg, Norway following suit. A Swedish party opposed to Knudson succeeded in expelling him and in transferring the crown to Christian; so that at the end of our period there was still only one kind in the three countries. But the successive elections had been accompanied by concessions on the part of the Crown which reduced its powers to a very low ebb both in Denmark and Norway, and to practical importance in Sweden.

CHAPTER XXII

ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES

I.—The Far East in the Middle Ages

DURING the whole mediæval period the Far East was, to the Europeans, a land of myths and marvels, having no relation to the actual world and certainly no influence on current history. Civilizations, however, were progressing with which the West began to come into direct contact at the close of the fifteenth century. Therefore, as we find ourselves at end of the Middle Ages, we may spare a glance at those remoter regions.

We have seen that in India the old Aryan Hindu system was modified by the doctrines of Buddhism, which, without driving out the earlier beliefs, were in the ascendant approximately from about 600 B.C. to about A.D. 600. Then in India Buddhism almost died out, though in Farther India and beyond the northern mountains it spread and grew till it came to number, perhaps, more adherents than any other faith. Buddhism was driven out of India by the revival or the modification of the old Hinduism, which may best be called Brahmanism—a system embodying esoterically an extremely subtle philosophy for benefit of the few, while for the benefit of the many it absorbed and adapted every superstition which had ever taken root between the mountains and sea. It is probably to this period of the Hindu revival that we must attribute the known form of all those works which professed to expound, historically or otherwise, the authoritative principles of Hinduism.

India less even than Europe presents us with a picture of organized nations or states. It abounded in kingdoms or principalities, eternally expanding and contracting their borders as the king happened to be a successful or an unsuccessful warrior. Conquest and expansion meant mainly subjection of neighboring kings and princes to vassaldom and tribute.

A somewhat more definite history began with the era of the Mohammedan conquests. In the early stages of the advance of Islam, when the Moslems in the Far West were bursting into Spain, the Arabs in the East also broke through the mountains and established themselves for a time on the Lower Indus. But they did not

advance; in another fifty years they had been driven out again. Something over two centuries passed, and then Mahmud of Ghazni, the "Idolbreaker," began the great series of his invasions. Seventeen times he led his hosts into the Punjab, and swept southwards with fire and sword to Gujerat or eastward to the Upper Ganges basin. Mahmud was not an organizer of empire; but he established in the Punjab the Mohammedan dynasty known as the Ghaznavids, who ruled there after a fashion until the middle of the twelfth century, although their headquarters remained in Afghanistan.

The Ghaznavids were Turks. They were overthrown by the Turco-Afghan, Allah-ud-din of Ghor, and his successor, Mohammed Ghorî, otherwise called Shabab-ud-din. Having conquered the Punjab, Shabab-ud-din advanced against the Rajput monarchies of Delhi and Kanauj, and carried his conquering arms to Benares, and even Bengal, before the century closed. Shabab-ud-din did not establish a dynasty. On his death the lordship of the great dominion which he had won was seized by his great captain, Kutb-ud-din, who, like the father of Mahmud of Ghazni, was originally a slave. For a century the "Slave" dynasty or dynasties ruled over Hindustan, to be then supplanted by Allah-ud-din Khilji, founder of the Khilji dynasty. All these Mohammedan princes conquered or ruled by the aid of Moselm armies composed of Turks or Afghans, whose officers formed a sort of ruling military caste; while in the eyes of Hindus they were all foreigners and infidels. Many of the old proud Rajput clans had retired to the great district which still bears the name of Rajputana, rather than submit to the invaders. Allah-ud-din having made himself Sultan at Delhi, fell upon Rajputana and smote it, and further extended his dominion over the greater part of the Deccan. Almost immediately after his death a new dynasty was established by Ghyas-ud-din Toghlok, whose son, Mohammed Toghlok, projected enormous schemes of conquest. Bengal, however, broke away from his dominion under the leadership of an Afghan dynasty, and the Toghloks were overthrown by the devastating invasion of Timur or Tamerlane in 1398. But Timur was only a destroyer. He founded nothing—Northern India was left a prey to competitors; and although the names of the Seyyid and Lodi dynasties survived, there was still, at the end of the fifteenth century, nothing in the nature of a consolidated empire in any part of India. Only in the greater part of the peninsula, the ruling dynasties and the ruling races were nearly all Mohammedan Afghans or Turks.

China is distinguished by the possession of a recorded history even from the very earliest times; but only confusion arises in the mind of the average Western reader who attempts to track the story of the successive dynasties which rose and fell in an eternal indistinguishable succession. The era to which we give the name of the Dark

Ages in Europe is noted in China as the period of her most brilliant literary development, especially under the Tang dynasty; yet this brilliancy must be taken on trust. No one has yet succeeded in producing renderings of Chinese classics calculated to rouse the enthusiastic admiration of the West. The impression we receive is that of a strictly academic conception of literature, as consisting in the eternal production of commentaries and commentaries on commentaries, and yet more commentaries, all always following the orthodox conventional pattern, and singularly unproductive. It is perhaps conceivable that the Chinese might take a similar view of the works of ecclesiastics or schoolmen in mediæval Europe.

Contests with the Khitai Tartars are suggestive of comparisons with the incursions into Europe of Huns and Avars and Margyars. But we are unable to realize such striking personalities as gave life to the stories of Europe until we reach the thirteenth century. For in the thirteenth century Genghis Khan appeared, and the volcanic Mongol eruption flooded the East as well as the West. On the death of Genghis Khan his Eastern conquests were assigned to one of his sons, Ogdai. Ogdai was succeeded by Mangu Khan, and Mangu was followed by his brother, Kublai Khan. Kublai established his capital at Peking, where he was visited by the famous Venetian, Marco Polo. Kublai was a mighty ruler, by no means a mere barbarian, who conquered China, but failed to subjugate the island dominion of Japan. Christian missionaries found their way to China, and the Great Khan displayed the tolerant spirit which was characteristic of the Mongol monarchs, presumably because of their own entire indifference on questions of religion. Kublai, however, was evidently a broad-minded person, who was ready to adapt himself to the customs of the subjects whom he had conquered, and to rule in the character of a native prince rather than a conqueror. Art and science flourished under Kublai, for our knowledge of whom we are chiefly indebted to Marco Polo. In the course of the next century, however, the Mongol dynasty was overturned, and was replaced by the native Ming dynasty—a revolution effected by the Emperor Hung Wu.

Hung Wu was a remarkable man. He had turned monk—monachism was a no less notable feature of Buddhism than of mediæval Christianity. But when insurrections broke out against the degenerate successors of the great Kublai, the monk's natural fighting instincts drove him to join the insurgents, to become their leader, and to lead them to unflinching victory. His armies called upon him to claim the Imperial scepter for himself, and having become Emperor he devoted himself zealously to the business of reform. Education, the codification of the law, the sound administration of justice, were matters to which he gave serious attention in the intervals of his vic-

torious contests with the Mongols. A Chinese Alfred the Great is difficult to conceive, but there are certainly remarkable analogies, not perhaps in the characters, but in the achievements of the hero-king of England and Hung Wu, who was in some sort the hero-emperor of China. Alfred vanquished the Danes, and the England which he built was subsequently conquered by the Normans. Hung Wu vanquished the Mongols, and the China which he reconstructed was ultimately conquered by the Manchus.

Not unnaturally, on Hung Wu's death in 1399 there was a disputed succession. The grandson, whom the great Emperor had nominated, was ousted by a son, Yen, who took the Imperial name of Yunklo. Yunklo carried on his father's work as an administrator, and successfully held the Tartar attacks at bay. But after his death successive emperors proved inefficient. At the close of the fifteenth century the Chinese Emperor, though still nominally existent, and still recognizing the Ming dynasty, was as amorphous and as little consolidated as it had ever been.

II.—Economic Conditions

Medieval Europe was the product of the great collision between an advanced and elaborate civilization and a vigorous barbarism. The advanced civilization, a normal development in the Greek and Italian Peninsulas, had been imposed on one side on the Celtic and pre-Celtic populations of Western Europe, and on the other upon the older Oriental civilizations of Western Asia and Egypt; and it had not been completely assimilated by either. When the Roman dominion fell, the East reverted to Orientalism. The Teutonic deluge swept over the West, submerging the Latin civilization, but did not permanently take its place. When the flood subsided, what emerged again in Italy, in Gaul, and in Spain was more Latin than anything else. But beyond the Danube, the Rhine, and the British Channel, Latinism only modified slightly the Teutonism or Celticism of peoples who had never been thoroughly subjected to the Roman dominion.

Neither Teuton nor Celt had passed out of the stage in which war and agriculture engaged almost the entire energies of the community. Society was organized for these two purposes. The unit for agricultural purposes was the self-sufficing rural community, which within a defined locality produced a sufficiency of food, clothing materials, building materials, and materials for tools. The unit for fighting purposes was the aggregate of such communities, which would provide a troop of fighting men, summoned at the call either of some official or of an overlord who could claim military service—military service or agricultural service or both being the conditions upon which the actual occupier of the soil held his land, at least after the establishment of

the legal theory of feudalism that all land was held ultimately from the king.

The industrial basis of society, then, was the self-sufficing agricultural community, which grew its own corn, bred its own sheep, cattle, and other live-stock, whether for food, for wool, for hides, or for labor; made its own clothes, built its own houses, and fashioned its own weapons and tools. The needs of such a society were small; they were met in effect by common labor, of which there was practically no division except into that which was appropriated for men and women respectively. Only the work of the smith required expert specialization from the outset. Metal was almost the only material which each locality could not produce in sufficient quantities to supply its immediate needs. The barbarians had no use for cities; the old cities survived only where the Roman civilization had become thoroughly implanted.

Nevertheless towns grew up, mainly for two reasons. One was the natural tendency of the community to expand when its situation was a favorable one, and it attracted to itself a commerce which it hardly sought; the other was the military need of establishing garrisons and fortified posts at strategic points. Both circumstances tended in the first place to draw a larger number of persons into a given area, either for security or for gain, and also to enlarge the area into which they were drawn. Yet for a long time the town continued to be in its main features merely an agricultural community bigger than the normal village. Agriculture continued to be the normal occupation of the bulk of the residents.

Differentiation of employment attended the expansion of the community. Other experts developed besides the expert smith; the expert was relieved of so much of his share of common agricultural work in exchange for his expert work, which, as the community grew, absorbed his whole time. The things that every man had done for himself were now done exclusively by the experts, who became numerous enough to be grouped together in specific trades, exchanging their goods or their labor for the goods or labor of other trades, even for the goods of other communities. But in the early stages, when precious metals were rare, these served only to a very limited extent as a medium of exchange. Exchange, commerce, meant the bartering of labor and goods for labor and goods. It was only by slow degrees that coined money, a currency, came into use as a medium for the exchange of labor and of goods and as a standard of values.

Whatever may have been the origin of rural serfdom—a question on which the learned continue to hold high controversy—the broad fact stands that the great bulk of the occupiers of the soil held it upon condition of doing service upon the lands of some one who was accounted as the legal lord of the soil. Such services came to be in part,

commuted for payments in kind, and ultimately even in cash—a movement of which the corollary was that voluntary services, taking the place of the commuted compulsory services, were in their turn paid for in kind or in cash, providing employment for men who occupied only very small plots or none, and bringing into being the wage-earning laboring class. Service, however, was the normal condition, which did not necessarily imply serfdom, but tended to sink into it. The freeman could separate himself from the soil; the serf could not. He was *ascriptus glebæ*. If he went away the owner of the soil could bring him back again and punish him. He was not in the technical sense a slave. He had legal rights even as against his lord. The conditions of serfdom varied enormously in different regions. The serf might be little better than a chattel; he might be all but a free man. But he was not a free man. He could not escape from his lord's service except by an act of emancipation on his lord's part. The freeholder, on the other hand, was a free man who could quit his lord's service even though he forfeited his land by doing so. But whether in general the freeholder was derived from an emancipated serf or the serf derived from a degraded freeholder, or freeholders and serfs were in the first instance free members of a conquering race and enslaved members of the conquered race respectively, remains a question to which the most competent critics give the most widely divergent answers.

In England the general impression is that there was only a small amount of serfdom prior to the Norman Conquest. At that date most of the occupants of the soil were freeholders, rendering agricultural services to their lords, though a substantial proportion were already paying rents in kind instead of rendering services. The transfer of the lordships to Norman conquerors enabled the new lords to transform the majority of their service-paying tenants into serfs, while the general depression drove rent-paying tenants to become service-paying tenants; so that a hundred years after the conquest the term "villein," a villager, implied serfdom. At the same time there survived in England, more than in any other country, a large number of freeholders, who later provided the backbone of the English armies, serving voluntarily for pay.

All over Europe the power of the lords of the soil tended to increase, and the subjection to them of the peasantry to grow more complete. In England serfdom had reached its maximum development in the twelfth century, when there was still a large mass of freeholding peasants—yeomanry who had not been reduced to serfdom; and from that time the constant tendency was towards emancipation—the natural accompaniment of the increasing inclination to substitute wages and rent for forced agricultural service—except during the temporary reaction which followed the Black Death in 1348. In England

and Switzerland, almost alone, serfdom had practically disappeared before the middle of the fifteenth century. Everywhere else the lords—which meant roughly those who held by military service—were able to tighten their grip upon the peasantry, who held from them by agricultural service and were entirely without means of redress against a lord who chose to oppress them. Serfdom among the rural population was not merely prevalent; it was practically universal, and remained so virtually until the French Revolution.

In the larger communities the freeholders were better able than in the villages to stand together and resist the attempts to deprive them of their rights. The townsmen remained freeholders, and especially from the close of the twelfth century onward obtained from their lords and from the kings, always at a price, concessions which freed the burgesses (that is to say, the freeholders) of one town after another from extraneous jurisdiction, rendering them free boroughs with their rights legally secured by charters. What happened in England happened also on the Continent. On the countryside the lords, under no effective central control, reduced the peasantry to serfdom much more thoroughly than was done in England; but the burgesses of the towns strove with varying degrees of success to win chartered rights from their overlords, and sometimes emancipation from all overlords except emperor or king.

The primitive rural community had the least possible incentive to commerce, because it produced a sufficiency of foodstuffs and of most raw materials for its own needs, and was content with the rough-and-ready transformation of the raw material into clothes and other crudely manufactured articles. Still a certain interchange was necessary of rural produce for the special products of particular localities, such as iron, tin, copper, and salt, and then of articles which were found to be better made elsewhere than by the local artificers. But traveling from place to place was difficult. Particular points, therefore, became established as markets, to which goods might be brought for exchange.

Security rather than freedom of individual action was the great desideratum in a state of society in which every man was still frequently called upon to guard his own head with his own hand. Police measures were comparatively easy to enforce in relation to a fixed market; the privilege of attending the market was worth paying for. The lords imposed tolls, which were highly remunerative as far as they were concerned, though it was well worth their while for would-be buyers and sellers to pay the tolls. The market easily acquired exclusive rights, so that exchanges effected elsewhere came to be regarded not only as not legally binding, but as actually illegal encroachments upon the lord's rights. Here again was a source of development for the towns where markets were established. Commerce

breeds commerce; the more the markets were frequented the greater was the inducement to attend them. The market towns realized each other as rivals, and every prosperous market town resented the neighborhood of a rival as detracting from its own prosperity. At the same time the citizens of each town resented the importation and sale of goods which came into competition with those of which they were themselves producers. To the men of every town the men of other towns were "foreigners," who were to be made to pay heavily for permission to sell their goods. The exclusion of foreign competition by "making the foreigner pay" was a primary feature of all medieval commerce; and it was applied not only by states to the subjects of foreign states, but by the dwellers in every locality to outsiders of every kind.

The discovery of community of interest between different localities, even in the same country, was a slow and prolonged process. In England it was perhaps Edward I. who did the most to break down the barriers to trade created by local hostility to the "foreigner;" and he did it in part by his habit of bargaining not with individual towns but with individual groups, thereby rousing them to a sense of their common interests as being of greater weight than their individual rivalries. In this, as in other matters, the nation owed to him a developed consciousness of nationality, conquering the particularism which is natural wherever intercommunication is slow and difficult.

In England, too, in the reign of Edward III., we find the example of the market town in its highest state of development—the Towns of the Staple. These were in ten towns, each connected with a port, which were erected into exclusive markets for the sale of staple goods, chiefly wool and woolens. Only in a very minor degree was it the intention to confer a benefit upon the particular towns; the conferring of a benefit was merely incidental. But the concentration in the particular spots made it possible to impose the most exact regulations under strict supervision, which guaranteed the quantity and quality of the merchandise, and also, incidentally, very much simplified the process of levying duties for the benefit of the Treasury.

Obviously this glorified market town, only in a greater degree than other market towns, was a very definite interference with the freedom of commerce; for which the justification in the Middle Ages has already been noted, in the need for security being greater than the need for freedom. The same principle is exemplified in the whole system of mercantile corporations, whether local gilds or associations for foreign trade. Thus the staple trade was not only restricted to staple towns, but to members of the trade association, called the Merchants of the Staple, whose members, while they traded as individuals, were bounded by the regulations of the association, to which they paid fees for membership. On the one hand this supplied the purchaser with a

guarantee, on the other, it gave the individual the support of his association in securing him fair play in foreign markets. The individual could not fight for exemptions and privileges which local markets would not concede if they could help it; the association could. But it was by no means willing that the outsiders who refused to join the association should either profit by its energies, or should have the chance of bringing upon it unmerited discredit by trading without regard to its regulations. The spirit was precisely that of the modern trade union when it seeks to exclude the non-unionist workman who profits by the improved conditions which have been secured by combination, without having contributed to the combination which secured them.

Associations, however, for foreign trade were a comparatively late development, following upon the growth of the idea of community of interests between different localities as distinguished from the community of interests of the traders in a single locality. The latter gave rise at a much earlier stage to the guilds, varying greatly in character, which were a common feature of all medieval trade. The central idea of the guild was the power of regulating local trade, vested in the body of the local traders. Each specific craft or trade wanted to make its own area binding upon every one within that area; and this produced the local craft-guilds. But each locality also wanted something in the nature of a central control over the whole group in the general interests of the community. In England this took the invariable form of the demand for charters sanctioning the establishment of the Gild Merchant, which, broadly speaking, authorized the regulation of the local trade by the burgesses, the freemen of the borough. At a later stage the functions of the Gild Merchant were apt to be usurped by the specific guilds of the more important individual crafts.

We must divest ourselves of the conception of the modern distinction between the producer and the salesman, and the further divisions between the capitalist manufacturer and his employes, and between the wholesaler and the retailer. Primarily, the manufacturer was the man who made the articles with his own hand, and he was also the merchant who sold the things when they were made. And he made his goods to order, of the materials supplied by his customers. If his trade was large enough to necessitate the employment of other labor than his own, the workman or journeyman was a person who intended to set up for himself as soon as he had acquired the necessary skill, and the very small capital needed, not for purchasing a stock of raw material, but merely for providing himself with tools. Primarily, there was not antagonism of interests between masters and men as groups, because every employee expected himself to become a master in the course of time, and would have regarded it as a short-sighted policy to seek to procure between masters and men relations which

while advantageous to him during his journeyman stage, would fetter him when he became a full-blown master himself.

Outside of England the advance towards differentiation was more rapid. The time was sooner in arriving when the journeyman ceased to expect to become a master; and associations of journeymen were formed in antagonism to the guilds of masters—associations which sought with varying success to acquire a voice in the regulation of trade; so that contests between these two types of guilds assume the character of a contest between oligarchy and democracy, political as well as industrial.

The development was slow, in proportion as the accumulation of wealth was slow, since it was the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the comparatively few which on the one hand led to the extensive employment of labor, and on the other hand prevented the journeyman from leaving the ranks of wage earners, because he could not successfully set up as a master in competition with his wealthier neighbors. Accumulation of capital only became practical with the extension of a money economy, and the general employment of currency as a medium of exchange. There was no sufficient inducement for the accumulation of capital as long as it was in the form of goods, which were to a great extent perishable, and could not be readily exchanged. The precious metals, on the other hand, could be accumulated in small space; they were not perishable, and could be readily exchanged.

Of hardly less importance in checking the expansion of commerce was the medieval antagonism to usury—the lending of money at interest. It was not perceived that money might legitimately be hired, and the use of it paid for to the profit of the lender, as well as anything else. Christian men were forbidden to take interest for lending money, and consequently there was no inducement to lend it. For a long time the only lenders were the Jews, on whom princes and nobles were dependent when they wanted immediate supplies of cash in greater quantities than could be supplied by the taxation of their subjects or vassals. Hence the protection of the Jews by the Crown, which in England came to an end in the reign of Edward I. Whether it would have ended then is extremely doubtful, had it not been that in the thirteenth century the Italians were leading the way in encroaching upon the Hebrew monopoly, and evading the moral embargo upon the lending of money by Christians. When the example had been set, it was followed by others. The wealthy cities of the Empire competed with the Lombards as bankers, and Edward III. borrowed heavily from the Flemings. The prejudice disappeared, money began to be lent for commercial as well as for political purposes, and commerce began to expand upon borrowed money.

Associations for foreign commerce, begun in England probably in the reign of Edward I., reached an advanced stage with the in-

stitution of the Staple, and progressed rapidly with the creation of the rival institution of the Merchant Adventurers. But these are cited merely as examples. England did not lead the way. London, from its geographical position, had attracted foreign commerce from the earliest times; but to a much greater extent than in England, individual German towns, besides Mediterranean ports, developed their trade, and it was the North German towns which, in connection with the Baltic and the North Sea, set the example of combinations in order to procure privileges and rights of buying and selling in foreign countries, and to support each other in the regulation of commerce in their own interest. This combination developed into the Hansa or Hanseatic League of German cities, which monopolized trading rights.

The primary basis of this famous League was to be found in the Hansa, the equivalent of the English Gild Merchant, in each of the individual towns. Two antagonistic principles, which have been al-
noted, were always at work—each town's jealousy of all other towns as competitors, and in opposition to this the common interests of traders as against the domination of interests, whether of foreigners or of a baronage which habitually sought to enrich itself at the expense of the traders—in inverse proportion to the stage of general progress reached by the community at large.

There was consequently stronger inducement to combination in the northern than in the southern towns. The inducement was the greater for those towns which were engaged in overseas commerce. As the individual merchant was unable to protect his own interests, so the individual town was unable to protect its own interests on foreign soil; and the merchants of the North Sea towns and the Baltic towns combined to form associations for the furtherance of their trade, and to procure for them a legal status in the great marts of foreign countries, Bergen in Norway, London in England, and Bruges in Flanders. The English Merchants of the Staple and the Association of Merchant Adventurers played the part for English trade in Germany and on the Baltic; which was played by the League for German trade in Flanders and in England. But the English were only following the example which the Germans had set, though they were doing so in accordance with a policy directly organized by the Crown for its own ends, whereas with the Germans the whole organization was initiated and controlled by the Association of the towns.